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Abstract 
 
 This thesis seeks to offer a novel theoretical and empirical insight into the 
unique form of the United States (US) extended nuclear deterrence (END) －also 
known as a nuclear umbrella－provided to Japan. In contrast to the main trend of 
nuclear weapons deployment in America‘s close allies during the Cold War, Japan 
was only the key allied state that never hosted US nuclear weapons on its soil 
throughout the Cold War. Japan, instead, relied on US END backed by strategic 
forces mainly at sea. US END over Japan was thus ―invisible‖ in that US nuclear 
weapons were not forward-deployed.  
 This situation has not changed since it was developed in the 1960s. The 
thesis is an essentially historical project but its main aim is to understand US END 
over Japan today. Its approach is to use history as a tool to understand the present. 
The thesis unravels the complex developments of such deterrence between 1945 and 
1970.  More specifically it seeks to understand under what circumstances Japan 
came under the US nuclear umbrella and what factors have shaped ―Invisible‖ 
END.  
 The primary argument of this thesis is that public anti-military and 
nuclear sentiment in Japan shaped by its historical experience in the devastating 
World War Two significantly influenced the strategic calculations of Japanese 
leaders as well as American leaders. Key events in the foregoing period set social 
and political conditions on strategy making of Japan even today. The thesis will 
specifically examine the formation process of Japan‘s non-nuclear path chosen. In 
order to understand the non-nuclear path taken, the thesis will also examine the 
meaning of the Japan‘s alternative nuclear path. In fact there were some Japanese 
leaders such as Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who clearly saw strategic value in 
nuclear deterrence. ―Invisible‖ END was arguably a product of political compromise 
for Japan.   
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
  You have to believe in two impossible things before breakfast: someone will use 
 nuclear weapons; someone will use nuclear weapons on your behalf. 
―Edward Luttwak1 
 
  This thesis will explore the peculiarity of United States (US) extended 
nuclear deterrence (END) over Japan with a particular focus on a period between 
1945 and 1970. It seeks to provide a novel theoretical and practical insight into 
what the author terms ―Invisible‖ US END over Japan constituted by strategic 
forces mainly at sea (submarine launched ballistic missile: SLBM) and to a lesser 
extent strategic bombers stationed in the US territory.2 It is invisible in the sense 
that US nuclear weapons were never deployed in the mainland of Japan at any 
period despite the fact that the US military certainly had plans to place nuclear 
weapons in Japan. Interestingly such plans were never implemented. 
  While the approach of the thesis is essentially history-oriented, it employs 
history as a tool to understand the present. Where we stand today has grown out of 
the past and thus, ―knowledge of the past is prerequisite to an understanding of the 
present.‖3 Historically grounded analysis is essential for contextual understanding. 
Ignoring history essentially fails to appreciate the current social and political 
contexts within which present-day discourses and practices operate as they are 
formed and institutionalized over time.  
 Drawing on historical insights, this analysis is the first attempt of its kind 
to theorise ―Invisible‖ END; hence it will examine not only how this concept came to 
                                                   
1 Author‘s exchange with Edward Luttwak before his interview by Bungei Shinjuat the Bungei 
Shunju Building in Tokyo, 12 October 2018. 
2 See for example Morton H. Halperin: Contemporary Military Strategy (Boston: Little Brown and 
company., 1967), pp. 122-123. 
3 Michael Howard: The Lessons of History (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1991, ppb. 1993), p.9. 
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emerge in the first place and developed but also how it functions in theory. The 
effect of the invisibility of extended nuclear deterrence has been overlooked, and it 
has not been adequately theorised. This thesis specifically looks at the formation 
process of Japan‘s non-nuclear path and the peculiar form of US END. Drawing on 
multinational archival research in Japan, the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) 
done by the author, it sets out to empirically account for how Japan came under the 
US nuclear protection and what factors have shaped ―Invisible‖ END. More 
specifically this thesis addresses the two research questions: Under what 
circumstances did Japan come under the US nuclear umbrella? ; What factors have 
shaped invisible extended nuclear deterrence?  
 The thesis will scrutinise not only these primary sources but also public 
opinions elaborated and represented in works by critics, political debates and 
domestic events. It sheds light on the divergent views on nuclear deterrence 
between political elites and the Japanese public. It will identify Japan‘s strategic 
preferences and strategic views on nuclear weapons and END through close 
analysis of the significance and impact of Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment shaped 
by its unique historical encounter with nuclear weapons on the actual strategy 
making and political calculation of decision makers. In parallel with this, it will also 
distinguish the patterns of Japan‘s strategic behaviours with respect to nuclear 
threats from regional nuclear powers (Russia and China). The most simple but 
probably most difficult way to tackle the regional nuclear threats was to acquire 
Japan‘s own nuclear weapons but Japan instead took the non-nuclear path. To 
understand why a certain choice was taken and preferred (Invisible END ) but some 
other options (Visible END or Japan‘s nuclear option) were not taken helps us 
understand the strategic preferences and choices of Japan, or more specifically how 
Japan will likely address current nuclear threats in East Asia especially given that 
Japan still maintains ―Invisible‖ END. In order to comprehend ―Invisible END‖, it is 
appropriate to start with a close examination of the central concept of the thesis: 
Extended Nuclear Deterrence. 
11 
 
I.A. Map: Countries under the US Nuclear Umbrella  
Source: Nuclear Umbrella States, ILPI, http://nwp.ilpi.org/?page_id=1882,accessed 30 January 2019. 
 
The Subject: Extended Nuclear Deterrence      
 
 Extended deterrence is literally an extension of deterrence. What exactly is 
deterrence? Deterrence is essentially about preserving the status quo. 4  The 
fundamental goal of deterrence is to induce an adversary not to take specific 
undesirable actions (e.g. an armed aggression or a use of nuclear weapons) against a 
                                                   
4 Andre Beaufre: Deterrence and Strategy, trans. R. H. Barry (London: Faber and Faber., 1965), p. 24; 
Barry Buzan: An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International Relations 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan., 1987), p. 136, 139. 
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deterrer through the use of threats.5 More specifically, the prominent deterrence 
specialist, Patrick Morgan, observed that ―Deterrence is a matter between states 
involving the threat of force to prevent military action.‖6 In short, deterrence aims 
to dissuade an adversary from crossing a line (attacking the deterrer) through the 
threat of force. It is essentially an art of manipulation of the adversary‘s 
psychological perception of the threat. An aggressor may be deterred for various 
reasons: overwhelming costs with little gains, unbearable pains, fear of escalation (a 
full-scale nuclear exchange), risk-aversion, ambiguity, confusion, the low likelihood 
of the achievement of aimed political goals, strong resistance, and the list goes on.7 
The bottom line is, nevertheless, a deterrer must psychologically influence the 
thought processes of the enemy, forcing him to reach a conclusion that an armed 
attack will not be a right choice. Morgan lucidly clarified the psychological 
dimension of deterrence: 
 
Deterrence is undoubtedly a psychological phenomenon, for it involves convincing 
an opponent not to attack by threatening it with harm in retaliation. To ‗convince‘ 
is to penetrate and manipulate the thought processes of the opposing leaders so 
that they draw the ―proper‖ conclusion about the utility of attacking. This gives the 
effectiveness of deterrence a psychological dimension that is only partially related 
to the deterrer ‘s retaliatory capabilities, for it is the persuasiveness of the message 
about those capabilities rather than the capabilities themselves that determines 
success of failure.8 
     
 A direct bilateral deterrent relationship (normally between two nuclear 
                                                   
5 John Baylis: Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy: 1945-1964 (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 
1995), p.4; Lawrence Freedman: Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press., 2004), p. 6. 
6 Italics in original. Patrick M. Morgan: Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Sage Publications: 
London., 1977), p. 20. 
7 On typology of deterrence, see Glenn H. Snyder: Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 
1961). See also Peter Roberts and Andrew Hardie: ―The Validity of Deterrence in the Twenty-First 
Century‖, Occasional Paper, Royal United Service Institute (August 2015), p. 9. 
8 Patrick M. Morgan: ―Saving Face For the Sake of Deterrence‖, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow 
and Janice Gross Stein (eds.): Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP., 1985, ppb. 
1989), p. 125. 
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powers: US-Soviet competition) is known as central deterrence. This bilateral 
competition is essentially to deter the other from attacking one‘s homeland. 9 
Beyond this one-to one confrontation, extended deterrence is therefore concerned 
with deterring an armed attack against a third party. It aims to ―protect other 
countries and territories from attack, as distinct from preventing a direct attack on 
one‘s own national territory.‖10 More specifically, it refers to ―the prevention of 
aggression or coercion against U.S. allies or security partners through threats of 
U.S. nuclear retaliation.‖11  While the concept also is described as a ―nuclear 
umbrella‖ in colloquial language, extended nuclear deterrence and a nuclear 
umbrella are interchangeably used in academic literature.12 
  The concept of a ―nuclear umbrella‖ is very much a derivative of the 
American containment strategy in the Cold War. The USA assumed a responsibility 
for global leadership to prevent spread of communism replacing the same role 
previously played by Great Britain. It had strategic stakes in protecting the global 
interests, in defence of the so-called the Free world as opposed to the communist 
world.13 The intense Cold-War confrontation between the two nuclear super powers 
required the USA to firmly preserve its own bloc even at the risk of nuclear war. 
Drawing a lesson from European events in the 1930s, the USA recognised that 
―peace and security come only through vigilance and preparedness.‖ This critical 
thinking was reflected in ―a strategy of containment of Soviet expansionism.‖ 14 
Accordingly, ―containment‖ rather than ―appeasement‖ was adopted by the US 
                                                   
9  Philip Bobbitt: Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1988),pp. 9-10; Freedman Deterrence , p. 35; David S. Yost: NATO 
Transformed: The Alliance‘s New Roles in International Security (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace., 1998), p.33. 
10 Paul K. Huth: ―Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War‖, American Political Science Review 
Vol. 82 No. 2 (1988), p. 424.  
11 Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 33. 
12 Andrew O‘Neil: Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the 
twenty-first century (London: Routledge., 2013), p.2. 
13 John Foster Dulles: ―Policy for Security and Peace‖, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32 No. 3 (Apr 1953), p. 353. 
14 National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington D.C.: the White House., March 1990), 
pp. 1-2, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at  
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1990.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121138-080, 
accessed on 14 February 2018. See also Melvyn P. Leffler: ―The American Conception of National 
Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48‖, The American Historical Review Vol. 89 No. 2 
(Apr 1984), p. 356.  
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policymakers, hoping to induce the Kremlin‘s restraint specifically in Europe 
backed by the US nuclear monopoly of the immediate post-world war two years.15 
This strategic condition resulted in the extension of US nuclear deterrence to 
America‘s key allies.16 In terms of their geographical settings, as the father of 
―containment strategy‖ George Kennan observed, Western Europe and Japan were 
particularly significant for the USA to contain the USSR. Kennan‘s view was well 
received in the US government.17 Therefore, it is no surprise that the US nuclear 
umbrella covered particularly Western Europe and Japan during the Cold War.18   
  Indeed Jeffrey Larsen, a former Strategic Command officer, explained that 
―The United States extended deterrence by making it clear that it would, if 
necessary, use nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet nuclear or conventional 
attack on allies, especially in Europe and Japan‖ during the Cold War.19 In addition 
to NATO, Japan is one of few Asian countries (South Korea and Australia), which 
has had credible nuclear assurance from the USA (See the nuclear umbrella map 
above).20 Other Asian countries like Thailand and the Philippines might be given 
US nuclear assurance but rather ambiguously. As former Australian Foreign 
Minister, Gareth Evans, rightly observed, in the case of these countries ―the 
                                                   
15 Harry S. Truman: ―The President‘s Farewell Address to the American People‖, 15 January 1953, 
Public Papers Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, Truman Library, 
https://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2059, accessed on 9 November 2017. See also 
Azar Gat: War in Human Civilization (New York: Oxford U.P., 2006, ppb. 2008), pp.613-617; R.J. 
Overy: ―Airpower and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939‖, Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 
15 No. 1 (1992), p. 81, 87, 96.  
16 Richard K. Betts: Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution., 1987), p.31; Gregg Herken: The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 
1945-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf., 1980); Janne E. Nolan: Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics 
of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic Books., 1989), p. 37. 
17 George F. Kennan: Memoirs 1925-1950 (Little, Brown and Company: Boston., 1967), pp. 374-375, 
381, 391; X: ―The Sources of Soviet Conduct‖, Foreign Affairs Vol. 25 No. 4 (Jul 1947), pp. 566-582. See 
also John Lewis Gaddis: Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1982), p. 57; John Lewis 
Gaddis: The Long Peace: Inquires Into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1987), p. 41, 
142; John Lewis Gaddis: ―Grand strategies in the Cold War‖, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne 
Westad (eds.) The Cold War Volume II Crises and Détente (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010), pp. 
1-21. 
18 Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, pp. 9-10. 
19 Emphasis added. Jeffrey A. Larsen: ―Extended Deterrence‖, in Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz and 
Jeffrey A. Larsen (eds.): Weapons of Mass Destruction: an Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, 
Technology, and History. Volume II (California: ABC-CLIO., 2005), p. 123. 
20 O‘Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence, pp. 2-3, 122-123. 
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protection of the US nuclear umbrella is at best implicit rather than explicit.‖21 
There is a question of the level of a regular defence dialogue with respect to US 
nuclear commitments between the US and these countries.22 In the context of the 
Cold War these two Southeast Asian countries were the members of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) with the collective defense treaty, Article 4 of 
which stipulated that ―it will in that event act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.‖23  
 Yet the SEATO officially dissolved in 1977. SEATO was first established in 
1954 in order to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia fueled and 
backed by Red China.24 Even since its foundation, SEATO had some serious flaws. 
Although SEATO was founded to prevent communists from gaining ground in 
Southeast Asia, its members included only two Southeast Asian countries, Thailand 
and the Philippines. This was a serious problem as a regional organisation. While 
there were other Asia-Pacific countries in SEATO, Pakistan (Australia and New 
Zealand in the organization), the organisation‘s membership also included 
non-regional powers, Great Britain, France and the USA. It is important to note 
that even from the start of SEATO, its members viewed the danger that China 
would spread communism in the region quite differently. Pakistan, for example, saw 
India as more of a threat than China and what Pakistan truly wanted from SEATO 
was security protection against its rival.25 Britain and France started trade with 
Communist China already in 1950s. Britain also was not willing to commit itself to 
                                                   
21 Gareth Evans: ―Nuclear Deterrence in Asia and the Pacific‖, Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies Vol.1 
No.1 (January 2014), p. 98 . 
22 Lawrence Freedman: ―The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence‖, The Changing 
Strategic Landscape, Part II, Adelphi Papers 236 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies:hereafter IISS, 1989), pp.18-31; Stefanie Von Hlatky: ―Introduction: American Alliances and 
Extended Deterrence‖, in Stefanie Von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger (eds.): The Future of Extended 
Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown U.P.,2015), p. 5; 
O‘Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence, pp. 2-3, 122-123. 
23 ―Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact)‖ 8 September 1954, Yale Law School 
Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp, accessed on 22 December 2018. 
24 Leszek Buszynski: ―SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977 and Why It Was Abolished‖, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies Vol. 12 No. 2 (Sep 1981), p. 287. 
25 Robert J. Mcmahon: ―US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy‖, in Melvyn P. 
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.): The Cold War Volume I Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 
2010), p. 299. 
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defending South East Asia when Europe faced more serious communist threats. As 
its name, SEATO, suggests, it was an Asian model of NATO although American 
policy-makers did not like the acronym of ―SEATO‖ since it naturally implied a 
NATO-like organisation, which it really was not.26 The multi-regional powers did 
not militarily cooperate when it was required the most (during the Vietnam War): 
SEATO was indeed portrayed as a ―zoo of paper tigers‖ 27 or ―a mere paper alliance, 
its capacity for dealing with either over aggression or international subversion well 
nigh invisible.‖28 There was no collective identity within SEATO, but different 
interests and challenges created by linguistic, political and cultural differences 
among its members resulted in paralysis.29   
 During the Vietnam War, indeed SEATO was of little use; unlike NATO, it 
did not treat an armed attack against one of the member states as an attack against 
all but its ambiguous treaty provisions considered it as a mere ―common danger‖ 
and SEATO was to ―consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which 
should be taken for the common defence.‖30 Instead of acting collectively, SEATO 
virtually let the USA carry out military operations unilaterally in Vietnam. As one 
analyst rightly described, ―SEATO had no power other than that provided by the 
United States.‖31 Richard Nixon even wrote in his Foreign Affairs‘ article (two years 
before he became President) that SEATO had ―weakened to the point at which it is 
little more than an institutional embodiment of an American commitment, and a 
somewhat anachronistic relic of the days when France and Britain were active 
members.‖32 Even though the USA justified its military intervention based in part 
on honouring the SEATO treaty obligation, in reality it was rather American fear of 
                                                   
26 Foreign Relations of United States (HereafterFRUS), 1952-1954, Vol. 12, Part 1, East Asia and the 
Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO)., 1984), Document 304, pp. 140-141. 
27 J.P.D. Dubabin: The Cold War, 2nd ed (Harlow: Pearson, Longman., 2008), p.214. 
28 Mcmahon: ―US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy‖, p. 300. 
29 Buszynski, ―SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977‖, p. 288; Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. 
Katzenstein: ―Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of 
Multilateralism‖, International Organization Vol. 56 No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 575-579, 593-598. 
30 ―Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact).‖ 
31 Paul E. Eckel: ―SEATO: An Ailing Alliance‖, World Affairs Vol. 134 No. 2 (Fall 1971), p. 99. 
32 Richard M. Nixon: ―Asia after Viet Nam‖, Foreign Affairs Vol. 46 No. 1 (Oct 1967), pp. 115-116. 
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losing its credibility and reliability as the leader of the West. It was feared that if 
the country did not act in Southeast Asia, the Communists would challenge and 
ruin American interests elsewhere or somewhere more important, resulting in 
major humiliation.33  
 Indeed, after the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 SEATO was 
dissolved in 1977 owing to the difficulties and differences articulated above.34 This 
proved that the USA was no longer willing to act militarily in defence of Southeast 
Asia. If these countries had been the principal defensive areas of US END, SEATO 
would not have been dissolved. It obviously lacked the official mechanism of 
assurance. In this connection it is important to note that Thailand and the 
Philippines in fact wanted SEATO to continue to exist due to their need for US 
security assurances, but in the end these two Southeast Asian countries had to 
accept that the credibility of US security commitments was in decline. They 
eventually moved toward an accommodation with Red China (the USA visited 
China in 1972 partially in an attempt to end the Vietnam War on its reasonable 
terms) and adapted themselves to the new situation.35 Today these Southeast Asian 
countries are the signatories to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
Treaty, which entered into force in 1997.36  
 In contrast, Japan was constantly given formal US security assurance 
mainly through verbal declaration especially from 1965. In July 1966 Dean Rusk, 
the State Secretary for the Kennedy and Johnson administration, held that in the 
case of a nuclear attack against Japan ―the U.S. would defend Japan with whatever 
was required.‖37 As we will see below, the strategic importance of Japan (economic 
strength, industry capacity and US military infrastructure: large military presence) 
during the Cold War was nothing comparable to the other Asian countries. While 
                                                   
33 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 240-242. 
34 Anthony Best, et al: International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond, 2nd ed (London: 
Routledge., 2008), p. 266, 298. 
35 Buszynski, ―SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977‖, pp. 287-296.  
36 Andrew Futter: The Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: Sage Publications., 2015), p. 182. 
37 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan (Washington, D.C.: GPO., 2006), Document 74, p. 150. 
18 
 
US perceived interests in Japan (not only the US perceptions but also the 
perceptions of other countries‘ US interests in Japan) were obviously high, how 
could the USA effectively protect its global interests at stake by nuclear weapons?    
 For effective END, the USA must have credible nuclear capabilities to 
inflict massive damage upon a potential aggressor who considers attacking US 
allies. Some defence analysts observed that END in essence developed as a 
maximum effect of US nuclear deterrence built on its nuclear superiority at the 
early stage of the Cold War when Russian nuclear retaliation capability against the 
US homeland was quite limited. In other words, the US threats of nuclear attacks 
in retaliation for Russia‘s military aggression on America‘s European allies were 
credible.38 Apart from nuclear capabilities (threats), there are three more vital 
requirements for END to function. First effective END requires US security 
commitments explicitly provided through a security treaty. Second, it also calls for 
US political resolve (including public declaration) to fulfil the security commitments 
to protect its allies potentially even risking the destruction of New York to deter 
aggression on West Berlin or Tokyo). Finally, the USA must clearly communicate its 
determination to the enemy: a potential attacker will be devastated by an American 
nuclear attack should it attack America‘s allies. Its political signalling must be loud, 
clear and credible; otherwise the aggressor would simply disregard the signal. 39  A 
                                                   
38 Christoph Bluth: ―Nuclear Weapons and British-German Relations‖, in Beatrice Heuser and Robert 
O‘Neill (eds.): Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan., 1992), p. 141; Johnston C. Conover: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and 
Deterrence P-5967 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation., 1977), p. 7; Gregory F. Treverton: ―How 
Different Are Nuclear Weapons?‖, in Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A 
Reader, pp. 112-113; Phil Williams: ―Deterrence‖, In John Baylis, et al (eds.): Contemporary Strategy: 
Theories and Policies (London: Croom Helm., 1975), p. 80. 
39 Edward Luttwak: ―The Problems of Extending Deterrence‖ in Christoph Bertram (ed.): The Future 
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simplified equation of extended deterrence can be outlined as follows. 
 
Capabilities+Security Commitments+ Resolve+Communication (Signalling)=END. 
 
 While END is not complicated in theory, it is extremely complex in practice. 
The bottom line is that the national security of US allies depends heavily on the 
USA on the grounds that they do not have nuclear weapons at their disposal. The 
central issue of END always centres around the credibility of US nuclear threats or 
US security commitments ( it is also known as reassurance to allies), including the 
use of nuclear weapons for its allies when they are being threatened by a nuclear 
aggressor.40 One of the key reasons why the USA has always retained a ―First-Use‖ 
policy is to reassure US allies including Japan that it may use nuclear weapons 
even before they are attacked.41 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, for instance, 
posits that ―To help preserve deterrence and the assurance of allies and partners, 
the United States has never adopted a ‗no first use‘ policy and, given the 
contemporary threat environment, such a policy is not justified today.‖42  It is 
inescapably a daunting political decision to defend an ally by recourse to nuclear 
weapons when retaliation in kind may follow. In reality, taking any necessary 
means－including use of nuclear weapons to defend allies and incurring massive 
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damage on the homeland of the nuclear defender for the sake of honouring its 
defence commitments to them－does not appear a feasible promise to fulfill. The 
credibility of such a nuclear threat is inherently questionable. 
 The following famous claim by French General Pierre Marie Gallois 
remains valid and relevant even today: ―no nation can be expected to commit suicide 
for the sake of another.‖43 In a similar vein, the distinguished American nuclear 
strategist, Bernard Brodie, emphasised the difficulty of achieving a credible US 
nuclear commitment: ―We may be quite sure we will hit back if hit directly ourselves, 
but will we do so if any of our chief allies is attacked or threatened to attack?‖44 
American Economist Thomas Schelling elaborated on this aspect and emphasised 
the inherent distinction between home and abroad by insisting as follows: 
 
 A good national starting point is the national boundary. As a tentative 
approximation － a very tentative one － the difference between the national 
homeland and everything ‗abroad‘ is the difference between threats that are 
inherently credible, even if unspoken and the threats that have to be made credible. 
To project the shadow of one‘s military force over other countries and territories is 
an act of diplomacy. To fight abroad is a military act, but to persuade enemies or 
allies that one fight aboard, under circumstances of great cost and risk, requires 
more than a military capability.45 
 
Thomas Nicholas of US Naval War College critically observed this conundrum: 
―extended deterrence was an immense gamble: it rested not on the intuitive 
understanding of self-defense, but increasingly on the imponderable question of 
whether a U.S. president would really risk trading Chicago for Bonn.‖46 The US, 
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therefore, must convince not only an adversary but also its allies that its security 
commitment is sufficiently credible to deter an adversary. Brad Roberts, former 
deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile-defense policy, pointed 
out that ―Today, the nuclear umbrella has the same purposes－to deter and 
assure.‖47 It is doubtlessly a daunting task to protect and reassure a distant ally not 
least when the defender‘s homeland is intact. 48  In this respect, ―the Healey 
Theorem‖ formulated by former British Defense Minister, Denis Healey, still stands 
out: ―it takes only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the 
Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility of American retaliation to reassure the 
Europeans.‖49 Thus, END also involves the psychological reassurance of allies 
(confidence-building measures). 50     
 That is, it is not sufficient for one party (defender) to declare and stress 
that the other (protégé) is protected by nuclear deterrence. This calls for constant 
US reassurance measures to its allies which must feel secured by the US protection. 
END is therefore concerned with not only deterrence but also psychological 
reassurance. A metaphor to describe such a facet of END is a coin: one side is the 
threat of nuclear retaliation against an aggressor (deterrence) and the other side is 
psychological reassurance to US allies.51 Thus, END cannot be studied in isolation 
from reassurance. For some US allies, reassurance can be more important than 
deterrence itself. As we will see, this was certainly the case with Japan. As several 
US security analysts lucidly explained, ―the requirements of assurance may differ 
from the requirements of extended deterrence.‖52 Both parties (a defender and a 
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protégé) need to mutually and explicitly acknowledge that one‘s nuclear deterrence 
is extended to the other－the mutual recognition of END: one side confirms that it 
provides a nuclear umbrella and the other side also confirms that it is under the 
protection of the nuclear umbrella.53 This must be further confirmed between the 
supreme political leaders (e.g. US President and Japanese Prime Minister) of the 
two countries given that the US President is the only person who can authorise the 
launch of American nuclear weapons.54 Once both leaders recognise the US nuclear 
assurance provided to Japan, the Japanese government formally acknowledges the 
existence of the US nuclear umbrella potentially through domestic political debates 
and formally and publicly declares that it relies on the nuclear umbrella. This is a 
formula for the recognition of an US ally formally being under US nuclear 
protection.  
 Accordingly, this thesis defines END as a mutually-recognized mechanism 
of security protection provided by a nuclear defender (the USA) that ensures the 
security of its ally (Japan) by means of nuclear threats so as to deter an adversary‘s 
nuclear attack on Japan. In this connection, it is also important to clarify that US 
END over Japan mainly aims to deter nuclear attacks against Japan but END 
naturally deters conventional attacks against Japan too. This is because nuclear 
weapons are more likely to be used when a conventional fight escalates. They could 
serve as general (peace time), immediate (crisis) and intrawar (in the midst of war) 
deterrence.55 
 
Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Visible and Invisible 
 
 During the Cold War, European NATO states relied heavily on US nuclear 
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forces deployed on European soil to offset their overwhelming conventional military 
weakness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its satellites.56 Since nuclear deterrence 
was seen integral to NATO‘s defence. 57  The first reference to US nuclear 
commitments to NATO was made as early as December 1949. 58  The final 
communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, 14-16 December 1953 stated that 
―special attention should be given to the continuing provision of modern weapons of 
the latest types to support the NATO defence system.‖59 Indeed some two months 
before this statement, the US Army deployed the first nuclear weapons (the 
280-millimeter atomic artillery) in West Germany.60      
 In view of NATO‘s concerns for the credibility of US END, David Yost, an 
American NATO specialist, even held that ―The history of NATO during the Cold 
War can be told as essentially a series of debates among the allies about the 
requirements of extended deterrence.‖61  Because of perennial fears of nuclear 
abandonment (the failure to come to defence and response by nuclear means when 
needed) by the USA, 62  NATO and especially the frontline state West 
Germany(whose territory was divided by the winners of World War Two) actively 
sought the deployment of American nuclear weapons on European soil.63 It is 
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NATO‘s belief that nuclear forces stationed in Western Europe bring forth stability 
and peace in Europe, which conventional forces alone could not produce.64    
 In general forward deployment since the late 1950‘s has been symbolized by
－ ―nuclear sharing arrangements‖－―that is, risk and responsibility sharing, with 
some European Allies hosting U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery systems and/ or 
providing delivery systems of their own.‖65 It also entails ―multinational decision 
making and policy implementation.‖66 These weapons are operated under dual-key 
arrangements that specify ―nuclear weapons could not be fired without positive 
assent by both the United States and the country on whose soil the weapons were 
deployed.‖67 In effect, the US has a stronger veto as nuclear weapons themselves 
are under the sole custody of the USA.68 The US government can refuse the 
transfer of its nuclear weapons to European NATO states in the event of emergency. 
The strategic rationale behind nuclear sharing arrangements was nevertheless in 
part to ―convince the allies that the US nuclear guarantee was genuine by giving 
them a hand implementing it. This would in turn…promote alliance cohesion and 
reinforce deterrence.‖69 While it is true that nuclear warheads stored in Europe are 
under sole US control, in theory the host nations could become ―de facto‖ nuclear 
powers should the US government authorise the transfer of its nuclear warheads 
and they are loaded on combat planes of the host countries such as Germany and 
Italy.  
 Nuclear sharing arrangements were institutionalized when the ―Nuclear 
Planning Group‖ was formed for the purpose of nuclear consultations within NATO 
and the sense of European involvement in the development of NATO nuclear policy 
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in 1966.70 This was done in consideration of West Germany in particular not least 
after France left the military command of NATO in 1966; West Germany needed to 
―have a voice in the formulation of Alliance nuclear policy….‖71      
 It is worth noting that West Germany faced an acute nuclear dilemma 
because of its Cold-War frontline status.72 On the one hand, it sought firm US 
nuclear assurances not least because it pledged its non-nuclear status (not to 
manufacture nuclear weapons) to Western European countries based on the Paris 
accords of 1954. It was a precondition for West German membership of Western 
European Union in 1954 and NATO in 1955.73 On the other hand, it did not want to 
use US nuclear weapons (forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons) stationed in 
its territory on the grounds even the use of tactical nuclear weapons on German‘s 
soil was devastating enough to Western Germany.74 This reaction was natural as no 
country wants its homeland to be a major nuclear battlefield. In fact, the distinction 
between ―strategic‖ and ―tactical‖ or also known as ―non-strategic‖ nuclear weapons 
is quite a blur as the dire Carte Blanche exercise in West Germany in June 1955 
demonstrated.75  
 While this military exercise did not escalate to all-out nuclear war, the 
simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons was nevertheless equivalent to the use of 
strategic nuclear weapons for Germany, resulting in millions of German casualties. 
The public reveal of results of the exercise immensely shocked West German 
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citizens and left a negative impact on public perceptions of nuclear weapons.76 
Roberts, moreover, claimed that ―the employment of any nuclear weapons would be 
a strategic act, whatever its target and whatever its means of delivery.‖77 That said, 
for the sake of clarification, this thesis interprets ―tactical nuclear weapons‖ as 
forward-deployable weapons such as short range missiles and artilleries and 
―strategic nuclear weapons‖ as weapons of intercontinental range (strategic 
bombers, ballistic missiles); hence they did not need to be stationed in US allied 
states and instead they were stationed in the mainland of the USA or in the middle 
of the ocean (e.g. SLBMs). 78 
 Although nuclear weapons were the sources of a serious problem as the 
West German case above shows, it must be reiterated that the physical presence 
(visibility) of US nuclear weapons stationed in Western Europe (forward 
deployment) is regarded as a tangible symbol of firm US nuclear commitments to 
NATO states.79 It is even argued that while a large number of US nuclear weapons 
were stationed in Europe during the Cold War, they were nothing but a political tool 
to reassure Europeans and West Germans in particular.80 The uniqueness of NATO 
as the only nuclear alliance can be summarised as ―the broadest possible 
participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles in peacetime 
basing of nuclear forces…‖81 NATO understands that ―The presence of US nuclear 
forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provides an essential political and 
military link between the European and North American members of the 
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Alliance.‖82 This is known as strategic ―coupling.‖83 
 For NATO, a mere American oral pledge to come to defend Europe in cases 
of contingency even risking nuclear war was not at all convincing and satisfactory. 
Without doubt, for Western Europeans the visibility of US nuclear commitments 
was required to reassure them during the Cold War. In theory because of the 
physical presence of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe even during peacetime, 
these weapons enhanced the credibility of US nuclear commitments and played a 
key role to ―deter any Soviet attack by acting as ‗tripwires‘ or detonators, escalating 
to the use of more destructive nuclear exchanges and ultimately to strikes against 
the American and Soviet homelands.‖84  Therefore, NATO strove to create the 
impression that more violence or further rapid nuclear escalation involving US 
strategic nuclear weapons would follow should it be attacked by the Soviet Union.85 
NATO‘s answer to this security challenge was an early and first use of its tactical 
nuclear weapons (MC 14/3: NATO‘s Flexible Response) to send a political signal to 
the Soviet leadership.86 It was essentially to show NATO‘s resolve by deliberately 
crossing the nuclear threshold87 and ultimately ―to dissuade an adversary from 
attacking, or if he attacked, to force him to agree an armistice.‖ 88  It can also be 
argued that ―A substantial consensus of officials and experts on both sides of the 
Atlantic holds that U.S. nuclear commitments would be less credible if they 
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depended solely on forces at sea and in North America.‖89 The deployment of US 
nuclear weapons outside its territory could also be seen as a clear sign of firm 
American resolve. 
  By contrast, this was not the case with Japan. Instead of demanding visible 
US nuclear commitments (forward-deployed nuclear weapons and potentially even 
nuclear sharing arrangements), Japan actively sought an invisible nuclear 
commitment in the sense that US nuclear weapons would never be deployed to the 
mainland of Japan: ―Invisible‖ END. The country specifically sought sea-based 
deterrence composed of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) or carrier 
aircraft deployed in the sea during the Cold War.90 Japan has also been protected 
by strategic bombers stationed in Guam.91 Accordingly the most crucial difference 
between the two models is the assurance form. One is visible (achieved through the 
presence of US tactical nuclear weapons on the ground) and the other is invisible 
(achieved through an offshore deterrent or deterrence at sea).  
    ―Invisible‖ END is rather a ―faith-based‖ approach while the NATO model 
is more of a ―physical-evidence-based‖ approach backed by the visible presence of 
US nuclear weapons in Europe. To be sure, the ultimate decision to use nuclear 
weapons resides with the USA, an American President in particular, who is the only 
person to authorise the launch of nuclear weapons. 92 The USA holds a stronger 
veto to transfer its nuclear warheads deployed to European NATO states. That said, 
the importance of the physical presence is also concerned with US reassurance (the 
other side of the END coin) to NATO. In the absence of any visible form of 
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reassurance, American oral reassurance to Japan has a significant impact on 
Japan‘s sense of security. As we will explore, the US reassurance mechanism for 
Japan was principally a bilateral talk (summit meeting) in which the American 
political leaders reassured Japanese counterparts that Japan would be protected by 
the US nuclear umbrella. The first clear reference to the US nuclear umbrella over 
Japan traces back to 1965. In this respect, what a US President has to say about US 
nuclear protection of Japan is a decisive factor to reassure Japan. Depending on a 
comment, his voice can undermine the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella over 
Japan. This is why now the credibility of US END is being questioned. Trump‘s 
constant critical comments about America‘s key allies including Japan undermine it. 
All things considered, ―Invisible‖ END is a faith-based deterrent backed by the 
off-shore component of nuclear weapons. It must be stressed that as this thesis 
reveals, this form of END was not exactly something Japanese leaders wanted but 
rather this was a product of political compromise.   
 While as widely known the Japanese public held anti-nuclear sentiment 
shaped by its historical experience in the two atomic bombings, this did not 
necessarily mean the top decision makers such as Japanese Prime Ministers held 
the same view. Driven by their strategic calculations, some of them actually thought 
that Japan would need an independent nuclear deterrent for Japan‘s defence. This 
point became evident not least when China detonated its very first nuclear device in 
1964. According to Brodie, this event was one of the key political developments of 
the 1960s.93 In response, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in particular reasoned 
that Japan would need nuclear weapons too now that China acquired its nuclear 
weapons.94 What this suggests is that there were some Japanese political leaders 
whose strategic views were in support of Japan‘s nuclear option notwithstanding 
prevalent anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan.  
 What we need to address is how far this Japanese anti-nuclear belief really 
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affected or limited the Japanese nuclear path. Therefore, this thesis will closely 
examine Japan‘s decision-making process to shed light upon Japanese perspectives 
on US nuclear weapons and deterrence for Japan‘s security. In light of this, the 
thesis will explore a formative period of US END over Japan between 1945 and 
1970. There were several key events during this period such as demilitarisation, 
rearmament, the emergence of the defence-minded Sato government, the Chinese 
nuclear test, Japanese secret nuclear studies, reversion of Okinawa and the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of Prime Minister Sato‘s pro-nuclear stance 
coincident with the rise of a nuclear China, this thesis contends that Japan under 
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato‘s strong leadership elicited American nuclear 
assurances in direct response to the first Chinese nuclear test of 1964. ―Invisible‖ 
END was in fact a product of Sato‘s political compromise. The rest of the chapters 
will explore exactly how this peculiar form of US END came to emerge and develope 
in Japan drawing on primary sources.    
 
Rationale of the Research 
 
  Why does the historical developments of US END over Japan matter for 
Strategic Studies and International Relations (IR)? There are two specific reasons 
why this study deserves academic attention. First the Japanese case is unique and 
even counterintuitive. Japan arguably had every conceivable reason to pursue its 
own nuclear weapons.  
  Most importantly, there was political geography: Japan faced the 
geographical reality of having two nuclear neighbours. Political geography is a 
socially constructed concept. 95  It is subject to the interpretation of political 
relations to one‘s neighbours by political leaders in a given country. It also depends 
on where those leaders are located from which they view regional and world 
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politics. 96  Colin Gray, the Anglo-American strategist, boldly contended that 
―geography per se is of no interest. What matters is the political and strategic 
meaning ascribed to geography‖ and ―Geography is context for human thought and 
behaviour.‖ 97  His colleague Geoffrey Sloan cogently argues that ―Geographical 
location is self-evidently unchanging, but the interpretation of it evolves according 
to policy preferences.‖98   
  Nevertheless, in the case of Japan, the geographic configurations of the Far 
East and the nuclear ownership in the region could be played down but not ignored. 
Focusing on political geography, foreign policy analysts John Spanier and Roberts 
Wendzel plausibly observed that ―The location of a state in relation to other states is 
a fact of immense importance. Who is or is not one‘s neighbour has significant 
strategic implications.‖ 99  Therefore, while political geography can be quite 
subjective and relative to one‘s political relations to neighbours, it is configured 
around hard realities. It is what one makes of it that varies: from a US strategic 
point of view, it was also quite logical to deploy its nuclear weapons in Japan exactly 
because of Japan‘s proximity to Russia and China. Despite those factors, Japan has 
maintained its non-nuclear status and relied on the peculiar form of ―Invisible‖ 
END.  
 Second, the Japanese case illuminates the importance of local context: the 
often forgotten and overlooked dimension of strategy.100 This study will empirically 
prove how socio-cultural factors influence the formulation of strategy. As American 
strategists learned in the late 1970s through the study of Soviet strategic culture, 
each country holds distinct strategic views and preferences.101 This study therefore 
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adds empirical knowledge of strategy making to Strategic Studies. 
   In terms of political geography, China and Russia were not only communist 
countries but regional rivals against whom Japan had fought twice over the last 
fifty years. Just before the end of World War Two, the Soviet Union invaded Japan 
breaching the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and illegally occupied the so-called 
Northern Territories (four islands: Habamai, Etro, Shikotan, Kunashiri). More 
significantly the Chinese nuclear test of 1964 was a watershed in Japanese politics 
and especially the emergence of explicit US END over Japan. China threatened 
Japan politically but not militarily more than Russia did because Japanese leaders 
saw China as a technologically backward country at the time.102 In other words, 
they did not believe that China would become a nuclear power in the 1960s. During 
the Cold War, Japan boasted highly advanced nuclear facilities and plenty of 
plutonium though not weapon-grade. Japan is often regarded a latent nuclear 
power.103 The father of Neo-Realism Kenneth Waltz boldly asserted that ―those who 
have harnessed the atom for peaceful purposes can quickly move into the nuclear 
military business.‖104 During this period, the Japanese economy was recovering and 
even booming, and became the world‘s second economic power after the USA by the 
late 1960s, getting ahead of other European economic powers (the Japanese 
Economic Miracle). Considering this material reality, Japan might have built its 
own nuclear forces. 
 Exactly due to Japan‘s political geography and its economic, technological 
and industrial potential, Japan in fact ―has historically received more statements of 
reassurance…than other US allies in Asia.‖105 Japan was a key US ally and played 
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a key role to keep Russia and China at bay during the Cold War.106 This was 
evident during the Korean War when US troops were directly sent to the Korean 
Peninsula from Japan. Furthermore, Japan would have been used as a central base 
for US nuclear operations in the Far East.107 Losing Japan as a strategic base 
would have been an American nightmare.108  Considering this, it was militarily 
logical to store US nuclear weapons in Japan.  
 In fact, the US government had secret plans to introduce nuclear weapons 
into the mainland of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. This also includes a plan to 
introduce nuclear sharing arrangements similar to those of NATO. In this plan US 
nuclear weapons stored in the mainland of Japan were to be operated by Japan Self 
Defence Force (JSDF). In the end, however, the USA never managed to secure 
acceptance of any of these plans and failed to deploy US nuclear weapons in 
Japan.109 This fact alone deserves great attention. More interestingly, US nuclear 
forces were deployed to other island nations, Britain, Taiwan and the Philippines. 
Japan was the only US Asian ally, which did not host any US nuclear weapons on 
its territory.110 In principle, it should be a puzzle that Japan was the only exception 
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to this rule. Even if Japan had not been able to possess its own nuclear weapons for 
whatever reason, Japan could have had US nuclear weapons on its soil. For this 
reason, external (external threats, political geography) and material (technology 
and economy) variables alone cannot explain the Japan‘s peculiar course.  
 To answer this puzzle, we also need to look specifically at the domestic 
process of strategy making. It is not sufficient to examine the US government 
rationale behind its failed plan to place nuclear weapons in Japan since one half of 
the solid account is still missing especially considering that END is a mutually 
acknowledged concept. Gray cogently contended that ―all knowledge is local 
knowledge, all policy is made domestically, and every maker of policy and strategy 
has been encultured by a particular tradition and society.‖ 111  That said, 
traditionally strategic studies, highly inspired by Western thinking, were centered 
on International Relations (IR) theory of ―(Neo) Realism.‖ It postulates that every 
single nation is a rationally uniform actor (or a mere unit of international politics) 
striving to survive in the world of anarchy (the ordering principle of international 
relations), positing its external environment is decisive in determining security 
policies.112 In its logic, each country prioritizes national survival as a political entity 
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and competes for power and security by increasing military strength.113 As Peter 
Kazenstein of Cornell University rightly pointed out, ―Most students of national 
security accord pride of place to material forces that define the balance of power 
between states. They have no patience for intangibles like culture.‖114 Arguably the 
major limitation of IR theory of ―Realism‖ is to focus dominantly on power balance 
and ignore non-material variables such as values, norms and interpretation of 
power itself by each country. The author of the Clash of the Civilizations, Samuel 
Huntington boldly asserted that ―In the post-Cold War world, the most important 
distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are 
cultural.‖115 Whether this claim is correct or not is a matter of severe debate. Today 
more and more military pundits are nevertheless cognizant of cultural influence in 
strategy making.116 The Japanese case evidently suggests that we should examine 
internal (domestic) as well as external influence to comprehend the case. 
  As for internal influence it is easy to conclude that Japan has a nuclear 
allergy because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The real question is, however, how this 
historical experience was shared within Japanese society as a norm and whether 
this socio-cultural factor acted as a decisive factor in determining responses to 
external threats. By analyzing the role of this factor in the process of strategy 
making, this thesis will add empirical insight into the role of the socio-cultural 
factors overlooked in the formulation of strategy to Strategic Studies.  
 Having identified why this study matters, we also need to discuss why it is 
important to study the specific twenty five- year period between 1945 and 1970 to 
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understand ―Invisible‖ END. In view of Japan‘s unique historical experience with 
atomic bombing, it is vital to start the study with the year of 1945. It was also when 
Japan came under US occupation, which lasted until 1952. The occupation period is 
also a key to understanding how the Japanese society transformed through the US 
introduced reforms such as the peace constitution, demilitarisation and later a 
major turn of the occupation policy: rearmament. A series of US reforms brought 
about institutionalized anti-militarism. As Christopher Hughes of University of 
Warwick, pointed out, Japan‘s passive military posture originally came from ―its 
experiences of catastrophic defeat in the Pacific war; the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the US-dominated Allied Occupation; Japanese 
demilitarization; the adoption of Article 9 of the so-called ‗peace constitution‘ of 
1947…‖117 As for the year of 1970, it was when Japan signed the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). Thus, Japan internationally declared that it renounced its nuclear 
path. In the meantime both the Japanese and the US government decided to extend 
the Japan-US security of 1960, which was due for renewal in 1970 (after that year 
unless a notice to terminate the treaty was made by either party, it would be 
automatically renewed).  
 There were some key developments in the early 1970s such as the so-called 
―Nixon Shocks‖ of 1971, the unilateral cancellation of the convertibility of US dollar 
into gold and President Nixon‘s visit to China and the ―Schlesinger Doctrine‖ in 
1974. 118 This thesis does not deny the significance of these events on Japan‘s 
defence but to reiterate the key argument of this thesis, the fundamental form of US 
END was formed before these events. With this in mind, this study will focus on this 
twenty five-year of the formative period of ―Invisible‖ END over Japan.  
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Literature Review  
 
 It was during the Cold War that extended nuclear deterrence theory was 
elaborated. The key driver behind this phenomenon was the advent of the nuclear 
age as described above. As security analyst Theo Farrell explained, ―It would be no 
exaggeration to say that strategic studies really took off…with the onset of the 
nuclear age: the prospect of nuclear annihilation concentrated the minds of 
academic and ordinary folk on the causes and impact of war.‖119 Since the frontline 
of the Cold War was Western Europe, West Germany in particular, much attention 
to US END was devoted to the region. Indeed the case of US END over Western 
Europe or European NATO is well studied.120 Among them, a renowned European 
security specialist, Beatrice Heuser‘s work empirically shows the key developments 
of nuclear relations among the North Atlantic alliance drawing on recently 
declassified documents.121  
 In comparison to the case of NATO, extended nuclear deterrence (END) 
outside Europe seems to have gained less attention notwithstanding the salience of 
the topic.122 Indeed, it is quite recent that English literature has started to focus 
more on END in the Asia Pacific as a whole driven by the resurgence of Russia and 
the rise of a nuclear-armed North Korea.123 These works are, however, written by 
Anglo-Saxon scholars. Since they do not use Japanese sources, their analysis of 
Japanese perspectives on US END is one-sided and limited given that translated 
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sources (from Japanese into English) are still not adequate.  
 The Cold-War trend of intensive academic attention paid to the European 
case was natural due to the geopolitical importance of Western Europe (the location 
was considered essential to prevent world domination by a single power) to the US 
grand strategy (containment strategy) during the Cold War. 124  Its principal 
objective was to ―prevent any hostile power or group of powers from dominating the 
Eurasian land mass.‖ 125  Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor to President 
Lyndon Johnson, articulated on this point as follows:  
 
 Since the combined resources of Eurasia could pose a serious threat of military 
defeat to the United States, it is the American interest that no single power or 
group of power hostile or potentially hostile to the United States dominate that 
area or a sufficient portion of it to threaten the United States and any coalition the 
United States can build and sustain.126 
 
 In contrast, East Asia was considered to be secondary and peripheral 
area.127 This is certainly true, but as the Cold War intensified, the US interests 
were globalized in the form of ―Strategies of Containment‖ and of NSC 68 (National 
Security Council Policy Paper).128 It is pointed out that ―During the Cold War, the 
United States had no choice but to go onshore in Europe and Northeast Asia, as its 
allies in those regions could not contain the Soviet Union by themselves. So 
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Washington forged the Korean War to contain Soviet political clout in Northeast 
Asia.‖129 It is also true that the chief objective of US Cold-War nuclear strategy was 
to convince its adversary not to take any direct military action against the USA and 
its allies by the use of US nuclear threats.130 
  It is worth nothing that an American nuclear strategist, Keith Payne, 
stressed that today‘s nuclear landscape is different from the Cold War and warned 
that ―The convenience of focusing largely on a single adversary in this regard is 
over.‖131 In fact, this statement was already true in East Asia after China denoted 
the first nuclear device in 1964. END was thus, crucial in East Asia too. Despite this, 
US END over East Asia received much less academic attention than that over 
Western Europe during the Cold War.132  
 As for specifically the case of Japan, there is one major reason why END 
over Japan has received less attention within Japan. Studying military affairs in 
general was not really welcome in postwar Japan. It was regarded as a 
controversial subject. 133  During the Cold War, studying military affairs was 
considered to be pure evil business mainly because this conduct was uncritically 
believed to lead to a revival of prewar Japan‘s militarism. The main issue of postwar 
Japan‘s defence policies was rather ideological battles: rearmament vs. unarmed 
neutrality. 134 In postwar Japanese society military affairs became a Japanese 
Pandora‘s box.135  
 Moreover there are fewer Japanese academic works than journalistic works 
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on US END over Japan.136 This is mainly because access to official documents was 
significantly limited until quite recently. Most of these works focus on Japan‘s secret 
nuclear studies on the feasibility and desirability of Japan‘s nuclearisation carried 
out by Japanese government officials in the 1960s, and US-Japan secret nuclear 
deals. The main motivation behind their works is to attract public attention that the 
Japanese government officials secretly studied the feasibility and desirability 
nuclear weapons while Japanese political leaders did not order that such studies be 
conducted. These works were internal reports in nature. With respect to the secret 
nuclear deals, Japanese journalists seek to shock the Japanese public that the 
Japanese government secretly concluded a deal that the US military could 
reintroduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa in the event of a crisis without 
informing the Japanese. Those works essentially criticise the behind-the-scenes and 
dishonest dealings. 
 To be sure, this does not mean there were no great Japanese academic 
works on US END over Japan produced during the Cold War. Due to the limited 
availability of primary source, these works were, however, purely descriptive, 
theoretical but not empirical.137 In English literature on the subject Terumasa 
Nakanishi‘s and James R. Van de Velde‘s work, both published in the late 1980s, 
stood out for their theoretical excellence while their theoretical contention was not 
backed by primary source either.138   
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 Until the late 2000s when then Foreign Minister, Katsuya Okada, 
undertook his initiative in thoroughly reviewing the US nuclear policy toward 
Japan (Mitsuyaku: Secret Nuclear Deals) in 2009, the Japanese government had 
highly restricted the declassification of the documents related to US-Japan nuclear 
relations and the Japanese policy makers‘ views on nuclear deterrence. At his 
request an official report was subsequently released in 2010.139 The existence of 
secret nuclear deals was long known. One of the deals includes the reintroduction of 
US nuclear weapons into Okinawa in emergency situations publicly revealed by Kei 
Wakaizumi already in 1994. 140  Yet until 2009, the Japanese government had 
publicly ignored the issue. Okada castigated the Japanese declassification system of 
diplomatic documents as undemocratic.141 It is also important to note that Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1964-1968 and 1969-1972 were released in 
2006 and 2018 respectively. Thanks to the completion of these edited volumes, key 
documents related to US END over Japan became more widely accessible.  
 Because of the limited available information, empirical studies of US END 
over Japan using both American and Japanese archival documents have been 
scarce. Fintan Hoey‘s work is one exception to this rule. His work fully incorporates 
recently declassified archival documents from both Japan and the USA. Admittedly 
as the title of his book (Sato, America and the Cold War), the main focus of his work 
is on Prime Minister Sato‘s foreign policy but not on the US nuclear umbrella over 
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Japan.142 Other than that, this brilliant work provides the most updated knowledge 
about Sato‘s foreign policy and his time.  
 There also are several excellent Japanese works on the subject by Akira 
Kurosaki and Masakatsu Ota.143 While they draw on Japanese and American 
archival materials, their principal interests are different. Kurosaki‘s work focuses 
mainly on the Japanese government‘s non-nuclear path while Ota with his 
journalist background traces the historical developments of Mitsuyaku (Secret 
Nuclear Deals between the Japanese and the US government). Ota incorrectly calls 
Japan-US security alliance a ―nuclear alliance‖ despite the fact that US nuclear 
weapons have never been deployed in the mainland of Japan during peacetime and 
therefore, the alliance lacks the mechanism nuclear burden sharing.144 Moreover, 
the US government clearly recognizes NATO as a nuclear alliance. In April 2010, 
State Secretary Hillary Clinton stated that ―As a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear 
risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental.‖145 NATO‘s latest Deterrence and 
Defence Posture Review of 2012 also posited that ―As long as nuclear weapons exist, 
NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.‖146 By contrast, neither the US government 
nor the Japanese government ever made any similar statement about a nuclear 
alliance. Ota‘s statement is somewhat value-laden particularly in view of his 
anti-nuclear position. His works indeed put a strong emphasis on the existence of 
US secret plans to introduce its nuclear weapons into Japan.147  
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 Surprisingly, these two outstanding works do not discuss the peculiar form 
of ―Invisible‖ END. Given the fact the nuclearisation of East Asia accelerated in the 
1950s and 1960s but Japan was exception to this rule, more attention should be 
paid to this peculiar case. In fact, they do not devote any attention to the invisibility 
of END, much less theorise it.148 This may be because they do not come from the 
field of Strategic Studies. Kurosaki is a diplomatic historian while Ota is a 
journalist.      
 This thesis is, however, written within the tradition of Strategic Studies. 
Moreover, these two works and all other works on US END over Japan pay little 
attention to the 1940s. This is probably logical because the period was not an 
exactly formative period of US END. Yet overlooking this period fails to draw a 
comprehensive picture of US END over Japan. Key issues surrounding it developed 
during the 1940s and the early 1950s. There are two particularly vital issues: the 
introduction of Article 9 and demilitarisation. Nobody can discuss Japan‘s security 
without any reference to these two points. With this in mind, this thesis draws a 
more comprehensive picture of US END over Japan by theorizing ―Invisible‖ END, 
focusing on the overlooked period and drawing upon primary sources including 
recently declassified materials and those already declassified but previously  
ignored by other authors.      
 
Research Methodology and Sources  
 
 In order to unravel the complexity and peculiarity of the US END over 
Japan, this project adopts a qualitative research method. Qualitative research is of 
particular use in interpreting meanings, ideas, images, beliefs and values in great 
depth as the method enables researchers to analyse specific contexts.149 This aspect 
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is crucial for this research because this study entails hardly quantifiable factors 
such as ideology, personal idiosyncrasy and beliefs.150 These factors are crucial to 
understanding US END over Japan today. They have considerably influenced the 
formation of Japan‘s defence strategy and thus, the form of US END over Japan. 
More specifically, this thesis employs a historically informed approach: ―Path 
Dependence.‖  According to economist Douglass North, ―Path dependence means 
that history matters. We cannot understand today‘s choices…without tracing‖ their 
evolution over time. 151 More specifically it suggests that ―earlier processes are 
relevant to a full understanding of contemporary social events.‖152 This sounds too 
obvious and vague to tell us anything about exactly how history matters. That said 
its logic is in fact more complex than a simplistic contention: ―the past matters.‖153 
 In order to see the dynamics of historical force, ―Path Dependence‖ suggests 
that we need to probe not only a single event but a sequence of events because they 
shape particular courses of action.154 In other words, it actually warns that we 
should not just look at a single decisive event such as Japan‘s complete defeat in 
August 1945. Japan‘s anti-nuclear sentiment is doubtlessly rooted in the 
devastating war marked by atomic bombing upon Japan but as we will see it did not 
become evident until the Daigo Fukuryumaru incident of 1954. Ever since, the lofty 
idea of realising a nuclear-weapons-free-world as the Japanese paramount political 
goal started to gain wide public support in Japanese society. 155  The incident 
suggests that it actually took some time and events to bring about the anti-nuclear 
sentiment. While it is true that some changes are more decisive than others, each 
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key event is still incremental in nature and all the events combined are to bring 
about a particular belief system and path.156 
  The existence of the distinct belief system is, however, not sufficient enough 
to condition Japanese policy makers. While it does not have to become the 
consensus of the Japanese, it has to be widely shared as a norm throughout Japan. 
Once this non-nuclear path is formed, a self-reinforcing mechanism operates. The 
internal dynamics growingly become dominant and the path gains more support 
and legitimacy and attempts to preserve practices.157 Self-reinforcing dynamics 
create social patterns which reproduce themselves over time.158 The Japanese 
public, for instance, demonstrated its fervent opposition to visits by US 
nuclear-powered naval vessels to Japan in the 1960s even though they were not 
armed with nuclear weapons. This resulted in wide public acceptance of Japan‘s 
declaration of three non-nuclear principles in 1968 and to a lesser extent Japan‘s 
signature to the NPT in 1970. Japan‘s decision to sign the NPT stemmed in part 
from a norm of its non-nuclear status. Japan‘s non-nuclear path was further 
institutionalized by itself. After this formalising process, it becomes extremely 
difficult to deviate. Change can still occur but its extent is rather bounded not least 
after a particular norm is institutionalized.159  Contrasting paths such as the 
nuclear path and the path of ―Visible‖ END are nearly automatically excluded. 
 The path gets deeply fixed over time as a specific norm such as an 
anti-nuclear norm has already been deeply embedded throughout society and also 
in practice. It has become a Japanese tradition to officially oppose nuclear weapons, 
and this tradition is reflected in formal and informal Japanese institutions. Policy 
makers do not necessarily get locked in fixed values or traditions but their actions 
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and preferences are severely conditioned within them. They stick to their dominant 
modes of political understanding (in this case, the non-nuclear option) in the face of 
challenges. 160  Indeed today‘s Japanese policy makers are still considerably 
conditioned by the path taken nearly 70 years ago. As historian and sociologist 
William Sewell succinctly explained, ―what has happened at an earlier point in time 
will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point 
time.‖161 This is what the author means by ―history matters.‖ Looking at ―Path 
Dependence‖ from a different angle, it helps us understand the choices not taken, or 
why actors do not change polices to seemingly more beneficial ones. Concomitant 
with the non-nuclear path, the non-military path was adopted. The 
American-imposed new peace constitution came into force in 1947 and Japan‘s 
rearmament has been a controversial issue ever since. Japan has also decided to 
take a broadly non-military path. In this respect, an in-depth analysis is required to 
comprehend the detailed contexts of the subject.  
   For the sake of in-depth examination of the dynamics of historical forces 
this study will principally focus on Japan‘s decision-making process－ exactly how 
decision makers were influenced by both external and internal elements to shape 
―Invisible‖ END. It is important to note that while anti-nuclear sentiment (or 
nuclear mentality) was widely shared in Japan, some political leaders especially 
those who were in charge of making a strategy had a significantly different view of 
nuclear weapons from the Japanese public. In this regard, it is essential to examine 
how the political leaders vacillated between two possible courses of action (whether 
to build an independent nuclear deterrent, and whether to accept the deployment of 
US nuclear weapons in Japan). In short, through the in-depth examination of the 
decision-making process, this thesis will aim to analyse how external and internal 
elements interact with each other. This thesis draws on multiple sources ranging 
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from official primary sources to comic books to study the process. 
    Since extended nuclear deterrence is mutual acknowledgement of such 
deterrence by both a protector and a protégé, it is essential to examine top-level 
discussion between the Japanese and the American government. Given the 
importance of the issues, the summit-level talks between a Japanese Prime 
Minister and a US President need to be scrutinized. For this purpose, archival 
research was conducted in the National Archives II, College Park, the Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Library, Texas, the National Archives, London, the National 
Archives of Japan, Tokyo and the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Tokyo. This research project, therefore, draws on these archival documents.  
 Apart from these official government documents, edited government 
document volumes are also used. These include the Foreign Relations of the United 
States series edited by the Office of the Historian, Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho (Key 
Diplomatic Documents) edited by the Kajima Institute of International Peace and 
Nichibei Kankei Shiryo Shu, 1945-97 (A Documentary History of US-Japanese 
Relations) edited by Chihiro Hosoya. Online databases such as the Digital National 
Security Archive and the Japanese Foreign Affair ‘s website also provide key 
materials. These primary documents are examined in order to investigate the 
political recognition of US END by the top leaders and their perception of Japanese 
public opinion against nuclear weapons with a particular focus on the Japanese 
decision-making level. In other words, the primary sources are used to identify two 
distinct aspects in the decision-making level: the actual views of the political 
leaders on US nuclear deterrence and their assessment of domestic anti-nuclear 
sentiment when making key decisions. In addition, memoirs, diaries, biographies of 
former leaders and officials, and their comments and government statements are 
examined for the analysis of their understanding of END and public opinion.     
    For the analysis of Japanese nuclear mentalities, it is vital to study books 
and journals by critics of the day, and newspapers. Since Japan is known for its 
popular culture, Japanese manga (comic book), and movies have been included. 
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Interestingly Japanese anti-nuclear feeling is at times clearly depicted in popular 
culture. The elucidation of these materials helps us to understand the distinct 
background of Japanese nuclear mentalities.162 It is worth mentioning that public 
opinion polls are a useful indicator to measure Japanese public opinion against 
nuclear weapons, but as Freedman aptly warned us, ―Just because numbers were 
involved did not make a statement more correct than one expressed in a more 
literary form…‖163 In other words, it is more crucial to look at the context where 
this number originates.  
 It is also crucial to analyse political debates on nuclear weapons as how 
nuclear issues were treated in public might reflect a general attitude toward the 
subject. As for political debates, Diet debates are key in that nuclear issues often 
received more attention due to its controversial nature of the subject in Japan. For 
this reason, the political leaders in the ruling party were more attentive to the 
debates. In general public debates within mass politics may largely affect political 
calculation of decision makers.164 As Heuser asserted, ―in a democracy or political 
nation-state, the electorate cannot be dissociated from the politics of the 
government they have elected into office.‖165 While it is true that today national 
leaders still dominate decision-making and they can do away with public opinion, 
the popular voice has become a critical, if not deterministic, factor for influencing a 
political direction. Political leaders cannot simply ignore public opinion about 
sensitive military issues such as missile deployment. The mass public voice can 
challenge the political stability and legitimacy of the government.166 By analyzing 
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the research materials above, this thesis aims to unravel how ―Invisible‖ END came 
to emerge and develop.  
 
Structure and Content 
 
  This thesis is essentially first attempt of its kind to theorise ―Invisible‖ 
END through the detailed examination of the formative period of the deterrent 
between 1945 and 1970. Following this introduction, the rest of the thesis is divided 
into six chapters. From Chapter Two to Chapter five, the developments of US END 
over Japan are examined chronologically followed by the strategic analysis of key 
events and developments especially with respect to their impact in Japan‘s defence 
strategy. Chapter Six also deals with Japan‘s elite perceptions of US END but its 
main focus is on several secret nuclear studies on Japan‘s independent nuclear 
option driven by fears of the Chinese nuclear test and time pressure to sign the NPT 
in the late 1960s. After examining the historical developments of ―Invisible‖ END 
and the studies of feasibility and desirability of Japan‘s nuclear option in the next 
six chapters, this thesis identifies the circumstances under which Japan came 
under the US nuclear umbrella, factors that shaped the peculiar form of the 
umbrella, and the nature of it.  
  Chapter Two explores background factors of ―Invisible‖ END, looking 
closely at a period between 1945 and 1955. It first analyse the way Japan‘s nuclear 
decision making was made and factors that surrounds the decision making. There 
were some key developments and events such as the US occupation from 1945 and 
1952, the Korean War of 1950 and the Lucky Dragon Incident of 1954 (a Japanese 
finishing boat was irradiated by nuclear fallout from an American thermonuclear 
test at Bikini atoll: the Third Bombing), which drastically changed the course of 
Japan‘s Cold War. Had it not been for these events, Japan‘s post-war path would 
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have been completely different. It therefore focuses on them and their impact on 
rearmament of Japan following disarmament during the early occupation years. 
Over all it explains how the key events in the period of the chapter brought Japan 
on Japan‘s distinct path of non-military-cum-nuclear path. 
  Chapter Three analyses a period between 1954 and 1964. It focuses on the 
Eisenhower‘s plan to introduce nuclear weapons on Japan‘s soil including nuclear 
sharing arrangements. Fervent Japanese reactions to the deployment of Honest 
John missile even without nuclear components in 1955 virtually thwarted the US 
introduction plan. This chapter also examines measures the Eisenhower 
administration attempted to assuage Japanese hysteric attitudes toward nuclear 
weapons so that it could eventually deploy nuclear weapons in Japan. It intensively 
discusses how carefully the US and Japanese government handled key nuclear 
matters especially between 1955 and 1963 regardless of whether they were civilian 
or military use. 
Chapter Four looks at a period between 1964 and 1968. This four-year period 
was a key moment for Japan to come under the US nuclear umbrella. It examines 
the strategic impact of the Chinese nuclear test of 1964 on the new defence-minded 
Prime Minister Sato. The test marked a watershed in the emergence of the US 
nuclear umbrella over Japan. Since nuclear assurance from US President is a key 
component of US END over Japan, the chapter analyses the assurance mechanism 
provided by President Lyndon Baines Johnson through the summit meetings in 
1965 and 1967 and some other various meetings. This four-year period helps us 
understand how Japan explicitly came under the nuclear umbrella.  
Chapter Five focuses broadly on a five-year period between 1964 and 1969 
and it specially looks at diplomatic negotiations over the reversion of the Bonin 
(Ogasawara) and the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands between 1967 and 1969. These 
islands were under US control even after Japan regained its independence in 1952. 
Because of the administrative status of the islands, the USA deployed nuclear 
weapons in the islands. While in the end, the Japanese government managed to 
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remove nuclear arsenals from the islands, it had to conclude a secret nuclear deal 
with the US government, which permitted the US military to reintroduce nuclear 
weapons to Okinawa in the case of emergency. This chapter examines why this deal 
was made. It also discusses how ―Invisible‖ END works in theory because the 
reversion of these islands means the completion of the invisible form of US END at 
least during peacetime.      
  Chapter Six deals with considerations that surrounded Japan‘s decision to 
sign the NPT in 1970 and Japan‘s secret nuclear studies on the feasibility and 
desirability of an independent nuclear deterrent. For clarification, they were not 
ordered or directed by Prime Minister Sato. Rather they were done by Japanese 
government officials and their close colleagues. The NPT was closely connected to 
Japan‘s nuclear option. As far as Japanese policy makers were concerned, signing 
the NPT would internationally foreclose Japan‘s nuclear option. The most 
important driver behind these studies was the Chinese nuclear test. This chapter 
also critically analyses Japanese technological capabilities to produce nuclear 
weapons in the late 1960s. It address a key question: Did Japan have a reliable 
―strategic hedging‖ option? 
  Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by considering special meaning of 
nuclear weapons attached to Japan. It discusses why the non-military-cum-nuclear 
path was chosen but not the nuclear path, answers the research questions of the 
thesis and describes the nature of ―Invisible‖ END over Japan. It deals with what 
Japanese nuclear history between 1945 and 1970 teaches about today‘s nuclear 
challenges in the Asia Pacific 
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II. List of Key Events  
 
2 September 1945:  
Japan formally surrenders by signing the Instrument of Surrender. 
3 November 1946:  
The new Japanese constitution is promulgated. (It comes into effect on 3 May 1947) 
25 June 1950:  
The Korean War breaks out (The truce agreement is signed on 27 July 1953) 
10 August 1950:  
The National Police Reserve is promulgated and enforced. 
8 September 1951:  
Japan signs the San Francisco Peace Treaty and First US-Japan Security Treaty. 
1 March 1954: 
The Lucky Dragon was irradiated by nuclear fallout from a thermonuclear test at 
Bikini atoll. 
2 July 1954: 
Japan Defence Agency and Self-Defence Forces are established. 
15 November 1955: 
The Liberal Democratic Party is formed. 
6 January 1960: 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Record of Discussion was exchanged by 
Aiichiro Fujiyama and Douglas MacArthur II. 
19 January 1960: 
New US-Japan security treaty (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
the United States and Japan) is signed. It comes into effect in June. 
4 April 1963: 
Ohira and Reischauer had a secret meeting about transit rights of naval vessels 
16 October 1964:  
Communist China conducted its first nuclear test 
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13 January 1965: 
Joint Communiqué between President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato following 
talks in Washington refers to US security commitments to Japan potentially 
including nuclear protection. 
30 January 1968: 
Prime Minister Sato announces the four nuclear pillars including Japan‘s reliance 
on the US nuclear umbrella at Diet. 
26 July 1968: 
The Bonin Islands are restored to Japan 
21 November 1969: 
President Nixon and Prime Minister agree to return the Ryukyu Islands without 
US nuclear weapons in 1972. In the meantime, they also sign ―Agreed Minute.‖  
3 February 1970 
Japan signs the NPT two years after it opened for signature. 
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Chapter Two 
Background Factors: From a Former Evil Enemy to a Virtual Ally 
 
 
 I am well aware of my political stance, but it is my belief that the cadets at the 
National Defence Academy of Japan are a weakness and obloquy in our young 
generation. I should like to put all my efforts to discourage our young people from 
going to the academy. I wish that there will be only few candidates in the future. 
―Kenzaburo Oe167 
 
This chapter will examine the period between 1945 and 1955 to explore the 
origins of ―Invisible‖ US END over Japan. There were several key developments in 
the period: US occupation accompanied by postwar reforms represented by two Ds- 
―Democratisation‖ and ―Demilitarisation‖ including disarmament and the 
introduction of the new American-imposed constitution. Although the USA 
succeeded in demilitarising Japan, the Korean War significantly changed the mood 
and Japan‘s rearmament had to initiate. More importantly, the emergence of 
Japanese fervent anti-nuclear sentiment in the foregoing period was significant as 
far as the formation of ―Invisible‖ END was concerned.  
 Therefore, this chapter aims to identify a postwar anti-nuclear norm 
(Nuclear Mentality) in Japan. Its main facet is not only anti-nuclear weapons 
sentiment but also a military aversion. This can be simply summerised as 
―Anti-Nuclear Pacifism.‖168 While at first glance this expression appears to describe 
a prevalent postwar Japanese norm, the reality was more complex. Japan‘s feeling 
of anti-nuclear and anti-military was genuine, but not all Japanese were pacifists. 
The Japanese socialist party that advocated a pacifist norm such as ―unarmed 
neutrality‖ never won its position as the ruling party. In reality, the conservative 
                                                   
167 Kenzaburo Oe: ―Jyoyu to Boueidai Sei [Actress and Cadet]‖, Mainichi Shimbun, 25 June 1958.  
168 Sayuri Gutherie-Shimizu: ―Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960‖, in Leffler and  
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party (Liberal Democratic Party) governed postwar Japan. Some Prime Ministers of 
the party even advocated Japan‘s nuclear option. While the Japanese were truly 
sensitive about military issues, they did not necessarily deny Japan‘s right to 
self-defence. Rather the post-war national consensus of Japan was that people did 
not want another bloody and devastating war. The vivid symbol of the war was 
doubtlessly the atomic bombing. There was a strong feeling of ―never again‖ widely 
shared among postwar Japanese society.169 Japan was traumatised by the war and 
many people indeed did not want to even think about it.170 Many people did not 
want to touch military affairs and their deliberate lack of interest in them was 
somewhat natural. Therefore, to be more accurate, postwar Japan held a norm of a 
military aversion under which Japan had anti-nuclear and military sentiments; 
hence its non-military-cum-nuclear path. The top priority of postwar Japan was not 
to rebuild its military strength but to revitalize its economy. The emergence of this 
socio-cultural norm was probably inevitable given that Second World War 
completely devastated Japan. Japanese society was literally born out of the ashes of 
the war. Without close scrutiny of the Japanese postwar beliefs, it will be less clear 
exactly why Japan relied on the peculiar form of US END.  
 To be sure, particular strategic preferences adopted to deal with security 
challenges are a reflection of strategic beliefs (ideational) but also material 
limitations of countries. Strategies are doubtlessly made under the interaction and 
influence of multiple factors. Strategy-making can never be reduced to just a single 
causal relationship as all the factors function differently from context to context.171 
Strategic preferences are substantially influenced by key material factors such as 
                                                   
169 Yuichi Hosoya: Sengoshino Kaiho II Jishu Dokuritu towa Nanika Zenpen: Haisen kara Nihonkoku 
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171 See for example Carl von Clausewitz: On War, tans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1984, ppb. 1989), p. 183. 
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technology and geography.172 Technology is not all about what technology one has 
but it is also about how human beings interpret it and employ it.173 Japan might 
have been technologically capable of building its indigenous nuclear weapons. Yet 
Japan did not even have a nuclear weapons programme. The possession of nuclear 
weapon technology did not automatically mean that the Japanese political 
leadership wanted to utilise it to acquire nuclear bombs. In this respect, it is more of 
a question of why specific technology was accepted while other technology was not. 
This can be for a variety of reasons well beyond the narrow military technological 
dimension. Japan‘s political perception of nuclear technology was crucial because it 
was essentially a Japanese choice to renounce its nuclear path. Despite its advanced 
nuclear technology, ultimately Japan decided to rely on US nuclear protection, 
instead. Accordingly, technology involves political and cultural understanding of 
specific military technology and its strategic utility.   
 As the term political geography emphasizes, geography is subject to the 
understanding and interpretation by policy makers in a given state because it is 
relative to the nature of foreign relations (e.g. friendly or hostile) to neighboring 
states.174 The locations of countries with respect to their neighbouring countries are 
one of most important strategic considerations for national leaders as nations must 
be vigilant and watchful if they are surrounded by hostile nations.175 Indeed, most 
wars are fought between neighbours for various causes but one of the major reasons 
is specific territorial disputes.176 Thus, a threat perception is closely related to 
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geographical proximity.177 Generally speaking proximate power can more easily 
and physically pose an acute and immediate threat than those in the distance. 178 It 
is true that Brazil does not pose any significant threat to Japan simply because it is 
located in the distance (and of course Brazil has no desire to do so at all). 
 If a country is surrounded by hostile nations, the policy makers of the 
country are more wary of their national security, but this does not mean the public 
shares the same view as the policy makers; in fact they did not, and this is where 
the political dimension comes in, with its particular views of the world conditioned 
by country-specific interpretations of the world, nuclear mentalities as we will see 
below. It is worth noting that due to Japan‘s geographical proximity to China and 
Russia, the Pentagon had a clear plan to store US nuclear weapons in Japan in the 
1950s, but in the end, it abandoned the plan as Japan as a whole was not convinced 
of the necessity of such deployment. Worse still, it was fervently opposed to such 
deployment.  
 It is important to note that several issues that arose in the approximately 
ten-year period covered in this chapter were directly linked to the nuclear debates 
over ―Invisible‖ END particularly during the diplomatic negotiations over the 
reversion of Okinawa as we will shall. This period thus sets the foundation for the 
peculiar form of US END over Japan. This chapter revolves around how postwar 
Japan found its beginnings in the new world with a particular focus on rearmament 
and nuclear weapons. First we will examine two key dimensions of the formation of 
―Invisible‖ END: Japan‘s Nuclear Decision Making (how a key decision was made) 
and Japan‘s cultural disposition or mentality with regard to nuclear weapons (how 
the Japanese perceived nuclear weapons). 
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Japan‘s Nuclear Decision Making with respect to US END. 
 
    Before we delve into the historical development of ―Invisible‖ US END, it is 
crucial to understand how Japan made decisions with respect to the policy of relying 
on US END over Japan. Japan‘s security policy making in general was conditioned 
broadly by five factors, factional politics, the opposition party, the peace constitution, 
bureaucrats and public opinion.179 While it is true that the key decisions with 
respect to US END ultimately resided with the leadership of Japanese Prime 
Ministers as we will see below, these five conditions nevertheless set strict 
limitation on the expansion of Japan‘s military capabilities. In other words, they 
constrained Japan‘s military posture. Japanese Prime Ministers‘ strategic 
calculation was circumscribed by these conditions, especially public opinion. 
 From 1955 to the end of Cold War, Japan loosely had a two-party system 
with the conservative or centre－right Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the left
－idealist Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). This system is also known as 
Gojugonen Taisei (The 1955 Political System) because the political rivalry between 
the conservative camp and the socialist camp was created in 1955.180 Their struggle 
for political power continued throughout the Cold War. In reality, the LDP had been 
the ruling party since its establishment in 1955 and dominant in policymaking 
during the period. One of the principal reasons why the LDP successfully managed 
its political power, keeping the opposition parties from gaining political power, was 
its economic-centred policy. It prioritized economic growth and Japan‘s rapid 
economic success during the Cold War attracted wide domestic political support for 
the party.181  
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 The LDP itself was established as a merger between the Liberal Party led 
by Shigeru Yoshida and the Japan Domestic Party led by Ichiro Hatoyama in 1955 
to contend with the rising socialist power.182 Its key goals included the revision of 
the constitution to make Japan more sovereign.183 Because of this formation history, 
the LDP had some influential factions such as Yoshida‘s and Hatoyama‘s group. In 
other words, the LDP leaders could not afford to ignore the existence of factional 
politics within the party. 184  Yoshida‘s preference for an unambitious military 
posture for the sake of economic recovery was, for example, consciously or 
unconsciously followed especially by his disciples (Yoshida school), Ikeda Hayato 
and Eisaku Sato. 185  Moreover, a LPD leader needed to run consensus-based 
management to have cohesion within the party. Such cohesion was needed to run 
the party smoothly.186 Yet when it came to the emergence and treatment of US END 
over Japan, factional politics did not usually have any strong influence. It was left 
to the strong leadership of the Prime Minister to ensure the US nuclear umbrella. 
This was clear in the negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa as we will see 
below. Prime Minister Sato secretly concluded a secret nuclear deal with the US 
government without letting the fractional political leaders know about the 
surreptitious operation. Their interaction with Prime Ministers, however, helps us 
to understand how the Japanese supreme leaders viewed nuclear deterrence and 
Japan‘s nuclear option.  
 As for a political role of the main opposition party (SDPJ) that long denied 
the constitutionality of JSDF, it had little political input into decision making not 
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least when it came to US END. That being said, it raised nuclear issues as the 
political agendas at the National Diet at times.187 This indeed helped clarify the 
government stance on the US nuclear umbrella as we will see below. The opposition 
party also put the brakes on the rise in Japan‘s defence spending while the LDP 
dominance managed to incrementally expand Japan‘s military force.188  
 The Japanese constitution is commonly known as a peace constitution. 
Article 9 legally bans the possession of Japan‘s national military force and war 
potential:  
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.  
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, 
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency 
of the state will not be recognized.189  
 
Due to the existence of the Article, as one Japanese analyst explained, ―any security 
policy formulated by the Japanese government must therefore be scrutinized to 
ensure compliance with its basic tenets.‖190  Owing to Article 9 some military 
choices were nearly automatically excluded. During the Cold War, sending SDF 
overseas for whatever purposes including Peace Keeping Operation was, for 
example, infeasible. SDF‘s role was completely limited to defence of the territory of 
Japan. As long as this pacifist constitution was in effect, Japan‘s remilitarisation 
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was inevitability restricted. When it was drafted in 1946, the US government or the 
General Headquarters (GHQ) led by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers in particular was convinced that this constitution 
was necessary to prevent Japan from rising again as a military power. As the Cold 
War intensified in the late 1940s, the constitution became a stumbling block for the 
renewed US policy for Japan. This is why the US government urged Japan to revise 
the constitution in the 1950s after it changed its occupation policy (the reverse 
course) as we will see below. 
 In general, bureaucrats, many of whom were in favour of an 
economic-centric policy and a lightly armed force, were also leading actors to draft 
and implement policies with political leaders in Japan.191 As Japan‘s defence was 
dependent heavily on the US-Japan security treaty, bureaucrats especially those 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) not the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) 
closely worked with the US government. They were in charge of developing the 
general direction of Japan‘s defence. It is important to note that Japan finally 
elevated the JDA to full-fledged ministry status (the Ministry of Defence) in 2007. 
The JDA was part of Prime Minister ‘s Office rather than an independent ministry. 
Because of war-time experiences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took an initiative 
and played a leading role in dealing with security matters with the US 
government.192 Indeed one of the main roles of the JDA was limited to monitoring 
and controlling Japanese Self-Defence Force under civilians.193 Since the ruling 
party remained unchanged during the Cold War, Japanese political leaders from the 
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LDP managed to create harmonious relations with the Japanese bureaucrats.194 
Yet it is important to note that while government officials conducted some internal 
studies on nuclear matters including an independent nuclear deterrent, those 
studies did not influence Japan‘s nuclear policy. This was mainly because nuclear 
issues, not least the US nuclear umbrella over Japan, were so sensitive and 
emotionally-charged in Japanese politics that only Prime Ministers made key 
decisions with regard to the official treatment of the US nuclear umbrella as we will 
see below. 195  In other words, key decisions were left in the hands of Prime 
Minister.196 In the meantime, the political climate shaped by the constraints noted 
above surrounded Japanese political leaders.197  
 It is important to note that the political climate was also greatly shaped by 
domestic anti-military culture stemming from Japan‘s historical experience in 
devastating defeat in World War Two clearly marked by the two atomic bombings. 
To some extent, an anti-military norm is arguably institutionalized by the pacifist 
constitution represented by Article 9. The constitution was much welcomed by the 
Japanese public.198 Moreover, Japanese political leaders were concerned about the 
consequences of overlooking public opinion especially given that anti-military 
culture was pervasive throughout Japanese society. If they did, they would more 
likely lose their political seats in the next general election. While there were 
political, social and institutional conditions for the formulation of Japan‘s security 
policy, there was no systematic way of making Japan‘s nuclear decision regarding 
US END over Japan. It is rather a case-by-case approach and a product of the social 
climate and diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, it is crucial to scrutinize how some 
key political figures (actual decision makers) viewed, discussed and treated the US 
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nuclear umbrella over Japan with their American counterparts. 
 
III.A. Table: Proliferation Drivers and Barriers 
 
Drivers Barriers 
Security 
States acquire nuclear weapons 
to protect their own 
sovereignty. 
States forgo nuclear weapons when 
it is in their security interest to do 
so and/ or when they can gain 
protection from a nuclear ally. 
Prestige 
States acquire nuclear weapons 
to fulfil perception of national 
destiny or to be viewed as a 
―great power‖ in international 
affairs. 
States forgo nuclear weapons 
because of the international norm 
against the weapons. They seek 
acceptance or leadership in the 
international community. 
Domestic 
States acquire nuclear weapons 
when a set of well-placed 
bureaucratic actors convince 
political leaders of the need for 
them. 
States forgo nuclear weapons when 
there is significant public 
opposition to nuclear programs, 
when there is a change in regime or 
in government priorities, and/or 
when well-placed bureaucratic 
actors convince political leaders 
that nuclear weapons are 
unnecessary.  
Technolog
y 
States acquire nuclear weapons 
because they have the 
technological ability to do so. 
States forgo nuclear weapons when 
they cannot develop or acquire the 
technology or technical know-how 
necessary to make fissile material 
and build a bomb. 
Economic 
Economics generally do not 
drive a state to pursue nuclear 
States may forgo nuclear weapons 
because they are too costly, because 
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weapons, though advocates of 
nuclear weapons do argue that 
a nuclear defence is cheaper 
than a conventional defense.  
of the economic sanctions that 
result from a nuclear weapons 
program, or because of the 
economic benefits that follow the 
abandonment of such a program. 
Source: Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: 
Columbia U.P., 2007), p. 49. 
 
Nuclear Mentalities of Japan 
 
   This section aims to discuss key questions of the thesis: are the Japanese 
keen on nuclear weapons, are they nuclear-minded, do the Japanese have ―nuclear 
mentalities.‖ According to Heuser, who elaborated upon the concept, ―nuclear 
mentalities‖, they refer to collective world views, beliefs and discourse common to 
the public at large within a given state. They are to disclose distinct assumptions 
(unique to a given state) about nuclear deterrence and defence in general.199 
National attitudes and beliefs―widely shared by the public― about war and 
defence issues including nuclear deterrence are particularly shaped by historical 
experiences, which serves as ―a framework of reference known to anybody‖ in the 
country.200 It is generally believed that historical experiences provide people with 
some guidance: ―Sociocultural values are assumed to be axiomatic beliefs that 
members of a society hold in common, even if the opinions they derive from these 
beliefs vary greatly.‖201 In this respect, it truly depends on people‘s interpretations 
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of historical experiences, which in turn shapes strategic debates. Therefore, the 
concept entails some subjective understanding of social reality. Indeed, Japan‘s 
unique historical experience in the atomic bombing could have justified and 
legitimized Japan‘s possession of nuclear weapons to protect itself from another 
nuclear attack in the future. On the contrary the atomic bombing against Japan led 
to Japan‘s support for the nuclear-weapons-free world.202 The socially constructed 
world view of Japan is that as the only country ever suffered from the two nuclear 
attacks, Japan has to promote this imagined world and nuclear weapons are 
absolute evil that has to be slain. The British philosopher of war, Christopher Coker, 
convincingly explained that ―Societies have different cognitive styles, different 
cultural beliefs and different ways of perceiving the world and their own place 
within it.‖203 
  In this regard, we need to look at the term of ―social imaginary‖ elaborated 
by Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor to clarify the cultural approach the thesis 
employed. Taylor defines ―social imaginary‖ as ―the ways people imagine their social 
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and 
their fellows.‖ 204 Its role is ―what enables through making sense of, the practices of 
a society.‖205 The social imaginary may not be shared by every single member of the 
society but shared by a majority of people. More importantly, it is ―common 
understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of 
legitimacy.‖206  The common understanding of social surroundings or collective 
world views suggest that once a certain norm is developed and accepted in the 
society, it becomes highly influential and affects the minds of people, leading to the 
common and collective practice. In the case of Japan, this refers to non-nuclear 
option rather than an independent deterrent. As Taylor cogently held, ―we have a 
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sense of how things usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea of how they 
ought to go, of what missteps would invalidate the practice.‖207 Indeed as Coker 
lucidly argued, ―We are comprised entirely of beliefs about ourselves and about the 
world we inhabit.‖208 In other words, the collective understanding of and discourse 
on nuclear issues common to the society is socially constructed. Mentalities in 
relation to nuclear weapons － or as a short hand. ―nuclear mentalities‖―are 
therefore a reflection of our subjective understanding of nuclear deterrence and 
defence issues in general. Nuclear Mentalities are of use when explaining unusual 
political phenomena or what looks like anomalies in the eyes of Western researchers. 
They have, for example, long considered Japan will become a nuclear power because 
it faces immediate nuclear threats from its nuclear neighbours (Russia and China), 
boasts highly advanced civil nuclear technology, and Japan‘s rich economy can 
afford to pay for nuclear weapons. Japan has seemingly every conceivable reason to 
acquire nuclear weapons. In the words of Schelling, ―Japan indeed is an anomaly. 
Japan is a departure from the general rule.‖209  
 Looking at external and material factors does not spell out why Japan 
refrains from acquiring nuclear bombs. As the focus on mentalities suggest, we also 
need to scrutinise internal and ideational force together with external and material 
factors. With that in mind, we have to recognize that strategies go through a 
domestic process and they are inevitably influenced by domestic beliefs and 
collective world views. Accordingly, strategy makers cannot escape from their local 
context that inevitably reflects national beliefs of their country. 210  
 The main focus of this section is on the identification of general Japanese 
public perceptions of defence and nuclear issues in the period between 1945 and 
1970. While postwar Japan is well known for its pacifism, it is not much known that 
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exactly what the domestic climate was like and how defence issues were assessed 
and treated within it. It explains this key domestic political and cultural context (a 
general aversion of military affairs) where these issues were domestically perceived 
and assessed. It must be stressed that Japanese policy makers could not simply 
afford to be indifferent to public opinion emerged from this context when making 
Japan‘s defence strategy. The examination of the domestic context in the foregoing 
period will not be done completely chronologically. Instead it will focus on some key 
ideas emerged from the domestic context that influenced general public views on 
defence issues. Public opinion in turn influenced the political calculation of 
Japanese leaders and eventually affect Japan‘s defence strategy. The perceptions of 
Japanese political leaders on these issues will be discussed in the next three 
chapters.  
 Without the clear identification of Japanese mentalities in relation to 
nuclear weapons and the domestic condition, the level of the impact of Japanese 
public opinion on the making of Japan‘s defence strategy will be less clear. Without 
it we do not understand exactly why Japan took a non-nuclear path as opposed to 
the contention by some Western analysts such as Herman Kahn that Japan would 
go nuclear.211 The rest of the thesis will demonstrate that Japan‘s non-nuclear path 
was self-reinforced and hard to deviate.        
 One of the crucial differences between prewar and postwar Japan was that 
in general the Japanese public showed a general aversion from defence issues and 
use of force in particular.212 A strong feeling of an aversion to the next war was the 
national consensus. Anything related to military became eclipsed in postwar Japan.  
 When one talks about the Japanese nuclear mentalities, there are two key 
components: an anti-military norm distinctly marked by the acceptance of the 
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Pacifist constitution and anti-nuclear sentiment rooted in historical experience in 
the atomic bombing during Second World War.213 Both were highly emotional 
matters. As noted above, the Japanese shared sentiments of ―never again.‖ In view 
of Japanese experience of the highly devastating war, and the complete defeat 
symbolized by the two atomic bombs dropped upon Japan, anti-military sentiment 
was probably a natural reaction for the Japanese. The last war was doubtlessly 
traumatic enough. Because of the war, the country was completely ruined. Nobody 
wanted another war ever again and wanted to think about war. It was probably 
natural for postwar Japan to take a non-military-cum-nuclear path. Once this path 
was chosen and especially institutionalized by the Japanese constitution and 
subsequent political non-nuclear pledge, it got extremely difficult to reverse the 
course. In short, it nearly automatically excluded some key options available such 
as the revision of the American-made constitution and the introduction of US 
nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan. At the same time Japanese political 
leaders sought to ensure Japan‘s security with limited but available means. 
 In the words of General MacArthur, ―the military defeat had produced a 
spiritual and political vacuum. All the old beliefs had been fundamentally shattered 
by the outcome of the war.‖214  The late administrative vice minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ryohei Murata, similarly observed that postwar Japan was aberrant and 
there was a distinct line between before and after 1945. Japan had become a 
peculiar country. 215  The Japanese non-military path might have not been 
necessarily inevitable but the Japanese intentionally put aside defence issues 
immediately after the war because rehabilitation was urgently needed. Japan‘s 
economy was completely destroyed and its sovereignty was virtually suspended 
during the US occupation period between 1945 and 1952.   
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  An idealist norm such as ―unarmed neutrality‖ emerged in the 1950s was 
widely prevalent and influential in postwar Japan. To be sure, it does not mean that 
the idea of ―unarmed neutrality‖ was widely accepted by the majority of the 
Japanese. One opinion poll conducted in December 1966 by the Japanese 
government showed only 17% of respondents supported such a concept.216 The idea 
was promoted by the Japanese socialist party and the so-called Shimpoteki 
Bunkajin [progressive intellectuals], some of whom even praised the Cultural 
Revolution in China.217 According to the logic of ―unarmed neutrality‖, if Japan was 
unarmed and neutral to any side of the Cold War competition, Japan would not be a 
military target in cases of war. In light of this logic, they argued that the Japan-US 
security treaty should be terminated and US bases in Japan should be closed down. 
Japan should not possess any form of military capability.218 To put it simply, 
―unarmed neutrality‖ was ―anti-military, anti-government and anti-American.‖219 A 
nationalist figure like Yukio Mishima, one of the most influential novelists in 
postwar Japan, chastised the concept for its idealism. For him it was nothing but 
illusory.220 This was completely unilateral peace. Actual peace cannot be realised 
without any cooperation with Japan‘s neighbours. Political scientist Takashi 
Inoguchi called this mood ―inward-looking pacifism.‖221 Or it can also be described 
as Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi (one country pacifism).222 That said, it is true that the 
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Japanese public to some extent favoured some sort of neutrality.     
 More importantly, the Japanese embraced the American-made constitution 
that prohibits Japan from possessing national military force.223 This meant that 
Japan virtually renounced the use of force to achieve political ends apart from 
self-defence. Because of this peace constitution, the use of a Japanese word Gun 
meaning military became a taboo in JSDF despite the fact that the nature of the 
organization is a military establishment.224 As stated previously, until 2007 Japan 
did not have the Ministry of Defence (MOD). To be sure, this did not mean Japanese 
political leaders believed it unnecessary to establish the MOD. Prime Minister 
Eisaku Sato insisted that Japan should ―make the Japan Defense Agency a 
ministry.‖225   The political debate upon the status upgrade of the JDA always 
ended negatively during the Cold War. Japanese policy makers viewed it with great 
suspicion and even believed that the possession of the MOD would lead to the rise of 
another militarist Japan.226  
 The Novel Prize in literature laureate, Kenzaburo Oe‘s statement above 
made in 1958 evinced that Japan‘s anti-military culture was evident in post-war 
Japanese society. Moreover, at the dawn of JSDF, its personnel had been condemned 
as ―tax thieves‖ by Japanese public and it took some time to gain public approval for 
the new establishment.227 As Japan cannot legally have its armed forces, bizarrely 
infantry (Hohei in Japanese) is instead called Futsuka (i.e. ―normal division‖), a 
term which still makes no sense to ordinary Japanese people. Similarly, tank 
(sensha) was initially called special vehicle (Tokusha) in order to avoid using a 
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military term.228 At the political level, political debates on Japanese security were 
prone to ending up with interpretation of Article 9.229 Notably a public opinion poll 
carried out in 2002 demonstrated that more than half the Japanese people (63.6 
percent) believed that postwar security was sustained by the peace constitution.230 
In this connection, only approximately 10 percent of the Japanese (between 1969 
and 2003) firmly believed that Japan should protect itself by its own people without 
any dependence on the USA.231 
 As such the peace or military-averse identity was institutionalized and 
embedded in the formulation of Japan‘s security policy after the end of World War 
Two.232 As Hughes rightly observed, ―Japan‘s predilection for limiting its military 
security role was in large part derived from wartime defeat and the anti-militaristic 
principles derived from the 1947 ‗peace constitution‘, which ever since have framed 
the constraints and opportunities of security policymaking in Japan.‖233 
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III. B. Table: Japanese views of Effectiveness of Various Means for Japan‘s Security 
 
 
Effective Not Effective 
Military Power 40% 46% 
Economic Cooperation 75% 11% 
Diplomatic Means 75% 10% 
Source: Mainichi Shimbun 3 May 1972 as cited by Paul Midford: Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion 
and Security (Stanford: CA: Stanford U.P., 2011), p. 61. 
 
 To be sure, there are some Japanese critics who lamented this public 
climate. Tsutomu Matsumura, retired General of Ground Self-Defence Force 
(GSDF), used a metaphor of a person afraid of seeing a doctor in order to criticise 
the postwar Japanese environment for uncritically viewing military affairs: You are 
scared to have a medical checkup because you might have a fatal disease. If you do 
not go to see a doctor, at least you do not need to face the reality of your health. 
Needless to say, this kills you sooner or later. The same thing can be said of postwar 
Japan. In the name of the peace constitution the Japanese public avoided facing 
anything related to military.234 More specifically the dominant attitude of postwar 
Japan toward military issues can be described as ―see no evil, hear no evil, speak no 
evil.‖ 
 Notably when the existence of Mitsuya Kenkyu (Three Arrows Study), 
which studied the security impact of the renewal of hostilities on the Korean 
Peninsula on Japanese security, and the SDF‘s contingency plans for such a 
scenario carried out by the Japanese Joint Chief of Staff, were publicly revealed in 
1965 at the National Diet, this study was severely criticised for violation of civilian 
control.235 Needless to say, it was natural and vital for those in charge of national 
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defence to study and prepare contingency plans but the Japanese government failed 
to explain why SDF was responsible for such a study.236 The dominant climate of 
postwar politics as a reflection of the popular anti-military mood viewed this act as 
if SDF had been secretly planning a next war. The Japanese public at that time 
suspected that the SDF would attempt to start a war like the Imperial Japanese 
Army. In the end, SDF‘s staff had a sense of guilt for having drawn up this plan, 
which in other countries would have seen as an essential part of an army‘s work.237 
In the wake of this incident, another study of contingency plans became virtually 
unfeasible.238  
 
III. C. Japanese views of an Independent Japanese Nuclear Deterrent, 1966-1973  
 
 
Support Oppose 
Does Japan need nuclear weapons? 20.30% 64.60% 
How desirable is Japan's nuclear option? 
(1969-1972) 
11.60% 76.60% 
Source: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 264. 
 
 Additionally, ―memories of horrific nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
have sustained anti-nuclear sentiment and helped justify national policies 
championing non-proliferation and forgoing an indigenous nuclear arsenal.‖239 As 
Murata maintained, throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons became an 
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emotional issue. It has been impossible to have political debates objectively on 
nuclear strategy without provoking an emotional response from the Japanese public. 
He lamented this unhealthy political environment for making Japan‘s defence 
policy. 240  In other words, discussing nuclear issues especially with respect to 
nuclear weapons (and deterrence) in public became a taboo. This was particularly so 
after the Lucky Dragon incident in 1954 as we will see below. We even find this 
approach in popular fiction and films. The first Godzilla movie of 1954 was a direct 
reflection of the incident and the societal shock of the time.241 The fictional monster 
lived quietly in a cave of the seabed at Bikini atoll but a series of nuclear tests 
conducted near his nest forced poor Godzilla to evacuate. Awoken by the nuclear 
tests, Godzilla attacks human civilization242 In other words, Godzilla is also a 
victim of the nuclear tests. The leading actor in the first Godzilla, Akira Takarada, 
once said that the film ―has a serious historical background.‖243 Indeed this monster 
is sometimes understood as a metaphor for nuclear dangers in Japan.244 As a result 
of the nuclear incident the anti-nuclear sentiment was widely prevalent and deeply 
embedded in the minds of the Japanese in postwar Japan. 
 Having experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan emphasized 
peace education and taught intensively the inhumanity of the atomic bombings at 
school. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are one of the most popular school trip (also as part 
of peace education) destinations.245 Many Japanese students visit these places and 
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learn the horrific effects of atomic bombing. Before and after their school trip, they 
also study about the atomic bombing and understand why nuclear weapons must be 
abolished in the world. One of the most popular materials for the school trip (and 
also for peace education) to Hiroshima is Keiji Nakazawa‘s manga (comic book) 
Hadashi no Gen (Barefoot Gen) in 1972. It would be no exaggeration to say that 
most pupils in Japan have read it because a copy was widely available at primary 
schools throughout Japan. It was, moreover, made into TV series and movies. It has 
been translated into many languages as well. The author himself was a Hibakusha 
(atomic survivor) in Hiroshima. He initially did not want to write a comic book 
about the atomic bombing on Hiroshima as he vividly remembered every single 
detail of what happed in Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. For a long time he had not 
wanted to recall this traumatic event. Yet his mother‘s death caused by radiation 
sickness as an after effect of the atomic bombing was a turning point in his career. 
From that moment on, he was determined to share the memories of Hiroshima with 
wider audiences.246 Because of his encounter with the atomic bombing in Hiroshima, 
what happened on 6 August 1945 was very realistically depicted in Barefoot Gen. At 
first, Japanese anti-nuclear attitudes were not clear as Japanese society was 
literally devastated and its top priority was to recover economically. Moreover, as 
Nakazawa suggested, many Japanese people tried not to think about war ever 
again. After Japan‘s independence was restored and Japanese had some space to 
look at external issues, they also recovered repressed memories. Japan‘s unique 
experience in encountering the atomic bombing have produced some popular 
cultural works through which many generations of Japanese children have been 
exposed to how dreadful and inhumane the atomic bombings against Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were.  
 As a retired General Toshiyuki Shikata aptly put it, ―Japan‘s non-nuclear 
option is a rare exception of a national consensus.‖ Shikata even said that 99 % of 
the Japanese would support this view: Japan would never develop its own nuclear 
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weapons.247 Shikata‘s contention is probably over exaggerated. National consensus 
does not necessarily mean that 100 % of the people or every single member of a 
given nation agrees with a certain opinion. Any political decision or opinion never 
gains a 100 % approval rate of the people. There is always a minority view that 
endorses Japan‘s nuclear option. In reality as the Cambridge English dictionary 
defines, consensus is ―a generally accepted opinion or decision among a group of 
people.‖248 France, for example, is well known for its national consensus on the need 
of its independent nuclear weapons in order to make the country sovereign and 
independent, but France still has a minority group opposed to French nuclear 
bombs.249 As Heuser rightly observed, ―Few states contain just one culture, and just 
one homogeneous population with shared values, traditions, and attitudes to life, 
death, and the use of force.‖250 In France a national consensus on the need of 
French nuclear bombs means that in addition to conservative parties, from the 
1970s onward the French social and the communist parties embraced force de 
frappe. Therefore, France nuclear weapons receive wide public and political 
support.251  
 In the case of Japan, despite the anti-nuclear norm widely accepted in 
Japanese society, there were always individuals and groups that sought an 
independent deterrent. A Japanese renewed sociologist, Ikutaro Shimizu, for 
instance, publicly declared that Japan should acquire its indigenous nuclear 
weapons in 1980.252 As we shall see below several Japanese Prime Ministers too 
thought Japan should develop its own nuclear weapons. As the Table III. C 
(Japanese views of an Independent Japanese Nuclear Deterrent, 1966-1973) shows, 
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still approximately 11% of respondents answered that it would be desirable for 
Japan to acquire its own nuclear weapons while 76 % of respondents answered that 
it would be undesirable for Japan to obtain its own nuclear weapons.253 The data 
nevertheless suggests that a large majority of the Japanese explicitly exhibited 
strong opposition to nuclear weapons. Behind this background, ―the pro-nuclear 
discourse has been delegitimized…by establishing the central role of victim in the 
anti-nuclear discourse.‖ Indeed the feeling of nuclear victimhood has been deeply 
embedded in Japan. 254  
 As a nuclear proliferation specialist, Maria Rost Rublee, noted, ―a 
significant segment of the Japanese population, including many politicians and 
large portions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been persuaded specifically 
that nuclear weapons are morally wrong and thus can never be considered a 
legitimate political or military tool.‖255  In effect the pro-nuclear Japanese Prime 
Ministers could not afford to ignore major public opposition to nuclear weapons as 
we will explore in the rest of the chapters. They indeed did not choose Japan‘s 
nuclear option as it was not a politically practicable option. As a result, we can say 
that Japan‘s non-nuclear option is a national consensus: a generally accepted 
decision among the Japanese to forgo nuclear weapons although this does not deny 
the fact that Japan still has a minority group that advocates an independent 
nuclear deterrent. 
 Whether nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction or weapons 
for long peace did not matter to them because nuclear weapons automatically 
denoted absolute evil. For them as the only country ever attacked by atomic bombs 
(Yuiitsu no Hibakukoku), Japan was on a mission to draw attention to the 
inhumanity of nuclear weapons.256 What was unthinkable for them was the idea of 
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placing nuclear weapons in Japan－nuclear weapons were thus visible to the 
Japanese public. When we study perspectives of the Japanese government on 
nuclear deterrence, we must keep this aspect in mind. Japanese policy makers have 
to take into consideration the mentalities of the Japanese with regard to nuclear 
weapons.257 Key political decisions were still made within this distinct mode of 
Japan‘s political thinking. To be sure, there was a small group of defence planners 
and political leaders who considered that Japan‘s own nuclear weapons were vital 
for its defence and prestige in international politics.258 While several key Japanese 
Prime Ministers (Kishi, Ikeda and Sato) also supported this view as we will see 
below, their policy still paid heed to postwar popular antinuclear attitudes.   
 Japan‘s encounter with the three atomic bombings including the Lucky 
Dragon incident has doubtlessly transformed its way of perceiving nuclear weapons. 
Had it not been devastated and irradiated by atomic bombs and the thermonuclear 
test, Japan would have had a more modest and objective attitude toward nuclear 
weapons and deterrence. The strategic use of nuclear weapons was not considered 
with the strategic reality of international security in mind. For Japanese audiences, 
nuclear issues were rather political, societal and emotional subjects.259 As we will 
see below, the US government and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato actually attempted 
to correct this Japanese public view about nuclear weapons although it was doomed 
to failure. Japan has a unique approach to nuclear issues, and understanding this 
peculiarity is a key to comprehend how the Japanese government viewed nuclear 
deterrence as a representative of the Japanese citizens. As Nick Ritchie of 
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University of York maintained, ―Explaining the politics of nuclear weapons requires 
an understanding of the meanings assigned to them in their social and historical 
contexts, how these meanings are embedded in shared understandings of national 
identity, and how these meanings change and develop.‖260 
 
Japan Under US Occupation  
 
 Japan was under US (ruled from the General Headquarters: GHQ 
stationed in Tokyo, to be more precise) occupation for nearly seven years between 
1945 and 1952. There is no question that the seven-year occupation had a lasting 
effect on Japan‘s post-occupation security policy and the perception of Japanese 
national security especially given the fact that Japan was occupied by a foreign 
power for the first time in its history. 261  More importantly political reforms 
implemented in Japan during this period subsequently influenced the shape of US 
END over Japan. By embracing the pacifist constitution introduced in this period, 
Japan limited its military capability by itself. 
 Japan formerly surrendered and ended the Second World War on 2 
September 1945. The initial US occupation policy for Japan was straightforward in 
that it aimed at realising a demilitarised including disarmament and democratised 
Japan as a key US initial post-surrender policy, the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC) 150/4 A evinced. Its ultimate objectives were that ―To insure 
that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and 
security of the world‖ and ―To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful 
and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will 
support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.‖ To realise these objectives, it posited that 
―Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarised. The authority of the 
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militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her 
political, economic and social life.‖262 In other words, by bringing social-political 
changes America wanted both a physically (disarming) and psychologically 
(replacing old ideas by imposing new values) transformed and neutralised Japan.263  
 The most important and long-lasting postwar reform implemented by the 
GHQ was without doubt the introduction of the American-imposed new constitution. 
General MacArthur requested the Government Section (in charge of making and 
implementing US occupation policies) of the GHQ to create a new constitution the 
basis of his notes: ―MacArthur notes.‖264 This document is the origin of Article 9 
that has been regarded as a sacred object by the Japanese.265 The crucial difference 
between the notes and the final version of Article 9 is that the former actually even 
denied the right to self-defence as Japan must become an unarmed country.266 
General MacArthur‘s adjutant, Justin Williams, also conceded that at first 
MacArthur even denied the possession of any military capability by Japan including 
such a capability for self-defence.267 Colonel Charles Kades of the Government 
Section, a main author of the Japanese constitution, did not share MacArthur ‘s 
view and did eliminate the following line: ―even preserving its own security‖ from 
the notes. 268 When interviewed by a Japanese scholar, Kades asserted that ―every 
single nation has the right to preserve its own security, and that the constitution 
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abandoning such a right is unrealistic.‖ 269  When the Japanese government 
considered whether or not it accepted the American-made constitution, Kades 
observed that Article 9 was actually not the biggest issue, but it was the future of 
the Japanese emperor and his imperial family that mattered most to Japan.270 
Prime Minister Yoshida (1946-1947/ 1948-1953) recalled that for the sake of the 
future status of the Japanese emperor it would be better to follow the GHQ order.271 
It is without doubt a peaceful constitution but it was produced in an undemocratic 
way. The new constitution came effective in May 1947. 
 Although initially the introduction of the new constitution and Article 9 in 
particular was a marked symbol of ―democratisation‖ and ―demilitarisation‖ of 
Japan, ironically this new change significantly made it difficult for the US 
government to implement its subsequent foreign policy (rearmament of Japan). The 
core spirit of the constitution was set out in the preamble to the constitution as 
follows: ―We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious 
of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to 
preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the 
peace-loving peoples of the world.‖272 
    There was also a key GHQ policy that influenced Japanese nuclear 
mentalities. During the occupation period, the GHQ implemented censorship.273 It 
did not allow the Japanese media to criticise the GHQ for American soldiers‘ crimes 
and such policies as the creation of the new Japanese constitution.274 Any mention 
of the US atomic bombing on Japan was actually subjected to strict censorship until 
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the end of the US occupation of April 1952.275 Thus anti-nuclear and anti-American 
sentiment was formally suppressed during this occupation period. Moreover, for the 
Japanese the biggest priority during the occupation period was to restore its 
completely devastated economy and war-weary society. The Japanese desperately 
needed butter more than guns.276 
    As shown initially the GHQ‘s main task was to disarm and democratize 
Imperial Japan to prevent from it fighting against the United States ever again. 
The GHQ maintained this initial policy in the first three years of the occupation. 
Gradually the superpowers confrontation was looming large not least after the 
Berlin blockade of 1948. This crisis was significant in terms of the emergence of US 
END because Truman did send B 29 heavy bombers, though not modified to carry 
atomic bombs, to Britain and Western Germany during the blockade.277 Gregg 
Hearken, an American historian held that ―Significantly, only the shadow of 
deterrence had crossed the Atlantic.‖278 Furthermore, an authority on American 
security Richard Betts put it, ―the nuclear threat of 1948 marks the crystallization 
of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence.‖279 
   In the meantime, the importance of Japan increased as the Chinese 
communist party won the Chinese civil war in 1949, which drove the US policy 
makers to reassess America‘s global strategy involving Japan.280 One American top 
secret report of 1949 indeed noted that ―The Japanese Islands are of high strategic 
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importance to United States security interests in the Far East, primarily because of 
their geographic location with respect to the trade routes of the North Pacific, the 
exits and entrances of the Sea of Japan, the East China and Yellow Seas.‖281 Since 
then, the US occupation policy for Japan had to be altered and softened, or even 
reversed. The US government started to regard Japan as a bulwark against the 
Communists in the Far East.282 This is, according to historian John Dower, ―the 
shift of occupation priorities from democratization of a former enemy to 
reconstruction of a future cold war ally.‖283 In other words, Japan had to be part of 
Western containment force so as to prevent the spread of communism in the Far 
East.  
 According to the late American government official, Townsend Hoopes, 
during the midst of great turmoil in East Asia in the late 1940s and the existence of 
divided political opinion in its policy toward China and Korea, ―Japan seemed the 
area in the Far East where they [American political leaders] were willing to offer 
genuine bipartisan support.‖284 In September 1947 one CIA assessment report on 
the global security situation indeed deemed Japan ―the only area [within the Far 
East] capable of relatively early development as a power center.‖285 In June 1950, 
US Army General Omar Bradley held that ―From a strictly military point of view, I 
do believe the defense of Western Europe would be strengthened by the inclusion of 
Germany…because we do know that they have great production facilities that we 
could use and we know that they are very capable soldiers and airmen and 
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sailors.‖286 Without doubt, exactly the same thing could be said of the Japanese 
situation. The same CIA report of 1947, however, alerted the American leadership to 
the risks of the early termination of US occupation on the grounds that the 
Japanese unsettled economic situation ―would open the way to vigorous Soviet 
penetration.‖287  
  Similarly the prominent American diplomat George Kennan was acutely 
concerned about Japanese economic recovery, political stability and security since 
its military forces were totally disbanded with ―no effective means of combating the 
Communist penetration and political pressure.‖288 At the same time, as NSC 20/1 of 
1948 posited, the US foreign objective was ―to reduce the power and influence of 
Moscow to limits where they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and 
stability of international society.‖ 289  Therefore, Japanese independence was 
extended by the new policy (NSC 13/3 of 1949) inspired by Kennan now with a 
particular focus on Japan‘s economic recovery rather than democratization and 
demilitarisation.290 The outbreak of the Korean War, however, drastically changed 
the mood in Washington, urging the early settlement of a peace treaty and the 
rearmament of Japan. John Foster Dulles, special advisor to the State Department 
for the peace treaty negotiation, was in Tokyo when North Korea invaded South 
Korea. He reported to his supervisor Dean Acheson: ―War at the doorstep had 
awakened Japan and stirred apprehension among its people…Delaying the treaty 
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might lose us more than successful resistance of the attack might gain.‖291  
 
The Korean War: A Turning Point for Rearmament   
 
   The Korean War itself was a local war fought within the Korean Peninsula. It 
nevertheless had a global impact on Europe in particular, let alone Japan.292 It 
triggered the fear that it would be only one of a series of Communist moves to 
extend Communist control of the World, eventually leading to a war in Europe.293 
In the wake of the war, Truman accepted a top secret government decision 
document NSC 68 accompanied by a significant increase in defence spending. 294 
The US military budget tripled (from 13.1 billion dollars to 50.4 billion dollars) and 
a major rearmament programme began as a result of this decision.295 The war 
prompted the US government to reappraise its strategy, making it more globalized 
since ―If any weakness or hesitation on the part of the United States is encountered 
anywhere it will be instantaneously exploited by the communists to undermine 
confidence in and support of the United States everywhere‖.296 As Heuser lucidly 
noted, ―What was not foreseen was the psychological effect of the Korean War on 
America‘s allies. The USA subsequently had to make a commitment to the defence 
of South Korea in order not to weaken the allies‘ faith in a US commitment to other 
parts of the world.‖ 297  The US decision to enter the war was thus strongly 
motivated to show its resolve to protect global interests at stake, and demonstrate 
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the credibility of American security commitments to its allies. 
 When US troops were sent to Korea in 1950, US Army General Maxwell 
Taylor was in Berlin. He recalled that a leading Socialist figure in Berlin told him 
that ―We Germans have always known you Americans are generous and 
kindhearted. Look at what the Marshall aid has done for Berlin. But we never were 
sure how you really stood until you offered Korea the lives of your sons and 
not…pancakes.‖298 As Schelling aptly put it, ―A government never knows just how 
committed it is to action until the occasion when its commitment is challenged.‖299 
It is also important to note that the Eisenhower administration allegedly deployed 
atomic weapons (either aircraft or warheads) to Okinawa during the war although 
nuclear weapons were probably not deployed there until 1954. This strategic signal 
was nevertheless meant to break the stalled negotiations on the termination of the 
war.300  
 In direct response to the Korean War, NATO was turned into a peacetime 
military organisation (the full initiation of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied 
Powers in Europe: SHAPE). America sent more its troops (four divisions) to West 
Germany for ―forward defense‖ commanded by the very first Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Dwight D. Eisenhower.301 A long-term 
American commitment to Europe demonstrated by the large American military 
presence in the region was therefore made. Indeed the Korean War ―put the ‗O‘ in 
NATO.‖ 302  The war also proved that the US forward bases (overseas) were 
increasingly more vital to US global strategy and its constant military readiness.303  
 The war also significantly influenced the future course of Japan‘s 
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security. 304  When the Korean War broke out, the US occupation army (four 
divisions) was sent to the Korean Peninsula directly from Japan due to its 
geographical proximity to Korea. Thereafter Japan crucially became a strategic 
outpost for fighting in Korea. 305 Now there was no question that Japan had to 
protect itself from a communist threat or even subversion. Dean Acheson, then 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs, made an assessment about the 
Japanese reaction to the war. According to Acheson, ―an attack on Korea would be 
regarded by the Japanese as aimed at them‖ and he ―stressed that importance of a 
conciliatory peace treaty in maintaining a Japan independent of Soviet influence.‖ 
He feared that the Soviet Union would increase pressure on Japan to be neutralized 
rather than aligning with the USA.306  Against this backdrop on 8 July 1950 
General MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida. This letter requested 
Japan to create a new police establishment (a 75000-man national police reserve).307 
Colonel Frank Kowalski, who was in charge of training the new organization, 
explained that the emergence of the ―National Police Reserve‖ was ―a kind of 
twilight zone of rearmament.‖308   
 The Korean War proved two crucial points: the geographical significance of 
US military bases in Japan and the importance of holding Japan on the US side for 
the US bases in Japan played an important role to provide logistical support during 
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the Korean War.309 As we will see below, the geographical proximity of Japan to the 
Korean Peninsula was also why it would have been logical to deploy US nuclear 
weapons in Japan.  
 Since Japanese bases were the centre of logistics, Japan received a various 
bulk order such as trucks, tires, radios and repair service from the US forces, which 
was paid in US dollars increasing foreign exchange reserve. Japanese economy 
benefited greatly from the high demands in the war known as Chosen Tokuju 
(Korean War Special Procurement). This war virtually revitalised Japan‘s 
economy.310 For the American leaders, domestically this war ―helped transform 
Japan ruthless enemy into de facto ally.‖311     
    In the wake of the Korean War, Dulles urged the Truman government to 
hasten the negotiation of the peace treaty with Japan to grant Japan‘s 
independence. The Pentagon, however, demanded the extension of the occupation 
due to the importance of US bases there especially with respect to unrestricted use 
of such bases.312 Prime Minister Yoshida was all too well aware that US forces in 
Japan needed to remain stationed where they had already been settled if the 
coming peace treaty was to be concluded.313 Japan was willing to permit the 
provision of bases and facilities on the territory of Japan for the US military in 
return for the restoration of Japan‘s sovereignty. In short, the treaty was based 
mainly on ―the terms of continuing the American military presence on Japanese 
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territory.‖314  
 The US- Japan security alliance is often described as an alliance composed 
of ―Japanese shield‖ and ―American Sword.‖315  This sword includes American 
nuclear force as it later became clear. Japan has only defence capabilities (shield) 
and therefore, the US forces in Japan complements them with offence capabilities. 
Without doubt, this unique character of the alliance is closely linked to the fact that 
Japan was completely disarmed in the 1940s and its defence capability was limited 
to self-defence legally circumscribed by Article 9. Initially even self-defence was 
severely limited. The Japanese was supposed to grapple with their internal security 
(communist movements) by themselves and the USA would take responsibility for 
external security.316 
    Yet Dulles expected Japan to have a more vigorous role in containing 
communist expansion in the Far East including by a massive rearmament 
programme. 317  The prominent American authority on Japan‘s security, Mike 
Mochizuki, rightly pointed out the American intention by asserting that ―In 
adopting a comprehensive containment policy, the United States wanted Japan to 
be an active military and economic ally to combat Asian communism…In short, 
what Americans wanted from Japan was both a strong Japanese economy that was 
resistant to communism and an active diplomatic and military ally for their 
regional containment strategy.‖318  
 Dulles conducted a round of tortuous negotiations on Japan‘s rearmament 
with Prime Minister Yoshida in 1951. Dulles got a strong impression that the 
Japanese leaders were surprisingly equivocal about future Japanese security after 
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its independence.319 The Japanese government attitude toward rearmament was 
that rearmament was not possible at this moment. The top priority was the 
rehabilitation and stabilisation of the country.320 For Yoshida, however, it was not 
acceptable to rearm before Japanese economy was fully recovered. Japan would also 
be obliged to amend Article 9 of its constitution for drastic rearmament.321 In fact, 
Yoshida dodged the US demands for rearmament by using the existence of Article 9 
as a pretext for a slow and moderate increase of Japan‘s defence capabilities.322 
 The San Francisco Peace Treaty was nevertheless signed between the allied 
nations and Japan on 8 September 1951. Yet this did not mean that Japan became 
fully independent. Japan did not regain its whole territory because Article 3 of the 
treaty stipulates that 
 
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to 
place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole 
administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude 
(including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu 
Can (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and 
Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and 
affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and 
any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and 
inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.323 
                                                   
319 Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 96; W. J. Sebald: Nihon Senyro Gaiko no Kaiso 
[Memory of the American Occupation of Japan], trans. Kenzo Nozue (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha., 
1966), p. 223. 
320 Beigawa he Shukou Shita: ―Waga Ho Kenkai‖, [The Document Passed to the US side: Our Stance], 
30 January 1951, Microfilm, B‘-0009, B‘. 4.0.0.1-3, Gaiko Shiroyokan [Diplomatic Archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: DAMOFAJ]. 
321 Hata, Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi, pp.186-187; Futoshi Shibayama and Ayako Kusunoki: ―Nichibei 
Senso to Nihon Senryo [The War and the Occupation]‖ in Makoto Iokibe: Nichibei Kankeishi[The 
History of US- Japan Relations] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2008), pp. 172-173; Schaller, ―Japan and the Cold 
War, 1960-1991‖, p. 157; Tanaka, Anzen Hosho, p. 54; ―Saigunbi no Houkoue[ Toward the 
Rearmament ]‖, Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 February, 1951. 
322 Nakajima, Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku, pp. 92-95. 
323 Reprinted in Nishimura, Nihon Gaikoshi, p. 398 and United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty of 
Peace with Japan (with two declarations). Signed at San Francisco, on 8 September 1951, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf, accessed 
91 
 
 
It is important to note that there were conflicting views between the State 
Department and the Pentagon whether these islands should continue to be retained 
by the USA.324 This territorial conundrum eventually led Japan to face a major 
nuclear problem during negotiations over the reversion of the Bonins and the 
Ryukyus in the 1960s as we will see in Chapter Five. The State Department did not 
necessarily think that the maintenance of these islands was imperative. The JCS, 
nevertheless, urged the Truman government to retain the islands as they were 
deemed necessary for its military operations.325 The US military was in favour of its 
military needs taking priority over local sentiment.326 In the end, the US military 
won the Truman government‘s support. 
 On the same day, the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan 
was also signed.327 The preamble of the treaty read that  
 
On the coming into force of that Treaty [San Francisco Peace Treaty], Japan will 
not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self defense because it 
has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because 
irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan 
desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force 
simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of American 
and Japan.328 
 
The wording of US security commitments in the security treaty between the USA 
and Japan was, however, extremely ambiguous. It only recognised that Japan did 
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not possess sufficient defence capabilities for self-defence and therefore, it was 
crucial for the American military forces to remain stationed in Japan. Article 1 of 
the treaty read as follows:  
 
Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming 
into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, 
air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to 
the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the 
security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at 
the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large scale internal 
riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through or intervention by an outside 
power or powers.329 
     
 This security treaty thus bore a character of continuation of the US 
occupation. It was severely criticised as an unequal treaty by Japanese political 
leaders, for there was no reference to a US defence commitment to Japan but it 
nevertheless permitted US force to continue to stay in Japan. Worse still, the US 
military forces could be employed for Japan‘s internal security in cases of 
large-scale riots as Article 1 shows. While the essence of the treaty might have been 
transitional, it did not set any time limit of expiration of the treaty. Article 4 posited 
that ―This Treaty will expires whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the 
United States of America and Japan will have come into force there will have come 
into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or 
collective security dispositions as will satisfactory provide for the maintenance by 
the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan 
Area.‖330 
 The unequal nature of the security treaty was a main driver for the Kishi 
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administration to sign the new security treaty with the USA in 1960 to correct these 
shortcomings.331 While the formal declaration of establishing a security relation 
with the USA by signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 could be taken as a 
deterrent message in the case of NATO,332 even extended deterrence over Japan, 
not to mention END, was at best ambiguous with the 1951 security treaty. 
Nevertheless, as the prominent British strategy analyst Lawrence Freedman 
explained, ―In principle, to be an ally of the United States might be thought 
sufficient to be considered a vital interest of the United States and so gain the 
benefits of deterrence.‖333 
 At any rate, Japan was externally powerless, and it needed continued US 
military presence in Japan. 334  Former Prime Minister Nobuske Kishi indeed 
recalled that ―Then we had no troops…the United States bore the entire 
responsibility for defense…‖ 335  In general, forward-deployed US forces are 
considered ―to provide for the mutual security of allied nations, primarily to counter 
and contain communist powers such as the Soviet Union and China.‖336 It is 
important to note that ―At the end of the American occupation of Japan, 260,000 
U.S. military personnel remained in Japan with their bases and facilities covering 
1,352 square kilometers.‖337  In other words, ―The Preponderant U.S. military 
presence in and around Japan during the early decades of the Cold War seemed 
evidence enough that the U.S. military would be there to assist in any situation that 
might threaten Japan‘s security.‖338 This was mere existential extended deterrence 
backed by the presence of large US troops. The main assumption of mere existential 
extended deterrence rests on the fact that large US troops in Japan would make it 
difficult and costly for a would-be attacker to strike Japan. To some extent, it did 
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not matter if US forces in Japan would take a military response in retaliation for an 
armed aggression on Japan. As long as there was a possibility backed by the mere 
visible presence of large US troops in Japan, an aggressor could not completely 
eliminate the probability that they would come to defend Japan. Therefore, it would 
be deterred.   
 From the perspective of US grand strategy, one top secret National Security 
Council report of 1952 stressed, ―The security of Japan is of such importance to the 
United States position in the Pacific area that the United States would fight to 
prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part of the territory of Japan.‖339 
Furthermore one NSC report of 1955 even asserted that ―The strategic location and 
military and industrial potential of Japan are such that the security of the United 
States would require us to fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any 
part of Japan by attack.‖340 
  Japan thus virtually managed its security by relying on US military forces 
stationed in Japan for the purposes of defence and deterrence. Or it was what 
Martin Weinstein, former political advisor to US Ambassador to Japan, called a ―de 
facto guarantee‖ since it was hardly conceivable that the Soviet Union would attack 
Japan as long as the large US forces were stationed in Japan. 341  The US 
government also was aware that the presence of its army, navy and air force served 
to deter communist aggression.342 In this regard, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw 
Sikorski made an interesting remark about the importance of hosting US troops for 
a deterrent effect at the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. in November 2008. He 
held that ―Everyone agrees that countries that have US soldiers on their territory 
do not get invaded.‖343 Historian Marc Gallicchio argued that ―Yoshida and other 
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Japanese leaders understood that a strike against Japan would provoke an 
American military response. At any rate, most Japanese officials doubted that any 
such attack would occur.‖344 Their presence was thus interpreted by Japanese 
leaders as having a deterrent effect. 345  
 Owing to the strategic importance of Japan to US grand strategy and the 
fact that the US fought in Korea to prevent the communist control of the Peninsula, 
the credibility of US threats to punish an armed aggression against Japan was 
probably high.  
For some this can also be interpreted as de facto reliance on US nuclear 
weapons because Japan was included into US extended deterrence although this 
argument is considerably debatable.346 There was no articulation of US security 
commitments with respect to nuclear protection of Japan at that time. Be that as it 
may, as the treaty was signed, the US nuclear superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
was unquestionable (a 17 to 1 ratio)347 and its nuclear threat was credible given 
that the US continent was relatively invulnerable to Soviet nuclear attacks by its 
nascent nuclear force which lacked intercontinental delivery platforms.348 
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III. D. Table: US/ Soviet Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1949-1952. 
  
 
USA Soviet Union 
1949 170 1 
1950 299 5 
1951 438 25 
1952 841 50 
Source: Norris and Kristensen, ―Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010‖, p. 81.. 
 
The Stalled Negotiations and Moderation in American Policy 
 
 Further rearmament negotiations between the US and the Japanese 
government ensued even after the peace and security treaty. Indeed as one analyst 
observed, ―In the early 1950s, rearmament was a source of protracted debate 
between Japan and the United States and within Japan itself.‖349  Exasperated by 
Japan‘s tenacious reluctance to its rearmament programme, when he visited Japan 
in November 1953, Vice President Richard Nixon even lamented that the 
disarmament of Japan including the introduction of the new peace constitution was 
a great American mistake.350 While the last section explained the general US 
strategic rationale behind its demand for Japan‘s rearmament, in this section we 
will more closely probe why the US wanted a stronger Japan by rearming itself and 
how Japan reacted to this demand by grudgingly increasing its military strength.   
 It is important to note that the US government even urged Japan to build 
10-15 divisions composed of 300.000-325.000 for a new army and appropriate air 
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and naval strength as articulated in NSC 125 series in 1953.351 In reality the 
strength of 180,000 personnel was the virtual ceiling of the Ground Self Defence 
Force (GSDF) throughout the Cold War.352 Although the number (a ground force of 
180,000) had been first proposed by Japan in October 1953, this target number was 
actually not achieved until the late 1960s. 353  The Eisenhower administration 
expected that Japan would play a vigorous security role in the Asia Pacific: ―Japan‘s 
independent position is directed in the interest of the free world‖354 and ―Japan has 
the potential to assume a leading and stabilizing role in Asia.‖355  
 To some extent, the USA even wanted a stronger Japan so that America 
could reduce its military role and responsibility and its great costs of operation in 
the region. As far as alliance politics is concerned this is known as ―burden 
sharing.‖356 In addition, due to Japan‘s great economic and military potential for a 
contribution toward the stabilization of the Far East, Japan was assumed to be the 
America‘s regional partner to contain communism. The Eisenhower administration 
foresaw that ―United States interests would best be served by a strong Japan, 
firmly allied with the United States, and better able to serve as a counterweight to 
Communist China and contribute to free world strength in the Far East.‖357 In fact 
this American stance continued throughout the 1960‘s not least during the Vietnam 
War. The State Department recognised that ―the basic long-term goal of U.S. policy 
toward Japan was…the development of Japan as a major power center in Asia 
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acting in concert with U.S. and Free World objectives…A corollary to our base policy 
is our desire to see a stronger Japanese defense establishment which would assume 
a greater responsibility of the Far East.‖358 As we will see below, in line with this 
thinking, the US military even wanted to equip Japan with operational nuclear 
weapons. 
 Although Yoshida believed that it was sufficient to provide America with 
Japanese military bases to meet Dulles‘ demand, in the end he had to compromise 
with the US government on the rearmament matters.359 The Japanese government 
presented a new idea of creating new forces (the National Security Forces) apart 
from the existing a national police reserve to the American side.360 When the 
National Security Forces composed of 110,000 ground troops and a 7,590 maritime 
force were established in August 1952, Yoshida made a speech at National Safety 
Agency in which he declared that ―the establishment of the National Safety Forces 
was the foundation of the future independent Japanese military forces.‖361 Some 
internal documents of the National Security Forces also clearly showed that those 
engaged in the organization recognised its establishment would eventually become 
the national independent military forces.362 Indeed, this new organization later 
turned into the Japan Self-Defence Forces in 1954. This proposal was nevertheless 
meant to meet the US demand for rearmament and it domestically could explain 
that the new establishment was to enhance Japan‘s internal security.363 This was a 
tipping point for postwar Japan as ―Yoshida made the crucial decision to create the 
armed forces within the Constitutional restrictions rather than to revise Article 
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9.‖364  
 The constitutionality of SDF has been a controversial issue ever since while 
the Japanese government has always interpreted that the status of SDF is 
legitimate. It is because Article 9 (peace clause) of the constitution does not deny 
Japan‘s right for self-defence. As a result the constitution permits Japan to possess 
self-defence capabilities which are kept to a minimum.365 SDF‘s main role is solely 
self-defence and lacks offensive capability－―land, sea and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained.‖ 366  Moreover, SDF cannot be 
employed for offensive purposes.367 It is not difficult to imagine that this legal 
interpretation is quite controversial. The government claim of the constitutionality 
of SDF is rather a political interpretation. If one reads it literally, the legal existence 
of SDF is truly questionable. Even those in SDF questioned themselves the legal 
status of their establishment. One retired general of Air Self-Defence Force said in a 
Japanese online TV programme that he reckoned that Article 9 did not allow Japan 
to possess SDF when he was a cadet at the National Defence Academy.368 In short, 
Japan‘s defence policy in the early 1950s was not necessarily a reflection of its 
military logic or Japan‘s threat perception. It was a direct diplomatic compromise.369     
 America eventually accepted the proposal of establishing SDF and expected 
future rearmament of Japan on its own initiative and responsibility for its national 
security.370 Yet this was not completely satisfactory to Dulles. He asserted that 
without a clear responsible attitude toward mutual defence, ―the United States was 
not disposed to assume obligations which Japan could not now reciprocate.‖371 He 
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also stressed that ―Potential aggressors have little respect for peoples who have no 
will to fight for their own protection or to make the sacrifices needed to make that 
fighting significant. Also, they know that such peoples do not attract allies to fight 
for their cause. For all of these reasons, local defense is important.‖372 To be sure, 
Japan wanted explicit US security protection given its own small military 
capability.373 For Dulles, Japan had to take more responsibility for at least its own 
defence and collective security for the Asia Pacific. The matter of mutual defence 
later became a point of contention when the US and the Japanese government 
negotiated over the revision of the 1951 security treaty. Christopher Hughes 
speculated that the Japanese government did not want the mutuality in the treaty 
due to its fear of entrapment (Japan might unwillingly be dragged into war started 
by America).374 Yet he could not furnish any evidence.375  
   Be that as it may, Yoshida was quite successful in that Japan maintained 
only a small-scale self-defence force.376 This is what Yoshida had aimed for: the 
maintenance of the lightly armed self-defence force (its military capacity was kept 
to a minimum level constrained by Article 9), primary pursuit of economic growth 
by closely aligning with the US and dependence on the US-Japan security alliance 
for Japan‘s security.377 This is known as ―Yoshida Doctrine.‖378 In fact Yoshida did 
not completely opposed rearmament while it is true that the Yoshida line enabled 
Japan to recover quickly and to achieve Japan‘s economic miracle in the Cold 
War.379 Yoshida believed that Japan should have full-fledged armed forces when it 
recovered from the war. He was, however, certain that the time was not ripe yet.380 
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Dulles even wanted the revision of the Japanese constitution for further 
rearmament, but this was not politically acceptable to the Yoshida administration. 
The Japanese government was simply not ready to establish a full-fledged army.381  
 Yoshida‘s principles become a cornerstone of the post-war Japan‘s grand 
strategy.382  Japan successfully revitalized its economy and became the second 
largest economic power by the late 1960s.383 As Mochizuki succinctly described the 
postwar Japanese security context, ―Japan has adhered to a strategy which relied 
upon the American security guarantee, permitting the country to have a minimal 
defense capability and to concentrate on economic development.‖384 The doctrine 
was widely received on the grounds that the Japanese were extremely exhausted 
and devastated by war. For them the top priority was placed on Japan‘s 
rehabilitation, economic recovery in particular after the total defeat. The ―Yoshida 
doctrine‖ should be understood in a very distinct post-war context where Japanese 
forces were disbanded, the peace constitution was introduced, and the 
peace-seeking society was developed out of a war-weary Japan. This emotional 
reaction, indeed, became a principal drive for postwar Japan.385 For postwar Japan, 
the issue of rearmament was not a mere problem of economic recovery but a 
political and emotional predicament as well.  
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IV.Figure: Military Expenditure as Share of GDP 
Source: Military Spending, Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending, accessed 
2 February 2019. 
 
 Gradually the US government understood the Japan‘s financial struggle 
and the fragility of the society. Even Dulles, for instance, recognised Japan‘s 
position.386 The Eisenhower administration moderated further its view on Japan‘s 
rearmament and virtually recognised Yoshida‘s policy of gradual rearmament in an 
incremental fashion. Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida and US 
President Eisenhower issued on 10 November 1954, indeed stated that  
 
It was agreed that the economic well-being of the Japanese people is a matter of 
importance to the entire free world. The achievement of improved economic 
conditions in Japan depends partly upon the ability of the Japanese people 
themselves to pursue sounds and constructive internal monetary and other 
economic policies and partly upon Japan‘s ability to expand its trade with other 
countries…The United States is aware of the efforts which Japan is making to 
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solve its difficult economic problems and will continue to examine sympathetically 
means whereby it can assist the Japanese people to advance their well-being.387  
 
 NSC 5516/1 of 1955 (US Policy Toward Japan) further suggested that the 
US government ―should avoid pressing the Japanese to increase their military 
forces to the prejudice of political and economic stability.‖388 The US government 
was aware that ―Both economic austerity and the defense program are essentially 
unpopular with many segments of the Japanese public, and require major political 
efforts if they are to be achieved.‖389 In the meantime, the US government still 
wanted to ―assist Japan to develop military forces which will eventually be capable 
of assuming primary responsibility for the defense of Japan.‖390 Obviously the 
rearmament issue illuminated Japan‘s postwar military aversion. Interestingly, 
when it comes to demanding rearmament, as the US government conceded, it ―has 
limited capacity to influence Japanese action.‖391 Even though the USA attempted 
to urge Japan to rearm itself through the diplomatic negotiations, both the 
Japanese government and the Japanese public were adamant and did not allow any 
radical change in rearmament. While the Eisenhower administration did not give 
up its policy of Japan‘s rearmament, it softened the tone of the issue. Two years 
later, Eisenhower told Prime Minister Kishi that ―Japan can be a true partner only 
if it is strong spiritually, in the sense of combating the dangers of communism, 
strong economically, and possesses defense forces capable of making it a real ally in 
case of attack in that part of the world.‖ The Eisenhower continued and stressed 
that ―the great burden in the Pacific lies upon the United States, and…for that 
reason our forces stationed in Japan have been larger than would otherwise have 
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been the case.‖392 Eisenhower still implied that Japan should assume responsibility 
for self defence and regional defence. 
 For Japan, the tightened bilateral relations between the two countries 
further enabled Japan to revitalize the Japanese economy not least because of 
Japanese access to the US market and ―the United States is Japan‘s largest foreign 
customer and source of supply (20 % of its export trade and 40 % of its imports).‖393 
In 1956 Japan‘s Economic White Paper stated that ―Finally our economy has proved 
that we are now at the end of war‖ denoting that the Japanese economy had 
recovered from the post-war depression.394 While the Japanese economy started to 
revive from the early 1950s, Japan experienced nuclear dangers again in March 
1954. This incident eventually thwarted US nuclear policy toward Japan.   
 
The Third Bombing: The Daigo Fukuryumaru Incident  
 
    The postwar US-Japan negotiations on Japan‘s rearmament proved that 
the issue could not be dealt with in isolation from Japan‘s postwar military-averse 
culture and its low military posture. Although the Japanese nuclear allergy has 
been taken for granted since 1945, it was not so evident until 1954. In 1954 
Japanese nuclear mentalities were clearly identified. Thereafter, it became evident 
that nuclear weapon was unacceptable to postwar Japanese society.  
 On 1 March, 1954 a Japanese fishing boat, Daigo Fukuryumaru (Lucky 
Dragon) was irradiated and contaminated by nuclear fallout from a US 
thermonuclear test (code-named Castle Bravo) on Bikini Atoll.395 One of the crew 
members, Aikichi Kuboyama, died one year later because of acute nuclear radiation 
                                                   
392 FRUS, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 183, p. 374. 
393 Ibid., Document 28, p. 53. See also Leffler, ―Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991‖, p. 68; 
Mike M. Mochizuki: ―Economics and Security: A Conceptual Framework‖ in Green and Cronin (eds.), 
The U.S.-Japan Alliance, p.231. 
394 Nenji Hokoku [Annual Report], Economic Planning Agency, 1956, available at 
http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je56/wp-je56-0000i1.html, accessed on 15 May 2017. 
395 Robert A. Divine: Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1954-1960 (New York: 
Oxford U.P., 1978), pp. 3-4. 
105 
 
disease. His death made headline news in Japan.396  
 US official‘s statement that the Lucky Dragon was a Soviet spy ship, doing 
espionage provoked Japanese resentment despite the fact that the ship was out of 
the off-limit area. 397  This incident not only triggered Japanese memories of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also cast a dark shadow on US-Japan relations, 
sparking anti-American sentiment.398  
 This nuclear test aroused public fears and anti-US sentiments and caused 
further direct life problems for many Japanese people. It turned out that tens of 
fishing boats were also contaminated and thus, Japanese fishermen had to throw 
away tons of fish. Some fishing markets including the largest market of Japan, 
Tsukiji Fish Market, and fish stores were temporarily forced to close. Due to 
concerns about food safety, fish stores posted a note that ―we do not sell Bikini tunas 
here.‖ This was a critical situation or ―tuna panic‖ given that fish is the Japanese 
primary source of food.399 As one critic rightly pointed out,  
 
Over the next 10 months, 414, 584 kg (457 tons) of fish were confiscated and destroyed 
instigating a major diplomatic and international incident between America and Japan. 
No longer were the atomic bombings considered as tragic incidents of the past but of a 
paralyzing present, bringing those events back into sharp public focus and encouraging 
many to support those who had survived the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings400 
 
 The Lucky Dragon incident, coming two years after the taboo of discussing 
all things nuclear was lifted by the US, sparked the so-called Japanese ―nuclear 
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allergy.‖ Thereafter, the Japanese started to advocate the ideal of the ―nuclear free 
world.‖401 As for the concept, ―nuclear allergy‖ is interpreted as a negative reaction 
to any matter related to nuclear weapons apart from peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
The term itself first appeared in the 1960s when a nuclear-propelled submarine 
made a port call at Japan.402 There were large demonstrations against the nuclear 
submarine visit in the local area (e.g. Sasebo) as we shall see. Japanese were 
extremely sensitive about such a visit as the submarine had an adjective ―nuclear.‖ 
Even though not all nuclear-powered submarines were armed with nuclear weapons, 
they were directly associated with nuclear weapons as far as the Japanese were 
concerned. The term, nuclear allergy, since then has broadened the meaning. Now it 
generally denotes strong anti-nuclear sentiment.403 ―Nuclear phobia‖ and ―nuclear 
hysteria‖ are similarly used to describe Japan‘s fervent anti-nuclear sentiment.404 
As far as US-Japan nuclear relations (especially with respect to the future 
deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to Japan) were concerned, the Lucky 
Dragon incident was a turning point. It is often described as ―the third atomic 
bombing‖, or ―the second benchmark in Japan‘s nuclear history‖405 discharging 
oppressed resentment from the US occupation period.406 Anti-nuclear sentiment 
stemming from Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not initially felt but the incident in 
1954 made it clearly visible. As one Japanese analyst succinctly held, ―Although the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are now recognized by almost all Japanese as 
the origin of anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, in the early 1950s, the seriousness of 
these events was not widely understood in Japan due to the [previous] media 
censorship imposed by the GHQ.‖407 Furthermore, Japanese did not want to think 
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back on their disastrous experience in war marked by the atomic bombing.The word 
Yuiitsu no Habkukoku (the only country ever suffered from atomic bombing) started 
to be widely used in Japan from the mid-1950‘s onward as a direct result of the 
lucky Dragon incident.408 One NSC report of 1955 also analysed the situation and 
rightly commented that ―Because of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, Japan 
has an unusually intense psychological vulnerability to the threat of nuclear 
weapons. This was evident in the reactions in Japan to the Fukuryu Maru incident 
of March 1954.‖409  
 This incident attracted nationwide petitions of 30 million Japanese people, 
one third of the whole Japanese population at the time, demanding the suspension 
of nuclear tests. Following the incident, Japanese opposition to American nuclear 
testing ensued. 410  This incident also produced several vocal anti-nuclear 
organizations such as Gensuiikyo and Hidankyo.411 The Eisenhower administration 
was concerned about the possibility of the public outcry accelerating Japan‘s 
neutralism or even anti-American sentiment.412 The US ambassador to Japan, 
John Moore Allison (1954-1957), sent a telegram that the vessel was not doing 
espionage.413 It also stressed that Japanese psychological vulnerability to nuclear 
weapons and the possibility of Soviet exploitation of such a problem (psychological 
warfare). 414  One American intelligence report released in August 1954 that 
predicted some probable developments through 1957 pointed out that neutralist 
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sentiment in Japan would probably increase and it would continue to be critical of 
US policy.415 Worse still, Allison, even noted that ―Japan does not consider itself an 
ally or partner of the United States but rather a nation which for the time being is 
forced by circumstances to cooperate with the United States.‖416   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The USA (and the GHQ led by General MacArthur) had clear occupation 
policies when it came to Japan. These were ―demilitarisation‖ and ―democratisation‖ 
including disarmament clearly represented by the peace constitution, Article 9 in 
particular. Japan‘s embrace of the US occupation policy has successfully prevented 
Japan from becoming a military power as the USA initially sought. Ironically this 
restrained the legitimacy of the altered US policy for rearmament of Japan. The loss 
of the Republic of China as a dominant power to control the Chinese continent and 
the outbreak of the Korean War drastically transformed America‘s occupation 
policies toward Japan. Now these were focused on ―economic recovery‖ and 
―rearmament.‖ The course of the occupation was reversed. With the advantage of 
hindsight this drastic change was an ultimate strategic failure of US grand strategy. 
The US government could not achieve its ultimate aims: ―rearmament‖ and a 
―leading player‖ in containing communist in the Far East.417 These two goals were 
closely connected as Dulles even wanted a stronger Japan closely aligned with the 
USA so that Japan would take a more burden of regional defence.       
 In this regard, the biggest US strategic failure was the introduction of the 
new constitution. It became one of the strong barriers for the USA to demand 
Japan‘s rearmament. Had it not been introduced and therefore not been 
institutionalized, Japan‘s rearmament would have been much easier. The brake was 
institutionalized by Americans themselves. Once it became institutionalized and 
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accepted, it also became difficult to change the constitution. In addition to the new 
constitution, postwar Japan avoided facing military affairs. Following the 
devastating war, the Japanese top priority was the rehabilitation of its economy but 
not its military which ultimately destroyed the country. The early postwar period of 
anti-military feeling was probably natural. The Japanese needed somebody to be 
blamed for tremendous losses the country suffered. On the one hand, the USA was 
still somewhat successful in inducing Japan to establish a small scale military 
establishment: from the National Police Reserve to the SDF. On the other hand, 
Japan or Yoshida to be more accurate established the SDF without revising the 
constitution despite the fact that its nature is completely military. This has become 
a controversial political issue since its establishment in 1954. Due to the existence 
of Article 9 (peace clause), a massive rearmament programme was nearly 
automatically excluded. As a US government special report well summarised, ―Both 
popular attitudes and constitutional proscription have handicapped the 
development of Japan‘s defense…Pacifism was enshrined in…Japan‘s post-war 
constitution.‖418  
Japan‘s defence spending throughout the Cold War was relatively small in 
view of its economic capacity (virtually 1 % ceiling of GNP). After the Japanese 
economy started to recover followed by the Korean War (chosen Tokuju), Japan 
suffered from the ―Third Bombing‖ (the Lucky Dragon incident). This incident 
triggered Japanese memories of the war and the atomic bombing. The Japanese 
sense of victimhood arouse as well. It was a natural reaction for the Japan to dread 
nuclear weapons and feel that they did not even want to see nuclear arsenals near 
them. This is why the US deployment plan of Honest John missile provoked an 
angry response.   
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Chapter Three 
The Nuclearisation of US allies and Japan‘s Perceptions of a Nuclear Base  
 
As the use of nuclear power for other purposes develops, the emotional distinction 
between nuclear and conventional weapons will decrease. The real question…is 
when the time will come when Japan will permit the introduction of nuclear 
weapons. 
―Masayoshi Ohira419 
 
 Japan‘s complete defeat of World War Two doubtlessly had an enormous 
impact on the course of postwar Japan‘s defence. This chapter shows that the rise of 
fervent Japan‘s anti-nuclear sentiment did not stop the Eisenhower administration 
from seeking a stronger Japan even armed with tactical nuclear weapons as part of 
Eisenhower‘s grand strategy, ―New Look.‖ Having faced fervent Japan‘s nuclear 
allergy, the Eisenhower administration attempted to utlise the ―Atoms for Peace 
Programme‖ in order to educate the Japanese about the salience of nuclear 
technology as a first step toward the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. 
Arguably it was during the 1950s that Japan had the highest possibility to be 
nuclearised given the fact that the Eisenhower administration sought to make such 
nuclear arrangements. The chapter examines how the US and the Japanese 
government treated sensitive nuclear issues that emerged in the 1950s and how the 
USA ultimately compromised on these issues. In the 1950s US-Japanese relations 
were precarious and the presence of US troops stationed in Japan was seen as the 
continuation of US occupation. Neutralism appeared widespread in the eyes of US 
diplomats and the USA did not want a neutral Japan in any form. The chapter also 
looks at how the non-military and nuclear path was further reinforced in the period 
between 1955 and 1964. 
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US Failed Attempts: the First Appearance of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence 
 
 Ambassador Allison sent a telegram that highlighted Japanese 
psychological vulnerability to nuclear weapons and the possibility of Soviet 
exploitation of such an issue (psychological warfare). 420  Despite the clear 
emergence of the Japanese nuclear allergy, the US military still sought to introduce 
nuclear weapons into Japan. 
 While US air forces wanted to store nuclear weapons at US bases 
throughout Japan as with Western Europe, the State Department denied such 
action.421 The Eisenhower administration expanded the size and variety of nuclear 
bombs and deployed US nuclear forces globally on the basis of the ―New Look‖ 
strategy.422 The first and foremost business for the Eisenhower administration was 
to bring the prolonged Korean War to a rapid end.423 A pledge to pay his personal 
visit to Korea and to end the war was part of the Eisenhower‘s election campaign.424 
This public announcement was indeed considered to be one of the decisive reasons 
that elected him as President.425 
  Drawing lessons from the Korean War, the Eisenhower administration had 
a strong desire for the avoidance of another Korean War.426 Indeed the Eisenhower 
administration chose to move toward more reliance on nuclear threats over a large 
conventional standing army so as to lessen defence spending inflated by the war.427 
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Even though the ―New Look‖ policy is often simply summerised as ―More Bang for 
the buck‖, its logic was more complex and overarching than its critics castigated.428 
It was Eisenhower‘s strong belief that ―A vital factor in the long-term survival of the 
free world is the maintenance by the United States of a sound, strong economy.‖429 
  In parallel with this long-haul approach, it was in this context that the 
so-called ―Massive Retaliation‖ was introduced and remained ―the basic orientation 
of American defense policy‖ throughout the Eisenhower administration 
notwithstanding severe criticism.430 ―Massive Retaliation‖ publicly evinced how 
America would use nuclear weapons and thus, it served as the very first declaratory 
strategy of its kind.431 Dulles‘s speech on 12 January 1954 was believed to introduce 
the term, ―Massive Retaliation‖ although he never stated such words.432 What 
Dulles did actually say was that ―Local defense must be reinforced by the further 
deterrent of massive retaliatory power‖ as local defence with conventional force 
alone was not strong enough to deter the Soviet Union.433 What Dulles really aimed 
to achieve was to gain political advantage through a threat of ―massive 
retaliation.‖ 434  The true nature of ―Massive Retaliation‖ was ―calculated 
ambiguity‖435 because the Eisenhower administration actually did not explicitly 
explain the circumstances under which the USA would implement the massive 
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strike, making the Soviet Union unsure about a US response.436 According to Nixon, 
―Eisenhower always stressed that it is important not to tell an enemy what we 
would do, because he could prepare to meet it, but even more important not to tell 
an enemy what we would not do because it would encourage him to push us 
around.‖437 
 According to the distinguished political scientist Samuel Huntington, ―The 
decision to place greater reliance upon nuclear weapons was a key aspect of the New 
Look‖ and it implied that ―reduction in conventional armed forces would be 
paralleled by increasing capabilities in tactical nuclear weapons.‖438 It is worth 
mentioning that the USA ―moved, by the mid-1950s, from an era of nuclear scarcity 
to the threshold of an era of nuclear plenty…From approximately 50 bombs in 1948, 
the US stockpile grew to perhaps 300 in 1950, to at least 1, 000 in 1953, to 18,000 by 
the end of the Eisenhower administration, and into the 30, 000 range in the 
mid-1960s.‖439  
 Personally President Eisenhower was sympathetic toward the 
nuclearisation of close US allies. In February 1960 Eisenhower stated that he had 
―always strongly favored the sharing of our weapons.‖ 440 The military rationale 
behind the overseas deployment of US nuclear weapons was that the capability of 
US ground force deployed in the US allied states would be further strengthened ―by 
provision of short-range nuclear weapons.‖441 Indeed, NATO started to rely on US 
tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe for local defence from 1953 to 
substitute the new weapons for manpower and compensate NATO‘s conventional 
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weakness with these arsenals against the Soviet Union. NATO accepted the ―New 
Look‖ approach of defence.442  In December 1957 NATO agreed ―to establish stocks 
of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance 
in case of need.‖443 In June 1958 the Eisenhower administration amended the 
Atomic Energy Act (concerning development and control of nuclear energy) in order 
to share sensitive nuclear information on technical specifications of the weapons 
and actual atomic weapons with close US allies. Late in 1958 US 
intermediate-range ballistic (IRBM) missiles Thor were deployed in Britain under 
―dual-key‖ arrangements. 444  In order to reassure Europeans, the Eisenhower 
administration in the late 50s also made decisions to send its IRBMS (Jupiter) to 
Italy and Turkey. They were deployed in Italy in 1960 and in Turkey in 1961 
respectively.445 Interestingly the US military had a similar policy toward Japan as 
we will see below.  
 Another key tenet of the ―New Look‖ strategy was the creation of a more 
extensive alliance network to contain communism and deter communist 
aggression. 446  Dulles also placed a high priority on collective security with 
America‘s alliances. In his Foreign Affairs article, Dulles asserted that ―the 
cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defense. 
They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can develop for 
itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility.‖447  Based on the strategic 
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logic of the importance of the global alliance network, the Eisenhower 
administration started to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the Far East as well. It 
was designed to lessen its vulnerability by increasing more targets for Soviet 
military strikes. 448  It is also important to note that before the emergence of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, foreign bases were crucial for the USA to carry 
out its air (nuclear) strikes.449 More specifically foreign bases were vital for nuclear 
operations before B 52 strategic bombers with intercontinental flying range came 
into operation in 1955 in that B-29s and B-47s with their limited flying range were 
capable of attacking the Soviet Union only from its peripheral areas such as 
England, Turkey and Japan.450  As one analyst observes, ―The basic strategic 
concept underlying all American war plans called for an air offensive against a 
prospective enemy from overseas bases.‖451 Indeed, Dulles stressed this aspect: 
 
Without the cooperation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate 
massively against the war industries of an attacking nation. That requires 
international facilities. Without them, our air striking power loses much of its 
deterrent power. With them, strategic air power becomes what Sir Winston 
Churchill called the ‗supreme deterrent.‘452 
 
 In terms of Japan‘s strategic location, Japan was one of the key strategic 
areas in close proximity to the Korean peninsula, China and the Soviet Union. As 
already noted, it is important to bear in mind that the US government also wanted 
Japan to assume a more active defence role due to its very strategic location. From 
Japanese perspectives, Japanese military leaders certainly feared Soviet‘s invasion 
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from the Northern part of Japan in a manner of the Korean War in Japan and the 
key strategic areas of Japan for protection were indeed Hokkaido and Tsugaru 
Strait－both are Northern Japan.453 The location of these places was a strategically 
key exit to the pacific.454 Throughout the Cold War, Soviet invasion of air space and 
its large naval presence around Japanese waters naturally posed a threat to 
Japan.455 As a general rule, geographical proximity ―breeds issues for dispute, 
provides territory contiguous to both parties, which facilitates combat, and triggers 
incentives to sign up allies which are able to distract the neighbor elsewhere.‖456 
Furthermore, proximate powers can more easily and physically pose an acute threat 
to one than those that are in the distance.457 One analyst even asserted that ―If the 
Soviet wanted to invade Japan, it would certainly have the military capabilities to 
do so.‖458 The CIA also estimated that the Soviet Union possessed the military 
―capability of conducting a major amphibious airborne offensive against Japan; 
simultaneously assaulting Hokkaido and northern Honshu; or of invading 
Hokkaido first, to be followed by an invasion of Honshu‖ although it concluded that 
the possibility of such an attack was remote.459  
 Of course, unlike West Germany that has continuous neighbours, a direct 
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outright invasion of Japan by the Soviet military was much more challenging 
because of its insular status and US air and naval superiority (the Seventh Fleet 
equipped with both conventional and nuclear arsenals) combined with the SDF‘s 
defence capabilities.460  Yet due to Japan‘s geographical proximity to the Soviet 
Union, Japan, needless to say, could not have been intact, had a war between the 
superpowers broken out.461 Strikingly, Dulles maintained that ―It is in Asia that 
Russian imperialism finds its most powerful expression.‖462  
 Japan was considered to be the strategic base of US nuclear strikes as part 
of nuclear operations against China and the Soviet Union. 463  Moreover, the 
Eisenhower government started to halve the numbers of 200,000 troops in Japan by 
the end of 1956 based on the ―New Look‖ strategy.464 Behind this shift, there also 
was growing resentment over the continued massive presence of US ground troops 
after Japan regained its independence in 1952. The Eisenhower administration was 
clearly aware of the domestic sentiment. Eisenhower indeed stated: 
 
 We are aware of the problems created for Japan, and also for the United States, by 
the presence of our troops in Japan. We do not like to be anywhere where we are 
not wanted. We are therefore ready to consider beginning to withdraw our troops. 
We realize that in a crowded country the presence of foreign troops causes 
unusually acute problems and we are ready to talk about that as one of the ways in 
which we can help.465  
 
As a result, Japanese had to increase military strength by themselves to fill a 
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security gap to be created after US troop withdrawal from Japan.466 Since the USA 
depended more on US nuclear deterrence, a large expensive standing army was not 
essential. Throughout the Eisenhower administration, the solution probably lay in 
new technology. In the words of Dulles,  
 
The essential thing is that a potential aggressor should know in advance that he 
can and will be made to suffer for his aggression more than he can possibly gain by 
it. This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more 
mobile deterrent power. The method of doing so will vary according to the character 
of the various areas.467 
 
This general statement did not directly indicate that the USA needed to deploy its 
nuclear weapons to Japan. The Eisenhower administration was nevertheless clearly 
saw the value of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Japan. In December 
1954 the Eisenhower administration first authorised the deployment of non-nuclear 
weapon components to US bases in Japan. In fact around the same time, a number 
of media reports emerged on the plans on US nuclear weapon (Honest John missile) 
introduction into Japan.468   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
466 Ibid., Document 43, p. 89 ; FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 18, Japan; Korea (Washington D.C. : GPO., 
1994), Document 190, p. 378. 
467 Dulles, ―Policy for Security and Peace‖, p. 358. 
468 See Memorandum For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ―US of Atomic Weapons‖, 8 February 1955, Special 
Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, 
Box 2, RG 59,NARA and Letter to Reuben B. Robertson, Jr from Herbert Hoover, Jr, 18 November, 
1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy 
Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA. 
119 
 
III. E. Table: The Numbers of US Forces in Japan and SDF 
 
US Forces, Japan Self Defence Force (SDF) 
1952 260,000 117, 590(National Security Forces) 
1953 250,000 120,323 (National Security Forces) 
1954 210,000 152, 115 (SDF onwards) 
1955 150,000 149, 769 
1956 117, 000 197, 182 
1957 87,000 204, 105 
1958 65,000 222,102 
1959 58,000 230,935 
1960 48,000 230,934 
Source: Nakajima, Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku, p. 156. 
 
 The then US ambassador to Japan, Douglas Macarthur II (General 
MacArthur‘s nephew: 1957-1961), later also confirmed that he had a talk about the 
deployment plan of US nuclear weapons in Japan with the Japanese government.469 
Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama (1954-1956) stated in March 1955 that ―Japan had 
no reason to decline the US deployment of nuclear weapons to Japan if [military] 
power sustains peace‖ although he retracted his words following the severe public 
outcry against his statement.470 In response to the Hatoyama‘s statement, the State 
Department noted that ―this might give us some color of a claim of Japanese 
acquiescence in the event of a leak as to such deployment.‖471 
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 That said, this was an optimistic observation. One memorandum sent to 
the Secretary of State in August 1955 observed the Japanese reaction to the missile 
(Honest John) introduction and explained that ―There is a very considerable furor 
over introduction of Honest John rocket launchers into Japan.‖472 Hatoyama faced 
the much more severe backlash than he had expected. Later the same year 
Hatoyama made an assertion that if the US government requested the Japanese 
government for the introduction of US nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan, 
the government would certainly reject such a request. He reiterated that the USA 
could not deploy nuclear weapons in Japan without our consent. He implied that he 
would resign if this rule was violated and nuclear weapons were introduced by the 
USA.473 Around the same time similarly Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu 
assured at the Diet that the US military did not have any nuclear weapons in Japan. 
Moreover, he said that he had a special agreement with Ambassador Allison that 
the US military forces did not have any intention of bringing its nuclear weapons 
into Japan or create a nuclear base in Japan in the future without our consent.474 
This was, however, a complete falsehood arousing Allison‘s ire. 475  Allison, 
nevertheless, understood that the severe political climate of Japan against the 
introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan.476  
 While it is uncertain why Shigemitsu made this remark, it was not difficult 
to conclude that Shigemitsu‘s action was aimed to placate public apprehension. In 
other words, this statement was reassurance to the Japanese public that was 
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strenuously opposed to the nuclear presence on Japan‘s soil.477 Notably, in August 
1955, the first Gensuibaku Kinshi Sekaitaikai (World Conference Against A & H 
Bombs) held in Hiroshima proclaimed its slogan that ―non-introduction of nuclear 
artillery, non-nuclear storage and non- expansion of military bases for war 
preparation.‖478   
 Honest John missiles were after all deployed to a US base (Camp Drake) 
close to Tokyo in summer. The missiles were reported to be unequipped with nuclear 
warheads.479 Indeed the official study of the Defence Department revealed in 1975 
that ―Only nonnuclear components, however, were authorized for Japan.‖480 As far 
as the Japanese government was concerned, a missile without a nuclear warhead 
was interpreted as a non-nuclear weapon.481 The decision to deploy non-nuclear 
missiles was made on account of ―the bad political situation then existing in Japan, 
it was decided that nuclear components would not be deployed to Japan.‖482 Yet the 
deployment of complete nuclear weapons was still militarily desirable with a view 
to enhancing the combat capability and readiness of US forces in Japan.483  
 This introduction was an American test to closely monitor the Japanese 
public reaction and Weinstein analysed that ―If there had been no public outcry, or if 
it had passed more quickly, the United States Government would probably have 
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continued to press for the atomic warheads in Japan.‖484 In reality, as American 
embassy in Tokyo noted, Japan ―has trembled at the introduction of the ‗Honest 
John‘ rocket, has indicated lack of concurrence in the storage in Japan of atomic war 
heads…‖485 It must be stressed that in the US military point of view, nuclear 
weapons were needed to protect American troops in Japan as well. Two months 
before his death (November 2016), President Nixon‘s Defence Secretary Melvin 
Laird spoke to NHK (Japan‘s national public broadcasting corporation) and 
expressed America‘s security concerns about Japan‘s non-nuclear status. He said 
that ―we [the US forces in Japan] were standing there naked.‖ 486 This acute reality 
eventually led to the conclusion of the secret nuclear agreement (reintroduction of 
US nuclear weapons into Okinawa in cases of emergency) partially in return for the 
reversion of Okinawa as we will explore in the Chapter Five. 
 Having faced the vehement repugnance after the thermonuclear test and 
the Honest John incident, President Eisenhower backed away from the deployment 
plan in the end. Ambassador Allison also opined that ―it would be most unwise to 
attempt to bring nuclear components into Japan now unless there is urgent military 
necessity to do so…‖487 The US military too was acutely aware of this political 
difficulty when a joint Map Exercise FUJI took place in Japan between 24 and 28 
September 1957 where nuclear weapons played a role. They faced an acute 
challenge: ―The most difficult problems concerning atomic weapons involved 
introduction of atomic weapons into Japan, which the Japanese would not agree to 
prior to joint U.S.-Japanese declaration of emergency, and their use in hostilities, 
which was approved only if Japan were attacked by atomic weapons or if the two 
governments considered the situation to be grave.‖488 Yet it was to somewhat 
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sanguine about the prospect of future introduction of atomic weapons into Japan 
because ―the door has been left open for a change in policy as soon as public opinion 
will permit.‖489 As a provisional and immediate military measure, the JCS was 
authorized to have an access to nuclear components stored adjacent to Japan (most 
probably Okinawa) and use the completed weapons in times of contingency.490 In 
other words, nuclear components became available to the military commander in 
Japan and they were united with non-nuclear components such as Honest John 
missiles as nuclear weapons in face of imminent armed attack. As we will see below, 
this contingency plan even continued in the 1960s. This was the very first 
appearance of US END over Japan. The US government nevertheless failed to 
introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. 
 Interestingly Dulles was reported to describe the Japanese ―nuclear allergy‖ 
as ―a wave of hysteria.‖491 One US State Department‘s intelligence report of 1957 
analysed that ―The intensity of Japanese public reactions to association with 
nuclear weapons in practical ways has limited the effectiveness of Japan‘s security 
arrangements with the US. In the present climate of domestic opinion, for examples, 
the Japanese Government could not publicly agree to storage by US forces of 
nuclear weapons in Japan and still retain office.‖ It went on to observe that 
―Japanese opinion is a controlling factor in the formulation for Japan‘s national 
policy toward nuclear weapons.‖492   
 In the end, Dulles, who had long advocated rearming Japan, advised the 
US military to renounce its nuclear deployment plan to Japan.493 Indeed, these 
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non-nuclear components were removed from Japan as a Japanese nuclear allergy 
had not waned away while one of the potential courses of action for US nuclear 
plans in Japan was ―Secretly to replace non-nuclear components with sealed pit 
weapons when the former become obsolete‖ as this was the most desirable military 
option. It was, however, politically the most unrealistic one as well.494  
 While Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (1957-1960) articulated in the Diet 
in May 1957 that it was not entirely correct to say all nuclear weapons were 
unconstitutional in light of the technical development, he also claimed that Japan 
would not allow any US nuclear battalion to be stationed in Japan.495 He was 
attentive to the nuclear-sensitive Japanese public. Kishi‘s statement apparently 
had some political effect on the Soviet Union. The Soviet embassy in Tokyo sent a 
warning note to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating that ―Japanese 
statesmen…have recently been making statements which can only be interpreted 
as attempts to secure the legality of nuclear armament.‖ It then expressed the 
Soviet desire for ―the permanent neutrality of Japan.‖ 496  In respect to this 
possibility, one American government official stressed that a neutral Japan was 
simply an immediate political objective of the Sino-Soviet bloc.497  
 Although Kishi believed that nuclear weapons for the exclusive purpose of 
self-defence were constitutionally permissible, he conceded that the Atomic Energy 
Basic Law of 1955 (Article 2 in particular) limited development and use of nuclear 
energy to solely peaceful programmes. Successive Japanese governments have 
inherited this understanding of the legality of an independent nuclear deterrent.498 
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As to his stance on nuclear weapons, he later clarified that at that time he did not 
think that Japan would acquire nuclear weapons but nuclear weapons were 
constitutional if nuclear weapons could be used defensively for national defence.499 
In fact Japanese Foreign Ministry officials are reported to have discussed a 
Japanese option of acquiring nuclear weapons during the Kishi administration. Vice 
Foreign Minister Hisanari Yamada informed US ambassador to Japan, MacArthur 
that the nuclear option was under scrutiny. Yet he also maintained the difficulty of 
realising such an option considering the foreseeable general public reaction to the 
decision.500  
 One CIA report rightly assessed that the Japan‘s nuclear option was widely 
unwelcome in Japan and Japanese conservative leaders including Kishi ―take the 
position that Japan‘s future greatness must rely primarily on economic rather than 
military strength.‖501 Since Hatoyama‘s statement on the possibility of hosting US 
nuclear weapons, however, no politicians had explicitly and positively favoured 
welcoming US nuclear forces onto the Japanese soil. It had become a great political 
risk for the Japanese leaders. This norm has not changed yet. In 1983 Prime 
Minister Nakasone (1982-1987), for example, stressed that there were no nuclear 
weapons throughout Japan due to the Japanese non-nuclear stance.502 This fact 
contradicts one analyst‘s claim that ―Japan has since the 1950s regarded the 
extension of a US nuclear umbrella to be integral to its national security 
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strategy.‖ 503  While it is true Japan could have obtained visible US nuclear 
assurance, it instead rejected such an offer. 
 
Japan‘s Encounter with Nuclear Energy 
 
 The US nuclear storage plan on Japan was renounced while in fact the 
Eisenhower administration did not eliminate the plan completely as NSC 6008/1 
revealed. 504  It was nevertheless concerned that Japan‘s adamant anti-nuclear 
sentiment would be wedded to socialist movements. The US officials suggested that 
Eisenhower‘s ―Atoms for Peace‖ programme (the promotion of civilian uses of 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes)505  should be utilized to counter the 
movements and get the Japanese familiar with and exposed to atomic energy and 
conventional defence, fostering a healthier environment for an appreciation of the 
nuclear weapons programme.506 Japan was indeed the first country to house an 
American atomic energy library and Japanese young researchers were invited to US 
cancer research facilities. This series of activities was considered to be of use ―in 
reducing existing psychological barriers as well as fostering a greater appreciation 
of the realities of the military atomic program.‖507  
 After this first step forward, ―indoctrinating Japanese leaders as to the 
necessity for nuclear weapons to the defense of the free world‖ was a natural 
measure for clearing away political obstacles to the storage of atomic weapons in 
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Japan.508 The ultimate goal was to get the Japanese government to accept US 
nuclear weapons even during peacetime as desired earlier.509 This situation is often 
described by a Japanese proverb: Doku wo Motte Doku wo Seisuru (Send a thief to 
catch a thief).510 Japan and the USA reached an agreement for cooperation on 
nuclear energy in November 1955. The US government was to provide Japan with 
uranium and research nuclear plants. The Japanese government enacted the 
Atomic Energy Basic Law the following month. The basic policy of Japanese nuclear 
research, according to the main writer of the bill, Yasuhiro Nakasone, was after 
all.directed to solely peaceful purposes.511 Yet it did not exclude the possibility and 
capability of building Japanese nuclear weapons.512 In theory, ―As the number of 
power and research nuclear reactors in a country increases, the potential for 
producing plutonium will increase, which could reduce the time between decision 
and the availability of nuclear weapons.‖513 
 Based on the bilateral cooperation, some American political leader even 
proposed a plan to build a nuclear power plant in Hiroshima so that the people in 
Hiroshima could benefit from the new technology for medicine and industry. The 
implication of this idea was to tranquilize the anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan.514 
As is not difficult to imagine, the proposal faced a strong backlash by the people in 
Hiroshima. Eisenhower learned the severity of Hiroshima‘s anti-nuclear 
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sentiment.515 That said, the ―Atoms for Peace‖ programme was widely welcome in 
Japan in part due to the Japanese mass media‘s positive media coverage. Yomiuri 
Shimbun, in particular, featured on atomic energy and atomic exhibitions 
throughout Japan and the Japanese leaders trusted that the civilian use of atomic 
power was harmonious with Japanese society.516 It was also reflected in popular 
Japanese sci-fi animation. Tetsuwan Atomu later made into a Hollywood film under 
the name Astro Boy is powered by nuclear power as his name suggests, Atom(u). He 
represented an image for ―Atoms for Peace‖ in Japan. At that time atomic energy 
was representation of state-of-art scientific technology.517 
 One of the main reasons why atomic energy was highly promoted in Japan 
was the lesson of history that Japan should not prioritize morale superiority over 
scientific and material prowess. One of the well-known examples that highlights 
Japan‘s superiority in terms of morale was that the Imperial Japanese Army and 
Navy completely underestimated the importance of logistics in a war. One command 
manual of the Imperial Japanese Army produced in 1928 clearly stated that the 
destiny of a battle would be ultimately determined by morale strength. Material 
power was important but it was not a decisive factor to influence the course of a 
war.518 This morale-oriented spirit was often reiterated by Prime Minister Hideki 
Tojo. He famously said war was a clash of wills and war could be only lost that one 
thought lost and if one‘s resistance is exhausted; ―we can win the war as long as we 
believe in victory and our moral resistance persists until the end of the war.‖519 
Furthermore, Tojo and other Japanese military commanders tended to claim that 
the most important thing of all in war was one‘s ―morale superiority‖ but not the 
superiority of technology and weapons. As a consequence Tojo‘s argument about 
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morale rendered Japan blind to overall US material superiority to Japan.520 The 
Japanese penchant for prioritizing morale was rooted in its victory in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904. This victory was led to a complete illusion and ―victory 
disease‖ (The Japanese military falsely believed that Japanese victory was due to 
its non-material strength especially its superiority in morale and command skills) 
convincing the Japanese military that the Japan was never to be defeated.521  
 As political scientist Taketsugu Tsurutani rightly observed, ―The martial 
spirit…ultimately led to the disaster of 1945.‖522 Japan indeed undervalued the 
critical role logistics played in the Pacific theatre, even causing Japanese soldiers to 
die from starvation in islands like Guadalcanal. The island was called Gato (an 
island of starvation) in Japanese. Many Japanese soldiers died from starvation even 
before engaged in fighting because there was not enough food and ammunition to 
sustain their combat operations (the logistic line was completely cut off). 523 
Incidentally many Japanese soldiers did not know the existence of the US Marine 
Corps until they physically encountered the Marines in Guadalcanal, implying 
that the Imperial Japanese Army did not devote enough time to study its enemy, the 
American armed forces, even though the USA had been a potential rival for years 
before the war.524 Worse still, the Imperial Japanese Navy did not protect the 
Japanese convoy routes and let US submarines destroy Japanese merchant ships 
(they were there without any naval protection most of the time). 525  Japan‘s 
merchant fleet carried the crucial resources Japan needed to sustain wartime 
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economy and supply its military. After the war, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo himself 
admitted one of the reasons why Japan lost the war was it did not protect its 
merchant fleet and sea lane.526 Needless to say it was completely absurd and 
disastrous that Japanese war plans ignored the importance of logistics and 
intelligence (material power of its enemies). 527 
 Because of this costly lesson learnt from World War Two, the National 
Defence Academy of Japan intentionally offered no humanities course until 1974.528 
The principal education policy of the school put a great emphasis on scientific logic 
(Kagakuteki Shikoryoku) and its curriculum followed Tokyo Institute of Technology, 
the most renowned science and engineering university in Japan. The new school 
was not designed to produce ―great warriors‖ but rational men. The first head of the 
academy, Tomoo Maki, and Prime Minister Yoshida worked out the basic curriculum 
and orientation of the new academy. For Yoshida the new academy had to 
accommodate all the cadets for three different services in one place. They had to 
study together at the same school rather than study separately in three different 
locations so that future officers would not mistrust and oppose each other in a war 
where close collaboration among the different services is required. It was believed 
that one of the main reasons why Japan lost the war against the USA was that 
there was no close operational and intelligence collaboration between the army and 
navy, let alone a clear joint operational plan.529  
 According to one graduate (Class 1966), who later became the Chief of staff 
of the Ground Self-Defence Force (equivalent to the Chief of Army), it was 
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self-evident that the academy was designed to educate future officers in science and 
engineering because there was no humanities course (when he entered the 
academy) but science and engineering. All the cadets could study was those science 
subjects. Those officers equipped with scientific knowledge were expected to think 
scientifically but not intuitively and irrationally (acting without any concrete data 
and information about material strength and military capabilities of an enemy). As 
a result, scientific logic (Kagakuteki Shikoryoku) means that officers deal with 
military issues and make appropriate judgments predicated on scientific data and 
evidence.530 In short, the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme in Japanese 
military education. 
  Additionally, the new technology (atom) was seen as a chance to revitalize 
postwar Japan since it was the state of art technology. Japan had a slogan of 
―catching up and surpassing the powerful Western nations‖ such as Great 
Britain.531 For those who advocated nuclear energy, they could not waste another 
minute since Japan was banned from doing research on atoms during the US 
occupation period.532 Advancing the new energy was wedded to Japanese National 
Pride.533 As we shall see, advancing Japan‘s civilian nuclear technology was one of 
the biggest reasons why Japan was reluctant to sign and ratify the NPT. It took six 
years for Japan to ratify it after Japan signed it due to Japan‘s concerns that the 
NPT system, safeguards in particular, would hinder its civilian atomic energy 
programme.  
   That being said, it was truly uncertain whether the civilian atomic 
programme of Japan contributed to assuaging the Japanese nuclear allergy. One 
CIA intelligence report of 1957 posited that ―While Japanese opponents of nuclear 
weapons are extremely vocal at present, considerable work is being done in the area 
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of peaceful uses, which will probably serve in them to develop a less emotional 
public approach toward military uses as well as contributing to the potential for a 
military program.‖534 Such an analysis was nothing but naïve. While the ―Atoms for 
Peace‖ programme was widely received in Japan because of its appeal as the 
state-of-art technology and the historical lesson learnt from the war, the Japanese 
civil nuclear energy programme was advanced in isolation from the military use of 
nuclear energy (nuclear weapons). Throughout the rest of the Cold War, US nuclear 
weapons were never stored on the mainland of Japan. The Japanese government 
was extremely sensitive about the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons in 
Japan. 
 
Prime Minister Kishi, US Nuclear Introduction Plans and the New Security Treaty 
of 1960   
 
    As already noted, the first US-Japan security treaty of 1951 was generally 
considered as an extension of the US occupation. Shigemitsu believed that it should 
be revised to be a more equal one and ―Japan was in a ‗subjugated‘ position under 
the Treaty.‖535 The treaty indeed bore the deep impress of US occupation when 
Japan was in a precarious situation. The treaty did not even set forth US 
responsibility for the protection of Japan. Worse still, the US forces in Japan had 
the right to suppress large-scale domestic unrest.536 This was considered as a clear 
violation of Japanese sovereignty. As discussed above, although the US could not 
manage to bring its own nuclear weapons into Japan, technically the US could 
introduce its nuclear weapons into Japan as there was no stipulation on the change 
or deployment of specific military weaponry in the 1951 security treaty.537 For 
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Japan, the new security treaty meant recovery of its sovereignty as an independent 
state. It sought to regulate the operational use of the US military bases in Japan as 
well as the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.538  
 In 1955 Prime Minister Hatoyama and his Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu 
made the first effort to replace the old treaty to add the provisions that stipulated 
mutual defence. Their effort was seen as premature by Dulles as he believed that 
Japanese defense capability was still weak and its defence effort was not 
satisfactory to the USA.539 Dulles implied that ―a sufficient legal framework and 
amended constitution‖ meaning the amendment of Article 9 were required to 
replace the old security treaty at that time.540 The Hatoyama government was 
precarious and it was unlikely to amend Article 9 in such a political climate.541 The 
major task of revision of the security treaty was left to the next Prime Minister. 
 Following Hatoyama, Nobusuke Kishi, a former Class-A war crime suspect 
but a pro-American political leader, became Prime Minister (1957-1960).542 To be 
exact, Tanzan Ishibashi succeeded Hatoyama, but he had the only two-month 
premiership due to his health issue, which led him to resign. Following the 
resignation Kishi replaced Ishibashi. Kishi strove to complete Hatoyama‘s 
unfinished business as he felt that the treaty was one of the remaining problems 
from the end of the war between the USA and Japan, and the rise of public 
revulsion against the treaty due to its unequal character had to be contained. As 
well as the revision of the Japanese constitution, this was his primary political 
goal.543 Kishi put much more efforts to eliminate unequal provisions in the treaty.544 
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It is important to look at the backdrop of his political move.  
 In 1956 Japan joined the United Nations (UN) after rapprochement with 
the Soviet Union and became a non-permanent member of the Security Council two 
years later. Japan‘s Economic white paper of 1956 also declared that war was finally 
over. It was no exaggeration to say that ―Japan‘s growth during the 1950‘s was 
phenomenal‖ not least because ―Between 1952 and 1960, Japan‘s exports tripled, 
and her imports more than doubled‖ and she became a leading global exporter.545 
Unlike in 1951 when Japan signed the first security treaty with the USA, Japan 
was regaining its power and political clout, coincident with the rise of the sense of 
further independence among the Japanese public.546 Indeed when Kishi replaced 
Tanzan Ishibashi as Prime Minister, ―resentment against Japan‘s subordinate 
position under the security treaty‖ was becoming more evident.547 
 To hasten the process of revising the security treaty Kishi expanded JSDF 
further and devised the first national defence policy. The Kishi government adopted 
the Basic Policy on National Defence and the First National Defence Build-up Plan 
in 1957. Kishi actually formulated the new defence policies prior to his visit to 
Washington in June 1957 with a view to demonstrating the Japan‘s own defense 
efforts to the American government as this was considered essential in order to 
revise the security treaty.548 The joint communiqué following the meeting between 
Kishi and Eisenhower issued on 21 June 1957 indeed stated that ―The United 
States welcomed Japan‘s plans for the buildup of her defense forces and accordingly, 
in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Security Treaty, will substantially 
reduce the numbers of United States forces in Japan within the next year, including 
a prompt withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces.‖549 The Japanese 
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government also successfully included the lines in the communiqué that ―The 
President and the Prime Minister affirmed their understanding that the Security 
Treaty of 1951 was designed to be transitional in character and not in that form to 
remain perpetuity.‖550 Based on this mutual understanding, the two governments 
proceeded the negotiations over the revision of the treaty. 
  The newly adopted Basic Policy proclaimed that ―Japan tackles external 
aggression on the basis of the security arrangement with the United States until 
such time that the United Nations will be capable of functioning in preventing such 
aggression in the future.‖551 In this connection, Kishi was reported to acknowledge 
to Ambassador MacArthur ―Japan‘s dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to 
prevent general war‖ in May 1957.552 The existing record does not specify exactly 
why he made this comment and how he viewed US END. Considering the context 
where Kishi‘s comment was made (they were discussing the importance of the 
revision of the 1951 security treaty), he might have said it to show his stance that 
unlike the Japanese public he was not fervently opposed to US nuclear weapons. In 
this regard it is important to note that the US government had to treat nuclear 
issues with Japan very sensitively after the Lucky Dragon incident of 1954 and the 
severe public opposition to the deployment of the Honest John to Japan in the 
following year. In short, his comment might have been tactical to demonstrate that 
he was the man whom the US government could reliably work with. Indeed 
MacArthur reported that ―we can do business with him...‖553 To be sure Kishi might 
have genuinely believed that US END was important for Japan‘s defence. While we 
do not know the truth, the existing record does not show that MacArthur gave Kishi 
any assurance that Japan was or would be protected by the US nuclear umbrella.554 
Even if MacArthur had assured Kishi that the USA would defend Japan by nuclear 
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means, his assurance would have not made much of a difference. He was just an 
ambassador and he was not even a cabinet member of the Eisenhower government. 
Given that END consists of deterrence and assurance and the latter is more 
important than the former to Japan, assurance would have had to be offered by 
President Eisenhower or at least Dulles. This was not to happen until January 1965 
when President Lyndon Johnson directly assured Prime Minister Eisaku Sato that 
US security commitments to Japan included nuclear protection.555  
 It is important to note that the basic defence policy also posited that Japan 
set out to builds up its defence capabilities on a step-by-step basis to the extent that 
self-defence permits and within national capacity and circumstance.556 Based on 
this, Japan also adopted the concept of Senshu Boei (the exclusively 
defence-oriented policy). According to Japanese Ministry of Defence, ―The 
exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the 
event of an attack…the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by 
Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense…The policy…refers to 
the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the 
Constitution.‖557 By implication this suggested that Japan ruled out an option of 
the use of threats of force for a political purpose and its homeland had to be 
attacked first to take military action (retaliation) in the name of self-defence.558 It 
also illuminates that the Japanese constitution limits military actions as an 
independent country.559 According to the Basic Policy on National Defence and the 
concept of Senshu Boei explicitly articulated that Japan‘s security would depend on 
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the US military cooperation as Yoshida laid out.560 Since this declaration, it has 
become a tradition for the leader of the DPJ to follow the Japan-US cooperation 
line.561 
 Around the same time, Ambassador MacArthur feared that the USA ―would 
see Japan drift progressively into neutralism‖ as he sensed that neutralism was 
rising among Japanese society.562 He stressed:  
 
 our basic objective with respect to Japan is…at least firmly align and, if possible, to 
knit Japan so thoroughly into the fabric of the free world nations that it will not in 
the next few years be easily tempted to take an independent course leading either 
to non-alignment or neutralism (at best of the Swiss-Swedish type or at worst of 
the Nehru brand) or worst of all some form of accommodation with the Communist 
bloc.563 
 
It might be difficult to imagine but postwar Japan was greatly colored by a socialist 
ideology. There was, for example, a dominant postwar narrative: the Korean War 
broke out because South Korea and the USA (the capitalists) invaded North Korea 
which some Japanese socialist intellectuals called Chijou no Rakuen (The Last 
Paradise on the earth).564  Of course, the truth is the other way around. Yet 
intellectuals and the mass media altogether repeatedly released the fabrication, 
which in turn misled the Japanese public, giving the narrative credibility.565  The 
US government too was clearly aware that it had to offset Marxist attitudes among 
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Japanese intellectuals.566 
 Ambassador MacArthur also urged the US government to revise the 
security treaty now that Japan finally had a reliable and seasoned political figure, 
appreciating Kishi‘s defense efforts.567  The rise of the Kishi government had, 
MacArthur argued, ―reached the turning point in our relations with Japan.‖568 He 
expressed his voice to President Eisenhower that ―if we do not work with Japan, 
within five years they will be headed in the wrong direction…They might even turn 
to work with the Communists.‖569  MacArthur also described Kishi favourably 
because he ―was content to seek security, prosperity, and a measure of diplomatic 
independence for Japan in partnership with the United States, as a loyal member of 
the Free World.‖570 Dulles, too, who was initially against the revision of the security 
treaty, softened his attitude toward the issue as Kishi‘s visit to the USA neared.571 
The President‘s special consultant, Frank Nash, even told Dulles that ―Mr Kishi 
was not only the ‗best bet‘, but the ‗only bet‘ we had in Japan for the foreseeable 
future…‖572 
 Stressing the strategic importance of Japan, MacArthur spelled out: 
 
 if there is not adequate deterrent military strength deployed in this area, the 
Communists might be tempted to use force (just as they did in Korea). Therefore, 
the continued presence in the Far East of the minimum necessary deterrent 
military strength is vital to the preservation of peace, and Japan is of major 
importance to the proper deployment and logistical support of our deterrent 
forces.573  
 
He also stressed ―the significance of Japan going into a long-term defense treaty 
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with us [the USA] incalculable psychologically and politically.‖574 Subsequently 
Eisenhower came to acceptance of MacArthur‘s suggestion and proceeded to the 
conclusion of the new security treaty without demanding the revision of the 
constitution.575  It is important to note that some US officials believed that the new 
security treaty would eventually lead the Japanese government to allow the US 
introduction of nuclear components (core) and itself to have its own nuclear 
weapons.576  
 Behind this rationale, in the late 1950‘s the US military had wanted to 
alter the Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment in order for the USA to store its nuclear 
weapons on Japan eventually, only to fail.577 As the revision of the US-Japan 
security treaty appeared evident, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) sent 
a telegram to JCS in which the CINCPAC demonstrated military desirability of 
introducing nuclear components to Japan while acknowledging such an option was 
politically daunting. The CINCPAC was also aware that there would be no 
satisfactory solution for both the US and Japanese government in this regard and 
suggested that the US maintain the neither confirm nor deny policy.578 This policy 
initiated in 1958 and it made the existence of nuclear weapons on board deliberately 
equivocal.579   
 For the JCS, it was logical to strengthen Japanese military capabilities; ―a 
strong Japan allied to the United States would be a deterrent to a general war, and 
a deterrent to military conflict short of general war.‖580 The JCS also pointed out:  
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 The United States would prefer that Japan integrate appropriate atomic weapons 
into the Japanese self-defense forces…it will be expected that she will make a 
greater contribution to the collective non-Communist strength in the Far East. In 
order to make this contribution Japanese self-defense forces must eventually be 
equipped with the most modern conventional and atomic weapons.581 
 
A more immediate course of action was to ―Seek governmental agreement for 
introduction of atomic weapons into Japan for use by U.S. Forces.‖582  
 From some Japanese defence practitioners‘ perspectives, Japan‘s proximity 
to the Soviet territory as well as historical encounters with the Soviet Union might 
have brought about Japanese anxiety. This war experience with the Soviet Union 
rendered Japanese views about the intentions of the Kremlin highly suspicious. 
Past behaviours may affect strategic perceptions about an old enemy, creating a 
hostile reputation whether or not it would be accurate and reasonable. To be sure, 
the past behaviours and present behaviours of the Soviet Union would have been 
different but Soviet‘s past behavious were certainly an indicator of its crisis 
behaviour. 583 As a result, Japan might have had legitimate fears and animosity 
against Russia‘s conduct. Psychologically, if not strategically, some Japanese might 
have wanted to have US tactical nuclear weapons on its soil given its geographical 
proximity to the Soviet Union. Yet the strategic environment of Japan was 
relatively moderate compared to Europe not least after the Soviet-Japanese Joint 
Declaration of 1956, which opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and 
enabled Japan to join the United Nations (UN) finally in the same year. Japan 
became a non-permanent member of the Security Council two years later. It was 
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also militarily formidable for the Soviet forces to send massive forces into Japan.584  
 That said, it is worth noting that several senior officers from Japan Ground 
Defence Force (JGDF) were sent to United States Army Command and General 
Staff College (CGSC) in Kansas. They studied how to employ nuclear artilleries 
operationally in battle fields. General Kenjiro Mitsuoka, who was invited by US 
army to Kansas when he was colonel, later thought back to his course at the college 
where he learned how to use tactical nuclear weapons (nuclear artilleries) in battle 
fields to offset operational weakness against a hypothetical adversary in detail. He 
wrote a report on a contingency plan involving the use of America‘s theatre nuclear 
weapons in case of Soviet attacks. 585 He translated the text books used at CGSC 
into Japanese for educating more Japanese officers about the actual use of nuclear 
weapons. This was carried out with the Pentomic division in mind. He even 
proposed that JGDF create a special nuclear battalion.586  
 In response to the nuclear age, the US army fielded the short-lived 
Pentomic division (1956-1961) in 1956. It was specially trained and designed to 
operate and survive in a nuclear battlefield, and was equipped with tactical nuclear 
weapons. 587 Tactical nuclear weapons with low-yield warheads (10 kilotons) were 
considered to be suitable for operational use in the battle field.588 It was deemed 
necessary for nuclear contingencies in the Far East in the post-Korean War era 
while this shift was probably more politically motivated so as to emphasise its role 
in nuclear operations.589 In fact when Honest John missiles were introduced into 
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South Korea in 1958, the US Army clearly envisioned that the Pentomic devision 
there would be equipped with those missiles. 590  The creation of the nuclear 
battalion also was not an absurd idea on the grounds that ―Strictly from a military 
point of view, possession of atomic weapon might be desirable for effective defense‖ 
although it might increase the risk of war.591 It is also important to note that the 
idea of ―limited nuclear war‖ was prevalent in the 1950s. Henry Kissinger ‘s Nuclear 
Weapons and Foreign Policy which advocated limited nuclear war was written 
against this backdrop and published in 1958.592 In the 1950s it was generally 
recognised in the West that warfare would be inevitably nuclear.593 
 Remarkably, General Kumao Imoto was reported to claim that Japan would 
need nuclear arsenals for its defence against a nuclear adversary and there was a 
possibility that Japan would create Pentomic forces in the near future during his 
visit to the USA in November 1958. 594  One year earlier Administrative vice 
minister of Defence, Keikichi Masuhara, told Chief Military Assistance Advisory 
Group, Japan, General William S. Biddle that Japan was not completely ready to 
accept US nuclear weapons in Japan while a possibility of nuclear armed forces and 
their deployment would be studied and ―Such forces would be activated prior to 
1960 if feasible.‖595 That being said, given that Honest John is a surface-to-surface 
missile, nuclear weapons would have been used on Japan‘s soil, most probably in 
Hokkaido (in proximity to Russia) against Russian invading forces. If that had been 
the case, Japan would have destroyed itself with another nuclear weapon.  
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 Additionally, the US military had an idea to introduce the NATO style 
nuclear-sharing arrangements to JSDF in order to deal with a Soviet nuclear threat 
while this was not an official proposal to the Japanese government. This was based 
on JCS‘s strategic consideration that ―Atomic weapons are needed as an integral 
part of the free world arsenal not only to serve as a deterrent…For best results and 
optimum defense, atomic capable delivery systems should be located in Japan.‖596 
It is also true that according to its internal documents, the JDA was keen on the role 
of NATO‘s tactical nuclear weapons.597 The JCS‘s stance on nuclear weapons for key 
US allies was unequivocal: ―For the long range period the most likely approach 
would be to seek Japanese acceptance of nuclear weapons under arrangements 
similar to those contemplated with the NATO countries.‖598 Around the same time, 
one top-secret NSC document posited that ―the United States should enhance the 
nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with term or provision 
to them of appropriate information, materials, or nuclear weapons, under 
arrangements for control of weapons to be determined.‖599     
 Japan was doubtlessly included in the selected US allies although the JCS 
was well aware that ―Under the present political climate in Japan, it would be 
optimistic to plan on the introduction of atomic weapons into Japan during the 
foreseeable future.‖600 Indeed the US government did not have an immediate plan 
to equip Japan with nuclear weapons or introduce them into Japan.601 At any rate, 
the signing new treaty meant that Japan would take more responsibility for not 
only its own defence but regional security in general. 
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 Finally, in January 1960, the US and the Japanese government reached an 
agreement on the new security treaty (the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security between the United States and Japan) and it was signed in Washington. 
The new security treaty was generally considered much more equal and firmer in 
terms of US security commitments to Japan than the old one.602 Article 5 of the new 
treaty finally stipulated US security commitments to Japan, (should Japan be 
attacked), which Japanese leaders had long yearned for.603 It read that  
 
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories 
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety 
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional provisions and processes. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof will be 
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures will be terminated 
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and 
maintain international peace and security.604  
 
 There are also some claims that Japan came under the US nuclear 
umbrella upon signing the treaty.605 Indeed, Larsen argued that ―the United States 
has long-standing security commitments to Japan through the US-Japan Security 
Pact. Both sides had always assumed that this meant the possible use of US nuclear 
weapons to protect Japanese territorial sovereignty against potential 
aggression…‖ 606  Some analysts also observed that the concept of extended 
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deterrence including the use of threats of nuclear weapons ―was enshrined in the 
language of the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty.‖607 This sort of reasoning is not entirely 
incorrect. Without doubt, US END is provided on the basis of the US-Japan security 
treaty. Yet as of 1960, this was not mutually understood. As discussed in the first 
chapter, NATO is the only nuclear alliance while its collective defence treaty does 
not state any US nuclear assurance. In the words of Beatrice Heuser, ―The text 
specifically leaves leeway for each Party to the Treaty to decide for itself what action 
it may deem necessary...‖608 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates: 
 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America will be considered an attack against them all, and  consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area.609  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof will 
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures will be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security. 
 
 To be sure, extended nuclear deterrence was provided as part of the North 
Atlantic treaty but as Heuser noted, what action to be taken is up to the NATO 
members. More crucially Article 5 does not guarantee American nuclear 
retaliation.610 In terms of security commitments, the Brussels Treaty of 1948 was 
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firmer.  Article 4 of the treaty read as follows  
 
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in 
Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all 
the military and other aid and assistance in their power. 611 
 
 More specifically US nuclear security commitments were provided through 
close discussion and consultation on the mechanism of US security assurances 
among the NATO member states; otherwise any country that had a security treaty 
with the USA would automatically be given the US nuclear umbrella. That is quite 
doubtful.   
 Moreover the analysts‘ analysis above can be emphatically denied given the 
existence of the nuclear umbrella debate of the 1960s where Japanese political 
leaders discussed whether Japan was under the US nuclear umbrella or not as we 
will see in the next chapter. As of 1960, there had been no bilateral talks on the 
subject at all. In fact, the mutual acknowledgement of the US security commitments 
including nuclear deterrence and serious discussions on a role of US nuclear 
deterrence for Japan‘s defence emerged in the mid-1960s. To be more accurate, this 
new security represented by Article 5 made extended deterrence (but not END) 
more explicit. At the time, the concept of US END was not officially and mutually 
treated as a key agenda. While the one side of the coin of END is assurance, there 
was no official assurance mechanism with respect to US nuclear protection of Japan 
in 1960.  
 Despite this shift in a more mutual defensive mode, the new treaty did not 
change the fundamental character of the US-Japan alliance: Japan provides bases 
and facilities to the USA and the US forces in Japan in turn utilise them for its 
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strategic purposes including contribution to the security of Japan as Article 6 
stipulated.612 Article 6 read that ―For the purpose of contributing to the security of 
Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the 
United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of 
facilities and areas in Japan.‖613 NSC 6008/1 of 1960 proclaimed that ―Militarily, 
Japan is the key to the defense of the Western Pacific against Communist 
aggression. Her logistic facilities and bases are indispensable to an economical and 
effective defense of the Far East.‖614 The new treaty also established the ten-year 
time period to terminate the treaty: ―after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, 
either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the 
Treaty, in which case the Treaty will terminate one year after such notice has been 
given.‖615 It meant that after 1970 the treaty could be technically abrogated at the 
request of either party as long as it was notified one year in advance, which 
unexpectedly shaped the course of the reversion of Okinawa in the late 1960s as we 
will see below.616  
 
Tacit Understanding of Transit Rights 
 
 Another Japanese major concern with respect to the new security treaty 
was doubtlessly the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan although the US 
could not freely bring its nuclear weapons into Japan at its will as the Honest John 
incident demonstrated. 617 Article 6 of the new treaty set forth the restricted use of 
US bases in Japan and the separate exchange notes stipulated the status of these 
bases: ―Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, 
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major changes in the equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as 
bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those 
conducted under Article 5 of the said Treaty, will be the subjects of prior 
consultation with the agreement of Japan.‖618 With this, Japan now had the power 
of a final veto over the specific US military equipment including the introduction of 
US nuclear weapons and operational use of US military bases in Japan in hostilities 
outside Japan. 619  The joint communiqué following the summit meeting also 
declared that ―The President assured him that the United States Government has 
no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese 
Government with respect to the matters involving prior consultation under the 
treaty.‖620  
 Behind this public agreement, however, the two governments made a secret 
deal regarding entry rights of nuclear weapons too as this issue could not be dealt 
with publicly. 621  Recognising the political infeasibility of obtaining a written 
assurance for such an agreement from the Japanese government, the US Navy 
explained that ―it probably would be necessary to make it a classified and therefore 
unpublished appendix to a future Mutual Defense Treaty.‖622 
 According to one recently declassified exchange of notes (commonly referred 
to as a ―Record of Discussion‖) dated on 6 January 1960, ―Major Changes in their 
equipment is understood to mean the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons, 
including the intermediate and long range missiles as well as the construction of 
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bases for such weapons.‖ 623  The American government understood that 
―Consultation was, however, not required for transit of ports or airbase in Japan by 
the United States vessels and aircraft, regardless of their armament.‖ Prior 
consultation was not called for introduction of non-nuclear components into Japan 
either.624 This military position was clear. In September 1958, the Chairman of the 
JCS, Nathan Farragut Twining, noted that ―The entry of U.S. warships into 
Japanese ports would not be a matter for joint consultation‖625 while he recognised 
that ―there is virtually no prospect of a solution which will satisfy both sides. The 
‗atom bomb‘ in any context still remains in Japan a matter of the utmost emotional 
intensity.‖626 
 At the time of negotiations over the new security treaty, however, the 
Japanese government reportedly did not share America‘s interpretation that US 
navy ships armed with nuclear weapons would be allowed to transit through Japan 
without subject to consultation with the Japanese government.627 That being so, 
one government document prepared for a series of Diet debates in the same year 
clearly articulated that ―major changes‖ signified the placement of nuclear 
warheads, medium and long-range missiles on Japan (no matter how short it was) 
and the construction of nuclear bases in Japan.628   
  To be sure, the US warships equipped with nuclear weapons made port 
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calls at Japan throughout the Cold War.629 It is worth nothing that one rationale 
behind a US submarine‘s visit to a port of a US ally was ―to reassure a U.S. ally.‖ 
For instance, ―In 1963, following the withdrawal of U.S. intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles from Turkey, the Sam Houston visited Izmir.‖630 Remarkably, this 
reassurance mechanism was more of a political challenge for Japan. Interestingly 
Japan did not share this US reassurance view at that stage.  
 In April 1963 the US Ambassador Edwin O, Reischauer met with Foreign 
Minister Masayoshi Ohira and told him that ―introduce...implying placing or 
installing on Japanese soil.‖ 631 Indeed the JCS understood that joint consultation 
would be called for only when US nuclear forces are deployed into Japan in time of 
emergency.632 Reischauer was rather confident about reaching complete mutual 
understanding with Ohira.633     
 When interviewed by a Japanese journalist in 1981, Reischauer publicly 
clarified the US position once again. It was the US government and military 
understanding that US naval vessels armed with either nuclear or conventional 
weapons were permitted to transit through Japan but were not permitted to store 
them on the Japanese ground on a long-term basis. He, however, admitted that the 
two parties did not codify this oral agreement. Nonetheless, introduction just meant 
the ―deployment‖ and the ―storage‖ of nuclear weapons on Japan, but not ―transit‖ 
and ―port call.‖634 Former Prime Minister Kishi actually backed Reischauer up on 
the matter and recalled that nuclear storage on Japan would be subjected to prior 
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consultation but the consultation would not be necessary for transit as this was not 
considered as ―major changes.‖635  
 At any rate this interpretation appears at least later shared by the 
Japanese leaders and officials especially those in Foreign Affairs. As one former 
administrative vice minister of Foreign Affairs admitted, a condition that required 
prior consultation was for the US government to store nuclear weapons in Japan. 
This rule did not apply to US naval ships carrying either nuclear or conventional 
arsenals that passed through Japanese waters.636  In view of this, one may argue 
that Japan actually did not have ―Invisible‖ END. Yet, it is important to clarify 
again that what makes ―Visible‖ END distinct from ―Invisible‖ END is the 
peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons on land of the US host nations for the 
purpose of visibility of reassurance. According to the US government interpretation 
above, ―introduction‖ was required for ―Visible‖ END. ―Invisible‖ END is distinct 
from ―Visible‖ END in that ―introduction‖ was never implemented and thus, 
―Invisible‖ END lacked nuclear sharing arrangements, a core component of ―Visible‖ 
END. Of course this does not alter the fact that US nuclear weapons were around 
Japanese waters. More importantly, as discussed above, Japan refused the 
introduction of US nuclear weapons. In other words, it refused the key component of 
―Visible‖ END.   
 Knowing Japan‘s anti-nuclear sentiment,637 it was nearly impossible for 
any Japanese leaders to concede that US naval vessels armed with nuclear weapons 
were allowed to transit through Japan. What successive Japanese governments did 
until 2010 was delivering an equivocal statement and employed an absurd logic 
that there was no request of prior consultation from the US government. Therefore, 
the US warships did not carry any nuclear weapons.638 This is what Japanese 
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people refer to, kusai mono ni futa wo shiro, meaning sweeping trouble under the 
rug and implying turning away from the real problem. This absurd logic was 
applied to evade political repercussions throughout the Cold War. 
 
The Kennedy Administration and Prime Minister Ikeda (1960-64) 
 
 Although Kishi succeeded in concluding the new defence treaty, there had 
been mass demonstrations led by Japanese leftists surrounding the National Diet 
building to protest against revising the new pact, chanting their unfounded 
message of ―Makikomare‖ (entrapment) and their slogan, Ampo Hantai (No to the 
new security treaty) even causing one fatality.639  Because of the fierce public 
repugnance, Kishi was forced to step down after the new security treaty came into 
effect in June 1960. Kishi was a member of the Tojo cabinet and a ―Class A‖ war 
crime suspect, which invited further public furor.640 As Ambassador MacArthur 
analysed, once Kishi made himself firmly committed to the new security treaty, the 
treaty issue could not be separated from Kishi.641 The vigorous impetus of the 
anti-security treaty campaigns naturally ceased after Kishi as an objectionable 
target resigned.642  
 Due to the massive media coverage, it was widely believed that a majority 
of the Japanese public opposed the treaty. This was not the case, however. The 
leading figures of the anti-new security treaty campaign were, in fact, Japanese 
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socialists. 643 MacArthur was clearly aware of a massive Communist campaign to 
neutralize Japan: ―Sino-Soviet Bloc has long had as its principal target in Asia the 
isolation, neutralization, and eventual control of Japan. It has skillfully directed a 
massive campaign of threats, inducements, and agitation against chronic weakness 
of Japan‘s democratic system.‖ 644  Soviet propaganda campaign urged Japan‘s 
neutrality and even implied the possibility of a nuclear provocation. At that time 
Prime Minister Kishi viewed that the communists were ―trying to alienate Japan 
from the United States. If even a small crack is opened between Japan and the 
United States, the communists will drive a wedge into it.‖645 It is worth mentioning 
that the Soviet Union made its sabre rattling and fired its missiles over Japan in 
January 1960 falling down to the Pacific Ocean.646 It is worth noting that the 
somewhat influential concept of ―unarmed neutrality‖ advocated by socialists was 
also supported by Soviet and Chinese communists. As long as this concept was the 
dominant thinking in Japan, they did not have to worry about the resurgence of 
Japan as a military power again. They could manage to keep Japan weak physically 
and psychologically.647 It is no surprise that the KGB provided some financial aid to 
Minoru Oda, the peace movement leader of Japan during the Vietnam War for his 
activities as revealed after the end of the Cold War.648  That said, it is true that this 
concept was somewhat popular in Japanese society regardless of Sino-Soviet 
Communist intervention. The Japanese public to some extent accepted the idealist 
norm.   
 In reality, even those including the members of the socialist party who were 
vehemently opposed to the security treaty had never taken a look at the treaty.649 
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Most ordinary Japanese enjoyed their normal lives and they were rather indifferent 
to the security issues.650 What Kishi truly desired to achieve was to regain further 
independence and initiative, but his political goals were never realised. 
 Owing to a severe backlash President Eisenhower ‘s visit to Japan was 
cancelled.651 It is notable that no sitting American President paid a visit to Japan 
until November 1974 when President Gerald Ford finally visited Japan. The 
memories of the mass anti-security treaty demonstrations were still vivid in 1974 
and in the end the Japanese government employed ten thousand policemen to 
ensure the safety of the President. 652  As the first sitting American President ever 
visited Japan, he made an interesting remark at the Japan Press Club on 20 
November 1974. There he said that ―I hope that my visit will be the first of many by 
American Presidents.‖653  
 Late in June 1960 Ambassador MacArthur sent a telegram to State 
Department. It analysed the current Japanese situation as follows: 
 
Although most Japanese appraise their economic interests in terms of alignment 
with free world and recognize the importance of American market, in the security 
filed there is an instinctive yearning on part of most Japanese for [a] world where 
they would not have to side with either American or Soviet giant but could sit it out 
on sidelines. This widespread form of latent neutralism is fed on [the] 
anti-militarist sentiments, pacifism, fuzzy-mindedness, nuclear neuroses and 
                                                   
650 One survey shows that the only 11 percent of the Japanese are willing to fight for Japan. See ―How 
Japan‘s youth see the Kamikaze pilots of WW2‖, BBC, 3 November 2017, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39351262, accessed on 3 November 2017. Strikingly the 
accommodation percent of nuclear shelters in Japan today is only 0.02 percent connotating 99.8 
percents of the Japanese can get killed by nuclear attacks in theory. The data is found on the website 
of Japan Nuclear Shelter Association, http://www.j-shelter.com/, accessed on 25 October 2017.  
651 FRUS, 1958-1960, Japan, Korea, Vol. 18, Document 162, pp. 304-305. 
652 Tara John : ―Here‘s What Happened During the First U.S. Presidential Trip to Japan‖, Time, 24 
May 2016, http://time.com/4346481/gerard-ford-president-japan-visit/, accessed 29 January 2019.  
653 Gerald R. Ford: ―Japan Press Club of the President‘s Speech and Statements‖, 20/11/ 74, Gerald R. 
Ford Presidential Library & Museum, available at 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0122/1252149.pdf, accessed on 29 January 
2019. 
155 
 
Marxist bent of Japanese intellectuals and educators.654 
   
 The US government sent a new ambassador, Edwin O. Reischauer 
(1961-1966) in March 1961, a Harvard professor who spent his childhood in Japan, 
with a view to improving damaged diplomatic relations with Japan.655 While it is 
widely believed Kishi‘s successor Hayato Ikeda‘s (1960-1964) general policy was 
economically oriented and conciliatory, Ikeda was actually a conservative politician 
who was clearly interested in nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.656 Yet it was 
just imperative of him to maintain a low profile attitude toward national defence by 
turning to the domestic attention to economic growth after the public backlash 
against Kishi.657  
 Due to his low profile attitude toward national defense and his 
economic-oriented policy, public debates on defense issues became muted. 658 
Throughout the Ikeda administration, Japanese economy boomed and this was 
when public opinion on the revision of the Japanese constitution and national 
defense became inattentive: their choice was the maintenance of limited JSDF 
military capability under the peace constitution. 659  At the same time, Ikeda 
understood well the salience of military power in international politics and even 
advocated Japanese indigenous nuclear weapons.660   
 As we have already seen, the Eisenhower administration had to renounce 
its plan to store nuclear weapons in the mainland of Japan as it had faced a 
vehement backlash. Interestingly this did not prevent the Kennedy administration 
from taking the same action. Due to the salience of the Japan‘s strategic location 
and military necessities, the Kennedy administration, too, sought a possibility of 
storing US nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. While admitting that the Japanese 
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were paranoid about eschewing another nuclear war, a policy paper of the State 
Department stressed that nuclear storage ―remains an important U.S. military 
objective to be pursued when politically feasible.‖661  
 Reischauer concluded that the US military plan to store US nuclear 
weapons on Japan‘s soil during peacetime was politically infeasible to the 
Japanese.662 While this was his assessment of the nuclear reality of the Japanese 
public at that time, he later implicitly suggested US nuclear weapon should be 
visibly deployed on Japan now that Japan‘s nuclear allergy was much mitigated 
than was in the 1950s and 60s.663 Notably, one policy guidance paper noted that 
―Maintain a pattern of consultation with Japan consonant with its status as the 
major partner of the U.S. in Asia, paralleling such consultations with top Western 
European leader.‖664  
 Since the Eisenhower administration failed to deploy US nuclear weapons 
in Japan the JCS devised a special contingency plan, ―High Gear‖, against this 
background. Since it had no operational nuclear weapons in the mainland of Japan, 
the US military planned that C-130s (a military transport aircraft) on a constant 
alert status in Okinawa would carry the nuclear components of atomic weapons to 
three American base in Japan－Itazuke in Fukuoka (Southern Japan), Yokota in 
Tokyo (Eastern Japan) and Misawa in Aomori (Northern Japan) in case of 
contingency. Edward Rice, deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern 
affairs, was opposed to the plan on the grounds that it would not have Japanese 
public approval, potentially causing unnecessary friction with the Japanese 
government.665 In view of the location of each base, the US air force in Japan was 
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probably to attack the Soviet Union and Communist China. At any rate the USA 
finally removed non-nuclear components from Japan in 1965 as ―by 1965 Pentagon 
official apparently decided that allergy was too difficult to cure.‖666 Even after this, 
the facilities related to the ―Single Integrated Operational Plan‖ (US strategic 
war-fighting plan) such as the Liaison office were established at Fuchu air base, 
Tokyo in 1967 and it was in operation until 1972.667 
 In view of this, it can be argued that Japan came under the US nuclear 
umbrella in the early 1960s. Yet the same situation had already existed when the 
Eisenhower administration attempted to store Honest John missiles in 1955. 
Morton Halperin, who served for the Johnson, Nixon and Clinton administration, 
well summarized the US stance that ―the focus during the 1950s and 1960s was on 
‗educating the Japanese about nuclear weapons‘ so that Japan would permit the 
stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory…‖668 This was more of America‘s 
unilateral action. The concept of US END was not mutually recognised on both 
occasions. In contrast, to some extent, Japan was trying to close the umbrella by 
refusing the introduction of US nuclear weapons. As one CIA intelligence report of 
1961 clearly stated, ―Antimilitary, particularly antinuclear attitudes remain 
extremely strong among the populace and susceptible to exploitation by socialists 
and Communists.‖669 While it is true that some Japanese conservative leaders 
believed that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, this sort of voice was a 
minority view.     
On the Japanese side Prime Minister Ikeda was actually the one who 
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approved to deploy Nike Ajax and MIM-23 HAWK in Japan.670  In fact a decision to 
introduce these surface to air missiles was made during the Kishi government.671  
It is important to note that he was also keen on US nuclear introduction to Japan 
for an economic reason. By placing nuclear weapons in Japan, he thought Japan 
could save defense spending as the USA and NATO did in the 1950s. While it was 
uncertain of how committed he was to the idea, he expressed his view that ―he had 
not been thinking so much of Japan‘s going into the production of nuclear weapons, 
but of the argument that the presence of US nuclear weapons in Japan might be 
necessary for its defense…he would be interested in learning more about the 
broader aspects of the nuclear armaments questions‖ when he met with Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk in November 1961. 672 
 While Nike Ajax and MIN-23 HAWK missile were not designed to equip 
nuclear warheads and one politician held at the National Diet that the creation of 
HAWK Battalions planned in the Second Defence Build-up Plan must be seen as a 
prelude of arming SDF with nuclear weapons.673 In the late 1950s a senior British 
officer suspected that Japan did not rule out a nuclear delivery platform (Nike 
missile) for its defence.674  While this analysis was not entirely correct, Ikeda 
personally seemed to be keen on nuclear arsenals. More importantly Ikeda also 
made a decision to approve the US nuclear submarine‘s first visit (USS Sea Dragon) 
to Japanese ports in August 1964.675   
While Ikeda was more concerned about Soviet nuclear forces, Japanese 
policy makers started to worry about a potential Chinese nuclear test. In reaction to 
this increasing concern, the Japanese government deliberately acted in a calm and 
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unemotional way.676  On 16 October 1964 China successfully exploded its first 
nuclear device. The following day the Japanese government voiced an objection to 
the nuclear test and made a short statement about the event that said that there 
was no immediate significant effect on Japan‘s defense as long as the Japan-US 
security treaty remained in effect. 677 At the same time, the Tokyo Olympic Games 
were taking place in Japan. Because of the excitement of the Olympiad, the nuclear 
test did not have a substantial impact on Japanese society. It produced neither 
public fear nor political debate at the National Diet.678 One report of Foreign 
Ministry also laid out that ―Only the existence of the U.S.-Japan security system 
keeps us from feeling any threat of foreign aggression and guarantees our security.‖ 
Yet it also stated that ―Though there is no present danger of direct military 
aggression against Japan, we still cannot feel completely at ease concerning 
Communist China.‖679  
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the key defence agendas between the USA and Japan in the 1950s 
was the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan during peacetime as NATO did. 
In contrast to NATO, Japanese unique experiences of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and 
Daigo Fukuryumaru made it impossible for the Japanese government to accept the 
introduction of US nuclear weapons. As Hatoyama learned the public backlash 
against the deployment of Honest John was massive enough for him to retract his 
previous statements that implied welcoming US nuclear weapons. As a consequence 
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of the strong public backlash, both Hatoyama and Kishi made a public statement 
that the Japanese government would not accept the deployment of US nuclear 
weapons on its soil. Without Japan‘s unique historical encounter with the atomic 
bombing, Japan would have had a more objective view on nuclear deterrence. 
Without peacetime forward deployment of nuclear weapons on Japan‘s soil, Japan 
cannot be considered as a nuclear alliance as opposed to one Japanese critic‘s false 
contention.680 Japan rejected the ―Visible‖ form of US END on its own free will. The 
US military did not manage to introduce any nuclear weapons into Japan due to 
concerns about a fervent public backlash.  
For Japan the Yoshida line created a posture of reliance on the USA for its 
security. Japan did not revise its American-made constitution throughout the Cold 
War and kept defence spending low even after the Japanese economy started to 
recover from the mid1950s. This chapter clearly demonstrates that the 
non-military-cum-nuclear path was reinforced. Once the self-reinforcing mechanism 
operated, it was difficult for both the US and the Japanese government to reverse 
the course. To some extent, it is not entirely incorrect to say the Japanese stopped 
thinking about defence issues as its own issue to tackle, and military affairs became 
disconnected from postwar Japanese society. Notwithstanding the public 
indifference, Japanese policy makers could not simply ignore the acute strategic 
reality of nuclear politics of the Far East as we shall see in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
The First Chinese Nuclear Test (1964) and the US Nuclear Umbrella over Japan 
 
 
 Japan is aware that security matters involve the survival of mankind…but that 
public opinion could not be ignored altogether under a democratic political system. 
The first level of awareness is most important but it must be balanced against the 
needs of public opinion. 
― Takeo Miki681 
 
It is highly unlikely that Japan would develop nuclear weapons, even if other 
countries less powerful than Japan did so.  
―Osamu Kaihara682 
 
 It is true that the Chinese nuclear test did not have a substantial impact on 
Japanese society. Interestingly one opinion poll conducted in December 1966 
demonstrated that nearly one third of respondents (28%) did not know that China 
actually developed nuclear weapons. 19 % out of 72 % (those who was aware of the 
Chinese nuclear programme) answered that Japan should abrogate the Japan-US 
security treaty and adopt a neutral policy. Only 10 % out of 72 % believed that 
Japan should also acquire nuclear weapons.683  
 On the contrary the test did have a great effect on Prime Minister Eisaku 
Sato (1964-1972), who replaced the ailing Ikeda in November 1964. It is also 
important to note that several Japanese secret studies on the feasibility and 
desirability of Japan‘s nuclear option in the late 1960s were directly driven by the 
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Chinese nuclear test too as we will see in Chapter Six.684  
 For Sato a nuclear China was a serious strategic problem.685 It definitely 
shaped the course of Sato‘s approach to the US government with respect to Japan‘s 
security.686 Sato, for instance, regarded a nuclear China as a ―Madman carrying a 
knife [Kichigai ni Hamono]‖ when China was making great progress in the 
development of nuclear missiles.687 This Japanese idiom described a nuclear China 
as an extremely dangerous entity. The use of such an expression actually implied 
that Sato probably thought a nuclear China was not rational but insane. To give a 
further example about Sato‘s perception of Communist China, Sato‘s executive 
secretary, Minoru Kusuda recalled that ―communist China would have probably 
been his [Sato‘s] biggest threat.‖688  
 Remarkably, Sato perceived that Communist China posed a more 
fundamental threat to Japanese security than the Soviet Union did. When China 
carried out its first nuclear test in 1964, the country was reported to possess only 
one nuclear bomb. On the contrary the total number of Soviet nuclear weapons was 
5220. The number included 193 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and 37 
submarines that were capable of launching submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM). Some of these submarines were operated in the Pacific and the Sea of 
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Japan. The Soviet Union possessed approximately 750 medium-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBMs) and IRBMs, which could attack Japan. Some of these missiles 
were based on the Pacific coast.689 With its few nuclear bombs, China did not target 
Japan but the Soviet Union. China moreover declared a ―non-first-use‖ policy. In 
other words, China would not use its nuclear weapons other than in retaliation.690 
Realistically the Soviet Union could pose a greater and more immediate threat to 
Japan but a threat perception is not all about military strength. As Huntington 
lucidly argued, ―States define threats in terms of the intentions of other states, and 
those intentions and how they are perceived are powerfully shaped by cultural 
considerations.‖691 In other words, threat perception is subjective and it may have 
nothing to do with actual military capabilities of a potential rival.692 Indeed China‘s 
military modernization was moderate and its military technology was still greatly 
behind Western powers throughout the Cold War.693 
 That said, China became the first non-white and Asian country to acquire 
nuclear weapons, which was a symbol of a major power and the most advanced 
technology at that time.694 The significance of the emergence of a nuclear China 
went beyond Japan‘s national security. It was concerned with Japan‘s national pride 
and coincided with the inauguration of Sato‘s conservative administration.695 It is 
also worth noting that Japan did not normalise its diplomatic relations with 
Communist China until 1972 while Japan had done so with the Soviet Union in 
                                                   
689 Norris and Kristensen, ―Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010‖, p. 81; International 
Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 1964-65 (London: The Institute for Strategic 
Studies., 1964), p. 3;Pavel Podvig (ed.): Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press., 2001), pp. 123-128, 135,237, 246, 273. 
690 Gregory Treverton: ―China‘s Nuclear Forces and the Stability of Soviet-American Deterrence‖, in 
Christoph Bertram (ed,): The Future of Strategic Deterrence, Adelphi Papers 236 (London: IISS., 
1980), pp 38-48.. 
691 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 34. 
692 See for example John Glenn and Darryl Howlett: ―Neorealism‖ in John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and 
Stuart Poore (eds.): Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate., 2004), p. 39. 
693 Sasae, Rethinking Japan-US Relaitons, p. 11; Luttwak, ―The Problems of Extending Deterrence‖, 
pp. 31-37. 
694 On the prestige aspect of nuclear weapons, see Scott D. Sagan: ―Why Do States Build Nuclear 
Weapons? : Three Models in Search of a Bomb‖, International Security Vol.21 No.3 (Winter 1996/97), 
pp.73-80; Anne Harrington de Santana: ―Nuclear Weapons As the Currency of Power: Deconstructing 
the Fetishism of Force‖, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 325-345. 
695 Kusunoki, ―The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan‘s Non-nuclear Policy‖, p. 32; Sugita, Kensho 
Hikakuno Sentaku, 90.  
164 
 
1956.696 
 Later, the Cultural Revolution might have had strong effect on Sato‘s 
perception of China‘s intention rather than capability. In Sato‘s eyes, a nuclear 
China was perceived as an irrational actor, which alerted Sato to Chinese nuclear 
developments.697 For a similar reason, the US government saw Communist China 
―as the ultimate revolutionary ‗rogue state‘, and in recent memory it had fought US 
troops in Korea, attacked India, threatened Taiwan, and armed the Viet Cong.‖698 
Already in November 1962 Kennedy‘s National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy 
stressed that ―A Red China nuclear presence is the greatest single threat to the 
status quo over the next few years.‖699 In this regard, China in the 1960s was much 
more threatening than North Korea‘s nuclear weapons today.  The USA even 
contemplated a military strike against the nascent Chinese nuclear production 
facilities while such military action was after all undesirable owing to the 
unbearable political and military costs, rife with considerable uncertainty.700 It is 
also no exaggeration to say the rise of a nuclear China was a watershed in the 
establishment of the NPT regime. From this point onwards, the USA and the Soviet 
Union were required to seriously work together to prevent the further spread of 
nuclear weapons. A nuclear China was considered to be a destabilising factor for the 
global balance of power. 701  In comparison to the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
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administration, the Johnson administration was more serious and committed to 
preventing further nuclear proliferation. It is important to stress that the Johnson 
administration considered that extended nuclear deterrence was one solution to 
inhibit US allies‘ ambition for acquiring their indigenous nuclear weapons. This 
point loomed large in the wake of a nuclear China. This chapter will explore how the 
emergence of a nuclear China coincided with the inauguration of the Sato‘s 
conservative administration affected the explicit emergence of ―Invisible‖ END.   
 
Sato‘s Stance on Nuclear Weapons and the Rise of a Nuclear-Armed China 
 
  Sato criticised Ikeda‘s low profile stance and the nuclear debates came back 
to the stage in the mid 1960‘s.702 He did not shy away from addressing Japan‘s 
security including nuclear security, striving to transgress the embedded 
anti-militarism of the post-war era. Sato could not simply sit still following the 
nuclear test and let ―China alone in Asia emerge as a world nuclear power.‖703 For 
the Japanese government a nuclear-armed China had a more political and 
psychological impact on Japan given deep-seated historical enmities toward China. 
This would inevitably create more opportunities to debate on defence more 
vigorously.704 It is true that a nuclear-armed China was not an immediate threat 
but a long-term threat.705 
 The US government viewed Sato as a conservative, pro-American and 
anti-Communist politician who was more enthusiastic and proactive about defense 
and even a proponent of acquiring nuclear weapons.706 As a defence-minded leader 
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Sato sought an early meeting with President Johnson with a view to discussing the 
Chinese nuclear test and the Vietnam issue.707 Sato gave a clear sign that the main 
agenda of the first summit meeting of 1965 was going to be Japan‘s security when 
he met with US ambassador to Japan Reischauer in December 1964. Reischauer 
suggested to Sato that the joint communiqué include a passage reaffirming the 
US-Japan defense treaty.708 It was also his belief that the most important US 
diplomatic objective with respect to Japan was to win over Japan to the US side as a 
more active partner.709 
  The Japanese talking points for the coming summit meeting given to the 
American side started with the issue of Japan‘s security, highlighting the 
importance of US-Japan security alliance and of US security commitments against 
a Chinese nuclear threat. It went on to say that China had to be convinced that any 
attack on Japan from China would invite US nuclear retaliation.710 In December 
1964 Sato articulated his view on an independent nuclear deterrent to Reischauer: 
―if [the] other fellow had nuclears it was only common sense to have them oneself. 
The Japanese public he realized was not ready for this but would have to be 
educated to this point, and he felt [the] younger generation showed hopeful signs of 
going this way.‖ Sato then clarified that this was just his personal view and did not 
represent Japanese public opinion.711 In Sato‘s eyes, the younger generation that 
did not directly experience the war was more objective about defence issues.712 
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Some two years earlier the American Embassy in Tokyo also reported that ―a 
growing number of Japanese have begun to focus more realistically on the 
consequences of Communist China‘s nuclear program.‖713  Moreover, two years 
earlier one Japanese foreign official similarly felt that ―Japanese opinion was 
already becoming more realistic about nuclear weapons, and he speculated that this 
trend might accelerate once China made progress in the nuclear field.‖714    
 Sato was also confident about Japan‘s technological prowess and said that 
nuclear weapons ―were much less costly than was generally assumed and Japanese 
scientific and industrial level was fully up to producing them.‖ Sato continued and 
insisted that ―[the] constitution must be revised, though time not yet ripe for 
this.‖715 Of course, this sort of reasoning was not uncommon at that time. The logic 
was straightforward in that ―If their opponent had, or was getting it, they too had to 
have it if they were not to fail in their patriotic duty‖ as a British Cold War diplomat, 
Rodric Braithwaite noted.716 In fact, two years earlier Sato had already expressed 
his nationalistic view. He told Reischauer that ―Japanese attitudes are changing, 
but slowly‖ and ―emphasized the importance of restoring a feeling of pride in Japan 
and an acceptance of the defence forces.‖717  
 Moreover, one CIA intelligence estimate report released after the Chinese 
nuclear test analysed that ―Japan has an advanced nuclear research and power 
program about as large as that of Italy and theoretically could produce nuclear 
weapons by the end of this decade if it desired. Like Italy, however, Japan does not 
have sufficient uranium for a weapons program.‖  Yet it also posited that ―The 
memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains vivid in Japan, and public resistance 
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to nuclear weapons is stronger than in any other country.‖718 Sato‘s comments on an 
independent nuclear deterrent was nevertheless significant in that ―Never before, 
had a Japanese leader expressed so openly the desire to develop nuclear weapons, 
even if those sentiments were only private ruminations‖ as analysts observed.719 
 Following Sato‘s eye-opening remark on Japan‘s nuclear option, 
Reischauer‘s analysis recommended that Sato needed ―more guidance and 
education by us than did Ikeda to keep him out of dangerous courses…and his views 
which are bound to leak out to some extent could set off some serious repercussions 
in Japan.‖ 720  At the beginning of the same month (December 1965), in fact 
Reischauer already suggested that ―We must…be very watchful of any tendencies in 
Japan to doubt the firmness of U.S. defense commitments or the value of our 
nuclear deterrent in defence of Free World positions in Asia and in Particular in 
Japan.‖721 An American background paper prepared for the visit of Sato, moreover, 
recommended that the US government convince Japan to rely on US nuclear 
deterrence for its security against nuclear threats rather than an independent 
nuclear deterrent. The US government should also cooperate with Japan on the 
development of its peaceful nuclear and space projects as a means to demonstrate 
its scientific superiority in Asia. This paper did not specify exactly how the US 
would defend Japan by its nuclear deterrence. It just asserted that ―the U.S. is both 
able and determined to come to their defense in a nuclear showdown.‖722 What this 
indicated was nevertheless that among many agendas one of the principal issues of 
the forthcoming meeting in Washington D.C was US nuclear assurance to Japan.  
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The First Summit (12/13 January 1965) and the Explicit US Nuclear Umbrella 
 
 On 12 January 1965, Sato met with President Johnson in Washington D.C 
and launched the first summit meeting by expressing his grave concerns about 
Communist China. While there is a slight difference in the exact wording of the 
records of conversation of America‘s and Japan‘s, both records showed that 
President Johnson guaranteed US nuclear commitments to Japanese security.723 
Specifically, Sato stressed the salience of US-Japan security treaty for Japan‘s 
security considering Japan had no nuclear weapons and asked Johnson for 
American nuclear commitments to Japan. According to the Japanese record, 
Johnson reassured Sato by stating ―You have my assurance.‖724 In response Sato 
answered that ―this is what he would like to ask but said that he is unable to say so 
publicly‖ according to the American record.725 This was a decisive moment for US 
END over Japan as this was the very first time that a Japanese Prime Minister 
officially and explicitly raised and discussed the issue with a US President, which 
had never taken place ever before.  
 More importantly, an American President gave a formal verbal nuclear 
assurance to his counterpart for the first time in history. Yet as we will see below, at 
that stage, this American pledge stayed only at the level of the political leadership 
of Sato. The Sato government had to undergo another three-year long political 
debate to officially and publicly acknowledge that Japan was under the US nuclear 
umbrella. In other words, the nuclear umbrella became explicitly open,726 but the 
Sato government as a whole did not acknowledge that the umbrella covered Japan 
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at this stage.    
 Following this meeting, they had another meeting joined by Foreign 
Minister Etsuzaburo Shiina, the Secretary General of the Liberal-Democratic Party, 
Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In this meeting, they confirmed the 
US nuclear assurance again and Rusk asked Sato how the Chinese nuclear test 
affected the perception of the Japanese of the Japan-US security treaty and the 
presence of US forces in Japan. Sato answered that that ―the majority of Japanese 
people are in favour of the treaty, but in general they were opposed to the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons and the use of such weapons‖ notwithstanding the 
Chinese nuclear test.727 That said, he briefly stated that ―although he could see why 
it might be argued that if China has nuclear weapons, Japan should also [acquire 
them], this was not Japan‘s policy.‖728 Here he reiterated his personal views on the 
necessity of Japan‘s own nuclear armament while he was well aware that an 
independent nuclear deterrent was politically unfeasible for Japan.  
 The former Chairman of the Japanese Joint Chief of Japan, Ryuhei 
Nakamura, noted too that at the time there was almost a consensus that Japan 
could not deal with nuclear security on its own.729 Similarly one year before the 
summit meeting the American embassy in Tokyo analysed public opinion about 
Japan‘ nuclear option and concluded that ―As the only people ever to suffer atomic 
attack, the Japanese people remain unalterably opposed to the military use of 
atomic energy.‖730 The foregoing American background paper prepared for Sato‘s 
visit was even more precise: ―Deep-seated pacifist, anti-nuclear inhibitions 
stemming from Japan‘s pre-war and wartime experiences are likely to continue to 
dominate Japan‘s defence policies for the immediate future.‖731  As far as the 
                                                   
727 Memorandum of Conversation, ―Current U.S.-Japanese and World Problems‖, 12:15 p.m, 12 
January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan , Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library; Zentai Kaigi [The General 
Meeting], 12 January 1965, CD1 01-535. MOFA, DAOJ. 
728 Ibid. 
729 Bouei Sho Bouei Kenkyujo Senshibu Hen, Nakamura Ryuhei Oraru Hisutorii, p. 243. 
730 A Background Study Prepared by American Embassy, ―The Japanese Defense Effort and Military 
Offsets‖, 29 January 1963, Office of the Country Director for Japan Records Relating to Japanese 
Political Affair 1960-1975, Box 2, RG 59, NARA. 
731 Background Paper, ―Japanese Security Situation‖, 7 January 1965. 
171 
 
meeting record is concerned, this embedded anti-military norm inhibited Sato‘s 
nuclear ambition. 
 In the afternoon of the same day, Sato had another meeting with Rusk, who 
asked Sato about the US nuclear assurance again; whether Sato was fully 
reassured by President‘s security commitments to Japan. Sato‘s answer was 
positive. Rusk replied to Sato further that ―the Chinese nuclear test had not 
diminished US security commitments to Japan and the US-Japan security treaty 
stood firmly as ever. We must teach Communist China that its nuclear attacks on 
Japan would trigger severe American nuclear retaliation.‖732 It must be noted that 
Rusk reiterated a similar point that the USA extended its deterrence to Japan in 
September 1967. He actually held that ―It must be made absolutely clear to Peking 
that the United State will respond and has the capability to respond.‖733 
  From this, it is safe to say that Sato obtained the first explicit formal 
assurances with respect to the US nuclear protection. At the same time the US 
government was highly concerned about the Japanese attitude toward a nuclear 
China. In the wake of the Chinese test, Washington had set out to intensify efforts 
to prevent further nuclear proliferation. Johnson was particularly concerned for the 
future with more nuclear states.734 The most direct consequence of the test was the 
formation of the so-called Gilpatric Committee (named after the chairman Roswell 
Gilpatric) in November 1964 at Johnson‘s request. 735 This committee studied the 
impact of the spread of further nuclear weapons to new hands.736 While the final 
report was not released until the end of January, it recommended that the US 
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government substantially intensify its efforts to check nuclear proliferation. It even 
posited that ―The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of 
controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.‖737 One CIA intelligence estimate report 
released after the Chinese nuclear test foresaw such a possibility throughout 
Asia.738 In fact one of the ways proposed for such a predicament was US END. It is 
important to note that following the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964 President 
Johnson declared that ―The US reaffirms its defense commitments in Asia. Even if 
Communist China should eventually develop an effective nuclear capability, that 
capability would have no effect upon the readiness of the US to respond to requests 
from Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression.‖ 739  
 He was probably well aware of the importance of providing explicit security 
commitments including US nuclear deterrence to Japan because he received several 
reports that recommended such a measure prior the meeting.740 Johnson regarded 
West Germany and Japan as the so-called ―nuclear threshold states‖ that were 
technically capable of producing their own nuclear weapons at ―any time they 
decided to do so.‖741 Political scientist Francis Gavin analysed a key US motivation 
to fight in Vietnam. It was essentially to demonstrate American firm resolve to 
protect its strategic interest even by means of force; otherwise Japan would not 
trust US security commitments to it and develop nuclear weapons for the sake of its 
national security. Moreover, it was considered that if either Japan or West Germany 
developed nuclear weapons, the other would follow suit.742  
 In a similar vein, one policy briefing memo considered Japan to be one of 
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few countries that ―are not only capable of producing nuclear weapons but are 
seriously considering whether to do so.‖743 A concept of a nuclear weapons bank (US 
nuclear stockpiles) ―in the Far East from which countries threatened by Chinese 
nuclear power might draw nuclear weapons when and if required‖744 was proposed. 
Nuclear sharing arrangements with Japan also were an alternative idea. It was 
suggested that US nuclear weapons be deployed in Japan and Japanese 
Self-Defence Force have training for the employment of IRBM in the Pacific. We 
might recall a similar idea was already suggested in the 1950s. Additionally an 
option of allowing the acquirement of Japanese indigenous nuclear weapons was 
also considered. 745  At any rate, it was obvious that ―a process of intensified 
dialogues with the Japanese on nuclear matters should be undertaken.‖746  
 What this suggests is that the US government started to be aware of the 
importance of strengthening its security commitments including nuclear deterrence 
to Japan. Behind these considerations, since the Chinese nuclear test, in the eyes of 
American policy makers, it had become obvious that the loss of Japanese confidence 
in US security commitments to Japan might cause Japan to develop its independent 
nuclear deterrent.747 In connection to US concerns about nuclear proliferation, a 
detailed account of Japan‘s decision to sign the NPT will be discussed in Chapter 
Six. We should bear in mind that the Johnson administration was more committed 
to nonproliferation and it worked closely with the Soviet Union to establish the NPT 
regime. With that in mind, it would have been unlikely that the Johnson 
administration would have permitted Japan to acquire its indigenous nuclear 
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weapons.        
 The next day (13th), Sato had a meeting with Secretary of Defence Robert 
McNamara. They discussed the importance of US extended nuclear deterrence over 
Japan, US security assurance in particular. McNamara suspected the initiation of 
Japan‘s nuclear weapons programme vis-à-vis a nuclear China. Sato noted that the 
Japanese were opposed to the acquisition and the use of nuclear weapons although 
it was technically possibly for Japan to build such arsenals. Japan was not like de 
Gaulle France.748 The Japanese did not want the US introduction of its nuclear 
weapons into Japan since it was an evident breach of the US-Japan security 
agreements. That said, ―Tokyo expected the US government to retaliate from US 
nuclear weapons at sea immediately in the event of war.‖ McNamara replied to Sato 
that nuclear weapons at sea could be launched readily.749 They did not specify what 
this sea-based deterrent constituted, but Japan gradually saw strategic values in 
SLBMs as we will see below. 
 From this conversation, we can see Sato‘s ambivalent feeling that, on the 
one hand, the presence of US nuclear weapons on Japan‘s soil was not politically 
acceptable considering Japan‘s nuclear taboo. Sato, on the other hand, sought 
another American nuclear assurance from US Secretary of Defense, knowing the 
importance of the US nuclear umbrella for Japan‘s security. What is more 
interesting is Sato was somehow confident in Japan‘s technical capability of 
producing nuclear weapons in Japan. Whether or not this statement was mere bluff 
and a diplomatic tactic is unknowable now. Sato‘s confidence might have been 
genuine given that he was acutely concerned that any information leaks from the 
Tokaimura reactors could facilitate the Chinese nuclear weapons programme while 
it is quite uncertain that to what extent he was informed about precise nuclear 
weapons technology.750 Japanese political leaders, nevertheless, appeared to share 
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the understanding at the time that Japan had a technical capability of producing its 
indigenous nuclear weapons but it would not do so for the sake of the peace of 
human civilization.751  
  Sato stressed that Japan relied heavily on the US nuclear umbrella despite 
its advanced nuclear weapon technology. From a strategic point of view, at any rate, 
this sea-based deterrent form fit well in the maritime nature of Japan.752 This form 
is less vulnerable than the land based deterrent form.753 In the afternoon of the 
same day, Miki spoke to the Vice President-elect, Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey 
expressed his deep concern about further nuclear proliferation by Japan and India. 
In order to prevent the spread of further nuclear weapons, he even proposed a 
Multilateral Force (MLF) with Japan to Miki. Humphrey went on to argue that ―It 
would have a good effect in Communist China if you had a hand on the umbrella to 
be sure the rain doesn‘t come down on you.‖ 754  
 The main idea of MLF proposed in the early 1960s was that NATO‘s 
integrated crews would jointly operate naval vessels armed with Polaris missiles 
under the NATO supreme commander ‘s authority. This was an American answer to 
NATO‘s concerns about American security guarantees.755 In the end, NATO failed 
to reach a consensus on the proposal because most NATO states were not willing for 
this joint effort; mixed manning sounded infeasible.756 This was not least when they 
discovered that the US government would still retain a veto over the launch of 
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nuclear missiles and the financial burden would be shared among the participants. 
757 The MLF proposal was also hoped to ―deter the allies, specifically the Federal 
Republic of Germany, from trying to build up their own nuclear arsenals.‖758 This 
suggests that the rationale of Humphrey‘s proposal could have been meant to 
prevent Japan from going nuclear by offering and ensuring a more credible 
deterrent.  
 As predicted, the Sato‘s first meetings with President Johnson and his key 
administration members addressed Japan‘s security. In view of political discussions 
between the two governments, this summit meeting was in part dedicated to US 
security assurances to Japan in the wake of the Chinese nuclear test. The first 
meeting was overall a success for Sato. The Johnson administration made it clear 
that Japan was explicitly protected by the US nuclear umbrella, which the previous 
Japanese Prime Ministers had never asked and broached openly. Indeed one 
intelligence report observed that Sato broke ―taboos against mentioning the need 
for nuclear protection.‖759 As a result of the first summit meeting, the concept of US 
END was explicitly and mutually understood by the two governments. Even before 
then, it can be argued that Japan had been under US nuclear protection. This was, 
however, completely one-sided, provided through Eisenhower ‘s grand strategy ―New 
Look.‖ 760  Considering that the key component of extended deterrence is 
psychological assurance, the concept must be mutually shared by both the protector 
and the protégé.  
 The joint statement following the meetings indeed reiterated that the USA 
was determined to fulfill its security commitments stipulated in the US-Japan 
security treaty and protect Japan from all forms of external aggression. It 
proclaimed: 
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The President and the Prime Minister recognizing that the question of China is a 
problem having a vital bearing on the peace and stability of Asia, exchanged frank 
views on the positions of their respective countries and agreed to maintain close 
consultation with each other on this matter. The President emphasized the United 
States policy of firm support for the Republic of China and his grave concern that 
Communist China‘s militant policies and expansionist pressures against its 
neighbors endanger the peace of Asia…The President and the Prime Minister 
reaffirmed their belief that it is essential for the stability and peace of Asia that 
there be no uncertainty about Japan‘s security. Form this viewpoint, the Prime 
Minister stated that Japan‘s basic policy is to maintain firmly the United 
States-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty arrangements, and the 
President reaffirmed the United States determination to abide by its commitment 
under the Treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside. The 
President and the Prime Minister affirmed the importance of constantly seeking 
even closer relationships between the two countries.761  
 
While the text did not elaborate what any armed attack actually meant, in 
February 1966 Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina suggested it included a nuclear 
attack from China and the Soviet Union.762 The two governments intentionally did 
not use the term ―Nuclear Umbrella‖ or ―Nuclear‖ for fear of a public backlash in 
view of the nuclear-sensitive Japanese public.763 This statement was nevertheless 
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the first explicit US nuclear commitment to Japan.764 To be more precise, the two 
governments had not seriously discussed the problem of US nuclear assurance to 
Japan until the US-Japan summit meeting of 1965. 
 Before the first summit meeting, Sato evinced his pro-nuclear weapon 
stance. No sooner did the meeting commence than he appeared to alter his nuclear 
policy or soften his tone. After the first day of the summit meeting (12th), he 
delivered a speech at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. where he 
reiterated the government stance on self-restraint in the development of nuclear 
weapons.765 Analysts vigorously discuss the motivations behind Sato‘s seeming 
change in his thought. Some observed that Sato‘s statement was possibly a 
diplomatic tactic to obtain US nuclear assurance and assure the Japanese of the 
American security guarantee as Japan lacked the technological capability of 
producing nuclear weapons.766 Yet it is uncertain whether Sato‘s statement was a 
diplomatic gambit; rather he wanted to see the American government reaction.767  
Based on his interview with a Japanese politician, a noted Japanese 
journalist, Tsuyoshi Sunohara, explained that Sato‘s shift was diplomatic 
bargaining with the USA. Japan abandoned its nuclear programme on the condition 
that the American government would not hinder the Japanese space programme. As 
evidence to support his argument, Sunohara pointed out one statement by Sato that 
the Japan‘s rockets could be used for a military purpose in his talks with 
McNamara.768 Moreover, it is true that the US government was even willing to 
technically assist the Japanese space programme. The rationale behind this was 
that advanced space projects could be utilised to demonstrate Japan‘s scientific 
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prowess challenged by a nuclear China. With the possession of this scientific 
superiority, the US government could also reduce the Japanese incentive for an 
indigenous atomic bomb as a symbol of its global power and prestige.769 In contrast 
to those arguments, Fintan Hoey, a specialist on Sato‘s foreign policy, suggested that 
Sato did not necessarily abandon his nuclear option but what he attempted to do is 
still to keep the nuclear option open while preserving the US nuclear 
commitments.770  
 It is conceivable that all these considerations shaped Sato‘s nuclear policy. 
In general, the ultimate decision on whether to carry out a nuclear weapons 
programme would depend on multiple considerations. They could be external 
(prestige and the nature of perceived threats), and internal (politics, economy and 
emotional).771 In view of Sato‘s talks with the American leaders, Sato was greatly 
sensitive to Japanese public opinion and Sato probably knew that his nuclear option 
was unrealistic against this backdrop even though he personally believed that 
Japan would need its own nuclear weapons for its security. On the one hand, when 
Rusk sounded out Sato‘s views on potential Japan‘s defence options including an 
independent deterrent in the absence of a defence treaty with the USA in July 1966, 
he pointed out that ―the majority of the Japanese people had not forgotten 
Hiroshima and were opposed to nuclear weapons.‖772 On the other hand, Sato 
privately told Nakasone that Japan as an independent country must have nuclear 
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weapons to deal with China and the USA.773 In September 1968 Sato also privately 
held that ―I should declare that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons and 
then, resign once and for all.‖774 In short, he was clearly aware of conceivable 
political repercussions to such efforts in the face of the so-called Japan‘s ―nuclear 
allergy.‖ Sato came to understand what his realistic option (reliance on US END 
rather than acquisition of Japan‘s own nuclear weapons) was and followed the 
direction accordingly.775  
 Moreover, the Johnson government was becoming more serious about 
non-nuclear proliferation. In 1966 Johnson stated at the dinner table that ―nations 
which do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that they will have our 
strong support, if they need it, against any threat of nuclear blackmail.‖ 776 
Furthermore, the NPT was already on the surface. Considering these factors above, 
reliance on US END was the most realistic option for Sato. END was a product of 
compromise in view of Sato‘s desire for an independent deterrent. 
 
The Nuclear Umbrella Debates in 1967 and the Political Recognition of the Nuclear 
Umbrella 
 
 While Sato successfully elicited the US nuclear assurance from Johnson 
and thus created the modern foundation for US END over Japan, debates on the 
salience of the US nuclear umbrella ensued in Japan.777 In February 1966 Takeso 
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Shimoda, administrative vice minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, publicly 
alleged that Japan was not yet under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella 
despite the fact that Japan had a security treaty with the USA.778 This statement 
precipitated a political debate at the National Diet, demanding the clarification of 
the government stance on the US nuclear umbrella. Foreign Minister Etsusaburo 
Shiina clarified that Shimoda‘s comment did not reflect a formal view of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).779 According to Shimoda‘s strategic perspective, 
the best solution for Japan‘s security was global nuclear disarmament. It was not an 
ideal option to depend perpetually on the US nuclear umbrella and there was no 
guarantee that the Soviet Union and China would renounce their nuclear 
arsenals.780 Some 10 months later Shimoda also expressed his strategic view on 
Japan‘s security against a nuclear-armed China. Noting that China‘s future was 
uncertain and unpredictable, Shimoda argued that a nuclear option should not be 
ruled out and a future generation should make a final decision over whether or not 
to acquire Japan‘s own nuclear weapons.781 
  Following Shimoda‘s controversial remark, Shiina soon announced the 
formally unified view of MOFA and stated that ―In view of the current international 
situation, the US nuclear weapons played a significant role in deterring general war 
in a global scale. Given this general role of US nuclear deterrence, it was hard to 
deny the fact that Japan was protected by the US nuclear umbrella.‖782 Two months 
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later, MOFA released a document on its official position regarding the US nuclear 
umbrella which read that Japan under the Japan-US security suggested US nuclear 
force performed as a deterrent to prevent an adversary from carrying out a nuclear 
strike against Japan.783 In other words, the Japanese government formally, if not 
explicitly, acknowledged that its security now depended on US END. Strikingly, 
Shiina also held that ―Japan under the US nuclear umbrella did not automatically 
mean that Japan would host nuclear bases. Right now Japan had no plan to join the 
NATO type MLF and will not do so in the future.‖784 It is important to note that in 
April 1966 Reischauer shared his opinion on a nuclear sharing arrangement with 
Japan with the State Department and stated that that ―is a possibility but not for a 
considerable number of years.‖785 
  At any rate a series of public remarks was significant since the Japanese 
leaders finally started to discuss the importance of US nuclear weapons for Japan‘s 
security, which had not really taken place previously. Indeed one CIA special report 
in April 1966 that reviewed Japanese security policy noted that ―For the first time 
since their devastating defeat in World War II, the Japanese have undertaken a 
serious and responsible debate on national security.‖786 As a result of Shimoda‘s 
statement, the Japanese government had more explicitly come to rely on the US 
nuclear umbrella.787 After the first meeting between Sato and Johnson in January 
1965, the Japanese government started to express its dependence on the US nuclear 
umbrella. In April 1967 Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeo Miki publicly remarked 
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that Japan‘s security was dependent on US nuclear deterrence, for instance.788 Miki 
reiterated this stance when he met with State Secretary Rusk later the same 
year.789 This was reconfirmed in the next summit meeting of 1967 between the two 
governments. That said, Sato had to go through another big political challenge 
before publicly acknowledging that the Japanese government as a whole relied on 
―Invisible‖ US END.   
 
The Second Summit (14/15 November 1967) and Sato‘s Failed Attempt at Raising 
Public Awareness 
 
 In November 1967 (between 14th and 15th) Sato had the second meeting 
with President Johnson and his cabinet members. There Sato again reemphasised 
the importance of the US nuclear umbrella for Japan‘s security and of raising the 
Japanese awareness of national security although the central theme of this meeting 
was the reversion of Ryukyu and Bonin Islands (those islands were still fully under 
US jurisdiction decreed by the San Francisco Peace Treaty).790 We will discuss on 
the link between reversion of these islands and the completion of ―Invisible‖ END in 
the next chapter.  
 It is important to note that China conducted its first thermonuclear test in 
June 1967. Even just before this test, the Policy Planning Council of the 
Department of State got an impression through the US-Japan planning talks that 
the Japanese officials were wary of the development of Chinese nuclear capabilities. 
They expressed their ―desire for a more visible US deterrent.‖791 As one US secret 
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report analysed, ―Appearance of a deliverable nuclear weapons capability in 
Chinese Communist hands will unquestionably, however, provoke a stronger 
reaction [from Japan].‖792 What made Japanese leaders uneasy about its security 
was a logical conclusion that as Chinese nuclear forces expanded, the USA would be 
more cautious about its military action against China although China‘s 
conventional forces could not match American forces at all, China could not have a 
credible second strike capability against the US homeland and China‘s nuclear 
programme were slow and moderate. 793  It was also doubtful that China had 
credible and sufficient numbers of operational nuclear weapons as of 1967.794 When 
he talked to McNamara on 14 November 1967, Sato asserted that ―Japan‘s whole 
security was based on its security arrangement with the U.S. The Japanese were 
well protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and Japan had no intention of making 
nuclear weapons. Three years ago the President assured him that the U.S. was 
prepared to aid Japan against any attack.‖ McNamara responded to this 
positively.795 It is also important to note that earlier in 1967 when McNamara was 
interviewed by Wakaizumi for Chuo Koron (Japanese magazine), he stressed that 
Japan was protected by the US nuclear umbrella and reassured that ―those with 
whom we have treaties are protected by the full arsenal of our weapon system, both 
conventional and nuclear.‖ 796 
 The next day (15th), Sato asked Johnson for reassurance of US security 
commitments to Japan. In response, Johnson stated that ―the United States is 
committed and as long as he is president we would carry out this commitment.‖797 
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In light of Sato‘s remark, Sato‘s determination to rely on the US nuclear umbrella 
was evident. The joint communiqué again touched the Chinese nuclear programme 
and declared: 
 
They [the President and the Prime Minister] noted the fact that Communist China 
is developing its nuclear arsenal and agreed on the importance of creating 
conditions wherein Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from 
Communist China. The President and the Prime Minister also agreed that, while it 
is difficult to predict at present what external posture Communist China may 
eventually assume, it is essential for the free world countries to continue to 
cooperate among themselves to promote political stability and economic prosperity 
in the area…They declared it to be the fundamental policy of both countries to 
maintain firmly the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the 
United States and Japan in order to ensure the security of Japan and the peace 
and security of the Far East.798  
 
As a Japanese scholar, Yuri Kase, pointed out, ―repeated U.S. verbal assurances 
regarding Japan‘s security played a crucial role for Japan in addressing the China 
threat of the late 1960‘s.‖799 
 It is important to note that the Johnson administration set out to tighten 
its defence ties more with Japan in the wake of the China‘s nuclear test.800 The US 
government even gave a high level confidential briefing on China‘s nuclear weapons 
programme to Sato in March 1967.801 The main purpose of the briefings was 
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presumably to ease Sato‘s grave security concern and they were also to show strong 
US security commitments to Japan. Ambassador Johnson was quite confident that 
the briefing deeply impressed Sato.802 Moreover, the US government potentially 
aimed to secure Japan‘s NPT signature. 803 
 As for the central agenda of the meeting (Okinawa and Bonin), before his 
second meeting, Sato made a tour of South East Asian countries including Saigon to 
show his keen support for Johnson‘s Vietnam War. Japan also financially 
contributed to the Asian Development Bank and provided financial support to 
South East Asian countries such as Indonesia.804 This was well received by the 
American government. Indeed the Defence Secretary McNamara stated that ―he 
was pleased to see Japan expand its role in Asia and growing interest in the Asian 
Development Bank and other projects. He hoped that as the years went by Japan 
would play a larger role.‖805 This act was considered necessary in order to facilitate 
the negotiations over the Ryukyus with a view to ―forming a consensus on a decision 
to repatriate Okinawa within the next two to three years.‖806  
 Indeed, historian Michael Schaller noted that ―The president‘s advisers 
agreed that the reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins must be linked to Japan 
carrying a heavier economic and political burden in Southeast Asia, cooperating in 
efforts to contain China, improving the balance-of-payments problems, buying more 
U.S. military products, and granting continued base rights on Okinawa.‖807 In 
preparation for the coming summit meeting one secret briefing paper drafted by the 
State Department also stated that ―On our part we will seek from the Japanese a 
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greater commitment to the regional security and strength of the East Asian region 
and more specifically greater support on Vietnam and commitments to assume a 
larger share of the financial burden for regional assistance and easing our balance 
of payment problem.‖808  
 On top of this, through the efforts of Kei Wakaizumi, Sato‘s ―confidential 
personal representative‖, Sato successfully achieved his key diplomatic goal 
(agreement on the return of Okinawa within three years) through this second 
summit meeting. 809  Sato sent Wakaizumi to Washington before the summit 
meeting in order to have his message delivered. Wakaizumi stressed that Sato 
would need to make progress in the reversion issue of Okinawa with his formula of 
agreement ―within a few years‖ on a date for the reversion of the islands due to the 
great rise of impatience of Japanese people with the unchanged status of the 
Islands.810 Interestingly, this behind-scene dealing without any involvement of 
MOFA is said to have been driven by Sato‘s distrust in Foreign Minister Miki. He 
was a very ambitious minister who wanted to replace Sato and did not work for Sato 
faithfully.811 The two leaders addressed the reversion issues of the Bonin and 
Ryukyu Islands and hammered out an agreement that the Bonin Islands would be 
returned to Japan in a year notwithstanding the JCS and Navy in particular 
opposition.812 They also agreed that a reversion date for the Ryukyu Islands would 
be arranged within a few years. 813  The joint communiqué announced on 15 
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November 1967 indeed proclaimed that ―an agreement should be reached between 
the two governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the 
reversion of these islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire 
of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands.‖ It also stated that the two 
leaders ―receognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue 
to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the 
Far East.‖814 
 Sato was well aware that post-reversion security of Okinawa particularly in 
respect to nuclear weapons must be directly dealt with for the reversion of the 
Ryukyu Islands. 815  Additionally when Sato‘s special envoy Wakaizumi had a 
meeting with William Rostow, National Security Advisor, to sound out US stance on 
reversion of Okinawa before the second summit meeting in November 1967, Rostow 
told Wakaizumi that the Sato government had to educate the Japanese about the 
salience of US nuclear deterrence in international relations. This was because 
Rostow expected that reversion of Okinawa meant that Japan would have to live 
with US nuclear weapons stored on Okinawa.816  The presence of US nuclear 
weapons in Okinawa had been an open secret for a long time.817 These nuclear 
missiles targeted the Soviet Union and Communist China although it is uncertain 
that exactly what targets they were designed to attack. 818   Since the US 
government had a ―neither confirm nor deny‖ policy, the presence of such weapons 
were not officially made clear. This, however, became the biggest issue in the 
reversion negotiations as we will explore in the next chapter.  
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 Japan had to make more efforts toward self-defence and assume more 
responsibilities for Asian security although reversion of the Bonins would be worked 
out within a year without any significant difficulty.819 The issue of the Bonin 
Islands in terms of security importance was much easier than that of Okinawa 
where key US strategic interests were at stake.820 To this end, Sato would strive to 
educate the Japanese about defense issues in general, the role of US military bases 
and nuclear weapons in Okinawa to soothe the Japanese nuclear allergy.821 We may 
recall that Sato had already told Reischauer that young people could be educated 
and he might have been confident of realising this aim. At the time of the meeting, 
it was well conceivable that Sato‘s idea of reversion was a nuclear-attached 
Okinawa.822 In November 1967 Sato boldly alleged at a press conference that 
―should the Japanese have a firm determination to defend the country by 
themselves, Okinawa would be returned to Japan in even less than three years.‖ He 
even went on to claim that ―The reversion of a nuclear-attached Okinawa was worth 
consideration.‖ In line with this thinking Sato also observed that the Japanese 
pacifist constitution had no strategic use in constraining behaviour of the Soviet 
Union and Communist China.823 This could also mean that the return of Okinawa 
to Japan was a more urgent issue that the removal of nuclear weapons from 
Okinawa as Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi implied later.824 This Japanese position 
was totally understandable in that the recovery of the islands even in an 
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undesirable way was better than continued foreign occupation of Japan‘s sovereign 
territory in which the local population had longed for the recovery of their control 
and the status of the islands as Japan. As the US Ambassador to Japan Alexis 
Johnson (1966-1969) well summarized, ―Prime Minister Sato, on the basis of his 
understanding that he would not be able to obtain the return of the administration 
of Okinawa unless he were able to agree to the storage of nuclear weapons there, 
has been trying hard to overcome what is known here in Japan as a nuclear allergy 
and obtain a consensus which would permit him to agree to the storage of nuclear 
weapons.‖825     
 Nearly a month later the summit Sato apparently set out to remedy Japan‘s 
nuclear allergy. Sato stressed that the Japanese should learn more about nuclear 
power beyond nuclear weapons. If they acquired accurate knowledge upon nuclear 
power, there would be no such thing as a nuclear allergy, continued Sato. At the 
same time, he also emphasised that Japan‘s defence capabilities would be expanded 
only within the limits of the Japanese constitution because Japan was expected to 
assume a more active defence role in regional as well as domestic defence following 
the reversion of Okinawa.826 He had never intended to replace the US forces in 
Japan by JSDF.827 Furthermore, Sato made a speech on ―How to survive in the 
Nuclear Age‖ at the National Diet in January 1968, promoting the peaceful use of 
nuclear power. He again held that Japan was protected by the US nuclear umbrella 
as part of the US-Japan security treaty.828 He also allowed US nuclear-propelled 
                                                   
825 Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries. 
826 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Talking Points for the NSC Discussion on the Ryukyus 
and Bonins: Action Memorandum, 29 August 1967, Box 2, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting Files, 
1966-1968, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum For the Secretary of Defense, ―Okinawa Reversion: Transfer 
of Defense Responsibilities‖, 14 June 1971, Box 191, Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the 
Ryukyu Islands, Reference Paper Files Relating to Reversion, 1971-72, RG260, NARA. 
827  Eisaku Sato, Okinawa Mondai to ni kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai [The Special Committee of 
Okinawan Issues, House of Representatives] 22 December 1967, KKKS, 
http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/0064/05712220064004.pdf, accessed on 25 Aug 2017. 
828 Eisaku Sato, Sangiin Honkaigi [A Plenary Session of House of Councillors] 27 January 1968, 
KKKS, http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/0064/05712220064004.pdf, accessed on 25 Aug 
2017; Eisaku Sato, Sangiin Honkaigi [A Plenary Session of House of Councillors] 30 January 1968, 
KKKS, http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/058/0001/05801300001003.pdf, accessed on 25 Aug 
2017 
191 
 
aircraft carriers to visit and dock at Japanese ports.829 His attempt to break the 
post-war nuclear norm deeply embedded was doomed to fail.830  
 First, there were massive demonstrations against an US nuclear aircraft 
carrier Enterprise‘s port call to Sasebo in January 1968.831 To some extent, Sato 
was confident of its successful visit to Japan as Japanese reactions to visits by other 
US nuclear-propelled vessels (e.g. nuclear-powered submarines) dwindled each 
time.832  
 It is important to note that the US government first requested the 
Japanese government to allow a Nautilus-type nuclear-propelled (but 
conventionally armed) submarine port call at Japan for repose and logistics in June 
1961.833 At that time Japanese Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka rejected the 
American request. He stated that ―The public still tends to relate anything atomic 
to nuclear weapons and thereby to the possibility of involvement in a nuclear war.‖ 
He went on to say ―At present, there is certain to be great deal of opposition to 
almost any step relating to atomic energy, including a visit by nuclear-powered 
submarines.‖834 One month later the two sides agreed that ―it was premature to 
raise the question of entry into Japanese port.‖835 They needed to readdress the 
question in the near future. The US government renewed a request again in 1963. 
This time again new Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira did not give 
consent to the American request for visits to Japan by nuclear-powered submarines 
immediately.836At the National Diet, the Japanese socialist party was clearly 
opposed to US nuclear-powered submarines‘ port calls at Japan. Prime Minister 
Ikeda and Foreign Minister Ohira had to explain a key difference between a 
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nuclear-powered submarine (Nautilus-type) and a nuclear-armed submarine 
(Polaris-type) and the main purpose and the safety of their visits.837 Given that 
Nautilus-type submarines were still conventionally armed, the US government did 
not call for Japanese permission for the submarines to visit Japan. The US 
government nevertheless clearly recognised the sensitivity of such a visit and it did 
not go against the Japanese will.838 Due to Japan‘s domestic concerns of an allergic 
reaction to the visit or what Reischauer called ―Nuclear Phobia‖839, the Japanese 
government did not give a green light to America until November 1964.840 The first 
port call at Sasebo by USS Sea Dragon (Nautilus-type) did not generate any strong 
public reaction except some socialist protest groups and nor did subsequent 
nuclear-powered submarine visits as both the Japanese and the US government 
worked closely to schedule each visit to avoid any sensitive timing such as prior to 
the Japanese House of Councilors election in July 1965.841  
 Before the first visit, some Japanese bureaucrats, such as Osamu Kaihara 
of the JDA, strove to assuage local fears of a nuclear-powered submarine visit. He 
met the mayor of the port city Sasebo and stressed the safety (free from radioactive 
contamination) of nuclear-powered vessels. Kaihara gave him assurance by telling a 
story to the effect that such a submarine visited New York and a local boy fished 
near the submarine. Convinced of the safety of a nuclear-propelled submarine visit 
by Kaihara, the mayor gave consent to the first visit by the vessel.842 In other words, 
long patience and preparation were required for the successful visit.        
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 The US government viewed the entry as part of Sato‘s tactics to overcome 
―Japan‘s Nuclear Weapons Allergy.‖843 The American Embassy in Tokyo also made 
an observation of anti-nuclear submarine visit campaigns and suggested that 
―Despite the fact that the opposition campaign will continue, they will lose the 
momentum.‖844 To Sato‘s surprise, it turned out otherwise. The visit of Enterprise 
(a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier) in January 1968, coupled with anti-Vietnam 
war campaigns by Japanese left-wing groups, aroused severe opposition and 
massive demonstrations even including many ordinary people mainly in and around 
Sasebo but also to lesser extent, across Japan, coupled with strenuous opposition to 
the American Vietnam War,845 which might have triggered a public demand of 
Japan‘s neutralism.846 In short, Enterprise became a symbol of war and nuclear 
weapons.847 The issue loomed large in Sato and it also showed that Japanese 
military-averse culture was as strong as ever.848 Toshio Kimura, the Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, enunciated that  
 
Both the Japanese and American governments must take cognizance of the fact 
that Enterprise visit precipitated a popular reaction different to that caused by the 
earlier visits of nuclear submarines. Although there may have been many who 
went along merely out of curiosity, the government must attach importance to the 
fact that citizens of Sasebo showed a certain degree of hostility to the police. 
Friendly relations between the two peoples are the basis of the Japanese-American 
security treaty system. It is the belief of both governments that incidents damaging 
to the future friendly relations should be, if possible, avoided.849 
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 Additionally, USS Swordfish (nuclear-powered submarine) at Sasebo was 
reported to leak some radioactive material in May 1968 although it was later proved 
that alleged leaks of radiation did not come from the submarine. High radiation 
results at the port were produced because of a mechanical failure of reading 
equipment.850 The news, however, attracted wide media coverage, causing nearly 
regionally limited but public hysteria.851 In fact after this incident, it took another 
one and a half year for another nuclear-propelled submarine to call at a Japanese 
port.852 This time the Japanese government responded very quickly to the public 
outcry.853  Seemingly, Sato strove to raise the Japanese awareness of national 
security including nuclear power by accepting nuclear-powered naval ships‘ port 
calls, but it ultimately failed. 
 In view of what he had said, his vision was to live in the world with US 
nuclear weapons which the Japanese would accept and depend on for their national 
defence. What Sato could realistically do was nothing but to create more 
dependence on the US-Japan security treaty. Even though he was known as the 
most pro-nuclear Prime Minister, it is uncertain how dedicated he was to build up a 
Japan‘s independent deterrent.854 If he had pursued careful military calculations, 
he would have attempted to acquire SLBMs or cruise missiles as effective and 
robust delivery vehicles. Yet there was no clear sign that such options were even 
considered.855 The fact is that Sato neither wished to nor attempted to substantially 
increase the defense budget. Indeed Sato‘s security policy was still in line with the 
Yoshida line.856 Clearly aware of Japan‘s anti-nuclear feeling, Sato‘s most realistic 
choice was to tighten Japan‘s security ties with the USA. In the meantime, Japan 
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would try to have a more open environment to make a more positive defence policy. 
As a first step toward this, as the Eisenhower administration attempted, Sato might 
have started his effort with nuclear energy to make the Japanese more familiar 
with the new scientific technology. To know the salience of nuclear technology 
eventually might have created a breakthrough in remedy of Japanese nuclear 
allergy. Yet as nuclear energy directly linked with military technology (naval ships), 
his attempt to raise security awareness through port-call visits by US naval vessels 
ultimately failed.    
 
The Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the US Nuclear Umbrella 
 
 Sato also enunciated the ―Three Non-Nuclear principles (not to possess, 
produce and introduce nuclear weapons)‖ at the National Diet in December 1967.857 
These principles were anything but original or new as the previous Japanese 
government had announced them separately since the 1950s. As we recall, Prime 
Minister Hatoyama, for example, clearly stated that the Japanese government 
would not approve the US introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japan. Prime 
Minister Kishi noted that Japan had no intention of building its own nuclear 
weapons while possessing nuclear weapons for a defensive purpose was 
constitutionally permissible. Sato‘s announcement was merely to grapple with 
domestic opposition to US nuclear weapons in his tactical manner.858 The true 
objective of these principles was in fact to break a nuclear taboo by directly raising 
this nuclear agenda publicly. In contrast to Sato‘s expectation, these non-nuclear 
principles were widely received and welcome in Japan. As a Japanese scholar, Yuri 
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Kase, aptly put it, ―His attempt ironically rekindled a strong feeling amid the 
Japanese people that Japan should be the leading advocate of a 
nuclear-weapons-free world.‖859 In fact Sato initially focused on the only first two 
principles of not possessing and not producing.860  
 Through the two summit meetings with President Johnson (1965/ 1967), 
Sato showed his keen interests in US extended nuclear deterrence. Nakasone of the 
LDP, however, insisted that the non-nuclear principles be three including the 
principle of non-introduction because the non-nuclear principles were only complete 
with a combination of three. It was Nakasone‘s firm belief that Japan should evince 
its lofty non-nuclear policies to the world while he admitted that they were just 
politically idealistic －  not necessarily reflecting the reality. 861  In line with 
Nakasone‘s suggestion, Sato reaffirmed the ―Three Non-Nuclear Principles‖ in the 
aforementioned speech (How to survive in the Nuclear Age) in January 1968.862 
Sato was not pleased to include the non-introduction principle in his speech on the 
ground that it would probably impede his negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa 
with the USA.863 Sato indeed later claimed that these principles were ―nonsense.‖864 
Indeed, this principle became a political restraint in the negotiations over Okinawa 
with the Nixon government. 865  Convinced that they would constrain the 
forthcoming negotiations over the Ryukyus and damage the credibility of the US 
                                                   
859 Kase, ―The Costs and Benefits of Japan‘s Nuclearization‖, p. 59. 
860  Ota, Meiyaku no Yami, p. 264; Kusunoki, ―The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan‘s 
Non-nuclear Policy‖, p. 38; Tanaka, Anzen Hosho, pp. 221-222. 
861 Nakasone, Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru, pp. 179-181. See also Entry of 26 January 1968, Kusuda 
Minoru Nikki, p. 159. 
862 Tanaka, Anzen Hosho, p.222. There have been vigorous debates on Sato‘s motivations behind the 
introduction of the ―Three Non-Nuclear Principles.‖ See Hoey, Sato, America and the Cold War, 
pp.43-45; Kase, ―The Costs and Benefits of Japan‘s Nuclearization‖, pp. 59-60;Kurosaki, ―Sato Seiken 
No Kakuseisaku to America‖, pp. 81-85; Kriestensen, ―Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella‖, p. 3. 
 Kusunoki, ―The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan‘s Non-nuclear Policy‖, pp. 37-46; NHK 
supesharu Shuzaihan, Kaku wo Motometa Nihon, pp. 112-113;  
863 Hoey, Sato, America and the Cold War, p. 44; Ota, Meiyaku no Yami, pp. 262-264. 
864 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, p.314. See also Sorini Taisuru Hokoku (Okinawa Kankei) 
[Report for Prime Minister: Issues related to Okinawa] 7 October 1969, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」
Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Deceits pertaining to The Secret 
Deals] ,MOFA; Draft Record of Conversation 15 October 1969, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」Mondaini 
Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals],  
MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1972kaku2.pdf, accessed on 9 October 
2017.  
865 Sasaki, ―Kakusenryaku no Nakano Nihon‖, p. 247. 
197 
 
nuclear umbrella, in January 1968 Sato publicly introduced the new ―four 
non-nuclear pillars‖: 
 
(1) maintain the original Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
(2) pursue global nuclear disarmament 
(3) limit the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes as regulated by the 
1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law 
(4) rely on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent based on the 1960 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.866  
 
Sato therefore fully recognised the importance of the US nuclear umbrella for 
Japan‘s security. Obviously, the original ―Three Non-Nuclear Principles‖ alone were 
insufficient and they would fully function in conjunction with the other three 
policies. 867  Finally, Sato officially and publicly acknowledged that Japan‘s 
non-nuclear path was backed by US nuclear deterrence. One Japanese scholar 
argued that from this moment on (January 1968) Japan came under the US nuclear 
umbrella. 868  Considering that the Sato government had to undergo domestic 
political challenges and END is a mutually-acknowledged concept, it is not accurate 
to say this moment alone was decisive for Japan to come under the US nuclear 
umbrella. Through a series of political events between January 1965 and January 
1968, Japan officially and publicly acknowledged that Japan was under the US 
nuclear protection. 
 The new four pillars were inspired by one of Sato‘s key advisor Wakaizumi, 
who is believed to have had a great influence in shaping the Sato‘s nuclear policy. 
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He indeed had several private meetings with Sato.869 His reflections on the course 
of the Japan‘s future nuclear policy are found in his works in the 1960‘s, 
underscoring the importance of keeping the nuclear option open by maintaining the 
capability of building nuclear weapons. One unpublished policy paper of 1964 
written shortly after the Chinese first nuclear device test similarly proposed that 
Japan should demonstrate to the world that Japan was capable of producing 
nuclear weapons, but it would not do so, founded upon its own belief and principle.  
 That said, he also urged that Japan build its advanced capability of 
producing nuclear arsenals on demand and therefore, Japan would promote and 
advance its civilian nuclear and space programmes, which would, in turn, be easily 
turned into a military nuclear programme.870  Wakaizumi argued that from a 
military perspective, the US-Japan defence treaty had a deterrent effect and 
keeping the capability would give the Japanese themselves 
 psychological and political reassurance.871 At the same time, Wakaizumi was 
well aware that Japan would need to rely on the US nuclear umbrella since the 
Japanese were not ready to assume defence responsibility in East Asia.872 In a 
similar vein, Wakaizumi‘s two essays published in 1966 and 1967 respectively 
argued that Japan should maintain the technological capability (foundation) of 
producing nuclear weapons; at the same time Japan deliberately would maintain its 
non-nuclear policy.873 If this was Sato‘s nuclear stance, he did not totally rule out 
Japan‘s nuclear option. There is, however, no clear evidence that this became Sato‘s 
nuclear stance while the possibility cannot be completely denied since Wakaizumi 
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was a key and trustworthy political advisor of Sato. The influence of this proposal is 
unknowable and unprovable. At any rate, Japan pursued its civilian nuclear and 
space programme. In order to pursue this option, Japan still needed to rely on the 
US nuclear umbrella. 
 Sato was also driven to promote the new four non-nuclear pillars for fear 
that the left-wing political parties would attempt to pass the non-nuclear principles 
as a Diet resolution. It was, in fact, in 1971 that the original three non-nuclear  
principles were passed as a Diet resolution.874 As Nobumasa Akiyama, a Japanese 
nuclear specialist, observed, ―The Diet resolution of the Three Non-nuclear 
Principles was a product of a political deal between Sato and the opposition for the 
approval of the agreement for the return of Okinawa which was signed between the 
United States and Japan in June 1971.‖875  In short, the ―Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles‖ have become an evident moral symbol of a Japan‘s non-nuclear pledge 
(Kokuze) of Japan although they lacked any legal binding force.876 Accordingly, the 
reversion of Okinawa was entwined with the status of US nuclear weapons after 
reversion.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 This chapter has illustrated the political process through which Japan 
sought US END. It did not arise out of nowhere. A series of events from the 
emergence of a nuclear China and the conservative and anti-communist Sato 
government onwards were key for US END over Japan to explicitly come out. As 
shown above, Sato was extremely cautious of a nuclear China. It was his strong 
leadership that elicited American nuclear assurance directly from President 
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Johnson and his cabinet members. It is worth noting that until the summit meeting 
in January 1965, both countries‘ supreme leaders had never faced the issue of US 
END as directly as Sato and Johnson did. To be sure, even before this event, the 
nuclear umbrella might have been unilaterally provided to Japan through 
Eisenhower‘s ―New Look‖ strategy, for instance. Yet, given the importance of 
assurance to US allies, it was one sided but not mutually recognised. In other words, 
it was implicit in essence. We have to keep in mind that this thesis interprets END 
as a mutually acknowledged concept. In this respect, January 1965 was without 
doubt a turning point. Yet it took another three-year domestic political debate for 
the Japanese government as a whole to acknowledge that Japan formally came 
under the US nuclear umbrella. As already noted by a Japanese scholar, it is 
difficult to pinpoint the exact date when Japan came under the US nuclear 
umbrella. A series of key political events and development occurred between 1965 
and 1968 can nevertheless be considered as one period during which Japan came 
under the US nuclear umbrella.    
 For Sato (a defence-minded and nuclear proponent leader), an independent 
nuclear deterrent was probably not absurd but strategic option. Despite his 
strategic view, this option was, as he admitted, politically infeasible. He was also 
sensitive about Japanese public opinion which was severely opposed to nuclear 
weapons. Aware of the domestic anti-nuclear feeling, he was the one who said 
directly to McNamara that Japan did not want the deployment of US nuclear 
weapons in Japan while at one point, he was determined to raise public awareness 
of defence issues so that Japan could facilitate the negotiations over the reversion of 
Okinawa. It was not really successful and his idea of a ―nuclear-attached‖ Okinawa 
was to be revised.   
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Chapter Five 
The Reversion of Bonins and Ryukyus: The Completion of Invisible Extended 
Nuclear Deterrence and Its Theoretical Mechanism 
 
As a keen student who has studied National Security and Crisis Management since 
I was young, I must say [Japan] is a ―Fool‘s Paradise‖ where the people idiotically 
and tragically believe that water and security are free. 
―Kei Wakaizumi877 
 
 In this chapter, we will examine the strategic impact of the reversion of the 
Bonin and especially Ryukyu Islands－  ―the only [remaining] major problem 
between Japan and the United States‖ 878― on ―Invisible‖ END rather than the 
detailed study of the reversion process of these islands. There exists well-studied 
literature on that subject.879 The key questions to be addressed here are why these 
islands were strategically vital to US military strategy and how the two 
governments treated the nuclear storage issue. As already noted, the presence of US 
nuclear weapons in Okinawa was an open secret. This was no surprise since 
Okinawa was part of US territory. It took twenty years for Japan to regain the 
Ryukyu Islands following its independence of 1952. It is important to delve into a 
strategic rationale behind the removal of the forward-deployed nuclear weapons 
from these islands as the return of these islands to Japan without forward-deployed 
nuclear weapons meant the completion of ―Invisible‖ END. This form of US END 
over Japan has not changed a bit ever since.  
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 As we have seen, the US government failed to introduce its nuclear 
weapons onto the mainland of Japan due to public revulsion against such a move: 
―Nuclear war planners never obtained the right to store complete nuclear weapons 
on the main islands.‖880 The Ryukyu and Bonin islands were, however, in practice 
under US administrative control.881 In fact the status of the Ryukyus was more 
that of a foreign country, but not Japan. During the US occupation period, Japanese 
people needed not only a passport but also a visa to visit the islands. There were 
occasions that the US government refused to grant a visa to Japanese people who 
criticised US military control over the islands.882 While cars drove on the left-hand 
side in Japan, cars in the Ryukyu Islands drove on the right. The local currency was 
not the Japanese Yen but the US dollar. 
 One of the focal points of negotiations about the reversion of these islands 
was indeed the issue of nuclear weapons. At its peak Okinawa hosted nearly 1200 
nuclear weapons with 19 different types such as Mace B, Honest John and Nike 
Hercules. 883  Some even described Okinawa as ―chock-a-block full of nuclear 
weapons of all types.‖884 Okinawa was in fact the largest nuclear depot in the Far 
East.885 The US military possessed unrestricted military use including the storage 
of US nuclear weapons in the islands. The provisions of the security treaty of prior 
consultation did not apply to these islands because they were beyond Japanese 
administrative control. 886  An American military historian, Nicholas Evan 
Sarantakes, bluntly held that ―Americans had ruled the Ryukyu Islands as a colony 
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in everything but name since the end of War War II.‖887 In a similar vein, Weinstein 
asserted that ―the United States would be free to equip its forces on the island with 
whatever weapons it thought necessary and to deploy these forces anywhere in the 
Far East without having to consult with the Japanese Government.‖888  
  In the 1950‘s the JCS learned that it would be politically challenging to 
introduce nuclear weapons into the mainland of Japan and that the Japanese public 
would be most unlikely to support US nuclear operations. As a consequence, 
Okinawa as a strategic base for theatre nuclear missiles became more vital.889 
Additionally one American secret document even explained that ―Okinawa houses 
the most important US military base system in the Western Pacific, capable of 
performing a wide variety of functions.‖890 The loss of these islands would constrain 
not only US nuclear but a variety of military operations. Referring specifically to 
Okinawa, one US secret document boldly claimed that ―Its value is enhanced by the 
absence of any legal restriction on American free access to or use of the bases; which 
permits storage of nuclear weapons and the launching of military combat operations 
directly from these bases.‖891 To lesser extent this was also the case with the Bonins. 
Indeed already in the early 1950‘s the US government foresaw that over the long 
term US military actions would be severely restricted in the mainland of Japan by 
future Japanese governments. This prospect enhanced the salience of retention of 
American bases in the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.892  
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The Reversion of the Bonin Islands 
 
 The Bonin Islands also known as the Ogasawara Islands, island chain 
composed of several key strategic islands such as Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima, both of 
which had held US nuclear weapons, were fully returned to Japan in June 1968 
based on the agreement in the summit meeting between America and Japan in 
November 1967.893 The joint communiqué following the meeting proclaimed that 
the President and the Prime Minister concurred that  
 
two governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific 
arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan 
without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into 
account the intention of the Government of Japan, expressed by the Prime Minister, 
gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defense of the area.894  
 
Therefore, the reversion of the Bonin Islands was closely concerned with Japan‘s 
assumption of more defence responsibility.  
 US Navy in particular regarded these two islands as strategic ―hideouts‖ 
for submarines and bombers to be resupplied after the mainland of Japan and 
Okinawa were destroyed at the initiation of nuclear war.895 The US Navy and JCS 
insisted that the USA have a right to store or place nuclear weapons there again in 
the future should such a necessity arise.896 According to the US Ambassador to 
Japan, Alexis Johnson, ―The Navy‘s basic position was that we should not give up 
anything anywhere that might someday possibly be useful. If we were to lose Japan, 
Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Navy argued, the Bonins would be an 
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important reserve. I thought this was nonsense.‖897 Furthermore, Senate Mike 
Mansfield held that ―There are no major U.S. military installations there and 
strategic considerations do not appear to be involved in any significant way. In sum, 
there would appear to be no major block－at least I know of none－  to the 
restoration of the Bonins.‖898 
 The JCS, however, did not wish to lose administrative rights over the 
islands in light of the military utility of these islands in the event of nuclear war or 
―for meeting a wide range of military contingencies‖ 899  while the Statement 
Department saw the reversion problem otherwise. The State Department did not 
find it vital to retain the Bonins Islands.900 The key aspect of negotiations over the 
reversion of the Bonins especially for the JCS was the treatment of the US nuclear 
weapons on the islands in the event of a contingency once the US government 
decided to cede control of the islands. It is, however, quite doubtful of the strategic 
importance of the islands. As Alexis Johnson pointed out, when they were used as a 
strategic back-up base in the scenario of US Navy, they would no longer serve as a 
backup base because it would be more likely to launch ICBMs stationed in the 
mainland of the USA in this situation. Why would US Navy remain to stay closer to 
Japan after the US allies in East Asia were completely devastated? It would be 
more sensible to go deeper and go toward South (Australia and New Zealand). That 
is what a strategic back-up plan means.  
 In 1956 the US navy started to store warheads of nuclear 
submarine-launched Regulus missiles on Chichijima. This island was assumed to 
serve as a recovery or back-up base and so was Iwo Jima on which nuclear cores 
were stored.901  The cores were removed from Iwo Jima in 1959 and the last 
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warheads of Regulus missiles replaced by SLBMs (Polaris missiles) were withdrawn 
from Chichijima in 1964.902 Accordingly, by the time the two governments started 
the formal negotiations over the Bonin Islands in 1967, nuclear weapons had 
already been removed. This casts serious doubt on the strategic importance of the 
islands. If these islands were truly crucial for US operational plans, nuclear 
weapons stored on the islands would not have been removed especially given that 
they were under US administrative control. Indeed, Alexis Johnson argued that 
―The Navy was making very little use of the islands anyway, so its argument 
seemed a little pale.‖903 It also suggests forward deployment of nuclear weapons 
was not necessarily vital in the case of the Bonins as they were replaced by 
nuclear-armed submarines.  
 As for a nuclear operation involving the Bonin Islands, the key challenge 
was the contingency use of the islands: the storage of nuclear weapons in such a 
situation.904 While US Navy and the JCS put pressure on Ambassador Johnson to 
reach a firm agreement with the Japanese government that they would be allowed 
to store nuclear weapons in the event of contingency, he did not believe that such an 
occasion were relatively conceivable. He was well aware that it would be politically 
unacceptable for the Japanese government to sanction the US military formal 
permission to store nuclear weapons in the Bonin Islands.905 This was a key 
rationale behind ―Invisible‖ END. In the case of the Bonins, reintroduction of US 
nuclear weapons would not be an urgent matter in cases of a contingency. The 
operational deployment of Polaris that replaced Regulus missiles reduced the 
necessity of the contingency use of the islands.   
                                                                                                                                                     
Statement Department Cable to U.S. Embassy Tokyo, 5 November 1967. Retrieved by the National 
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 Foreign Minister Miki nevertheless acknowledged that the case that 
nuclear weapons were to be reintroduced into the Bonin Islands would not be 
considered separately from security of whole Japan. Yet he refused to make a formal 
agreement to permit the US emergency reintroduction of US nuclear weapons into 
the Bonin Islands, let alone formulate a written agreement between the two 
governments and each copy would be kept secretly by the two governments.906 
Their conclusion was that Japan would commit to enter into prior consultation 
should the USA need to store US nuclear weapons in the islands. Ideally America 
―would anticipate a favourable reaction from the Government of Japan‖ for such a 
request.907 Realistically speaking, the possibility of such a situation was quite 
remote.  
 At any rate, the case that nuclear weapons were reintroduced to the islands 
would imply that Japan‘s vital security was in imminent danger and Japan would 
find itself in a difficult situation to refuse the request in such a situation. In a 
similar vein, Wakaizumi held that as to the issue of prior consultation, ―the point 
may be made that one should not necessarily assume that Japan will veto any 
American actions necessary for dealing promptly and effectively with threats 
directly endangering the peace and security of the Far East‖908 Some Japanese 
analysts insisted that this was another secret nuclear agreement between the US 
and the Japanese government as Japan was expected to approve the US request.909  
 That being said, depending on the severity of the situation, Japan still held 
power to decline the American request if it found such an act would not be essential. 
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In short, the US did not have automatic approval from the Japanese government to 
permit its nuclear storage plan in emergency. While the Japanese government did 
not make any special secret agreement on the contingency reintroduction of nuclear 
weapons on the islands, the same issue recurred in the case of Okinawa.910 It is 
pointed out that the reversion style of the Bonins set a precedent for that of 
Okinawa,911 although the two parties formally agreed that ―the Bonins settlement 
is not a precedent for the Ryukyus.‖912 This is because, as Rusk observed, ―should 
action be taken to return the Bonins, would this not make the Ryukyu situation 
more difficult, since it would impel the Ryukyuans to ask ‗why not us, too?‖913 
  At that time this sort of reasoning was probably natural given that 
Okinawa was truly the last major remaining problem between the USA and Japan. 
It would not have been too naïve for the local populace in the Ryukyu Islands to 
suppose it would be finally their turn to be returned to Japan. The Bonin Islands 
were where they continued to be administered together with the Ryukyu Islands 
even after Japan gained its national independence in 1952. Return of 
administration over the Bonin Islands by the US government to Japan would 
signify that the US government was finally willing to cede the remaining territories 
administered by the US to Japan. Despite Rusk‘s concern, as time went by it was 
becoming evident that the US government was required to work out the reversion 
problem of Okinawa and at least take interim measures in face of mounting 
pressures on reversion of the Ryukyu Islands from not only the Rykyu people but 
also ordinary Japanese: ―mishandling of this issue could lead to dire consequences. 
The Socialists will exploit such mishandling to their advantage. The Communists 
will also.‖ 914  Furthermore, Japanese Foreign Minister Miki stressed that ―As 
background for the Prime Minister ‘s visit in November, great expectations for some 
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progress on the matter of the return of Okinawa have been aroused among the 
people of Japan and the greatest difficulty would ensure if no step forward is taken; 
in fact, it would endanger the political life of the [Sato] government.‖915 The US 
government was well aware that the Japanese saw the status of Okinawa under 
―alien rule and a disparate administrative system‖ as ―unnatural.‖916 Indeed a prior 
return of the Bonin Islands was considered to be ―utilized to stem pressures for 
immediate return of the Ryukyus.‖917 This indeed served as an interim measure.  
 In fact it is quite uncertain whether Okinawa could have been returned to 
Japan without the reversion of the Bonins. In effect the State Department 
recognised that ―US finds Bonins Islands problem easier to treat than Ryukyus in 
view lesser degree of importance from security point of view.‖918  As a result, 
reversion of the Bonin Islands would naturally precede that of the Ryukyu Islands. 
To be sure, this was exactly what happened in the late 1960s. After all, as one top 
secret American document illuminated, ―The Bonins and other Western Pacific 
Islands are of little or no importance militarily but have been retained principally 
for contingency purposes.‖919 Tokyo also understood the Bonin Islands presently 
had little military utility. The immediate reversion of the Bonins was therefore 
relatively promising.920 This was, however, not the case with the Ryukyus. The 
strategic importance of the Ryukyus was nothing comparable to the Bonins. When 
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the Japanese and the US government worked on the negotiations on the reversion 
of the Ryukyus, the USA was in the midst of fighting the Vietnam War. Okinawa, 
the main island of the Ryukyu Islands, was fully used for war efforts. On several 
occasions B-52 bombers even directly flew from and in Okinawa to North Vietnam 
for strategic bombing operations.921 
 
Okinawa and Nuclear Weapons 
 
 For the US military, the Ryukyu Islands including the largest and main 
island Okinawa (Honto) were strategically crucial due to ―its critical importance for 
operations in Korea and security in the western pacific.‖922 As Sarantakes correctly 
observed, American military planners ―used the island‘s proximity to the Asian 
mainland to develop plans that allowed them to project American power onto the 
continent against Communist foe.‖923 Reischauer looked back on his first visit to 
Okinawa in the summer of 1961 and observed that ―The American military looked 
on the retention of Okinawa as essential to America‘s future military position in the 
Western Pacific…It saw the Japanese government as its chief challenger for control 
of Okinawa.‖924 This aspect implies that the US military regarded Okinawa as its 
legitimate territory. The JCS even asserted that ―The entire United States strategic 
position in the Pacific would be seriously jeopardized if the Ryukyus were to come 
under the control of Japan.‖925  
These islands were under US military (Army) control. The Japanese 
inevitably saw this condition as ―unnatural‖ and as an extension of the US 
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occupation.926 The longer Okinawa was administered by the US military, the more 
frustrated the Okinawan people were about the status of the islands. Sato‘s highest 
diplomatic goal during his tenure was the return of the Ryukyu Islands and he 
made a famous speech when he visited Okinawa in 1965 as the first Prime Minister 
to pay a visit to the island.927 In the speech, he enunciated that ―The postwar will 
not end until we have Okinawa back to Japan.‖928 Yet we now know that one 
sentence－―Okinawa has played a significant role in the stability and peace of the 
Far East‖－was added to the same speech by American pressure.929  
 As observed above, the summit meeting of 1967 between President Johnson 
and Prime Minister Sato made progress in anticipating the reversion of the Ryukyu 
―within three years.‖ Unlike the Bonins, which had little military utility during 
peacetime, Okinawa was actively used as ―an operational support base for combat 
operations‖ during the Vietnam War. 930  The salience of Okinawa naturally 
increased as the Vietnam War escalated.931 During that war, Okinawa served as a 
key logistic base for US military actions. 
  In light of this, the US military sought to retain its right of unrestricted 
military use there. Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp even asserted that ―without Okinawa 
we couldn‘t continue fighting the Vietnam War.‖932 Ambassador Johnson, however, 
thought:  
 
in the long run, I thought this freedom might be counterproductive. Japan would 
have to take more responsibility in regional politics if its security depended on its 
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own decisions about how those Okinawa bases could be used…I also believed that 
the United States was very unlikely ever again to fight in Asia without Japan‘s full 
support. Thus, under almost any circumstances, we ourselves would wish to 
consult with the Japanese government before deploying forces from Okinawa.933  
 
He went on to observe that ―Any ‗freedoms‘ we had on paper would be entirely 
theoretical in the face of a hostile population…it was an illusion to think we would 
have any freedom of action whatever, on Japan or Okinawa, if the local population 
was hostile to us no matter what ‗fine print‘ was included in our agreements.‖934  
 That said, there was even an option to turn down the Japanese demand and 
delay negotiations over Okinawa at least until the end of the Vietnam War.935 
Indeed Sato was well aware that the timing was not on Japan‘s side in view of the 
ongoing war and the developments of the Chinese nuclear weapons programme.936 
At the same time, the mounting public antagonism against the US military was 
becoming more and more evident.937 One top secret action memorandum for the 
President in August 1967 even stressed that ―The longer we delay negotiations the 
greater the danger than an explosive situation could develop.‖938 Both the Japanese 
mass media and public were highly against the free use of the US military bases 
and nuclear weapons deployed in Okinawa.939 
 It is also important to note that Okinawa had been highly fortified by 1960. 
The island hosted key facilities of navy, air force, logistics and intelligence forming 
the most important US base network in the Asia-Pacific.940 In other words, the US 
military invested a huge amount of money in Okinawa. Nuclear weapons were also 
                                                   
933 Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, pp. 508-509. 
934 Ibid., pp. 540-541. 
935 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967). 
936 Sato Sori Rasku Kokumu Choukan Kaidanroku, 15 November 1967. 
937 Schaller, Altered States, p. 184, 189, 193. 
938 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967). 
939 Memorandum for Walt Rostow, the White House, from Leonard H. Marks, 13 November 1967, NSF, 
Country File, Japan. Box 252, Japan, LBJ Library. 
940 Schaller, Altered States, p. 171. 
213 
 
extensively and massively deployed to the island.941 Against this backdrop, the 
reversion of the Ryukyu Islands was a daunting task for both governments. In 1968 
Sato implied at the Diet that to demand the US government to remove its nuclear 
weapons from Okinawa would make negotiations over Okinawa very difficult.942 
Notably when Japanese Foreign Minister Miki made a query about the necessity of 
a nuclear base on Okinawa to Secretary State Rusk in September 1967, Rusk 
answered to this inquiry by remarking that ―a nuclear base is an absolute.‖ He also 
said that ―this should be determined by security requirements and not by public 
opinion.‖943 
 As Alexis Johnson pointed out, ―The real issue was whether we would 
accept the same restrictions on them that governed our bases on Japan proper 
under the 1960 Security Treaty.‖944 The Japanese government pondered which 
choice to make: Genjo Dori (status quo) or Hondo Nami (the same status as the 
mainland of Japan; hence no peacetime nuclear deployment) with respect to the 
treatment of locally- deployed nuclear weapons on a post-reversion Okinawa.945 As 
noted previously, Sato initially considered the reversion of Okinawa with US 
nuclear weapons deployed and therefore, a status quo option. In 1967 Alexis 
Johnson informed Foreign Minister Miki that it was possible to remove nuclear 
weapons from Okinawa but such an act was undesirable on the grounds that this 
would weaken American deterrence vis-à-vis China. 946  Defence Secretary 
McNamara was opposed to this view and believed nuclear weapons did not need to 
remain there ―since we would never again fight a war in Asia without Japanese 
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support.‖947 At any rate, the final progress could not be made until President 
Richard Nixon came into office in 1969 since Johnson had abandoned his re-election 
bid as he faced domestically fervent public opposition to his Vietnam War.948 Indeed 
it was in 1969 when the Japanese and US government reached an agreement on 
reversion of the Ryukyu Islands. There were several reasons why the USA finally 
came to the conclusion that it should cede control of Okinawa, but it is difficult to 
distinguish which factor was the most decisive; some key factors can be singled out.  
 First, Washington understood that it would be eventually required to 
return the islands if it wanted to maintain good relations with Japan－ the longer 
the USA retained Okinawa, the more hatred it created among the Japanese.949 It 
was wiser to strengthen the US-Japan relations by returning the Ryukyu Islands.950 
In 1961 Reischauer as an American official publicly called Okinawans Japanese and 
he believed that this public statement was the first official statement to recognise 
Okinawa as part of Japan. He also suggested that the US government hasten the 
formal process of return of Okinawa. 951  One year later President Kennedy 
acknowledged that Okinawa was part of the Japanese territory and he showed his 
willingness to return the island.952 It was, however, uncertain how willing Kennedy 
was to return Okinawa to Japan. 953  At any rate his administration was 
unfortunately short-lived. Yet by the time Nixon took office in January 1969, the 
reversion of Okinawa had ―reached the point of no return…The pressures have built 
up in both Japan and Okinawa to the point where I can see virtually no hope of 
stalling off beyond the end of next year a decision on the timing of reversion‖ as the 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Bundy 
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observed.954 The further delay would seriously affect the renewal of the US-Japan 
security treaty ,which the US government wanted to continue,955 due in 1970 or 
even bring down the ―pro-America‖ Sato government, unleashing vehement 
resentment against America. The likely scenario of this deteriorating situation 
would have been the rise of the opposition parties. If the main opposition party (the 
socialist party) had replaced the LDP government, it would have abrogated the 
US-Japan security treaty as it had long claimed and Japanese neutralism would 
have further deepened.956  
 For the US policy makers, the reversion of Okinawa was far preferable to 
losing all the bases throughout Japan by continuously and adamantly refusing to 
grant the administration return of Okinawa.957 This was expected to accelerate 
further with the emergence of Chobyo Yara as chief executive of Okinawa 
(equivalent to prefectural governor) in 1968, who was adamantly opposed to the 
continued occupation of Okinawa by the US army.958 As Foreign Minister Miki 
correctly observed in 1967, ―Public opinion at present, which is critical of the failure 
to achieve reversion, cannot be disregarded for it is a major factor in the 
situation.‖959 
 The Okinawans, after all, truly believed themselves Japanese. 960  The 
longer the US military control over the Ryukyu Islands continued, the more 
frustrated the Japanese as a whole became. In June 1957 when Prime Minister 
Kishi met with President Eisenhower, Kishi insisted that ―The 800,000 people of 
Okinawa are Japanese, and they are not different from the rest of the Japanese 
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people. The problems of Okinawa are not simply those of 800,000 Okinawans, but of 
90,000,000 Japanese. It may be thought that the Japanese Government interferes 
too much in the affairs of Okinawa, but they are our people.‖961 There is even a 
claim that the USA was fortunate in that the nearly twenty years of US army 
retention of Okinawa did not significantly damage US-Japan alliance relations.962 
One analyst observed that ―There was an almost universal agreement that return of 
Okinawa, in a manner acceptable to both the Japanese political elite and to public 
opinion, was necessary to prevent the alliance from foundering.‖963 In the words of 
Sarantakes,, ―In fact, maintaining the security alliance with Japan, which was the 
foundation of regional stability, was the main reason the United States had agreed 
to return the island.‖964 Wakaizumi also understood the fragility of the bilateral 
relations due to the reversion and trade issues (textiles) and mishandling them 
―might compel renunciation of the Treaty by Washington or Tokyo.‖965 
 Second it was also due to Prime Minister Sato whom the US government 
found reliable and trustworthy. Sato was indeed more vocal about Japanese security. 
966 The US government also expected Japan to assume a more active and expanded 
role in greater defence responsibilities in Asia on Japan‘s own initiative following 
the reversion.967 In comparison to the 1950‘s, the early 50s in particular, it was 
much moderate but the US government in the 1960s continued to encourage 
―moderate increases and qualitative improvement in Japan‘s defense efforts, while 
avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces or to play a 
larger regional security role.‖968  Indeed Nixon decided to cede control of Okinawa 
to Japan in hope of Japan developing more military capability and assuming 
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greater defense responsibilities for regional security after the reversion of Okinawa 
coupled with Japan‘s more economic and technical assistance to the regional 
countries as part of the so-called Nixon Doctrine announced in July 1969 to 
facilitate an end of the Vietnam War.969 The new doctrine assumed that US Asian 
allies would have to be more responsible for their own defence and the USA would 
still provide its nuclear shield to them in case of contingency.970 In his TV address to 
the ―Nation on War‖ in Vietnam in November 1969, Nixon clarified his doctrine: 
 
First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. 
Second, we will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a 
nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. 
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we will furnish military and 
economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. 
But we will look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary 
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.971     
 
 On top of this, Sato understood and appreciated the importance of US bases 
in Okinawa for the security of the Far East and wanted the US military to remain 
stationed there.972  
 Third, Sato privately promised Nixon that the Japanese government would 
restrict the exports of Japanese textile products of Japan to the US market 
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although this later became an empty promise arousing the mistrust of the Nixon 
administration in the Japanese government.973 The textile issue first arouse in the 
mid 1950s when the US government lowered tariffs on textile. Since then cheaper 
Japanese textiles had swept the US textile market.974 The US textile industry 
demanded strong restrictions on the imports of textile from Japan. Interestingly, 
Schaller suggested that Nixon and Kissinger considered that US forces in Japan 
was not only to deter the Communist but also to keep Japan from becoming a 
military power again (double containment). 975  Schaller may be slightly 
deterministic. He did not really elaborate upon the possibility that Nixon and 
Kissinger might have been simply frustrated about Japan‘s political incompetence 
to breakthrough in the stalled textile problem. Since Nixon actually encouraged 
Japan‘s rearmament in the 1950s, it is questionable that Nixon and Kissinger had a 
serious policy of containment of Japan. Japan‘s case was completely different from 
Western Europe where the large presence of US troops reassured German 
neighbours that the resurgence of Germany would be prevented by Americans. As 
stated previously West Germany was permitted to join the Western European 
Union by its pledge of non-nuclear status.   
 In other words, the textile issue was crucial for the Nixon administration. 
Kissinger, for example, stated that ―we had traded Okinawa for concessions on 
textiles.‖976 Wakaizumi, who somehow got involved in the negotiations over Japan‘s 
restriction of textile exports to the US market, also highlighted that the textile 
problem was much more important than the nuclear issue of Okinawa for President 
Nixon.977     
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 Fourth, the nuclear weapons deployed in Okinawa such as Mace-B had 
become outdated as the introduction of strategic nuclear weapons such as SLBMs 
and ICBMs.978 This situation might be similar to the Kennedy administration‘s 
decision during the Cuban missile to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy 
as those missiles went outdated and could nevertheless be replaced by Polaris 
SLBMs. 979  McNamara reassured the Italians and Turks that the Polaris 
submarines assigned to NATO would serve ―as a replacement for the dismantled  
[Jupiter] missiles.‖980  Eisenhower also noted that ICBM would diminish strategic 
roles of IRBMs in the long run.981  As technology advanced, strategic bombers on 
continual air alert were rendered unnecessary by the introduction of ICBMs and 
SLBMs in the very beginning of 1960s and they dramatically reduced the level of 
strategic vulnerability.982 It is also worth noting that since the late 1990s when WE 
177 nuclear bomb was retired, UK nuclear deterrence has relied solely on a 
nuclear-submarine platform.983  
 According to Wohlstetter ‘s realistic analysis of the US nuclear force, ―Most 
of the force is made up of missiles that can be launched from the continental United 
States or from ocean areas to distant targets.‖984 In fact he already made a similar 
comment in the 1950s.985 On top of this, as Halperin observed, ―because the United 
States has very substantial nuclear forces that can be moved into the Pacific area on 
very short notice, it is necessary to take into account the American strategic and 
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nuclear forces based in the United States.‖ 986  In a similar vein, Wakaizumi 
observed that now that strategic nuclear missiles were in operation, a nuclear role 
of Okinawa was much diminished.987 It is also important to note that after the MLF 
proposal was renounced NATO also started to rely on US Polaris submarines 
assigned to the NATO supreme commander in the mid-1960s.988  
 As we will see below, this also was a positive development to the Japanese 
government. Sato changed his initial policy of a nuclear-attached Okinawa and 
adopted the policy of a nuclear-free Okinawa. Of course, Sato understood the 
importance of more visibility of nuclear weapons as noted in the last chapter. He 
indeed called ―Three Non-Nuclear Principles‖ nonsense. Because of his declared 
principles, it would be difficult to promote the idea of status quo. At any rate, Sato 
had already sought deterrence at sea in 1965. In view of the maritime nature of 
Japan, this was probably backed by SLBMs. In the meantime, he showed his 
reluctance to accept the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.  
 To some extent, the JCS was confident that these new weapon systems 
could replace the forward-deployed missiles while it was in favour of maintaining 
nuclear storages rights on Okinawa.989 Japanese policy makers were also aware of 
this view and shared the view that Polaris could replace Mace B and 
forward-deployed nuclear weapons would not be necessary any longer. 990 
Operationally nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines such as USS George 
Washington would not need to make port calls at foreign countries. Indeed, 
according to Reischauer, they did not make any visit to Japan.991 To give an 
example, the 1968-1969 version of the Military Balance indicated that seven 
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nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines, each of which carried sixteen Polaris 
missiles, were deployed in the Pacific Ocean.992  Moreover, US nuclear weapons 
were also stationed in South Korea and Guam.993 There was a review of US forward 
nuclear weapons and the US military also removed them from other regional 
countries such as Taiwan and the Philippines in 1974 and 1976 respectively994 
  That said, the US military desired the continued deployment of nuclear 
weapons on Okinawa even after the reversion although the US government was 
well aware that the Japanese would likely to refuse any US nuclear right.995 This 
opposition voice from the JCS was by far stronger than the case of the Bonin Islands, 
and it was too loud for Nixon to ignore, arguing that the withdrawal of US nuclear 
weapons there would weaken regional deterrence,996 which eventually led Sato 
down a path of signing a classified nuclear agreement (the right for emergency 
storage of nuclear weapons) with Nixon in 1969 even though Sato did not want any 
secret agreement with the US government. 997  As Alexis Johnson explained, 
―Although we might not now want to store nuclear weapons on the island or mount 
operations elsewhere without prior consultation, the right to do so in a crisis might 
be worth retaining.‖998 This deal was arguably inevitable as the Sato government 
tried to accommodate the military requirement and also understood the importance 
of US military presence as a deterrent. In the mean time the government was well 
aware of popular demand of a nuclear free Okinawa. In other words, the Sato 
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government vacillated between the two incompatible demands. A viable solution 
was to conclude the secret deal.999 As Kissinger recalled, however, ―the military and 
political risks of seeking to maintain the status quo outweighed the military cost of 
having somewhat less flexibility in operating the Okinawa bases under Japanese 
sovereignty. Indeed, our refusal to negotiate an accommodation could well lead as a 
practical matter to our losing the bases altogether.‖1000 
 Moreover, Sato shifted his earlier stance of ―blank state‖ (any option 
available) of the nuclear issue to Okinawa free of nuclear weapons at the beginning 
of 1969.1001 In January 1969 Sato surprised Ambassador (to the USA) Shimoda by 
giving his own thought that now nuclear-attached reversion was unacceptable. 
Japan should go for a nuclear free Okinawa.1002 Half a year later, Sato declared the 
same position of the return of Okinawa free of nuclear weapons at the Diet.1003 Sato 
was required to reverse his initial policy with respect to Okinawa reversion under 
the condition of a nuclear-attached Okinawa (status quo). He learned from his failed 
attempts to assuage a nuclear allergy that this reversion manner was not 
acceptable to the Japanese public although Okinawa could have been returned to 
Japanese control earlier if Japan accepted a nuclear-attached Okinawa. Moreover, 
it was becoming evident by the end of 1968 that the nuclear attached reversion of 
Okinawa was no longer a politically feasible option for the Japanese government 
due to mounting public outcry.1004 Japanese politicians including even conservative 
political figures like Nakasone also stressed that Okinawa had to be returned on the 
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basis of homeland-level (non-peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons).1005 
  That said, Sato personally understood the importance of US nuclear 
deterrence as Japan restricted itself with the ―Three Non-Nuclear‖ principles for its 
security. With that in mind, Sato also stated in March 1969 that, ―Japan had no 
choice but to rely on the US nuclear protection.‖1006 In the end, the Japanese 
government had to conceded to the USA secretly ―a right to reintroduce nuclear 
weapons to Okinawa in an emergency‖ and ―under the security treaty it had a stake 
in the security of Taiwan and South Korea‖ in order to have Okinawa back.1007 As 
for the Security of South Korea, Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi told Ambassador 
Johnson that Prime Minister Sato in January 1969 that Prime Minister Sato and he 
were fully supportive about US operations in Korea and without any prejudice to 
Japan, US bases throughout Japan would back such operations should hostilities on 
the Korean Peninsula resume.1008 
 Five months later when Sato met with Secretary of State William Rogers, 
he made a similar comment about Japan‘s formal support for US military 
operations in event of renewal of the Korean War. He remarked to Rogers that 
Japan would back US military operations on the Korean Peninsula. Should there be 
a request from the US government, all the US military bases throughout Japan 
including the ones in Okinawa would be available for such operations. In the 
meantime, Sato stressed that a nuclear-attached Okinawa would not be acceptable 
to the Japanese due to its historical experience of the atomic bombing.1009 
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The Secret Nuclear Deal and Invisible END 
 
 In 1994 Kei Wakaizumi, who served as Sato‘s envoy during the negotiations 
for Okinawa reversion, revealed to the public that Prime Minister Sato and 
President Nixon had the foregoing secret deal that US will reintroduce its nuclear 
weapons into Okinawa in cases of contingency. 1010  Although the Nixon 
administration understood that it was desirable to keep nuclear weapons on 
Okinawa, this was not imperative. One key top secret document dated on 28 May 
1969, National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 13, clearly stated the US 
stance on the coming negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa. They were mainly 
concerned with security issues as specified below. 
 
 Our willingness to agree to reversion in 1972 provided there is agreement in 1969 
on the essential elements governing U.S. military use and provided detailed 
negotiations are completed at that time. 
 Our desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly 
with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam. 
 Our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but indicating that the 
President is prepared to consider, at the final stages of negotiation, the withdrawal 
of the weapons while retaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other 
elements of the Okinawan agreement and satisfactory.1011   
 
 In September 1969 Sato‘s special envoy delivered Kissinger‘s (and hence 
the US government stance) messages to Sato that President Nixon had agreed to 
remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa on condition that the reintroduction of US 
nuclear weapons into Okinawa in an emergency was permitted by Tokyo, 
demanding a secret agreed minute. 1012  Sato grudgingly accepted this secret 
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minute.1013 Consequently the key issue for the US government was how to secure 
the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Okinawa in the case of contingency. The 
Nixon government tried to use the nuclear card to lead the negotiations over 
Okinawa on its own terms although the New York Times leaked the ―fallback 
position for the negotiations with the Japanese on Okinawa‖ in June 1969.1014 Sato 
sent his emissary Wakaizumi to Washington so as to deal with this issue and his 
American counterpart was Henry Kissinger (the National Security Advisor to 
President Nixon). Due to the importance of the secrecy of the negotiations, they 
decided to call each other Mr. Yoshida and Dr Jones respectively. 1015  This 
behind-the-scenes or back-channel diplomacy also appeared in Kissinger ‘s White 
House Years in 19791016 They carefully worked out the secret agreement on the 
emergency storage of nuclear weapons on Okinawa.    
 This confidential operation did not deny any role to the official US-Japan 
diplomatic channel in the negotiations over Okinawa: Japanese Foreign Minister 
Aichi also evinced the Japanese attitude toward the ―homeland-level‖ reversion of 
Okinawa which would restrict freedom of military action regardless of whether it 
was conventional or nuclear. 1017 Both sides of diplomats toiled on drawing up the 
Joint Communiqué, understanding the salience of the emergency nuclear storage on 
Okinawa. MOFA was in fact prepared to acknowledge the reintroduction of nuclear 
weapons in a contingency.1018 Sato also told MOFA officials that Japan would agree 
to approve the US request of the reintroduction of nuclear weapons in an 
emergency.1019 That said rather the secret nuclear accord depended heavily on the 
back channel and the final decision was left to the two leaders at the coming 
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summit meeting held between 19 and 21 November 1969.1020 Therefore, the official 
diplomatic track played a limited role in the final nuclear negotiations. Indeed, 
MOFA never housed the ―Agreed Minute‖ on the nuclear storage in time of 
emergency 1021  that was exclusively written by Kissinger and Wakaizumi. 1022 
Finally in November 1969 when Sato met with Nixon in Washington D.C, both 
governments formally declared that Okinawa would fully revert to Japan in 1972 
without any forward-deployed nuclear weapons.1023 The joint communiqué of 1969 
proclaimed: 
 
The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese 
people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government 
reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and 
assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United 
States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty 
of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out 
in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by 
the Prime Minister. 
 
 Kissinger clarified that the line ―the particular sentiment of the Japanese 
people against nuclear weapons‖ implicitly indicated the Okinawa would be 
―nuclear free.‖ In short Article 4 of the security treaty would apply to Okinawa upon 
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its return.1024 This was, however, a public statement. Before this statement was 
made public, Sato and Nixon signed a secret ―Agreed Minute‖ on the first day of the 
summit (19 November 1969). For Sato, this summit was particularly special 
because he went to Washington ―to settle the Okinawa issue.‖1025 The detailed 
procedure of signing the minute was devised by Wakaizumi and Kissinger.1026 
According to the planned scenario, President Nixon would invite Sato to the small 
room beside the Oval office during the summit meeting to show Sato Nixon‘s 
collection of art without their interpreters. There the two sheets of an agreed 
minute written in English― both leaders ―agreed that this Minute in duplicate, be 
kept each only in the offices of the President and the Prime Minister‖― were 
prepared by Kissinger and all they had to do was to sign each sheet.1027 This indeed 
took place on the first day (19 November 1969).1028  
 Notably the existence of this secret agreement was known to only four 
people: President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Prime Minister Sato and Kei Wakaizumi 
at the time of signing it although there is a strong possibility that this top secret 
was later shared by few elites especially from the State Department and the 
Pentagon so as to meet military demands.1029 Alexis Johnson also noted that ―The 
Prime Minister was here last week, November 19th and 20th, and a decision was 
reached that we would remove our nuclear weapons from Okinawa but we retained 
the right to consult with the Japanese to put them back if we felt there was an 
emergency.‖1030 While the American copy was finally discovered at the National 
Archives and Records Administration by a Japanese journalist in June 2018, the 
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Japanese copy was found at Prime Minister Sato‘s home in December 2009.1031 
When Sato‘s son found this document, he inquired whether MOFA‘s archives would 
preserve it. To his dismay, MOFA declined his offer.1032  
 This behind-the-scenes diplomacy was implemented outside the official 
diplomatic track and it is conceivable that MOFA officials were so resentful about 
this secret operation that they did not accept the document.1033 Five months later, 
the Japanese government acknowledged that this was the genuine document signed 
by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato1034 while this secret agreement was no 
longer valid since this document was not handed over to his successors.1035 In June 
2010 Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada officially announced that the US government 
also confirmed that this agreement was invalid now.1036 This can be interpreted as 
meaning that ―Invisible‖ END is complete. That being so, this does not necessarily 
deny the possibility that a strategic bomber such as B52 whether or not it carries 
nuclear weapons can fly into Japan in the event of crisis. 
 In 1994 this ―Agreed Minute‖ was revealed to the public by Wakaizumi. It 
read that 
 
 As stated in the Joint Communiqué, it is the intention of the United states 
Government to remove all the nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the time of actual 
reversion of the administrative rights to Japan…However , in order to discharge 
effectively the international obligations assumed by the United States for the 
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defense of countries in the Far East including Japan, in time of great emergency 
the United States Government will require the reentry of nuclear weapons and 
transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of Japan. 
The United States Government would anticipate a favorable response. The United 
States Government also requires the standby retention and activation in time of 
great emergency of existing nuclear storage locations in Okinawa: Kaduna, Naha, 
Chinook and Nike Hercules units…The Government of Japan, appreciating the 
United States Government‘s requirements in time of great emergency stated above 
by the president, will meet these requirements without delay when such prior 
consultation takes place.1037 
 
 Whether this minute was written reflecting the negotiations over the Bonin 
Islands was uncertain in which the US government representative expressed its 
desirability that the US government ―would anticipate a favorable reaction from the 
Government of Japan‖ for such a request.1038 The secret nuclear deal above also laid 
out that the American government ―would anticipate a favorable response‖ for 
emergency reentry and transit rights from the Japanese government. 1039  In 
contrast to the case of the Bonin Islands, this time the Japanese government was 
required to assume much more evident responsibility for the reintroduction of US 
nuclear weapons as the secret minute proclaimed that the Japanese government 
―will meet these requirements without delay when such prior consultation takes 
place.‖ 1040  This top secret agreement clearly demonstrates that both sides 
compromised on the nuclear issue and they managed to meet their demands. For 
Japan, needless to say, nuclear weapons were to be removed from Okinawa despite 
the US NCND policy. For America, it still retained the right of emergency nuclear 
storage on Okinawa. As for the ―free use‖ problem, the Japanese government did not 
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overtly grant such a right to the US military. Instead, the joint communiqué first 
acknowledged that ―in the light of the present situation, the presence of United 
States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area.‖ It 
then proclaimed that a ―the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to 
Japan‘s own security‖ and ―the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan 
area was also the most important factor for the security of Japan.‖1041 It also 
stressed ―the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without 
international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of 
countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan.‖1042  
 On the use of bases for the Vietnam War, Japan showed its tacit 
understanding of the importance of such military missions for the USA: ―should 
peace in Viet-Nam have been realised by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled 
to take place, the two governments would-fully consult with each other in the light 
of the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without 
affecting the United States efforts‖1043 In addition, Sato delivered a speech at the 
Press Club, asserting that both Taiwan and South Korean were crucial to Japan‘s 
security. Therefore, the Japanese government would favourably respond to 
American requests to use and operate from bases in Japan should an armed attack 
against these two countries arise. 1044  These two pieces were actually closely 
intertwined; the latter complemented the former. 1045  Sato‘s speech was to 
demonstrate the Japanese support for US military action in the Far East and to 
clarify the Japan‘s stance that the reversion of Okinawa would be completed 
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without detriment to the US security interests.1046  
 When Wakaizumi published his book, he expressed to the Japanese public 
there was no other choice but to conclude the secret agreement with the US 
government in order for Okinawa to revert to Japan. Wakaizumi believed it a 
― necessary evil‖ and he was rather confident that such a case that the 
reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Japan was quite remote in the foreseeable 
future.1047 With the advantage of hindsight, it can be argued that this secret deal 
would not have been vital. 1048  One analyst even crticised harshly Sato for 
contradicting his ―Three Non-Nuclear Principles.‖ 1049  While his decision was 
labeled as the behind-the-scenes dishonest dealing, his critics are ignorant about 
the diplomatic and strategic context.  
 The reversion could have been delayed further without this secret 
agreement while of course this argument is never provable. Sato must be given a 
credit as he managed to have US nuclear weapons removed from Okinawa despite 
the JCS‘s fervent opposition to such a move. More importantly, his non-nuclear 
principles actually did apply to Okinawa during a peace time. This was obviously a 
major achievement. It is important to distinguish the status of nuclear presence 
between peace and crisis time especially when it comes to the US END. At the time 
the Vietnam War was still taking place despite the temporary suspension of air 
bombing on North Vietnam in the wake of the Tet Offense of 1968, China was 
advancing its nuclear weapons programme, and the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan 
were in the proximity of Okinawa and many nuclear weapons were deployed in 
Okinawa due to its strategic location (keystone) in the Asia Pacific. Furthermore, 
the status of Okinawa was a clear symbol of the winner of the Second World War 
and the reversion of Okinawa to full Japanese control was, as Sato asserted, the 
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true end of the Second World War.1050 In 1952 US army General Joseph Lawton 
Collins boldly asserted that ―we don‘t envisage staying in Japan indefinitely, but if 
we build up Okinawa into a major base we do envisage staying their 
indefinitely.‖1051 Echoing General Collins, another US army General Omar Bradley 
maintained that ―Our position in Japan is temporary, but if we are going to stay in 
Okinawa we should stay there permanently.‖1052 It is not difficult to imagine that 
the ―Agreed Minute‖ was prepared predominantly for satisfying the long-held US 
military demands.1053  
  In view of these points, as Wakaizumi remarked, the secret nuclear 
agreement was indeed a necessary evil. Most importantly, what the Sato 
government carved out was a ―nuclear free‖ Japan where no nuclear weapons were 
deployed on Japan‘s soil at least during peacetime. It must be noted that reversion 
of the Ryukyu Islands is what the Japanese had yearned for. In 1972 Okinawa was 
fully returned to Japan on the basis of the agreement of the summit meeting (a 
nuclear free Okinawa) notwithstanding some difficulties.1054 US Secretary of State 
William Rogers, for example, wrote to Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda in 
1972, giving Japan ―the assurances of the Government of the United States of 
America concerning nuclear weapon on Okinawa have been fully carried out.‖1055 
This was also when the invisible extended nuclear deterrence came into a full form. 
Since then, theoretically Japan has been protected by the US strategic triad system 
rather than forward deployment of US nuclear weapons as in the case of NATO.  
 For the Japanese national leaders, initially a nuclear-attached Okinawa 
was a very realistic reversion style. Yet they eventually learned that this was 
politically unacceptable to the Japanese. As the negotiations over the reversion of 
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Okinawa progressed, the visibility of nuclear deterrence was no longer a militarily 
vital problem but a political and emotional issue. ―Invisible‖ END came to 
completion in 1972 when Okinawa was returned to Japan. From 1970 onward, the 
Japanese government officially started to use the term the ―nuclear deterrence [the 
US nuclear umbrella]‖ in its public documents without elaborating upon how 
exactly this umbrella protected Japan. 
 
The Shape of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence over Japan 
 
 As the preceding chapters illustrated, Japan came under the US nuclear 
umbrella through a series of key events between 1965 and 1968 as a direct result of 
both Japanese concerns about the first Chinese nuclear test and the emergence of 
the defence-minded Sato Administration. US-Japan security relations were 
politically tightened between Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson. Since 
1965 it has become a tradition for the US to provide verbal nuclear reassurance to 
Japan.1056 This fundamental basis of US END over Japan has not changed since the 
1960s.1057 Since the US and Japanese government reached the agreement on the 
reversion of Okinawa without forward-deployed nuclear weapons in 1969, ―Invisible‖ 
END also came to completion in the late 1960s at least during peacetime. In this 
section, we will explore how ―Invisible‖ US END over Japan works in theory. As the 
practical value of such deterrence has never been put to the test (i.e. Japan has not 
ever been close to any armed aggression since 1945), this is completely a theoretical 
analysis and it still refers to empirical evidence with respect to ―Invisible‖ END 
articulated above. 
 In contrast to NATO‘s nuclear sharing arrangements, there were no US 
forward-deployed nuclear weapons on Japan as we have seen. ―Invisible‖ END was 
instead backed by US strategic forces, B 52 Strategic bombers and SLBMs in 
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particular given the maritime nature of the region.1058 Indeed both Japanese and 
American strategists viewed in the late 1960s that SLBMs could protect Japan. The 
credibility of US security commitments may appear weak without the visible 
component of nuclear weapons. Yet as we have seen, this was more a political rather 
than a security problem for Japan. As stated previously, the requirements of END 
were Nuclear Capabilities (nuclear threats), Security Commitments (stipulated in a 
security treaty), Political Resolve and Communication (Signalling). Such a formula 
does not spell out how ―Invisible‖ END would discourage a potential attacker from 
attacking Japan in theory 
 There are two key components of ―Invisible‖ END: ―escalation‖ and 
―calculated ambiguity.‖ They are closely intertwined. Under these two concepts, 
there are some key notions that make END credible: ―tripwire‖, ―perceived 
interests‖, and ―reputations.‖ To some extent, ―escalation‖ and ―calculated 
ambiguity‖ are also key components of ―Visible‖ END although it does not mean 
that ―Visible‖ and ―Invisible‖ END work exactly in the same way in theory. The 
main difference was the layer of escalation: NATO‘s tactical nuclear weapons acting 
as a ―trip-wire‖ connecting between ―tactical level of deterrence‖ and ―strategic 
nuclear deterrence‖ would more likely trigger strategic nuclear exchanges in 
theory.1059 In addition to the presence of tactical nuclear weapons as a ―trip-wire‖, 
Britain and France also contributed to NATO‘s nuclear defence while they reserve 
completely independent nuclear decisions and their deterrent contribution is quite 
limited. 1060  Since the inception of NATO, the USA with its strategic nuclear 
arsenals has been the only country that could provide ―the supreme guarantee of 
the security of the Allies.‖1061 In this sense, both ―Visible‖ END and ―Invisible‖ END 
rely on US strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, what ultimately would deter 
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communist aggression was the prospect of nuclear war since it was a nuclear 
Armageddon, rendering many major cities ―nothing but a smoking, radiating ruin‖ 
in a Cold-War parlance. 1062  As a result END works in theory through ―the 
mechanism of escalation.‖ 1063  
 It is important to note that tactical nuclear weapons are not the only 
―trip-wire‖ but US local force stationed in host nations were also expected to serve 
as a ―trip-wire.‖ For Japan, US local troops stationed in Japan would also play such 
an important role to trigger nuclear escalation. In order to unravel the trip-wire role 
of US force in Japan, first we will examine the mechanism of escalation and how it 
contributes to deterrence followed by discussion on credibility elements and 
―calculated ambiguity.‖ 
 Escalation. As General Carl Von Clausewitz has taught us, war has a 
natural tendency to escalate.1064 Whether or not escalation was inevitable, nuclear 
powers in particular were well conscious of the probability of escalation in the 
nuclear age.1065 There is always an ambiguous and unpredictable prospect of the 
expansion of a crisis because one side may increase the level of its violence. Once a 
conflict erupts, each side might find it difficult to resist pressures to increase the 
level of violence rather than a fight in a regulated manner because violence might 
create counter-reaction (violence). What is the likelihood that a country attacked by 
an enemy will not retaliate and instead sit still? A military response would create a 
reaction from the other side by following suit. Exchanges of violence would further 
intensify the scale of violence. Such a reaction-action cycle would increase the level 
and extent of violence. This is commonly known as escalation.1066  By nature, 
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Schelling argued that ―Violence, especially war, is a confused and uncertain activity, 
highly unpredictable, depending on decisions made by fallible human beings 
organized into imperfect governments, depending on fallible communications and 
warning systems and on the untested performance of people and equipment.‖1067 He 
even claimed that ―The essence of the crisis is its unpredictability. The ‗crisis‘ that is 
confidently believed to involve no danger of things getting out of hand is no crisis; 
no matter how energetic the activity, as long as thing are believed safe there is no 
crisis.‖1068 In the nuclear age, nobody knew with a certainty whether a locally 
limited war might escalate to nuclear war. If escalation process did not stop at the 
early stage, it would be more likely that nuclear weapons, regardless of whether 
this was small-scale, were used in a war. This would probably provoke strategic 
nuclear exchanges, resulting in an all-out nuclear war. In other words, ―uncertain 
process of escalation‖ existed in a Cold-War crisis.1069  
 Although there is no convincing reason to believe that every war would 
escalate into nuclear war, political leaders were never certain that conventional war 
might escalate into nuclear war in the Cold War context and ―They might stumble 
into war without fully intending to get into war.‖1070 Policy makers inadvertently 
get trapped into war without any intention to engage in war.1071 The prospect of 
nuclear war must be cautiously assessed by decision makers. The Soviet leaders in 
fact did not believe that escalation could be placed under complete human control. 
They indeed acted with more caution and prudence.1072 Decision makers must bear 
in mind that ―non-nuclear war is not just appalling in itself. It is also the likeliest 
route to nuclear war. In practice, indeed, it is the only likely route‖ as British 
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strategist Michael Quinlan held.1073 In a similar vein, McGeorge Bundy, Security 
Advisor to the Kennedy and Johnson Administration laid out his concept of 
―existential deterrence‖ that ―rests on uncertainty about what could happen, not in 
what has been asserted.‖1074  
 In this respect, Schelling‘s concept of ―threat that leaves something to 
chance‖ stands out. Schelling argued that a crisis by itself may get out of control 
and the essence of this threat is that ―the final decision is not altogether under the 
theatre‘s control.‖1075 More plainly and succinctly, he also asserted that ―The idea is 
simply that a limited war can get out of hand by degrees.‖1076 In other words, what 
is frightening about escalation is that nobody could completely control the 
escalation mechanism.1077  The bottom line was that Schelling suggested that 
states were able to exploit the uncertainty nature of escalation inherent in a crisis 
for a deterrent purpose. 1078The prospect of escalation in a conflict creates risks and 
fears for potential military action. Such a concern in turn produces restraint and a 
deterrent effect.1079 As Freedman aptly put it, ―It was the fear of nuclear war itself 
that deterred, not the specific threat of nuclear retaliation.‖1080  
 It must be noted that the Soviet Union and the USA came very close to the 
brink of nuclear war over Cuba (a foreign country) in October 1962. During the 
crisis, both sides were extremely concerned about a possibility of the loss of control 
of the crisis due in part to miscalculation and the dynamism of the crisis itself. It 
could have inadvertently turned into all-out war especially given the fact that 
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(unknown to the USA at that time) the operational nuclear weapons were under 
control of the Soviet local commander in Cuba. 1081 The Cuban missile crisis taught 
both the Soviet and American leaders several straightforward and unequivocal 
lessons that the nuclear dangers and uncertainties lay naturally in a US-Soviet 
confrontation and the importance of communication during a crisis and the control 
of atomic bombs.1082 Miscalculation, miscommunication and misinterpretation of 
American interests and resolve were unavoidable, but they would have come at a 
great price. They would have led to hasten an uncertain process of escalation. 
Boldly it can be even argued that miscalculation and misunderstanding themselves 
escalate a war.1083 There is room for debate but after the Cuban missile crisis of 
1962, both the Soviet Union and the USA clearly became unduly cautious and even 
status-quo powers and had no intention to intervene in the other side by violent 
means. The division of the West and the East was completely formalised.1084 
 The concept of unpredictability inherent in escalation played a key role in 
the nuclear age as the last stage of war between nuclear states was likely to be all 
out nuclear war, which would have made decision makers to take an even first step 
extremely cautiously.1085 They might fear the consequences of their outright attacks 
against their opponent and avert a potential risk.1086 As Halperin observed, during 
the Cold War, pervasively ―The desire to avoid central war exercises a major 
influence on decision makers during a local war.‖1087 Such desire was especially the 
case with a high-tension conflict because ―the probability of a chain of event leading 
to a nuclear confrontation increases.‖In tense crises such as the Berlin crisis of 1958 
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and 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis neither the Soviet nor the USA took any 
outright military option even though it was recommended by the US military 
especially in the Cuban missile crisis.1088  
 Yet one can argue against the contention about uncertainty in a crisis. It 
could actually work the other way around. It may impair the credibility of a nuclear 
threat exactly because of fear and risk of escalation. If the prospect of nuclear 
escalation ever exists, a nuclear defender is quite unlikely to take military action to 
protect its protégé. That is to say, there is also a possibility of self-deterrence.1089 To 
be sure, the use of any type of nuclear weapons for the sake of allies was an 
extremely daunting political decision. Consequently, a potential invader might not 
be convinced that nuclear retaliation would follow its attack against an ally of a 
nuclear defender. It may abandon its ally if a nuclear exchange was imminently 
expected. While uncertainty of escalation was a key for deterrence, some certainty 
of firm American security commitments was also required. An American President 
should never declare that he would not threaten to use nuclear weapons in 
retaliation for an aggressor ‘s use of nuclear weapons against America‘s allies even if 
this threat might not be credible or a mere bluff. Unfortunately we do not live in a 
world where all threats are completely credible.1090 America still had to create an 
impression that nuclear escalation and thus, US nuclear retaliation on behalf of its 
ally would be carried out should a crisis escalate. To create a credible mechanism of 
escalation was doubtlessly a daunting task, and to make it credible requires the 
mechanism of some certainty of initiating an escalation process eventually leading 
to a nuclear attack against an aggressor.  
 Trip-Wire. How could the USA enhance the threats of nuclear retaliation 
and the credibility of its security commitments when and where required? It is 
essentially concerned with convincing a potential attacker that a defender will 
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defend its ally and be willing to escalate for that purpose. One answer produced to 
this conundrum during the Cold War was a trip-wire doctrine.1091 When a nuclear 
defender says that it will come to defend a country far from its homeland, this does 
not sound credible unless it has some vital interests in the protégé. In this regard, 
locally deployed US force can be seen as signalling political commitments and even 
vested interests of the defender. US troops stationed abroad were indeed not only 
there to defend a host country but also to show its tangible interests in and 
commitments to local defence. If American soldiers were killed because of an enemy 
invasion against the host country, it would now mean that American core interests 
were directly attacked, making escalation more credible.1092  If that happened, 
Americans would have to protect their fellow Americans. It is believable convincing 
that the USA would take a military response at least to rescue the fellow Americans. 
As Freedman explained, the key role of American troops in Europe ―was not as a 
shield but as a ‗trip-wire‘, capable of triggering the entry into a war of America‘s 
nuclear arsenal.‖1093 In the same vein, political scientist Michael Mandelbaum 
asserted that American troops in Europe ―served as hostages to the Americans‘ 
willingness to honor their commitments. If the Soviets attacked in Europe, the 
United States with all its wealth and power, would have to come to the rescue of its 
soldiers, and hence of the Europeans.‖1094 That being said, does conventional force 
acting as a trip-wire symbolise itself as ―an unambiguous threshold beyond which 
the alliance would use its nuclear weapons‖, as one analyst claimed?1095 This could 
have been the case with NATO since it is the most important formal alliance of the 
USA.1096 What about other areas? After the tripwire has been breached, will the 
USA be resolved to escalate in every single situation? How convincing is that to a 
potential attacker? Therefore, an important question is whether this ―trip-wire‖ 
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doctrine is applicable to the Japanese case. The answer is affirmative for a number 
of reasons.  
 Perceived Interests. As the analysis of the US treatment of Japan as a 
security ally in the previous chapters has shown, Japan was one of few countries in 
relation to which the USA had great interest in extending deterrence during the 
Cold War. In other words, America‘s ―perceived interests‖ in defending Japan 
appeared high.1097 ―Perceived interests‖ in defending allies even by nuclear means 
are formed under the influence of some key elements which also serve as credibility 
elements of END. According to one American military thinker, they entail ―the 
strength of alliances between the defender and ally, the defender‘s political and 
economic support for the ally, trade relationships, and the status of military 
forces…‖1098 These elements suggests that where US global strategic interests 
during peacetime are high, the credibility of the defender‘s threats are also high. 
The US-Japan alliance covers all these elements (security treaty, local military 
balance, and foreign trade and political support) as shown in the previous chapters. 
It also suggests that deterrence is not all about military capability but also the 
defender‘s political interests in defending its allies and resolve. An aggressor would 
be more hesitate and cautious when it comes to the areas where the US perceived 
interests were at stake.  
 In this respect, during the Cold War US immediate perceived interests at 
stake were doubtlessly Berlin. As a Cold War warrior David Miller observed, 
―Throughout the Cold War there was no other place or group of people that 
epitomized the issues at stake as clearly as Berlin and the Berliner.‖1099 The 
frontline of an intensive Cold War ideological competition was the divided city of 
Berlin. Marshall Plan aid and some other American generous financial aid enabled 
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West Berlin to prosper and it ―became a permanent advertisement for the virtues of 
capitalism and democracy in the middle of communist East Germany.‖1100 There 
were at least three major crises (1948, 1958, and 1961) in Berlin during the Cold 
War. On each occasion, the USA and the Soviet Union came into conflict over their 
interests in Berlin because the frontline of an intensive Cold War ideological 
competition was arguably the divided city of Berlin. Both sides were required to 
show force and the strength of their determination and interest in defending Berlin; 
the failure to do so would damage US grand strategic interests of containment. It 
would also erode America‘s global standing as the leader of the West. That is, 
―Perceived interests‖ and ―Reputation‖ are closely connected. 
  Reputations. In the highly geopolitical context of bloc politics in the Cold 
War, the failure to act to protect American global interests would erode American 
commitments and could destroy its reputation as the global leader of the West. 
Geopolitics, according to Gray, is defined as ―the spatial study and practice of 
international relations.‖1101 He further argued that ―all politics is geopolitics‖ and 
―all political matters occur within a particular geographical context; in short, they 
have a geopolitical dimension.‖1102 Sloan spelled out this aspect: ―geographical 
knowledge would always be integrated within the body of political knowledge‖1103 
and ―geopolitical theory has moulded the actions and perceptions of policy 
makers.‖1104 Similarly Gray noted that ―Some appreciation of the meaning of the 
geographical setting for international politics pervades thought and action, but that 
appreciation can be so habitual and uninspiring as to blind us to geopolitical insight 
and understanding.‖1105 Gaddis even asserted that ―There soon developed a line of 
reasoning reminiscent of Sir Halford Mackinder ‘s geopolitics, with its assumption 
that none of the world‘s ‗rimlands‘ could be secure if the European ‗heartland‘ was 
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under the domination of a single hostile power.‖1106 Indeed, the Cold War global 
competition also was perceived as recurring patterns of conflict between the 
continental power (tiger: the Soviet Union) and the maritime power (shark: the 
USA).1107 
  Shortly after the end of World War Two, the USA became nearly the only 
one capable of balancing against the newly emerging rival, the Soviet Union. Taking 
over war-torn Britain, the USA assumed a global leadership role and took interest 
in checking Soviet advances on the Eurasian continent.1108 Echoing Mackinder‘s 
theory, Gray argued that ―In Anglo-American perspective, the pre-eminent strategic 
narrative of 1800-1991 was the recurring necessity to prevent the domination of 
Europe, then of Eurasia, and then, prospectively, of the whole world, by a single 
state or coalition.‖1109 There was certainly a continuity of Classical Geopolitics but 
Cold-War geopolitics highlighted the aspect of an ideological struggle between the 
Soviet Union and the USA.1110 They viewed each other as ―deadly foes.‖1111 British 
historian Hew Strachan was correct in that ―The very expression ‗the west‘ makes 
the point: those states committed to liberal democracy and capitalism were also 
geographically contiguous, and united by the Atlantic.‖1112 While immediate stakes 
were the protection of the Rimlands of Eurasia (Western Europe in particular, the 
Middle East, and Southeast and East Asia), the geopolitical scope was beyond the 
Western Europe and certainly global.1113 The USA became ―the leading, indeed 
essential, guardian of the non-Soviet world against whatever might have transpired 
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in the absence of that guardianship.‖1114As US National Security Strategy of 1988 
noted. ―since 1945, we [Americans] fought two world wars to prevent the Soviet 
Union from capitalizing on its geostrategic advantage to dominate its neighbours in 
Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and thereby fundamentally alter the 
global balance power to our disadvantage.‖1115 What was considered to be crucial in 
this globalised political, military and ideological struggle was which side one was on, 
regardless of whether one truly put faith in either the Western (democracy and 
capitalism) or Eastern (Communism) system.1116 Such a black－or－white approach 
―was to lead to failure to appreciate the difference between Communism and Third 
World populist nationalism, a failure that repeatedly led to problems for US foreign 
policy‖ as historian Jeremy Black rightly pointed out. 1117 This approach underlay 
America‘s ―indiscriminate globalism.‖1118 In the words of Kissinger:  
 
 In effect, containment came to be equated with the construction of military 
alliances around the entire Soviet periphery over two continents. World order 
would consist of the confrontation of two incongruent superpowers－each of which 
organized an international order within its sphere.1119 
 
  In other words, there was a strong sense of ―us‖ versus ―them‖ antagonism 
in the Cold-War superpowers competition.1120 For this reason, as the Cold War 
authority John Lewis Gaddis cogently noted, in the Cold War context ―events in 
East Asia could not be separated from those taking place in other parts of the 
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world.‖1121 According to Freedman, ―In principle, every act of foreign policy has 
some significance for the creation of expectations of future performance. 
Compliance may be a form of humiliation and an acknowledgment of 
submission.‖1122 Reflecting the Korean War, Schelling also posited that ―The main 
reason why we are committed in many of these places is that our threats are 
interdependent. Essentially we tell the Soviets that we have to react here because, 
if we did not, they would not believe us when we say that we will react there.‖1123 
Schelling also argued that ―what one does today‖ in a crisis affects ―what one can be 
expected to do tomorrow.‖1124 As Scott Sagan of Stanford University observed, ―with 
respect to military intervention in regional crises, U.S. leaders have often believed 
that they must respond to deterrent failures because they fear that other U.S. 
commitments would otherwise appear less credible.‖1125 That is, America‘s motive 
for military intervention in a crisis was in part for saving its ―face.‖  
 Returning to Berlin, we know that Khrushchev made an attempt to drive 
the Western powers out of Berlin.1126 He demanded that the Western occupying 
powers terminate the military occupation of the city, turning Berlin into a free city 
and leave Berlin within six months, or he would conclude a separate peace treaty 
with East Germany and let the East Germans directly deal with the access of the 
Western powers to Berlin.1127 Eisenhower obviously could not back down from 
Khrushchev‘s threat on the grounds that this would clearly show that American 
security commitments to its allies were actually hollow in view of the strategic 
importance of Berlin.1128 Eisenhower stood firm over Berlin and even prepared to 
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use nuclear weapons to defend Berlin.1129 He refused the ultimatum while he 
showed his willingness to talk.1130 Convinced that the crisis would escalate to 
general war, Eisenhower did not find it imperative to increase conventional military 
strength in West Germany. He indeed rejected the JCS recommendation to send a 
division to Europe.1131 Khrushchev withdrew the deadline and instead he agreed to 
meet with Eisenhower for negotiation.  
    Khrushchev sought a new Berlin settlement because ―The bone continued 
to catch in his throat.‖1132 He resumed the Berlin conflict when he met with the 
newly-elected President Kennedy at the Vienna summit in June 1961. At the 
summit Khrushchev handed an aide-memoire on Berlin directly to Kennedy. He 
again put a six-month deadline for negotiations over a peace treaty and threatened 
to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany and to hand over Western access to 
Berlin to the East German government if there was no change in the status of 
Berlin.1133 Like Eisenhower, Kennedy stood firm over Berlin. He could not let any 
change in the city status, even risking nuclear war.1134 The principal reason for 
Kennedy‘s commitment to Berlin was the same as Eisenhower ‘s: America‘s 
abandonment of Berlin would undermine its credibility and prestige.1135 It would 
basically demonstrate America‘s weakness that could have been taken as a sign by 
its allies that the USA would not come to defend them.1136 In Berlin America would 
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have been required to use force ―to maintain the Western orientation of Germany 
and the cohesion of the NATO alliance as well as to defend the freedom of the West 
Berliners.‖ 1137 
 Accordingly, saving its reputation as the strong leader of the West was 
clearly part of American political objectives during the Cold War. Once the USA lost 
its reputation, it would be hard to rebuild its credibility and reputation. Worse still, 
the loss of its reputation would have invited further Communist aggression 
elsewhere because they would have been convinced that the USA would have 
backed down. This was certainly what the US government would have wanted to 
avoid. Yet this does not mean it is truly worth risking American lives to preserve a 
reputation as in the case of the Vietnam War. It is contended that the way the USA 
treated issues in the peripheral areas of the third world probably did not have much 
influence in shaping Soviet‘s image of American treatment of key issues in vital 
areas like Europe and Japan.1138   
 That said, it is important to note that the credibility of US nuclear threats 
would be easily undermined in cases where US interests were truly at stake. In this 
case, it seemed to have a serious credibility problem as in general ―the credibility of 
the extended U.S deterrent depends on the Soviet belief that a U.S. president would 
risk nuclear escalation on behalf of foreign commitment.‖1139  The level of US 
interests can be measured by the numbers of US troops in specific countries. Since 
the beginning of the Cold War, (West) Germany and Japan have been major 
countries where large US forces and key military facilities have been stationed. 
Even today Japan hosts the largest US troops (38,818 as of 2016). After Japan, 
Germany has the second largest US troops (34, 602). 1140 Still the biggest question is 
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whether the USA would use nuclear weapons to protect its key allies if this act 
certainly triggered Soviet nuclear strikes against the US homeland. The answer is 
quite negative and nuclear abandonment is highly conceivable. 
 Calculated Ambiguity. That being said, an interesting aspect of deterrence 
lies in the unpredictability of a response of a defender. On the one hand, a potential 
attacker could easily believe that Americans would not retaliate by nuclear weapons 
on behalf its protégé. On the other hand, the aggressor still could not completely 
ignore the possibility that they would retaliate with conventional force and 
eventually nuclear weapons. While it might have been an empty threat or a mere 
bluff, the US government still made public statements (declaratory policies) about 
its security commitments to its allies including nuclear protection. The US 
government, for example, publicly declared in January 1965 that the USA would 
come to defend Japan from all forms of attacks.  
 Realistically the most likely US military response in a crisis would not have 
been nuclear retaliation; it would have issued threats, increased military readiness, 
send more troops to a crisis area or a conflict zone. The threshold of the use of 
conventional force was much lower and it was indeed employed in Cold War crises 
and wars such as the Cuban crisis of 1962 and the Korean War. An American 
military response did not have to be a nuclear attack in the first place because once 
violence was exchanged between America and the Soviet Union or China, both sides 
could not ignore the prospect of nuclear escalation. Once an exchange of violence 
was initiated, the unpredictable nature of escalation inherent in violence and war 
would also set off. As security analyst Stephen Cimbala aptly put it, ―crossing the 
threshold from peace to war, from coercion into the actual use of force, is more 
significant than the first use of nuclear weapons for nuclear armed states.‖1141 In 
the transition process, unknown consequences might take place and things might 
get out of hand.1142  
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 Furthermore, nuclear strategist Herman Kahn argued that ―the fear that 
the other side may react, indeed overreact, is most likely to deter escalation.‖1143 
The bottom line is that a potential attacker was not completely sure if its aggression 
would not follow an American military response. It also was made deliberately 
uncertain under what circumstances the USA might use nuclear weapons against 
the adversary. One hundred percent certainty of nuclear retaliation is ideal but this 
is impossible to achieve. While it is true that ―ambiguous commitments could open 
the way to misperception‖, even a low chance of triggering nuclear exchanges was 
hardly ignorable.1144 Such fact alone would still influence the enemy‘s cost calculus 
in a crisis.  It is true that any political leaders ―are reluctant to begin a decisive 
action that is replete with dangers, no matter what the advantages dangled before 
them might be.‖1145  As long as the possibility of nuclear retaliation was not 
absolutely nil, a potential aggressor would still act with caution and restraint in the 
Cold War context.  
 As the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated, uncertainty of how the other 
would react was vital for both sides.1146 To put it simply, we did not know what the 
other would do next with absolute certainty. As Freedman observed, ―The role of 
uncertainty in reinforcing deterrence had been widely recognised by the leading 
strategists of the nuclear age.‖1147 In a similar vein, John Baylis, a leading British 
nuclear strategy analyst, noted that ―Deterrence…is enhanced by deliberately 
creating uncertainty in the adversary‘s mind.‖1148 During the Taiwan Strait Crises 
in the 1950‘s, the Eisenhower government was committed to the defence of Taiwan 
but it never specified what to do about the problem. It was vital to ―keep the 
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Communist guessing.‖1149  In the words of Dulles, ―It should not be stated in 
advance precisely what would be the scope of military action if new aggression 
occurred. That is a matter which the aggressor had best remain ignorant. But he 
can know and does know, in the light of present policies, that the choice in this 
respect is ours and not his.‖1150  
 The Soviet Union and China would not know in advance how the USA 
would react to their attacks against America‘s allies.1151 They were not certain if 
their aggression against US allies would set off an American military response. It 
was unknown to them that precise conditions under which American nuclear 
response would be evoked against the Communists. This reality could bring forth 
confusion, ambiguity, risk and frustration. Since ambiguity always surrounds a US 
response, it can be unlisted for a deterrent purpose. It is important to deliberately 
keep an enemy guessing about America‘s next moves, creating an opportunity for 
them to rethink the consequences of action yet to be taken. This is the ―calculated 
ambiguity‖ of END. 
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III. F. Table: Key Components of Invisible END 
 
Escalation Uncertainty inherent in a crisis 
Calculated Ambiguity 
Ambiguity of a US response and of when to use 
nuclear weapons 
Sub I: Tripwire 
Large presence of US troops in Japan (the 
number of US troops has been reduced and key 
military facilities are still heavily used ) 
Sub II: Perceived Interests Key strategic partner and location 
Sub III: Reputation 
The loss of a reputation as the guardian of the 
Free world 
 
 Invisible END. Having looked at the key elements of END, we now examine 
how they contribute to ―Invisible‖ END. If the concepts of ―escalation‖ and 
―calculated ambiguity‖ applied to ―invisible‖ END, one could say that a potential 
adversary would still consider the prospect of US nuclear retaliation and escalation 
before it attacked Japan.1152 It is worth considering that in a contingency ―there is a 
certain irreducible risk that an armed conflict might escalate into a nuclear war.‖1153 
The Soviet Union or China could not completely eliminate the possibility of the use 
of nuclear weapons by the USA especially when a crisis deepened and escalated. It 
was unpredictable that what a US response their armed aggression against Japan 
would provoke and under what circumstances the USA would use nuclear weapons 
against them. As Kissinger asserted, ―no war in the nuclear age can ever be 
completely free of the spectre of nuclear weapons.‖1154  
 Such fact complicated already complex strategic calculation further, 
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created uncertainty and made the risk of aggression against Japan incalculable. It 
is the unpredictability of an American response to a crisis and later its choice to 
escalate the conflict for Japan that would contribute to extended deterrence.1155 To 
be sure, the extent to which the Soviet Union or China was interested in attacking 
Japan throughout the Cold War was unknown. As pointed out above, the Soviet 
Union might not have had a strong intention to attack the US bloc after 1962. When 
it nevertheless had occurred, the Communists would have had to face the 
probability that the US military fought with Japan even threatening the use of 
nuclear weapons when and where deemed necessary not least after it intensified.  
 All a potential attacker should have known in advance was that the USA 
had the potential to harm. This fact would still complicate risk calculations of a 
potential aggressor when it contemplated attacking Japan. It had to take into 
account the unpredictability of the crisis and crisis behavior of the USA. The 
Communist leaders had to ask themselves a fundamental question that what would 
happen after they attacked Japan? Could the crisis be (in) tractable? More 
specifically, what would be a US response? Would they be able to manage the 
consequences of the penalty for their misconduct? If it was completely predicted 
that US direct military intervention in a crisis between Japan and China or the 
Soviet Union would not happen, Communists would enjoy the freedom of their 
action and be more tempted to invade Japan. America‘s military intervention was, 
however, not fully predictable. Miscalculations of American reactions and intent 
could be catastrophic. They would naturally want to avoid unforeseen risks and 
attempt to lower them under the condition of ever-present ambiguity.  
 As we have seen, the joint communiqué following the first summit meeting 
of 1965 articulated a pledge by the US that any armed attack by an adversary 
against Japan would be met by an American military response. To be sure, whether 
America actually would use nuclear weapons to defend Japan was not certain. Yet 
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this statement still made Chinese or Soviet strategic calculations complicated. It 
was not easy for the Communist to confidently hope that their deliberate attack on 
Japan would not provoke American retaliation in the form of whether nuclear or 
conventional attacks, making them unsure of what the USA response would be. 
 The fact that little accurate information was available about what was the 
next step likely to be taken in defence of Japan would generate caution, hesitation 
and even fear from an adversary.1156 Indeed, it is uncertainty of response that may 
deter a military aggression against Japan.1157 Adversaries were never certain of 
what their military actions would set off. Indeed, Halperin argued that ―the mere 
fact that the United States had nuclear weapons and had a treaty commitment to 
Japan would create the possibility that the United States would use nuclear 
weapons in response to a nuclear attack on Japan, even if it was not committed to 
doing so.‖1158 In short, the strategic logic behind US END over Japan is that either 
the Soviet Union or China could not completely ignore the possibility of triggering 
even US nuclear retaliation once Japan was massively devastated.1159 The US, 
needless to say, possessed massive and credible nuclear forces including possibly 
undetectable nuclear submarines. An American intelligence specialist, Gregory 
Treverton, aptly described this situation: ―Soviet uncertainty about the American 
and allied response would sustain deterrence even as Soviet nuclear forces 
improved…any potential aggressor would be compelled to caution because it would 
be uncertain how close the United States was to the brink of nuclear retaliation.‖1160 
As Freedman aptly put it, ―At issues is not the certainty that devastating weapons 
will be used but just the possibility that they might.‖1161 
 The prospect of employment of power to hurt (nuclear forces) could have 
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deterrent effects.1162 Any nuclear power could not technically destroy all US nuclear 
forces, SLBMs in particular by a first strike. As a renowned American nuclear 
strategy analyst, Fred Kaplan noted, ―If deterrence was defined as the survivability 
of a second-strike force, SLBMS… were crucial.‖1163 Given this frightful reality, so 
long as there is a possibility that rather invulnerable nuclear force might be 
launched in response to nuclear attacks by Russians or Chinese, they might be 
deterred. In view of this aspect, to some extent, details on specific weaponry 
required for deterrence did not matter as long as the USA had a secure second 
strike capability and a possibility of retaliation with this military capability. What 
matters was the potential to harm and retaliate effectively. 
 Ultimately, the key to ―invisible‖ END rests on ambiguity of a US response 
and escalation caused by the response to an armed aggression against Japan, which 
can never be eradicated both in peacetime and crisis time. In this regard, ―Invisible‖ 
END, to some extent, rests on Bundy‘s existential deterrence: the prospect of 
nuclear escalation or that ―the impossibility of knowing for sure that devastating 
retaliation would not occur‖ deters a potential aggression.1164 In this respect, we 
have to closely look at the trip-wire role of US force in Japan along with a role of US 
―perceived interests‖ and ―reputation.‖  
 In practice US nuclear threat designed to protect Japan is backed by 
forward-deployed conventional force, US forces stationed on Japan. As a plausible 
scenario, any large-scale armed attack against Japan would probably lead to a 
response of US forces in Japan as stipulated in the US-Japan security.1165 Of course, 
even before the assault, an opponent had to deal with the Seventh Fleet, arguably 
the best fleet among the US naval fleets, in view of the maritime environment of 
Japan. With the presence of the fleet, the successful chance of a Russian 
amphibious invasion of Japan was doubtful.1166  The Seventh Fleet relied heavily 
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on the facilities and ship repair services at Yokosuka base, which also guaranteed 
forward military presence.1167 Without this key base, the Seventh fleet operations 
would be much hindered. Already in1957, American policy makers saw the 
importance of Japan and stressed that ―without Yokosuka and Sasebo we would 
have to employ 2-1/2 times the number of ships to maintain and supply the 7th 
Fleet.‖1168 It is no surprise that the Seventh Fleet has been headquartered at 
Yokosuka since 1972. The loss of Japan as a military stronghold would significantly 
reduce the US power projection capabilities as a whole in light of Japan‘s 
geographical proximity to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and the Soviet Union. This 
was also a key American consideration behind the reversion of Okinawa as stated 
previously.  
 In this respect, Schelling‘s analogy of ―trip wire‖ may be of relevance. To 
reemphasise this point by paraphrasing Schelling, ―The acknowledged purpose of 
stationing American troops in Japan as a ‗trip wire‘ was to convince the Russians 
that war in Japan would involve the United States whether the Russian thought 
the United States wanted to be involved or not-that escape from the commitment 
was physically impossible.‖1169 That is, to some extent, the host nations hold the 
American troops hostage whose death would guarantee an American military 
involvement. As a result, the US defence commitments could be robust and even 
automatic unless the US government wanted to abandon fellow Americans.  
 All Japan should do was to defend itself against limited military attacks 
because large-scale communist attacks against Japan would provoke American 
military response in kind.1170 We must ask ourselves how likely it was that Russia 
or China would attack Japan without considering the prospect of US defence 
intervention in the instance of such an aggression to defend Japan where large US 
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troops were stationed throughout Japan. In 1969 when the US and the Japanese 
government agreed to return Okinawa to Japan, the numbers of US troops in Japan 
was, for example, 41,800.1171 They could not simply ignore the presence of US forces 
in Japan as its commitment to Japan and as a ―trip-wire‖. If American troops in 
Japan were attacked, the prospect of the entry of US nuclear weapons into a war 
would go much higher not least after the conflict expanded. In the words of the late 
British strategist, Michael Quinlan, ―The risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear 
war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between 
nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict.‖1172  
 To reiterate, Article 5 of the US-Japan security treaty stipulates that ―Each 
party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under 
the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional provisions and processes.‖1173  If American troops in Japan incurred 
massive damage, this large-scale attack would turn loose a negative chain of events 
that could eventually lead to nuclear war. Without forward-deployed forces being 
attacked, this escalation scenario was quite unlikely and Japan would doubtlessly 
be more vulnerable. In other words, forward-deployed forces are a key component of 
―Invisible‖ END.1174 In this respect, Schelling posited that ―What local military 
forces can do, even against very superior forces, is to initiate this uncertain process 
of escalation…Being able to lose a local war in a dangerous and provocative manner 
may make the risk－not the sure consequences, but the possibility of this act－
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outweigh the apparent gains to the other side.‖1175 Was it too native to think that 
the Communists wanted to avoid a military showdown with the USA? 
 On top of this, Japan and the US became trade partners during the Cold 
War. The US-Japan alliance is not only a security but also an economic and political 
alliance. Some American government officials even posited in 1965 that ―Even 
leaving aside our Security Treaty commitments to Japan and our economic interest 
in retaining Japan as our second largest trading partner, there is good reason to 
believe that it will remain apparent in Tokyo, Moscow and Peiping that Communist 
subjugation of Japan would so drastically impair our world political and security 
position that there could be no possibility of our failing to come to Japan‘s assistance 
if it were attacked.‖1176 In other words, the US core interests were also found in 
peacetime US-Japan relations. 
 As Kennan maintained, Europe and Japan were particularly significant for 
the USA to contain the USSR.1177  With the advantage of hindsight Kennan‘s 
contention was proved right. Japan became ―the Germany of Orient‖ as one scholar 
called.1178 One letter written to Dulles in May 1957 indeed stressed the strategic 
importance of Japan for US global strategy: 
 
In terms of our vital interests, Japan occupies in Asia a position similar to that of 
Germany in Western Europe. Just as the course that Germany follows in Western 
Europe will vitally affect where Western Europe goes, so the course that Japan 
chooses to follow will vitally influence the road that the free nations of the Far East 
and Asia follow. Japan has the only great industrial complex in Asia which in a 
sense is comparable to Ruhr-Western Europe complex. If it were ever harnessed to 
Communist power, we would be in a desperate situation. It is every bit as 
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important to us as Germany.1179  
 
 In other words, the loss of Japan would make it more difficult to defend the 
Asia-Pacific as a whole.1180  That Japan was under an imminent threat might have 
seen US global interests at stake too. In this respect, a potential attacker might be 
deterred by the probability that the US might react to protect its interests at stake. 
In a globalised context of the Cold War, from a grand strategic point of view, 
abandoning Japan meant the complete loss of its face, destroying its reputation as 
the global leader. If the USA had failed to respond to a military assault against 
Japan despite the large presence of American force in Japan, European NATO 
members would have lost their trust in American security commitments. In other 
words, the USA would have been required to retaliate in order to save its ―face‖ and 
―reputation‖ as the leader of the Free World.As Roberts held, ―issues of American 
credibility have sharpened in a world where actions anywhere have implications 
everywhere, reinforcing anxiety about U.S. consistency and magnifying the 
challenges of assurance.‖1181 Indeed as Schaller stressed the strategic importance of 
Japan, ―Neither the war in Korea nor the one in Vietnam could have been fought 
but for the fact American leaders considered Japan the ultimate target of 
aggression in both cases.‖1182 In other words, the USA was convinced that the 
credibility of American security commitments to its allies would be shattered if the 
USA did not militarily act to combat against the spread of communism in these 
areas.1183   
 One NSC document in 1959 even posited that ―The potential of Japan is 
now the key to Free World position in the Far East-Southeast Asia area because of 
her large industrious population highly indoctrinated and skilled in manufacturing 
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techniques, and a large commercial and industrial base…With the industrial power 
of Japan, the communists could control the Far East.‖1184  
 In light of this American analysis, there was a strong possibility that the 
US military must take military actions to protect the US ―perceived‖ interests in 
Japan. Japan under communist control would have destabilized the whole region 
and thus, it would have been disadvantageous in many other respects for the USA 
itself. This would make US resolve more robust. Of course, the credibility of US 
nuclear commitments depends on US political determination after all.1185 At any 
rate, ―invisible‖ END resides with the possibility of US willingness to escalate and 
the unpredictability of a US response. In short, ―Invisible‖ END rests on a function 
of existential deterrence built on calculated ambiguity. Due to the existence of 
America‘s constant political declarations about the possibility of America‘s military 
intervention in a crisis to defend Japan should it be attacked by Chinese or 
Russians, the possibility of honouring political commitments was never nil. What 
would cause nuclear retaliation on behalf of Japan was never specified and a 
potential attacker never knew how the USA would respond to its aggression 
(calculated ambiguity).  There were some strategic reasons for the USA to protect 
Japan: the presence of US troops in Japan (tripwire), the strategic importance of 
Japan for its grand strategy (perceived interests), the severe consequences of 
abandoning Japan (reputation). In view of these aspects, the probability of nuclear 
escalation following an attack on Japan could not be completely eliminated. This is 
how ―Invisible END‖ works in theory.    
  Even though Japan did not rely on tactical nuclear weapons to signal to the 
Communists America‘s resolve and the possibility of escalation, ―Invisible‖ END 
still relied on US force stationed in Japan as an instrument for the mechanism of 
escalation (bring US strategic nuclear weapons). Japan accepted this ―Invisible‖ 
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form of deterrence and put its faith in the uncertainty nature of the nuclear 
deterrent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 One of the primary reasons why Wakaizumi wrote the book on Okinawa 
reversion was to arouse national discussion on Japan‘s national security, but his 
plan was doomed.1186 Contrary to his expectation, his book did not get the attention 
he thought that deserved. The Japanese public showed apathy about his book and 
his confession. What this suggests is that the Japanese have not directly addressed 
one of the post-war fundamental issues: nuclear weapons. The invisible form of US 
END was a direct result of political compromise of Sato, who clearly understood the 
importance of nuclear deterrence. In the meantime, he was well aware that the 
Japanese public would never allow either the construction of indigenous nuclear 
weapons or the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan. In view of 
these concerns, Sato reached the secret agreement about the reintroduction of US 
nuclear weapons into Okinawa during a crisis especially in the event of the renewal 
of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. As Sato admitted, Japan could not simply 
ignore the developments of the Korean Peninsula in this circumstance.  
 The existence of the secret nuclear deal can emphatically deny the 
legitimacy of ―Invisible‖ END. Since this thesis contends that END constitutes not 
only deterrence but also psychological reassurance and the latter is more important 
than deterrence itself for Japan, it should stress again that ―Visible‖ END calls for 
the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons on the soil of host nations and 
joint nuclear operation (burden sharing.) NATO was the most evident case of 
―Visible‖ END. Most importantly, Okinawa, the whole island of which the US 
military had long regarded as the legitimate military base, was diplomatically 
returned to Japan. It was definitely the last remaining problem between Japan and 
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the USA. When President Ford visited Japan in 1974, he declared that ―Together, 
We removed the legacies of World War Two. The Reversion of Okinawa eliminated 
the last vestige of that war from our agenda.‖1187    
 As General Shikata plausibly observed, relying on US nuclear deterrence 
for Japanese security has been the best course available. 1188  Moreover, one 
Japanese analyst argued that ―US extended deterrence is like oxygen for Japan: one 
will never notice it when it exists, but one will never be able to survive without 
it.‖1189 We never notice US END over Japan probably because its nature is invisible 
inherent in ambiguity of a US response and the unpredictable course of a crisis if 
Japan is attacked. In theory Japan could elicit a deterrent effect from this 
uncertainty nature of deterrence (calculated ambiguity). Highly affected by the 
domestic political condition: infeasibility of the peacetime introduction of nuclear 
storage in Japan, this is after all the Japanese strategic preference.  
    Yet it must be noted that there is an unanswerable puzzle whether 
deterrence worked and consequently, the USSR and China did not invade Japan 
during the Cold War. 1190  In truth, despite the theoretical developments of 
deterrence in the Cold War, we do not know how to make deterrence work with 
absolute certainty. Deterrence is after all a function of human psychology.1191 As an 
international security expert Robert Art rightly asserted, ―Explaining why 
something did not happen is more difficult than explaining why something did.‖1192 
In a similar vein, a renowned deterrence specialist, Richard Smoke, also 
maintained that ―In international relations as in everything else, one can never 
prove why something has not occurred.‖1193 The effect of coercive use of force is a 
function of human psychology, which depends heavily on the perceptions of an 
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adversary influenced by multiple variables.1194 There is, nevertheless, one thing for 
sure: the US military presence matters in deterrence for the case of Japan.  
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Chapter Six 
The Japanese Secret Nuclear Studies in the 1960s: Elite Perceptions 
 
Some people consider it an anomaly that a country with Japan‘s economic strength, 
technological skill should be content to have comparatively small military forces 
and to depend on its nuclear security and on the behaviour of the other countries. 
Japan indeed is an anomaly. Japan is a departure from the general rule. 
―Thomas C. Schelling1195 
 
    As noted in the previous three chapters, Japan‘s nuclear allergy was 
deep-seated. This anti-nuclear sentiment has been indeed widely shared among 
Japanese society. As stated previously, ―Japan‘s non-nuclear option is a rare 
exception of a national consensus.‖1196 This does not mean, however, that Japanese 
policy makers have never considered Japan‘s independent nuclear deterrent option. 
We now know that Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1974 for his three non-nuclear principles, 1197  expressed his keen interests in 
Japan‘s nuclear option.1198 There were also several secret nuclear studies conducted 
by Japanese elites (bureaucrats and their associates) in the 1960s. These studies 
were driven by the first Chinese nuclear test of 1964 and the mounting pressure to 
sign the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Japanese elites critically analysed the 
world environment based in part on political realism. They could not simply turn a 
blind eye to the rise of a nuclear-armed China. This chapter will explore how the 
Japanese elites interpreted the feasibility and the pros and cons of an independent 
nuclear deterrent and their logical conclusion to dependence on US END. It will 
also critically examine if Japan had an immediate technological capability of 
producing nuclear weapons.   
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 For the sake of clarification, the secret nuclear studies were not a 
full-fledged government nuclear weapons programme like the Manhattan Project. 
Rather they were unofficial and pure theoretical studies on Japan‘s independent 
nuclear option. While the involvement of a political direction in these studies is 
pointed out by some analysts,1199 there is no evidence that Prime Minister Sato 
directed these projects at his request.1200 It must be noted that the key members in 
one major nuclear study emphatically denied any governmental involvement or 
intervention.1201 They were carried out purely by senior Japanese government 
officials and their close colleagues outside the government.1202 In this chapter, three 
nuclear studies will be chronologically examined. Among these, particular attention 
will be devoted to one study (1968/70) commissioned by the Japanese Cabinet 
Research Office due to its scale and repercussions after the public disclosure of the 
study. 
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I.B. Map: Current Membership of the NPT 
Source: Number Umbrella State, ILPI, accessed 30 January 2019. 
 
The Controversial Nature of the NPT  
 
 It is crucial to expound first how Japan viewed the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty that foreclosed Japan‘s nuclear option in order to 
understand the key rationale behind the Japan‘s secret nuclear studies of the 1960s. 
Although it seems no surprise for Japan to sign the NPT without any problem and 
delay, Japan was actually one of the last countries to sign the treaty in 1970. Japan 
took another six years to ratify it. As an authority on deterrence, George Quester, 
posed an important question: ―Given Japan‘s nuclear allergy in the aftermath of 
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki, why is NPT not made-to-order for Japan?‖ 1203  The 
answer to this question was more complex than his simple contention that Japan 
should be eager to sign the NPT. While it is true that it officially supported the NPT, 
Japan ran into some difficulties in signing and ratifying the NPT. Ambassador 
Johnson lucidly observed that ―while in the end Japan will probably have no choice 
but to sign the NPT on whatever terms the U.S. and Soviets are able to agree upon, 
we should not necessarily take Japan for granted in this regard.‖1204 Japan indeed 
faced some security and political obstacles to joining the NPT regime.  
 First, to sign the NPT essentially meant closing down Japan‘s nuclear path 
at least for the next twenty five years as stipulated in Article X. II: ―Twenty-five 
years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to 
decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended 
for an additional fixed period or periods.‖ After the initial term of twenty five years, 
the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995.1205 When the NPT was raised as a 
global political agenda in the mid1960s, there was an acute uncertainty whether 
China (a mad man with a knife) would sign the NPT. In fact China did not accede to 
it until 1992 (See the map of the current status of the NPT membership above). One 
Japanese diplomat implied that the NPT without China was meaningless because 
―it was the only country that would pose nuclear threats to Japan.‖ 1206  
 In this regard it was no surprise that Japanese foreign officials expressed 
their concerns about tying their hands to non-nuclear status. It would significantly 
                                                   
1203 George H. Quester: ―Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty‖, Asian Survey Vol. 10 No. 9 
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undermine Japan‘s national interests.1207  Ambassador Johnson understood the 
Japanese security position and explained in March 1967 that ―the NPT requires 
Japan to renounce its options while doing nothing to meet its immediate concerns, 
which are the Soviet Union and Communist China, are in my opinion only a part of 
the reason for Japan‘s ambivalence on the NPT.‖1208 In fact in March 1967 Sato told 
Johnson that ―Communist China was a clear threat and agreements such as the 
Partial Test Ban and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were meaningless (sic) 
As long as Communist China stayed outside.‖1209 
 To be sure, as already demonstrated in the previous chapters, even without 
the NPT, it was considerably unlikely that Japan would go nuclear. There was still a 
big difference between an international treaty-based non-nuclear status and a mere 
domestic political decision to remain a non-nuclear power.1210 While it is true that 
Japan could technically withdraw from the NPT as Article X. I articulates (the legal 
right to withdraw), ―NPT ratification unquestionably raised barriers to Japan‘s 
nuclearisation.‖1211 Article X. I stipulates as follows: 
 
 Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw 
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall 
give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United 
Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme 
interests.1212 
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Indeed North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, issuing an official 
statement that ―Though we pull out of the NPT, we have no intention of producing 
nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to 
peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity.‖ At the same time, North 
Korea severely blamed US aggression for its withdrawal.1213 Recently the Trump 
administration‘s decision to withdraw from the so-called ―Iran Nuclear Deal‖ has 
prompted Iran to threaten to withdraw from the NPT as well.1214 Accordingly, the 
NPT is not flawless and still gives the signatories an option to build nuclear 
weapons should their security be in imminent danger. That said, considering the 
record and history of the NPT, North Korea is the only exception and the treaty has 
been overall successful. 
 Importantly Japanese foreign officials even discussed the option of 
withdrawal from the NPT if a nuclear China posed serious threats to Japan. One 
official even held that ―the NPT without China was nonsense. Japan had better 
make its position clear that Japan would withdraw from the NPT without Chinese 
participation in the treaty.‖1215  
 The ramifications of the non-nuclear decision in the 1960s were decisive for 
Japan‘s future especially given that Japan might have had an advanced 
technological and economic capacity for the production of nuclear weapons.1216 One 
secret American government report of 1965 that assessed Japan‘s nuclear weapon 
production capability noted that ―Japan is technologically and economically capable 
of becoming a formidable nuclear power…it could test its first nuclear device as 
early as 1971 without violating existing reactor safeguard provisions, thereafter 
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producing estimated 10-30 weapons annually.‖ 1217  Regardless of whether this 
estimate was accurate, Japan was doubtlessly one of the NPT‘s main targets－ 
ensuring that Japan would remain a non-nuclear-weapon state was one of the 
NPT‘s important goals.1218  
 It is worth nothing that in November 1969 Kiichi Arita, Director General of 
Defence Agency (Defence Minister), admitted that twenty five years of a formal 
commitment to Japan‘s non-nuclear status was definitely a grave concern for Japan. 
He argued that while we wanted to see the future of the US-Japan Security Treaty 
(which was due to be renewal in 1970) and the political direction of Communist 
China first, we should nevertheless proceed to sign the treaty. A nationalist figure of 
the LDP and a Pearl Harbour attack Planner, Minoru Genda, argued against Arita‘s 
claim. He held that we were quite uncertain if the US nuclear umbrella would work 
against a Chinese nuclear attack upon us. Therefore, we should not sign the 
NPT.1219 To clarify his argument, the nationalist group did not necessarily deny the 
importance of the US-Japan security alliance, but it advocated more Japan‘s 
independence. It also regarded ―military independence and rearmament as a matter 
of national pride, and the military forces of such countries as the…Soviet Union and 
China as dangerous.‖ 1220  At any rate it is clear that following Chinese 
nuclearisation, the NPT was closely linked to Japan‘s security  
  Second, the NPT affected a Japanese global standing. The sense of 
frustration of joining the NPT regime was particularly found in some segments of 
the Foreign Ministry, which was in charge of the NPT negotiations.1221 The late 
administrative vice-minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ryohei Murata, thought 
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that the NPT principally targeted Japan‘s and Germany‘s nuclear option.1222 It was 
essentially an unequal treaty in that it allowed the five nuclear states to keep their 
nuclear forces while the rest of the world was prohibited from possessing such 
weapons, dividing the world between ―haves‖ and ―have-nots.‖1223 As President 
Johnson admitted, under the NPT ―nations without nuclear weapons promised not 
to make them or receive them from others‖ while ―Nations with nuclear weapons 
pledged to work toward effective arms control and disarmament.‖1224 This in part 
motivated the Foreign Ministry to have a secret (but private) meeting with West 
German officials in 1969 although this meeting did not have any great impact on 
the course of both countries‘ foreign policy.1225 The sense of inequality (haves and 
have-nots) was widely shared within the LDP too.1226 The NPT regime ultimately 
created the exclusive nuclear club while Japan was excluded from it at least for 
twenty five years and instead the treaty gave Japan second-class status.1227 Deputy 
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nobuhiko Ushiba, articulated in November 1966:  
 
 it would be absolutely unacceptable for Japan to be permanently categorised as a 
second-class state by joining the NPT regime. This was not just a Japanese status 
issue but it was a serious problem of the predetermined condition that would allow 
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the only five nuclear powers to make key decision about vital global issues. This 
condition would never be acceptable and for us, this was a critical problem.1228  
 
The following month, Ushiba made a similar statement when he met with Nicholas 
Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State. There he said: 
 
 Japan has very strong views against being permanently classified as a second-rate 
power through signing the treaty and foregoing nuclear weapons. While Japan is 
not contemplating a nuclear weapons program, it would be most unfortunate if due 
to the treaty there was a division between the nuclear powers as first-rate powers 
and the non-nuclear powers as second-rate powers.1229 
 
This is why the Japanese government was closely watching the reactions of other 
countries which had a similar position to Japan (technically advanced and 
potentially anxious for great power status) such as Italy, Sweden and West 
Germany in particular.1230 There was even a contention that Japan would not suffer 
from anything even remaining outside the treaty if West Germany did not join the 
NPT regime either.1231 Moreover, in September 1967 Miki told Rusk that ―Should 
India and Italy, for example, not agree to sign Japan would also find it most difficult 
to do so.‖1232 It is important to note that Japan signed the NPT in February 1970 
after West Germany signed it in November 1969. Japan closely watched West 
German‘s reaction to the treaty.1233 
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 In February 1969 the staff members of the Japanese Foreign Policy 
Planning Committee held a secret but still private meeting on the future foreign 
policy with West Germany officials and laid out future challenges Japan would 
likely face after joining the NPT such as the rise of a nuclear India and the arms 
control between the USA and China. The Japanese foreign officials implied that the 
Japanese civilian nuclear and space programme could be converted to the military 
nuclear weapon programme in case of an emergency. The Japanese side reportedly 
encouraged the West German officials to play a more independent and active 
diplomatic role in foreign affairs and work together for the goal. Needless to say, 
this idea was not well received in the German side.1234 Yet Japanese diplomats 
needed to know how their German counterparts perceived implications of the NPT 
on German‘s security.1235  
 Interestingly the opposition parties were also opposed to the NPT due in 
part to the discriminatory nature of the treaty. They also expressed their objection 
to the NPT on the grounds that its effort was not sufficient enough for the global 
nuclear disarmament. It still allowed the five nuclear weapons to retain their 
nuclear arsenals without any concrete deadline. 1236  
 Third, the Japanese government was concerned that the NPT would hinder 
the peaceful use of atomic energy.1237 The Japanese electronics industry too was 
greatly wary that the NPT would impede its commercial activity. The treaty raised 
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the question of safeguards. 1238 The Japanese government was opposed to any 
unequal treatment of safeguards or any special concessions for the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which retained its self-inspection system 
exempted from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection 
system.1239 The main duty of the IAEA is to monitor international proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.1240  
 Moreover, when the EURATOM member states (Belgium, West Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) signed the NPT in 1969, they clearly 
indicated their position on the treaty. They would not ratify it until they reached a 
satisfactory agreement on safeguards with the IAEA. Japan had to follow suit. 
Japan could not place its civil atomic programme in a disadvantageous position 
relative to EURATOM.1241 Although there were some negative aspects of signing 
the NPT in the long run, Japan did not face any urgent strategic challenges.1242 
Now we will look at why Japan signed the NPT.  
 Diplomatically and domestically there was no way that Japan remained 
outside the NPT like India. In addition, it was arguably more beneficial for Japan to 
join the non-proliferation regime.1243 It was after all nearly unthinkable for Japan 
to go nuclear. In this respect, the Japanese government was fully aware that its 
nuclear security had to depend heavily on US nuclear deterrence.1244 Japanese 
diplomats were to some extent convinced that the US nuclear umbrella would 
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continue to protect Japan as long as it acted as a responsible member of the free 
world.1245 
 In fact, as early as 1966 the Sato government showed its support for the 
NPT at the Diet mainly because of Japanese non-nuclear policy shaped by 
anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan.1246 In March 1967 Sato himself stated at the Diet 
that Japan as a country seeking world peace and disarmament was in support of the 
peace spirit of the NPT.1247 Moreover Japan declared that it would promote ―arms 
control and a reduction of arms race, including the early conclusion of a 
Non-Proliferation Treaty‖ in the joint statement following the US-Japan summit in 
November 1967. 1248  Following month, ―Three Non-Nuclear principles‖ (not to 
possess, produce and introduce nuclear weapons) were declared as well. Japan 
essentially reconfirmed its non-nuclear principles as a distinct symbol of a ―peace 
state‖ again by signing the treaty.1249 In this connection, Japan chose its peace state 
status over the second-tier status. Japanese policy makers were acutely aware that 
Japan in any case would not be able to become a nuclear super power like the Soviet 
Union and the USA.1250 To be sure, a nuclear Japan was highly unlikely at any rate 
given fervent public opposition to the nuclearisation of Japan. In the meantime, 
when Japan signed the NPT Japan pointed to the existence of Article X.I (the right 
to withdrawal) in the statement accompanying its signature in 1970. It still paid 
heed to its security.1251  The Chinese nuclear programme was deliberately left 
untouched.1252 One analyst argued that ―States such as Japan and South Korea, as 
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well as many NATO allies, have foresworn indigenous nuclear arsenals in part 
because of credible U.S. extended deterrence commitments.‖1253 As we have seen, 
the reality was much more complex than this assessment. Because of its security 
concerns about a nuclear China and the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella, some 
Japanese policy makers found it vital to keep Japan‘s nuclear option open in case of 
a future contingency. 
 It is also important to note how the US government perceived Japan‘s 
ambiguous attitude toward signing the NPT. As the Japanese government admitted, 
there was no strong American pressure on the Japanese government to hasten to 
sign the treaty. 1254  When Prime Minister Sato met with President Nixon in 
November 1969, Sato remarked to Nixon that ―there had been no change in Japan‘s 
position based on the strong national sentiment against nuclear weapons…If the 
United States felt that it required early Japanese signature he hoped it would so 
inform the Foreign Minister.‖ Nixon replied to Sato that ―he would not press for this. 
Each must do so in its own time, when it felt it best to do so…Japan was a sovereign 
state and should make this decision itself. He had told the Germans the same 
thing.‖1255 To be sure, Johnson‘s and Nixon‘s attitude toward the NPT was different. 
Johnson was the one who stove to establish the NPT while Nixon was arguably 
more relaxed about the treaty and even desired (selective) nuclear proliferation 
from his strategic point of view. We have to bear in mind that Nixon lamented that 
Japan‘s disarmament was a mistake and he wanted a stronger Japan to contain 
communist in the Far East. In short, Nixon wanted Japan to be a regional balancer. 
In view of his strategic view, it was probably no surprise that he was not personally 
against Japan‘s nuclear option although in public he would have had to completely 
oppose it. On 6 January 1972, Nixon told Sato that ―Japan is faced with an 
unacceptable choice: either Japan develops its own deterrent power however 
unpalatable vis-à-vis its neighbours, who are armed with nuclear weapons, or it 
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comes to an accommodation with them.‖ In response, Sato answered that ―Japan 
has adopted by unanimous resolution of the Diet a policy based on the three 
non-nuclear principles [on 24 November 1971]. Therefore, Japan must rely on the 
United States nuclear umbrella under the Mutual Security Treaty.‖1256 The next 
day they had a talk about the NPT. Sato asked whether Japan should ratify the 
treaty immediately and Nixon replied: 
 
each nation should handle this problem in the light of its own circumstances. It is 
not a matter for us to decide, and we respect the right of each nation to decide for 
itself in the light of its own desires. The United States, he said, is not exerting 
pressure on Japan to ratify...The President continued; Japan might take its time, 
and thus keep any potential enemy concerned. He then asked the Prime Minister 
to forget the preceding remark.1257 
 
He further went to claim that ―For domestic purposes he understood that the GOJ 
had to say that Japan would not develop its military power, but in terms of serving 
Japan‘s foreign policy he felt it better to cause its neighbors some concern…‖1258  In 
response Sato reiterated his political view expressed to US political leaders. He 
answered that ―the anti-war, anti-security treaty feelings in Japan are deep-rooted. 
If the situation changed, Japan would wish to defend itself, but the shock of the war 
is still deep and more time is needed before a change could take place.‖1259 From 
this exchange, we can see Nixon‘s strategic view, but his personal strategic view did 
not necessarily mean it would be shared by other nuclear powers and even with his 
own administration. 
 As for another key driver for Japan to sign the NPT, Japan also considered 
that its peaceful use of atomic energy would be hindered if Japan remained outside 
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the NPT.1260 Because Japan relied heavily on nuclear fissile materials imported 
from the NPT signatory states such as the USA and the UK, it was highly 
conceivable that these countries would have restricted imports to Japan in the 
foreseeable future if Japan had remained outside the NPT.1261 On the contrary, 
Japan would continue to have, and gain even better access to the nuclear materials 
if Japan signed the treaty.1262 As for the inspection issue, Japan followed the 
EURATOM‘s stance on ratification－it would ratify the treaty only after coming to 
the satisfactory agreement on safeguards. More technically, Japan had to sign it 
first in order to have a say in the equal treatment of safeguards.1263 If Japan signed 
it after the treaty came into force (March 1970), Japan was obliged to sign and 
ratify it at the same time without any negotiations over safeguards. It was more of a 
tactical decision to sign it at that time.1264 Japan could negotiate its position over 
IAEA safeguards against its civil atomic activities. The Japanese government was 
also aware that it took quite a long time to ratify it since the ratification process 
required Diet approval.1265 When Japan signed the treaty, it even implied that the 
signature would not be followed by rapid ratification.1266 Japan took as many as six 
years to see and ensure that its nuclear energy programme would not be 
constrained by the NPT regulations. Japan ratified the treaty again after West 
Germany ratified it in 1975.1267 In the end, Japan probably had no choice but to join 
the NPT. That being said, it was in no way uncontested and it was directly 
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concerned with Japan‘s defence, prestige and energy security. With these in mind, 
we will explore the rationale behind the secret nuclear studies of the 1960s. 
 
The Quasi Defence Agent Report of 1968 
 
    Let us start with a quasi-Defence Agency report on a Japan‘s 
nuclear-arming option. This study was publicly produced in the late 1960‘s by a 
quasi-private group known as Anzen Hosho Chousa Kai (Research Commission on 
Security). This group actually consisted of the active officials of the Japan Defence 
Agency (JDA) such as Osamu Kaihara and journalists from Yomiuri News Paper. 
One of the members later reflected that this kind of study was imperative although 
it was a taboo to examine the possibility of the possession of independent nuclear 
weapons within the JDA. This study was disguised as a private report despite the 
fact that active government officials were involved in the study. It could not 
completely conceal its official character as a production of the JDA.1268 When this 
work was produced, there was a clear reason why this type of work could not be 
conducted by the JDA. It was because of the public revelation of a secret US-Japan 
joint operational plan study (Mitsuya Kenkyu) of 1963 based on a scenario of the 
renewal of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. It assumed the introduction of US 
nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan and use of such arsenals in case of 
direct attacks on Japan.1269 Admittedly, the US military believed it necessary to use 
tactical nuclear weapons in times of an armed conflict in Korea, but it was 
predictable that the tactical use of nuclear weapons, nevertheless, would escalate to 
general war.1270 This secret operational study was unveiled in 1965 and provoked a 
fervent backlash as already noted. Since then, the JDA became reluctant to study a 
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contingency plan.1271 
 Its section of nuclear armament was written by Osamu Kaihara, who was 
the then Director General of the National Defence Council. 1272  The report‘s 
conclusion was straightforward in that Japan‘s nuclear option was not desirable 
even though Japan was technically capable of producing plutonium-based nuclear 
bombs (approximately 20 bombs per year) utilizing its first full-scale commercial 
nuclear reactor at Tokaimura imported from Britain.1273 The report raised two 
specific reasons why it argued against Japan‘s nuclear option: first it would incur 
the huge production costs that would make such an option not only financially but 
also militarily unattractive; second it would have considerable repercussions on 
Japan‘s global standing as a peace state, generating grave mistrust among 
Japanese neighbours. All these things considered, the report proposed that the most 
sensible option Japan should pursue to rely on US nuclear deterrence.1274 It also 
articulated that while Japan‘s nuclear option was often discussed abroad, there was 
general agreement in Japan that it should not build its own nuclear weapons in the 
foreseeable future. In view of the current constitution, political and social climate, 
the report concluded that it was inconceivable that the Japanese would allow 
themselves to choose the nuclear path.1275   
    
The 1968/ 70 Report 
 
 In the wake of the China‘s nuclear test, in February 1968 Minro Shigaki of 
the Cabinet Research Office commissioned a secret nuclear study to the top 
authorities on international politics, military strategy and nuclear energy, forming 
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a study group: Kanamaro Kai.1276 This study aimed to explore the feasibility and 
desirability of Japan‘s independent nuclear weapons. Shigaki explained that the 
study was driven by a sense of urgency and insecurity that the US nuclear umbrella 
alone did not have enough a deterrent effect on China.1277 As a Japanese scholar, 
Yuri Kase, plausibly maintained, ―Japan, in the mid-1960s, viewed China as a 
developing state with little technological capability. Hence, China‘s first nuclear 
detonation created major unease among Japanese policymakers and scholars.‖1278 
Indeed in March 1967 Sato said that he was shocked to find that the development 
pace of the Chinese nuclear weapons programme was much faster than he 
expected.1279  This perception of unsophisticated Chinese technology is likened to 
the Sputnik Shock of 1957.  After the successful launch of Sputnik, the Americans 
could no longer regard the Russians as technologically backward people.1280 This 
might have been the second Sputnik Shock to Japan.  As security scholar Barry 
Buzan maintained, nations ―face the constant worry that their rivals will gain a 
military advantage by being the first to achieve a decisive technological 
breakthrough. Such conditions create relentless pressure on states to lead, or at 
least to keep up with, the pace of change by continuously modernizing their armed 
force.‖1281 
  The study group produced the two separate reports known as the 1968 and 
the 1970 reports, which were first leaked to the public in 1994 by a Japanese 
national newspaper, Asahi Shimbun. It treated the reports as its headlines. 1282  
This study was significant in that the special government funding was allocated to 
it and the study itself was also comprehensive. The group studied the subject, 
consulting widely with government officials and experts on military, economy, 
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weapon, finance and nuclear energy in developing recommendations.1283 For that, 
the reports presumably reflected the most genuine information available on the 
subject at that time. Now we will examine the first part of the report (1968). 
    The 1968 report mainly assessed the Japanese technological, 
organizational and financial feasibility of Japan‘s nuclearisation (a nuclear armed 
Japan). In its introduction, the report set out its aim to analyse critically the 
popular contention that Japan could easily become a nuclear state. Notably while it 
concluded that purely theoretically Japan had no technical impediments to 
producing a small number of nuclear weapons and it would be rather easy, it 
suggested that Japan would face many practical barriers such as the huge financial 
costs of building an effective deterrent (i.e. a credible second strike capability).1284  
    The 1968 report suggested, as the Research Commission on Security noted, 
that the first commercial nuclear reactor at Tokaimura might be able to produce 
plutonium-base bombs. This reactor (the Calder-Hall variety) certainly produced 
plutonium that is under the IAEA‘s eyes. Yet it would not produce weapon-grade 
plutonium. Japan would need nuclear fuel reprocessing (plutonium separation) 
facilities to acquire weapon-grade plutonium. For that purpose, Japan would need 
more plutonium to produce weapon-grade plutonium and it would be hard to import 
more uranium than necessary from the UK. In other words, Japan did not have 
fissile materials at its disposal. Moreover, the reprocessing costs would be high.1285 
Even a sanguine CIA analysis done in 1964 reported that Japan ―theoretically could 
produce nuclear weapons by the end of this decade if it desired…however, Japan 
does not have sufficient uranium for a weapons program. A major problem would be 
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to locate sources of uranium free of safeguards.‖1286 More crucially even if Japan 
could produce nuclear bombs, they had to be tested at least three to five times to 
ensure that they would work. The reliability of untested weapons was not certain. 
Realistically speaking, Japan did not have any underground nuclear testing 
sites.1287 Of course, alternatively a testing site could have been constructed in a 
mountainous area at an estimated cost of 30 million US dollars.1288 Japan could 
have carried out a test under the sea within Japanese waters but this would have 
been a clear breach of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which Japan signed in 
August 1963. The test would have readily provoked public rage in Japan over the 
experiment.1289 
    As a delivery platform, missiles were the most realistic choices for Japan. 
Yet Japan did not have strategic missiles and much less the military guidance 
system. That said, China tested its first ICBM in 1971 and so, the technical 
difficulty would have probably been surmountable. Yet it was conceivable that many 
science students would not be willing to study the missile guidance system if they 
found out that this system in turn would be used for a military purpose.1290 There 
was no guarantee that Japanese scientists would obediently follow an order from 
the Japanese government order to produce nuclear bombs. This major project could 
not be achieved without massive public support either. Of course, in theory Japan 
would not have needed public support to build nuclear weapons. In the case of 
nuclear-sensitive Japan, this option was not politically sensible and even feasible. 
Any sign of a secret nuclear weapons program would have risked the political life of 
any cabinet no matter how popular it would have been. There was a big hurdle to 
reach a national consensus of a nuclear Japan even if the government was 
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determined to acquire its own nuclear weapons.1291 After all, the Japanese defence 
budget would soar so as to realise a nuclear-armed Japan. Shigaki also 
acknowledged that the cabinet would immediately collapse if the Japanese 
government attempted to convince the Japanese of the merits of an independent 
nuclear deterrent.1292 This was, indeed, one of the main reasons why the reports 
were never disclosed to the public.1293 This emotional impediment might have been 
surmountable if the international situation would have shifted dramatically. In this 
regard, the final decision to acquire nuclear weapons resided with the political 
determination of Japanese Prime Minister. It was not sufficient to assess a pure 
financial and technical capability of producing nuclear weapons. The first report 
contended that the final conclusion could not be made without any close 
examination of strategic, political, diplomatic and domestic dimensions of Japan‘s 
nuclearisation.1294  
    The second report (1970) addressed exactly these issues. It clearly stated 
in its introduction that the purpose of this report was to assess the remaining 
challenges and make the final conclusion.1295 It first analysed Chinese nuclear 
strategy and the possibility and effects of Chinese blackmail on Japan. It placed 
great confidence in the US nuclear umbrella against this security challenge. As long 
as China could not completely eliminate the possibility of US nuclear strikes on 
China, it would behave sensibly.1296 As we have already seen in the first report, 
building a robust independent nuclear deterrent would have involved significant 
costs. If Japan obtained only a small number of nuclear forces, it would merely 
induce China to launch a pre-emptive first strike. Therefore, Japan should be well 
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aware that its own deterrence would be likely doomed to fail.1297  
    Worse still, Japan was extremely vulnerable to nuclear strikes due to its 
unique geographical features. Japan lacked strategic depth with high popular 
density in one area. As of 1968, nearly half of Japan‘s population inhabited 20 
percent of its relatively small territory. The industrial hub was also located in the 
same area. Given this high popular density, even one hydrogen bomb could have a 
dreadful strategic blow to Japan.1298   
 Notably the report compared a nuclear-armed Japan with a nuclear armed 
France to study what strategic effects a nuclear Japan would entail. The report‘s 
analysis of French nuclear weapons was that these arsenals were a more political 
and diplomatic symbol of French independence than a mere military tool. The US 
nuclear umbrella covered the whole of Western Europe, and the French nuclear 
shield was only supplementary to America‘s. Unfortunately, the same rule could not 
be applicable to the Japanese case. It would alarm China and the Soviet Union and 
arouse diplomatic frictions with the USA, damaging the bilateral relations. It would 
also arouse the fervent public opposition and domestic political instability, dividing 
Japanese society.1299 In fact, Sato remarked Rusk in July 1966 that ―he personally 
did not think it would be a good thing for Japan to follow France.‖ 1300 There is 
indeed an analysis that French unilateralism was nevertheless enabled by French 
understanding that the security of Western Europe (including France) as a whole 
was supported by the fact that US interests were at stake.1301 Thus, the French 
case could not apply to Japan and reliance on the US nuclear umbrella was the only, 
if not the best, option available to Japan. 
 To sum up, it was difficult to reach the conclusion that Japan‘s independent 
nuclear weapons would strengthen Japan‘s defence capability and improve overall 
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Japan‘s security. From a strategic deterrent point of view, Japan would be required 
to build up a second strike capability, which was realistically almost impossible to 
possess. Moreover, practically speaking, Japan did not have any underground 
nuclear testing sites. After all, Japan‘s nuclear weapons would create more 
problems than security benefits. 1302 The report stressed that ―the day that the 
possession of nuclear weapons was prerequisite for major power status was simply 
gone now.‖ 1303 
    Accordingly, the top Japanese authorities concluded that Japan would not 
need its own nuclear shield and instead, they argued that Japan had better 
continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. As with Sato, their logical conclusion 
was dependence on US END while they did not discuss what the umbrella entailed 
in any detail. Although an independent nuclear deterrent option was a hugely costly 
project, purely theoretically the reports articulated that Japan had the technical 
ability to produce nuclear weapons. In view of economical, political and diplomatic 
constraints, indigenous nuclear weapons were neither practical nor feasible. That 
amounts to a political will and determination. Yet this decision would virtually end 
the political life of any cabinet no matter how popular the cabinet was. After all, the 
best option available for Japan‘s nuclear security was to depend upon US nuclear 
deterrence.  
 Be that as it may, these two reports did not have a great influence on the 
Sato government. It is important to note that these reports were completed without 
any review from political leaders and thus they did not represent the official 
Japanese nuclear policy.1304 These reports (200 copies) were distributed to the key 
members of the Sato Cabinet, and the senior officials of the MOFA, JDA, and 
Ministry of Finance, from which they did not cause any reaction. The reports were 
also delivered to Sato but he did not make any response either.1305 Shigaki later told 
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a Japanese journalist that the reports went straight to rubbish bins.1306 It was 
quite unlikely that Sato actually read the nearly 90-page long reports. Rather it was 
more likely that Sato had already made his non-nuclear policy based on his advisors 
by the time the reports were completed as shown in the last two chapters.1307 That 
said, these reports were valuable sources of information considering that the study 
was conducted by the top Japanese experts who could have been consulted as 
regards Japan‘s nuclear option if Japan had embarked on its nuclear weapons 
programme. Interestingly, their final recommendation was in the face of practical 
constraints the nuclear option could not replace the strategic values of US END. 
This conclusion was to some extent in line with Sato‘s strategic decision to rely on 
US END.  
 
Future Foreign Policy and Maintenance of Nuclear Potential 
     
 In 1969 the Japanese Foreign Policy Planning Committee at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs also produced one top-secret report, Waga Kuni no Gaiko Seisaku 
Taiko (Guidelines of Japan‘s Foreign Policy), which also dealt with Japan‘s nuclear 
future although it did not support the possession of Japan‘s independent nuclear 
weapons as with the other reports. A Japanese national newspaper, Mainich 
Shimbun, first revealed the existence of this top-secret report in 1994.1308 Yet, it 
had not been declassified until the 2000s. This report was produced against the 
background of Japan facing mounting pressure to sign the NPT while Japanese 
public onion was overwhelmingly in favour of UN-oriented diplomacy.1309 Notably 
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there was an argument within the organization that Japan‘s technical potential 
(technological foundation) to produce nuclear weapons should not be impeded by 
NPT while it is true that it did not represent an official view of MOFA.1310 One of 
the members involved in the report recalled that losing the option would weaken 
Japan‘s diplomatic and political standing in global politics. Japan would not acquire 
nuclear weapons; concurrently, it would not abandon the technological potential to 
build nuclear weapons.1311 Murata similarly asserted that ―Japan would not rule 
out its nuclear option in case that Japan‘s national survival was under imminent 
danger.‖1312 To be sure, this sort of strategic consideration was nothing unique to 
Japan. Similarly, Sweden was assumed to adopt ―the policy of maintaining the 
freedom of action‖ in the 1950s on the basis of the calculation that the development 
of a civil nuclear programme was decisive for a nuclear weapon programme. At the 
same time, Sweden decided to accept the US nuclear umbrella.1313   
    Remarkably, this report was written from an IR Realist point of view. It 
articulated that the world order was maintained by a balance of power. To some 
extent, it directly denied postwar predominant culture of a war aversion in 
Japan.1314 Like the other reports, however, it concluded that Japan was a militarily 
vulnerable country and it would be impossible to create its own effective nuclear 
deterrent. Consequently, Japan must continue to work closely with the USA for its 
security. The importance of diplomatic relations with the USA could not be 
                                                   
1310 Murata, Murata Ryohei Kaisoroku Jyoukan, p. 212. See also Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, 
Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu, p. 204-205 and ―Waga Kunino Gaiko.‖ 
1311 ―Gaimusho Kakuheiki Seizo Nouryokuwo.‖ See also Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu Hen (ed.): 
Usagino Mimi to Hato no Yume: Nihon No Kakuto Jyohou Senryaku [Rabbit‘s ears and Dove‘s Dream: 
Japan‘s nuclear and Information Strategy] (Tokyo:Liberuta Shuppan., 1995), pp.15, 19-21. 
1312 NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, Kaku wo Motometa Nihon, p. 26. See also Chunichi Shimbun 
Shakaibu, Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu, p. 204-205. 
1313 Paul M. Cole: ―Atomic Bombast: Nuclear weapon decision-making in Sweden 1946-72‖, The 
Washington Quarterly Vol 20 No. 2 (1997), p. 240; Lars Wallin: ―Sweden‖, in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.): 
Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security (New York: Oxford 
U.P.,1991), pp. 371-374. 
1314 Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai: ―Waga Kunino Gaiko Seisaku Taiko (hereafter Wagaku Kunino 
Gaiko)‖ [Guidelines of Japan‘s Foreign Policy], Top Secret, 25 September 1969, p. 69. This top-secret 
report is available at the MOFA homepage, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku02.pdf, accessed on 6 September 
2017.  
288 
 
overestimated.1315As for nuclear deterrence, Japan had no choice but to rely on the 
US nuclear umbrella. Japan would aim to strengthen its conventional military 
capabilities concurrently. It was also desirable for Japan to elevate the level of the 
consultation mechanism including contingency planning to that of NATO.1316 While 
it is true that there were some foreign officials who privately thought that Japan 
should acquire nuclear weapons, it appears that Japanese foreign officials generally 
agreed that Japan should rely on US END.1317 
    The report stressed the importance of raising Japanese awareness of the 
salience of the US-Japan defence alliance and regional threats to Japan‘s security. 
The Japanese‘s perception of national security was narrowly focused in accordance 
with the dictates of post-war pacifism and idealism. Since the views of Japanese 
ordinary people did not reflect real world politics, they had to be corrected. The 
Japanese public had to understand that the nature of world politics prompted 
responsible governments to strive to heighten their security. In doing so, the 
Japanese would understand the salience of military forces in global politics. 
Furthermore, they would not cause unnecessary public upheaval should the 
introduction of US tactical nuclear weapons into Japan in case of contingency 
arise.1318  
 Accordingly, the senior officials of MOFA interpreted that the Japanese 
nuclear allergy and their pacifist norm were detriment to national security; hence 
they had to be overcome through public education. That said, they did not reach the 
conclusion that Japan should obtain its indigenous nuclear weapons. Instead, they 
implicitly proposed that the Japan keep its nuclear option (or ―potential‖ meaning 
atomic technology and energy which can be drawn on to generate nuclear bombs) 
available in case of future contingency. The report stressed that ―regardless of 
whether or not Japan joined the NPT, Japan would maintain the policy of not 
                                                   
1315 Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai, ―Waga Kunino Gaiko Seisaku Taiko‖, pp.9-16. 
1316 Ibid.,pp.62-65. 
1317 Memorandum of Conversation: Japanese Policy Toward Nuclear Weapons (16 June 1962). 
1318 ―Waga Kunino Gaiko‖, pp.62-71. 
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possessing nuclear weapons for the time being. It was, however, crucial to keep the 
economic and technical potential necessary to produce nuclear weapons. Japan 
would see to it that such a latent capability was not to be impeded.‖1319  
 That said, the authors were certainly aware that Japanese anti-nuclear 
sentiment was deeply rooted in Japan‘s special historical experiences in the last 
world war and this could not be simply ignored. 1320 In this respect, the populace 
were not passive and obedient bystanders. On the contrary, they were active and 
strident participants. Overall, the reliance on the US nuclear umbrella and the 
maintenance of the nuclear potential might have been the most realistic option the 
senior foreign officials could afford for Japan‘s security. 
 Accordingly, all these studies reached the same conclusion that the nuclear 
option was not desirable for Japan. For its nuclear security in the face of China‘s 
looming ICBM development, the best option available was to depend on the US 
extended nuclear deterrence on account of the huge financial, political and 
diplomatic costs of the alternative. Kase observed that ―The only perceived benefit 
of a nuclear Japan would be less dependence on the United States; Japan would not 
have to be the ‗little brother‘ any longer.‖1321 This would be achieved at the expense 
of long-term huge financial costs to Japan as the Japanese economy was also tied to 
the American market. Nuclear proliferation analyst Etel Solingen correctly 
observed that ―the US-Japan alliance is a substitute for Japan‘s nuclear weapons, 
which would enable Japan to invest resources in the economic expansion that 
turned it into the second-largest economy worldwide.‖1322   
 It is noteworthy that the Japanese policy makers regarded domestic public 
opinion, the ―nuclear allergy‖ to be exact, as a major stumbling block to the nuclear 
option. They had to treat it with care so that it would not burst. In 1958 
Ambassador MacArthur observed that ―government cannot disregard public opinion. 
                                                   
1319 Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
1320 Ibid., pp. 67-71. 
1321 Kase, ―The Costs and Benefits of Japan‘s Nuclearization‖, p. 65. 
1322 Etel Solingen: Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: 
Princeton U.P., 2007), pp. 50-60. 
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Should Japanese public entertain some genuine apprehension on the nuclear 
weapons question, government has to deal with it.‖1323 While it is true that ―Japan‘s 
choices will be determined ultimately by how well potential threats can be managed 
and by the strength of the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence‖, it is not 
entirely correct to suggest that the US nuclear commitment was the ultimate 
factor. 1324  This is not to suggest a mono-causal argument but even the 
domestic-norm factor (the non-nuclear path) alone would have significantly 
constrained Japan from pursuing the nuclear option in the 1960s more strongly 
than other factors such as economic, technological and diplomatic constraint. It can 
be considered as a sufficient condition. In the meantime, we have to bear in mind 
that ―although public sentiment against nuclear weapons remains strong, its ability 
to fully inhibit the decisions of Japanese leaders should not be exaggerated.‖1325 A 
more realistic assessment is that ―Japan did not begin a program to acquire a 
nuclear weapons capability may have something to do with the confidence gained 
from extended nuclear deterrence commitments, but it could equally have had a lot 
to do with the formidable domestic institutional obstacles to nuclear 
acquisition...‖1326 
 To be sure, this was not a healthy environment to develop a security policy, 
but the policy makers had to face the reality and deal with the future security 
challenges. As defence analyst James Schoff aptly put it, ―the details about how 
deterrence worked mattered little‖ to Japan. This unhealthy environment ―allowed 
Japan to be fervently nonnuclear in its public statements and government 
policies.‖1327 To keep the economic and technical potential for the nuclear weapon 
production might have been the most balanced but realistic security option of Japan. 
Yet whether Japan did actually deliberately maintain this nuclear-potential option 
                                                   
1323 Incoming Telegram From MacArthur to Secretary of State, 31 July 1958,Box 9, Geographic File, 
Japan, RG 218, NARA. 
1324 Samuels and Schoff, ―Japan‘s Nuclear Hedge‖, pp. 236. 
1325 Campbell and Sunohara, ―Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable‖, p. 242. 
1326 O‘Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence, p. 88. 
1327 James L Schoff: ―Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan‖ in Toshi Yoshihara and 
James R. Holmes (eds.): Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition and the Ultimate 
Weapon (Baltimore: George Town U.P., 2012), p. 101. (99-113) 
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is somewhat doubtful. 
 
Nuclear Hedging or Energy Autonomy  
 
 Some analysts contended that Japan has maintained the nuclear potential 
(also known as nuclear hedging)1328 to produce nuclear weapons in a short time as 
its vital strategy even after the Cold War.1329 Should the US nuclear umbrella over 
Japan close, Japan might go nuclear in a short time.1330 This claim must be 
critically analysed, however.  
 First of all, it is uncertain if Japan even had this immediate nuclear 
programme. Second, even if Japan had had it, could Prime Minister have started it 
readily and immediately when faced with political constraints? Or Japan might 
play the nuclear-hedging card to send a diplomatic signal to the USA by adding 
more pressure on the US government to continue its security commitments to 
Japan.1331  
 In the words of Freedman, ―It is hard to think of a single development that 
would transform security calculations around the world, including whether or not to 
build national nuclear arsenals, than a decision by the United States to disentangle 
itself from its alliance commitments.‖1332 In a similar vein Mark Fitzpatrick at the 
                                                   
1328 On the term, ―Nuclear Hedging‖ See Ariel Levite: ―Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal 
Revisited‖, International Security Vol. 27 No.3 (Winter 2002/03), p. 69. Similarly Japan is regarded as 
a ―virtual nuclear weapons state.‖ On this point, see Campbell and Sunohara, ―Japan: Thinking the 
Unthinkable‖, p. 243. See also Halperin, ―The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Paper 
and Commentaries‖, pp. 21,27-28. 
1329 Arima, Genpatsu to Genbaku, pp. 151-153; Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, Nichibei Doumei to 
Genpatsu,p. 130-131; NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, Kaku wo Motometa Nihon, pp. 95-97; Samuels and 
Schoff: ―Japan‘s Nuclear Hedge‖, pp. 232-264. 
1330  Arima, Genpatsu to Genbaku,pp. 223-225; Campbell and Sunohara, ―Japan: Thinking the 
Unthinkable‖, p. 244; Report on ―Japan‘s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field‖, p. 3,8,10;Toshi 
Yoshihara and James R. Holmes: ―Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo‘s Nuclear Option‖ in 
Yoshihara and Holmes (eds.), Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 120; Report on ―Japan‘s 
Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field‖, pp. 2-4, 8-9; Halperin, ―The Nuclear Dimension of the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance‖, p. 29; Hughes,Japan‘s Remilitarisation, p. 110. 
1331 Green and Furukawa, ―Japan: New Nuclear Realism‖, p. 348, 365; Ariel Levite: ―Never Say Never 
Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited‖, International Security Vol. 27 No.3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 71. 
79-80. 
1332 Freedman, The Future of War, p. 282. See also Katsumi Sugiyama: Chugoku no Gunjiryoku Nihon 
no Boueiryoku [China‘s Military Capability and Japan‘s Military Capability] (Tokyo: Shoden Sha., 
2013), pp. 183-185. 
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International Institute for Strategic Studies argued that ―the reliability of the US 
security commitment is the dominant variable. Maintaining the credibility of US 
extended deterrence is the strongest safeguard of nuclear non-proliferation in the 
region.‖1333 Indeed after the Chinese nuclear test it was feared that Japan might go 
nuclear if American security commitments appeared declined. 1334   While the 
extension of US nuclear deterrence to US allies prevented nuclear proliferation 
among them while it did not stop France from obtaining its indigenous nuclear 
weapons.1335  
 In March 1963 President Kennedy famously said that ―I am haunted by the 
feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful there may be ten nuclear powers 
instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.‖1336 In contrast to his dire prediction, the 
nuclear club has expanded very slowly since 1963. Now there are in fact nearly 40 to 
50 countries which have technological capabilities of producing nuclear weapons.1337 
In this respect it can also be argued that most non-nuclear states are content with 
their non-nuclear status whether they are under the US nuclear umbrella or not. 
 Realistically to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent would severely 
undermine an alliance relationship with the USA at risk of losing its security 
protection.1338 The late administrative vice minister of the JDA, Takuya Kubo, 
discussed a close link between Japan‘s civil nuclear programme and US security 
assurance in his famous report. It is his belief that Japan advanced its civilian 
nuclear energy programme, which in turn would enable Japan to develop nuclear 
weapons at any time. If Japan reached that technologically advanced stage, the US 
                                                   
1333 Fitzpatrick, Asia‘s latent Nuclear Powers, p. 13. 
1334 Treverton, ―China‘s Nuclear Forces and the Stability of Soviet-American Deterrence‖, p. 43. 
1335 See for example, Rebecca K. C. Hersmand and Robert Peters: ―Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from 
South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback‖, Nonproliferation Review Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 539-553. 
1336 John F. Kennedy, ―News Conference 52‖, 21 March 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
and Museum, 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference
-52, accessed on 22 January 2019. 
1337 On this point see, Jacques E. C. Hymans: ―Theories of Nuclear Proliferation‖, Nonproliferation 
Review Vol. 13 No. 3 (November 2006), p. 457; Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, p. 31. 
1338 Halperin, ―The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Paper and Commentaries‖, p. 29, 
https://nautilus.org/nuke-policy/morton-h-halperin-the-nuclear-dimension-of-the-u-s-japan-alliance-pa
per-and-commentaries/, accessed on 13 September 2017; Hughes,Japan‘s Remilitarisation, p. 110. 
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government would feel pressured to sustain the US nuclear umbrella under the 
US-Japanese security regime. This was not least because the more advanced 
nuclear programme Japan had, the more likely the USA had to worry about 
regional nuclear proliferation and rapid instability in international relation. He 
reasoned that Japan had no choice but to rely on the US nuclear umbrella due to its 
inherent vulnerability to nuclear attacks.1339 
  In contrast, one of the participants (General of JGDF) of a secret 1995 JDA 
paper on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction1340 held that ―Japan 
would not need its independent nuclear weapons due to its strategic vulnerability 
even if Japan lost the US nuclear umbrella. The Japanese industry hub is located in 
a small and dense area [Tokaido/ Taiheiyo Belt], which gives Japan acute strategic 
vulnerabilities.‖1341 It is noted that nearly one third of the whole population of 
Japan dwelled in two major cities: Tokyo and Osaka. The rough rate of the 
population concentration was that one out of ten resided in Tokyo.1342 Beyond 
Japan‘s nuclear allergy, even from a military point of view, an independent nuclear 
deterrent option was questionable for some Japanese strategists. This contradicts 
the Western analysts‘ contention that Japan‘s nuclear option was impeded by US 
END.1343 In this regard, Japan might not be better off with own nuclear weapons. 
In theory Japan would lose more than it gained in case of nuclear exchanges. It is 
true that in the event of nuclear war against China or Russia both of which possess 
massive territories, they could overwhelm Japan unless Japan had a strategic triad. 
This would significantly increase the military budget and require Japan to amend 
Article 9; hence it was not even a realistic choice. That being said, their analysis, 
                                                   
1339 Kubo, ―Boueiryoku Seibino Kangaekata.‖ 
1340 Tairyo Hakai Heikino Kakusan Mondainitsuite [Concerning the Problem of Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction] Japan Defence Agency (1995). This report is available on the website of 
Union of Concerned Scientists, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ucs-documents/nuclear-weapons/Secret+Japanese+Report+on+Nuclear+Op
tions.pdf, accessed on 9 September 2017. 
1341 Remarks at Nihon Kurauzebittsu Gakkai (The Clausewitz Society of Japan), 26 April 2017. See 
also Matake Kamiya: ―Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?‖, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
26 No. 1 (Winter 2002/03), p. 68.     
1342 Packard, Protest in Tokyo, p. 183. 
1343 Fitzpatrick, Asia‘s Latent Nuclear Powers, p. 13. 
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however, overlooks the case of Britain, which especially now relies solely on 
nuclear-armed submarines. The land size of Japan is actually larger than that of 
Britain. Minimum deterrence (possession of a second strike capability after 
absorbing an enemy first strike) can be achievable in theory.1344 
 Having discussed the pros and cons of Japan‘s nuclear option. We will now 
focus on the reality of Japan‘s nuclear hedging option. It is important to note that 
Japan‘s nuclear hedging option is not supported by empirical evidence. With the 
official documents available, one Japanese scholar concluded that Japan lacked a 
political will and guidance to increase its capability to develop nuclear weapons, let 
alone an official cabinet decision to do so. Rather the development of civilian nuclear 
programme coincidentally helped establish its latent nuclear capabilities. 1345 
Llewellyn Hughes, a Japanese politics specialist, too, observed that nuclear hedging 
has not been a consistent national policy as this requires highly integrated 
coordination across government organizations, the Japanese atomic energy agency, 
the JDA and the ministry of Finance in particular. Yet there was almost no 
interaction between the defence and scientific community in Japan. Japan‘s civilian 
atomic energy programme developed extensively for energy security to reduce its 
level of external energy dependence (energy autonomy) rather than future military 
security concerns in mind as Japan lacked natural resources.1346 In September 
1967 when he met with Rusk, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, for instance, stressed 
that ―Japan requires annually 100 million tons of crude oil, 99 % of which is 
                                                   
1344 On this point, see for example, Kan Ito: Chugoku no Kaku Senryoku ninihon wa Kussuru: 
Imakoso Nihonjin ni Hitsuyo na Kaku Yokushiryoku [Chinese Nuclear Force Overwhelms Japan: 
Nuclear Deterrence Japanese Need Now] (Tokyo: Shogakukan., 2011), pp. 106-108. 
1345Akira Kurosaki: ―Nihon Kakubusou Kenkyu (1968Nen) to wa Nan Dattaka‖ [Reexamining the 1968 
Report on Japan‘s Nuclear Weapons Capability], Kokusai Seiji Vol. 182 (2015), pp. 133-135. See also 
Jacques E.C. Hymans: ―Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional 
Barriers to a Japanese Bomb‖, International Security, Vol.. 36 No. 2 (Fall 2011), p. 156, 187. 
1346 Llewelyn Hughes: ―Why Japan Will not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints 
on the Nuclearization of Japan‖, International Security Vol. 31 No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 80-83, 95-96. 
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Fitzpatrick, Asia‘s latent Nuclear Powers, p. 84; Atsuyuki Suzuki: ―Why Plutonium is A ‗Must‘ For 
Japan ‖, in Harrison, Japan‘s Nuclear Future, p. 63; Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.254; Jeffrey W. 
Thompson and Bejamin L. Self: ―Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology: 
Japan‘s Prospects for Nuclear Breakout‖, in Self and Thompson (eds.), Japan‘s Nuclear Option, p. 149. 
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imported, to provide for 60 % of her energy requirement. The peaceful development 
of nuclear energy, therefore, is of great interest to Japan because other energy 
requirements are expected to continue to increase.‖1347 
 In other words, ―what may appear at first glance to be nuclear hedging is 
actually merely the legacy of past choices‖1348 or nuclear hedging is simply a 
by-product of Japan‘s civilian nuclear programme.1349 These counter arguments are 
slightly off the point. To be sure, it is safe for them to conclude that Japan‘s nuclear 
hedging option is not empirically provable. From a strategic point of view, however, 
it is a card which you do not show to your enemy and even your friends. As a rule of 
thumb you would not tell your adversary what you are planning. It could be 
unwritten and implicit in nature, which was widely shared within the 
policy-making circle. It left some ambiguity that Japan might be able to produce 
nuclear weapons in a rather short term should it become inevitable. Those in the 
circle neither deny nor confirm it.1350 It was a sensible option for the Japanese 
government to keep a latent capability for the production of nuclear weapons.1351 As 
a nuclear non-proliferation specialist, Ariel Levite lucidly put it, ―Would-be 
proliferants rarely make formal decisions to acquire the bomb or for that matter to 
give it up before they absolutely have to (e.g., before they are on the verge of 
attaining or eliminating a nuclear capability), if then.‖1352  
 When it comes to nuclear hedging, therefore, it is more crucial to analyse 
how practical the option was and what strategic impact it entailed. We will now 
examine these two essential points with a particular focus on Japan‘s technical 
foundation of the late 1960‘s. We must bear in mind that in late 1964 Prime 
Minister Sato boldly asserted that ―Nuclears…were much less costly than was 
generally assumed and Japanese scientific and industrial level was fully up to 
                                                   
1347 Memorandum of Conversation:Non-Proliferation Treaty(Part II of II), (16 September 1967). 
1348 Hymans, ―Veto Players, Nuclear Energy‖, p. 156. 
1349 Thompson and Self: ―Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology‖, p. 148, 
167; Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.257. 
1350 See for example NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, Kaku wo Motometa Nihon, pp. 95-97. 
1351 Mochizuki, ―Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo‖, p.311. 
1352 Levite, ―Never Say Never Again‖, p. 67. 
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producing them.‖1353 How credible was this argument at that time?  
 First of all, it was doubtful that Japan was able to produce nuclear bombs 
with its first commercial nuclear plant at Tokaimura since it was not designed to 
produce weapon-grade plutonium. This categorically contradicts a common claim 
that Japan could build nuclear weapons in a short time. Yet some contended that 
Japan was technically capable of producing nuclear weapons.1354 Levite boldly 
asserted that Japan has been ―within a few months of acquiring nuclear 
weapons.‖1355 Japanese politics analyst John Welfield, also noted that ―Technically, 
Japan had been in a position to begin development of a small, independent nuclear 
strike force since the late 1960s‖ although he was also somewhat uncertain whether 
Japan was able to produce nuclear weapons rapidly. 1356  Joseph Cirincione, a 
renowned nuclear specialist, asserted that ―Building a bomb still poses significant 
scientific and engineering challenges…Technological barriers do not affect the most 
advanced countries of the world. Japan, for example, has long since known how to 
reprocess plutonium.‖ 1357  He went on to claim that ―Tokyo‘s civilian 
stockpile…could be converted to military uses in a matter of weeks or months.‖1358 
Already in 1961 one CIA intelligence report assessed that  
 
Given the state of Japan‘s scientific and technical advancement and its industrial 
resources, we believe that Japan could probably have its first nuclear device in five 
or six years, if it decided in the next year or so to embark on a nuclear weapons 
program, and that it could have its first weapon deliverable by aircraft a year or so 
later.  It could also probably develop missiles with ranges up to 1,000 [k]m in 
about the same time and compatible fission warheads for such missiles by 1970.‖ 
                                                   
1353 Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 29 December 1964, Box 
2376, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, POL 7 Visits, Meetings, Japan, RG 
59, NARA. See also FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Document 37, pp. 55-56.  
1354 Halperin, ―The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance‖, p. 21.  
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 The common logic behind these claims is the notion that any civilian atomic 
programme could be readily converted to a nuclear weapon programme.1360 
 In reality, this is nothing but a myth. Japan was required to change fuels 
quite frequently to produce the enough amount of plutonium for the production of 
nuclear weapons. This could not have been done secretly. The IAEA, which Japan 
joined in 1957, would keep a critical eye on the activities, inviting snap 
inspections.1361 In addition to this, Japan would need to use a reprocessing plant in 
order to extract weapon-grade plutonium.1362 It must be noted that the possession 
of reactor-grade plutonium is one and the production of nuclear bombs is 
another.1363 The 1968 report estimated that the first Japanese reprocessing facility 
was to be built by 1972.In fact it only came into operation in 1977.1364 It implies 
that Japan would not have been able to produce any nuclear bombs until 1977.1365 
Worse still, the commercial reactor had technical failures and broke down several 
times after its completion. It had not been fully operational when the 1968 report 
was written. This technical failure could happen quite frequently and it would cause 
further lengthy delays. This would have further hindered the production of nuclear 
weapons.1366 By 1977, Japan had ratified the NPT.1367 If Japan had wanted to build 
                                                   
1359 National Intelligence Estimate, 4-3-61, ―Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World 
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its own nuclear weapons, it would be required to withdraw from NPT as North 
Korea did. 
 It must be noted that Japan‘s nuclear capability was not immediate but 
latent and thus, it was difficult to say Japan could have acquired nuclear weapons 
immediately once the Japanese government made a political decision. This 
technological reality has not changed significantly even today.1368 Of course, this 
did not necessarily mean Japan lacked technical expertise and capability to build its 
own nuclear weapons once it was earnestly committed to produce nuclear weapons. 
Notably in the 1960s when horizontal nuclear proliferation (the emergence of more 
nuclear states) or the ―Nth‖ country problem as it was called at the time was 
looming large, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory made an interesting experiment 
on this very issue.1369 The laboratory selected two physicist postdocs who did not 
have any previous knowledge of nuclear weapons and paid them to design their own 
nuclear bombs together utilising only open information for two and a half years. 
They were not given any access to classified information. The principal purpose of 
this experiment was to see if a small hypothetical Third World country was capable 
of designing atomic bombs by itself.1370 Importantly, they deliberately chose to 
design a plutonium implosion bomb as it was more technically demanding. This 
decision was made principally for their reputation as scientists.1371  
 It is true that America was so confident that it did not even carry out a test 
for a uranium gun-type bomb and it still used the bomb against Hiroshima, 
suggesting this sort of a bomb is not technologically demanding to build. This 
implies that the construction of a uranium bomb was quite possible for technically 
advanced states like Japan. While the final results are still classified, the two 
scientists appeared to have succeeded in designing an atomic bomb that could 
                                                   
1368 See for example Matake Kamiya: ―Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?‖, The Washington 
Quarterly (Winter 2002/03), p. 69. 
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produce the same explosive yield as Little Boy. It was more of technical and 
material difficulty of obtaining weapon-grade plutonium and enriched uranium 1372  
 As the 1968 reported recognised, Japan relied heavily on foreign suppliers 
for fissile materials (uranium) to operate the plant. In other words, Japan did not 
have enough uranium for the production of nuclear weapons at disposal. The 
British government could exercise veto power. This seriously would limit Japan‘s 
nuclear activity. 1373  The British government would have stopped supplying 
uranium to Japan if it had seriously suspected Japan‘s nuclear programme. 
Naturally, countries without sufficient fissile materials will be prevented from going 
nuclear. They cannot be regarded as virtual nuclear states since their nuclear 
weapons programmes too vulnerable to external sources suppliers.1374 In prior to 
operational deployment of nuclear bombs, Japan would also need to find a testing 
site to conduct a nuclear test to ascertain that the bomb functioned. Without this, 
the bomb could not constitute effective deterrence. As Hughes succinctly observed, 
―Japan has no experience of nuclear testing, and would have to develop suitable 
delivery systems‖－the fact would make it difficult for Japan to build a credible 
second strike nuclear capability.1375 
 With respect to a delivery system, Japanese civilian rockets could be used 
to carry warheads. Notably, one US intelligence report estimated that ―Japan is 
further capable, in the light of its relatively sophisticated space program, of 
producing as many as 100 nuclear-equipped MRBMs by 1975‖ although it 
recognised a severe domestic barrier: ―the Japanese public is overwhelmingly 
opposed to the presence of nuclear weapons, foreign or domestic, on Japanese 
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soil.‖1376 Wakaizumi made even more sanguine estimates that ―Japan could build 
nuclear warheads and medium range missile by 1970.‖1377 Yet, the design of secure 
re-entry vehicles was hard to master. In fact Japanese research on re-entry 
technology was not conducted until 1994 notwithstanding its first successful launch 
of a satellite into orbit in 1970.1378 It must be noted that in May 1969 the Japanese 
National Diet ruled that Japan‘s space programme was limited to peaceful and 
scientific purposes.1379 The rocket programme of Japan developed was not meant 
and designed to serve a military use for both financial and constitutional 
reasons.1380 In 1969, the then director of Science and Technology Agency, Shiro 
Kimura, held that the space program solely aimed for non-military research.1381 It 
was indeed after the end of the Cold War (2003) that Japan launched its first 
information gathering satellite.1382 What is more technically challenging is the 
development of SLBMs. The sea-launched missile would have been needed in view 
of the maritime nature of Japan but they are technically more difficult to produce as 
they must be specifically designed to fit into a submarine, perform under sea and 
keep on the right track after a launch.1383     
 As James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, both American defence specialists, 
argued, ―if Tokyo chose to rely on a missile delivery system, then it would need to 
produce a workable, miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted atop an 
accurate cruise or ballistic missile. Such a feat is not beyond Japanese engineering 
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1383 Anzen Hosho Chosa Kainihon no Anzen Hosho, pp. 334-337; Thompson and Self, ―Nuclear Energy, 
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prowess, but it would involve significant lead time.‖1384 Yet Japan lacked this 
technical foundation. At the same time, Japan had to work on the effective 
command and control system for military operations. Who would actually direct the 
grand project? In Japan cooperation and coordination across organizations has been 
notoriously rare, even within the Self-Defence Forces of Japan. If the Japanese 
government would have wanted to establish the Japanese version of the Strategic 
Air Command, it would have been a daunting task.  
 Matake Kamiya, a professor of national security at National Defence 
Academy of Japan, made a more realistic assessment that ―The time needed for 
Japan to make this extensive list of technological strides can more realistically be 
measured in decades than years.‖1385 Or a slightly more optimistic assessment by a 
Japanese nuclear scientist estimated at least 5 years for Japan to arm itself with 
nuclear weapons.1386 It must be emphasized that possessing the technological base 
to build nuclear weapons and the capability to produce nuclear weapons at once if 
required have completely different strategic connotations. Realistically what Japan 
had was the former base. If Japan did not have the latter capability, the best 
alternative was still reliance on US END. 
 Second, when it comes to making nuclear bombs, there was uncertainty not 
only about the technological foundation but also about the characters of Japanese 
nuclear scientists. Japanese scientists completely lacked expertise on nuclear 
testing and missile and warhead design.1387 While it is true that the scientific 
knowledge of construction of nuclear bombs was widely diffused, this did not 
automatically mean that countries would not encounter any technical problems.1388 
When it comes to building an atomic bomb in practice, as Freedman noted, ―the 
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1386 Katsuya Yamada: Nihon wa Gensi Bakudan wo tsukurenoka [Nuclear Weapons and Japan] 
(Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo.,2009) p.228. 
1387 Furukawa,―Nuclear Option, Arms Control, and Extended Deterrence‖, pp. 114-115; Hughes, 
Japan‘s Re-emergence as a ‗Normal‘ Military Power, p. 94; Kazuhisa Ogawa: 14 Sai karano riaru Bouei 
Ron [Practical Defence Debate for Junior High School Students] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2010), p. 225; 
Yamada, Nihon wa Gensi Bakudan wo tsukurenoka, pp.214-215. 
1388 Peter R. Lavoy: ―Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy 
Responses‖, Nonproliferation Review Vol. 13 No. 3 (Nov 2006), p. 449. 
302 
 
technical difficulties were hardly trivial, even if sufficient fissionable material and 
capable engineers could be acquired, and there were obvious risks that would be 
faced by anyone trying to put a crude weapons together.‖1389 In this respect, it 
would take at least a few years to make themselves familiar with the exact 
techniques (Research and Development). Moreover, once Japan had started its 
full-scale nuclear weapon programme, it would have certainly met engineering 
difficulty and unexpected friction, increasing the production costs and extending a 
manufacturing period further.1390 One scientist who actually engaged in the first 
commercial nuclear reactor at Tokai used the analogy of flour to explain the 
technical obstacle to making nuclear bombs: That you produce flour did not 
automatically mean you could make bread. In other words, there is a distinct 
technological difference between the production of plutonium and that of nuclear 
bombs. Those are two different things in nature. 1391  This scientist also 
acknowledged that there had been neither an internal study on the production of 
nuclear weapons nor a political direction to do so.1392  
 It is also important to note that the commercial nuclear reactor at Tokai 
was privately owned.1393 The enterprise had a veto on the government proposal to 
produce nuclear weapons. That is, even reactor-grade plutonium was not at the 
disposal of the government.1394 As noted previously it was not enough for Japan to 
have only a few atomic bombs if the country wanted to deter its regional nuclear 
powers. In that case, Japan might need nuclear submarines equipped with SLBMs 
or at least nuclear cruise missiles.1395 One Japanese military analyst noted that 
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these weapon systems were required to build Japan‘s effective nuclear deterrence 
against its regional nuclear powers. Yet these could not have been achieved without 
American technological support.1396  
 There was also a question of the character of the Japanese scientists. 
Kumao Kaneko, a retired diplomat who worked closely with Japanese nuclear 
scientists for years, observed that having been exposed to post-war peace education 
and the atoms for peace policy, they were unlikely to follow government orders to 
produce nuclear bombs.1397 Japanese nuclear scientists at universities shared a 
similar attitude toward the military use of atoms.1398 This fact would lead to an 
ultimate question whether the Japanese Prime Minister could successfully convince 
them to build Japan‘s independent deterrent. Their motivation for dedication to the 
nuclear programme would be truly uncertain.1399 Quester interestingly noted that 
―‗self-inspection‘ in the pluralistic Japan of the 1970‘s would be as reliable as 
self-inspection within EURATOM.‖1400 This does not necessarily mean they would 
never be convinced but it would take a lengthy time for the supreme leader to do so. 
This would undermine the nuclear-hedging option of Japan. 
 Third, the Japan‘s atomic basic law limited the utilisation and research of 
atomic energy to solely peaceful purposes: ―the use of radioisotopes in research, 
medicine, and industry.‖1401 Of course, this law could be amended. This would 
eventually lead to the question of the amendment of Article 9 despite the fact that 
the Japanese government alleged that defensive weapons were constitutional. A 
majority of the Japanese viewed the issue otherwise.1402 Politically it is generally 
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interpreted that Japan was not allowed to possess any power projection capabilities 
or war potential as stipulated in Article 9 including ICBMs, strategic bombers and 
aircraft carriers. These weapons were generally considered as offensive weapons 
rather than defensive forces.1403  Could the Japanese government gain enough 
public support to amend Article 9 while ―Pacifism was enshrined in…Japan‘s 
post-war constitution‖? 1404  Would the Japanese support Japan‘s independent 
nuclear option? The answer would have been negative on the grounds that the 
Japanese public was vehemently opposed to Japan‘s independent nuclear forces in 
the 1960s and the 1970s. 
  Throughout this period, opinion polls demonstrated that only 20 percent of 
the Japanese consulted were in favour of an independent nuclear deterrent. This 
national consensus has indeed remained the same. 1405  Over this period there 
appeared two major security concepts among the Japanese public: reliance on the 
Japan-US Security Treaty and a posture of unarmed neutrality. 1406  As one 
Japanese nuclear scientist accurately depicted the Japanese nuclear mentality, 
―Most Japanese people believe that Japan will undoubtedly stick to its 
non-nuclear-weapons position and abide by its Three-Non-Nuclear Principles.‖1407 
Hughes similarly held that ―Japanese policymaking opinion concerning nuclear 
option reflects and certainly has to take note of deeply embedded anti-nuclear 
feeling among the Japanese public…‖1408 Indeed the Japanese government could 
not simply overlook the extremely nuclear－sensitive public and this key factor was 
credible enough to create doubt ―whether Japan could really enter into the nuclear 
‗balance of terror‘ with enemy nations.‖ 1409  If these obstacles were not 
surmountable, the Japanese government would be self-deterred to convert its 
civilian nuclear and space programmes to the military nuclear weapons programme. 
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In this respect, Mochizuki is correct in that ―three factors have been particularly 
salient in determining Japan‘s policy toward nuclear weapons: national identity as 
a peace state, commitment to the global non-proliferation regime, and realistic 
security calculation including the alliance with the United States.‖1410 Similarly, 
some US officials working on non-nuclear proliferation issues viewed that Japan‘s 
technological capacity to produce its indigenous nuclear weapons was 
unquestionable while they also recognise that a combination of four factors would 
determine the course of the Japanese nuclear programme. These were (1) public 
support for rearmament including nuclear weapons (2) the level of the development 
of Chinese nuclear weapons programme (3) the emergence of further nuclear states 
in Asia (4) the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella.1411   
 After all, Japan had to overcome both domestic and international obstacles. 
This is not necessarily to deny that Japan was capable of producing nuclear 
weapons. Especially now that North Korea is a nuclear power, no one could doubt 
that Japan could have been a nuclear power too. Jacques Hymans, a renowned 
nuclear proliferation analyst, rightly pointed out that ―when the nuclear 
policymaking arena contains a large number of entrenched veto players, they all 
need to agree before a nuclear weapons project can be set in motion.‖ He went on to 
claim that ―ever since the 1950s…the country‘s traditional nuclear policy 
orientation has become extremely difficult to change- and next to impossible to 
change quickly or quietly.‖1412 Moreover, based on his actual experience in making 
political decisions Kissinger argued that his critics totally overlooked the 
complexity of ―the pluralistic political system of a democratic ally, in which national 
leaders could not dominate the decision-making as in a dictatorship.‖1413  
 With these barriers in mind, it is difficult to conclude that Japan actually 
had the potential or the reliable nuclear hedging option in the time period this 
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thesis covers. Given the complex issues discussed above, as a viable strategy Japan 
had to rely on the US nuclear umbrella for its security against the regional nuclear 
threats. Since Japan ratified the NPT in 1976, Japan in fact has opposed 
resolutions demanding world-wide nuclear disarmament at the UN not least when 
the USA is against them. Strikingly, the average approval rate for the UN 
resolutions related to nuclear disarmament over the last 50 years is 55 percent.1414 
Considering Japan‘s disastrous experience with nuclear weapons, it would have 
been natural to assume that Japan would have spearheaded those resolutions. In 
reality, Japan recently even boycotted the negotiations on the Nuclear Weapon Ban 
Treaty, which the USA, needless to say, did not take part in either.1415 Why has 
Japan followed and supported the USA at the UN? The principal rationale behind 
has been that Japan is under the US nuclear umbrella and Japan does not want to 
poke holes the umbrella. A retired diplomat and a former arms reduction 
representative of Japan, Mitsuro Donowaki, suggested that so long as Japan is 
under the US nuclear protection, Japan‘s choices must be in favour of 
American‘s.1416 He also called the nuclear umbrella a ―necessary evil‖ not least 
because Japan‘s security relied heavily on the USA and also the reality of world 
politics was unpredictable.1417 In this connection, it is worth noting that Japan is a 
strong opponent of the policy of ―Non-First-Use.‖ Japanese policy makers hold ―a 
belief that adopting no first use would weaken the perceived American commitment 
to Japan‘s defence.‖1418 
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Conclusion  
 
    Notwithstanding Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment, it was imperative for 
those in charge of the formulation of Japan‘s national security strategy to explore 
the desirability and feasibility of Japan‘s acquisition of an independent nuclear 
deterrent in the wake of the first Chinese nuclear test. In other words, the impact of 
the test on their perceptions of the security environment in the Far East was 
enormous. This is clear because the secret studies in the 1960s were carried out by 
the initiatives of Japanese themselves. Sato emphasized that a nuclear China was a 
mad man with a knife. Interestingly enough though, they all reached the same 
conclusion: Japan‘s nuclear option was not worthwhile; instead, Japan should 
continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Several considerations against the 
nuclear option were identified: deterioration of Japan‘s international standing, 
great diplomatic and economic costs, Japanese geographical particularities and 
public opinion. After all, the Japanese policy makers could not be indifferent to 
pervasive anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. For defence-minded officials, it was 
completely logical to consider raising public awareness of self-defence to increase 
Japanese security. In reality this political condition has not changed much since the 
1960s. 
    In contrast to what foreign analysts estimated, Japan would not obtain 
nuclear weapons in a short period of time. To be sure, Japan would eventually 
succeed in building its indigenous nuclear weapons purely theoretically. This would 
not come easily and cheaply, however. There were stumbling blocks even including a 
technological difficulty on the way of the successful nuclear weapons programme. 
The Japanese government as a whole did not have any strong intention to acquire 
nuclear weapons. To maintain a technological capability for the production of 
nuclear weapons was one thing, and to possess firm political determination to build 
nuclear weapons was another. Moreover, technological influence on 
strategy-making depends heavily on how strategy makers interpret the technology 
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for strategic use. Gray lucidly accounted for this aspect: ―A weapon can be no more 
effective than the person who uses it. Technology is important, but in war and 
strategy people matter most.‖1419 Whether Japan carefully chose a nuclear-hedging 
option is not empirically provable. In the meantime, it is not deniable that some 
political leaders shared the same idea and promoted the civilian nuclear and space 
programme in case of an emergency. Such calculation might have been made in 
isolation from Japanese scientists. Rather it could have been pure strategic 
consideration. All things considered, US END was still the best but only option 
available to Japan, and successive Japanese governments agreed.     
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion: Long Peace or War Avoidance 
 
 
 Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In 
a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the 
risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. 
―Barack Obama1420 
 
It is inconceivable that we could ever become, even if we wanted to, a military 
power capable of attacking our neighbors, to say nothing of carrying war far down 
beyond the equator. There is no menace from Japan. 
―Shigeru Yoshida1421 
 
 Ultimately, this thesis has examined the formative period of ―Invisible‖ 
END over Japan between 1945 and 1970. When it comes to nuclear issues in Japan, 
a nuclear allergy always dominated public debates that reached a dead end. When 
making a strategy, the Japanese leaders carefully took into account a series of 
historical and emotional factors. As strategy analyst John Garnett lucidly explained, 
―Not that international situation is irrelevant; but internal factors are at least as 
important because policymakers spend as much time looking behind them as they 
do in front of them, and any adequate explanation of defense policy must take this 
into account.‖1422 This was clearly true to the Japanese case. 
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  The thesis has elaborated upon exactly how a post-war antimilitary and 
antinuclear norm clearly marked by the embrace of Article 9 and shaped by Japan‘s 
unique historical encounter with the three atomic bombings including the Lucky 
Dragon incident had an influence in making Japan‘s defence strategy.  These in 
turn paved the non-military-cum-nuclear path. Of course Japan‘s non-nuclear path 
is well known. Yet the thesis has highlighted clear divergent views between 
American and Japanese political leaders and even the Japanese leaders and the 
Japanese public. Until March 1954 (the Lucky Dragon incident), initially Japanese 
anti-nuclear sentiment were interestingly not so obvious. By then, it had already 
existed but it had been dormant like Godzilla was suddenly awoken by the 
American thermonuclear test in 1954. Japan faced nuclear dangers again. Despite 
Japanese anti-nuclear feelings, American leaders sought to deploy nuclear weapons 
on the mainland of Japan on the basis of their military logic. As we have seen, the 
Japanese leaders in the 1950s and 1960s understood the strategic importance of 
nuclear deterrence for Japan‘s security. In the face of the socio-cultural constraint, 
what the Japanese leaders could realistically do against regional nuclear threats 
was, however, to strengthen security ties with the USA.  
 On the one hand, in the 1950s the Eisenhower administration attempted to 
place newly available tactical nuclear weapons in Japan as part of its grand 
strategy ―New Look‖ and the US military was crystal clear about its stance on the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into the mainland of Japan to enhance local 
defence capabilities. To rephrase Laird, US forces in Japan could not be there naked.   
On the other hand, the Japanese government was required to refuse such a 
controversial plan in the face of a severe backlash against the deployment of Honest 
John missiles in Japan. The missile deployment provoked a more severe backlash 
than the Hatoyama administration expected, forcing Foreign Minister Shigemitsu 
to lie about the existence of mutual understanding of non-deployment of nuclear 
weapons with the US government. Then Prime Minister Hatoyama probably 
underestimated Japanese anti-nuclear feelings. Godzilla was already awoken. The 
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US military too completely underestimated fervent Japanese anti-nuclear 
sentiment and got a backlash. Having understood the difficulty of the deployment of 
nuclear weapons in the mainland of Japan, the US government used Okinawa as a 
nuclear base.  
 Remarkably it took nearly twenty years after the outset of the nuclear age 
for a Japanese leader to elicit a verbal nuclear assurance to Japan from the US 
leader. As a direct result of the China‘s first nuclear test of 1964 coincident with the 
emergence of the more defence-minded Sato administration, ―Invisible‖ US END 
became explicit. Yet Japan had to undergo some acute domestic political debates 
between January 1965 and January 1968 to officially and publically acknowledge 
that Japan was now under the US nuclear umbrella. To remind ourselves the first 
research question of the thesis is:  
 
 Under what circumstances did Japan come under the US nuclear 
umbrella?  
 
 As the thesis reveals, it is impossible to specify or pinpoint the date. Japan came 
under the US nuclear umbrella during one consecutive period between January 
1965 and January 1968 on the grounds that it was in this period that Japan finally 
explicitly recognised and then officially and publicly accepted the importance of US 
END for Japan‘s security. Prime Minister Sato was well aware of two things 
important for a balanced strategy: nuclear deterrence and making allowance for 
public opinion. Sato found nuclear weapons vital for national security vis-à-vis a 
nuclear China. Considering that Japan‘s nuclear option was not politically feasible, 
what Sato realistically could do was to seek a US nuclear assurance and thus US 
END. Interestingly as the Sato-McNamara meeting in January 1965 illustrates, 
this deterrent form was invisible－sea-based deterrent. This invisible form was a 
product of Sato‘s political compromise. Like his predecessors, he could not accept 
the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan. Sato still sought US END deemed 
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vital for Japan‘s security but it was inevitably an invisible form. In connection to 
Japan‘s understanding of US END, it is also important to discuss Japan‘s nuclear 
option (nuclear path).  
 While the Eisenhower government in the 1950s was relaxed about and even 
willing to share nuclear weapons with close US allies, the Johnson administration 
in the 1960s started to be more concern about nuclear proliferation in the wake of a 
nuclear China. President Johnson was committed to the NPT and succeeded in 
concluding the treaty in July 1968. While it is true that Japan had already decided 
to rely on ―Invisible‖ US END by July 1968, the NPT internationally foreclosed the 
Japan‘s nuclear path. Partially beset by the development of Chinese nuclear 
capabilities, Japanese officials were somewhat reluctant to sign the treaty although 
they did sign the treaty in 1970. 
  In view of this Japanese concern, it was no surprise that some officials 
insisted that Japan maintain the technological potential or foundation to produce 
nuclear weapons in a short period of time in case of emergency. Such a contingency 
measure sounds reasonable and feasible given that Japan is a technologically 
advanced country. In reality, however, it was quite uncertain that Japan had an 
immediate technological capability to produce its indigenous nuclear weapons 
promptly in the late 1960s. As the thesis reveals, there were some technical hurdles 
for the production of indigenous nuclear weapons in the 1960s. This did not mean 
that they could not be surmountable. Yet it would have taken longer than Western 
analysts estimated. More importantly, it was uncertain that to what extent 
Japanese nuclear scientists were willing to develop Japan‘s nuclear weapons. All 
things considered, the technological potential option was not a reliable option. If it 
was not reliable, it could not be taken as strategic option.  
   From the US strategic point of view, as this thesis elaborates, it was 
desirable for Japan to accept the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan for 
regional defence. The US government could have exerted more pressure on the 
Japanese government to accept the deployment of nuclear arsenals. Or in the 1950s 
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before the Japanese government had no veto over ―major changes in the military 
equipment", the US government could have technically introduced nuclear weapons 
onto the mainland of Japan. In each key event such as the Honest John Deployment, 
the revision of the new treaty, the treatment of nuclear weapons in the Bonin and 
the Ryukyu Islands, to some extent the US government compromised. It also 
prioritised its diplomatic ties with Japan and Japan‘s domestic political stability 
over its ultimate demands of Japan‘s rearmament. The Japanese public was not 
ready to assume more responsibility for regional defence. The issue of Japan‘s 
responsibility for regional defence continues to be a matter of debate even today.  
 That being said, if we look at the secret nuclear agreement between Sato 
and Nixon in 1969, the reintroduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan in the 
event of contingency could have occurred. One may be doubtful whether Japan is 
truly protected by ―Invisible‖ END. What makes ―Visible‖ END distinct from 
―Invisible‖ END is the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons in host nations, 
and these nuclear weapons are jointly operated under nuclear sharing 
arrangements. The 2018 Brussels summit declaration, for instance, posits that 
―NATO‘s nuclear deterrence posture also relies on United State‘s nuclear weapons 
forward-deployed in Europe.‖1423 Under the nuclear sharing arrangements there is 
a strong sense of burden sharing in ―Visible‖ END. The same thing cannot be said of 
the case of ―Invisible‖ END. 
 Be that as it may, as the Japanese public never allowed Japan to go nuclear, 
Japanese policy makers had to seek a way to protect the country from regional 
nuclear threats and major invasions.1424 To reiterate the key point, ―Invisible‖ US 
END is a product of compromise for Japan. Having reached the agreement with the 
US government on reversion of Okinawa in 1969, ―invisible END‖ came to 
completion in 1972 when Okinawa was legally restored to Japan. Since then, actual 
wording of US nuclear deterrence for Japan‘s defence has become more explicit and 
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evident. The first clear public reference to the importance of US nuclear deterrence 
for Japan‘s security was indeed found in an official Japanese government document 
in 1972. The Defence Buildup Plan for the next five years posited that ―Japan will 
rely on US nuclear deterrence against nuclear threats to Japan.‖1425  Furthermore, 
the joint announcement delivered to the press following the Japan-US summit 
meeting publicly employed the words: nuclear deterrent for the first time in 1975. It 
proclaimed that 
 
The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States has 
greatly contributed to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and is 
an indispensable element of the basic international political structure in Asia, and 
that the continued maintenance of the Treaty serves the long-term interests of both 
countries. Further, they recognized the US nuclear deterrent is an important 
contributor to the security of Japan. In this connection, the President reassured the 
Prime Minister that the United States would continue to abide by its defense 
commitment to Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in the 
event of armed attack against Japan, whether by nuclear or conventional forces.1426  
 
While it directly referred to the nuclear deterrent, the most basic message was not 
different from previous statements such as the joint statement of 1965. It claimed 
that the USA would stand by to ―defend Japan against any armed attack from the 
outside.‖ 1427 In other words, since 1965 it has become a recurrent ritual for the two 
                                                   
1425 ―Dai Yoji Gokanen Keikaku no Sakuteini Saishiteno Josei Handan oyobi Boeino Koso (Showa 
Yonjunana Nen Jugatu Kokonoka Kakugi Kettei) ‖ [The Analysis of the Current World Situation and 
Defence Concepts for the Fourth Defence Build up Plan For the Next Five Years, approved by the 
Cabinet on 9 October 1972] in Boei cho: Showa 51 Nenban Boei Hakusho [Defence White Paper, 1976], 
available at http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1976/w1976_9106.html, accessed on 4 
November 2018. 
1426 Emphasis added. The World and Japan Database: ―Japan-U.S. Joint Announcement to the Press 
(by Prime Minister Takeo Miki and President Gerald R. Ford)‖, 6 August 1975, 
http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19750806.O1E.html, accessed on 4 November 2018. 
1427 Text of Joint Communiqué Between President Lyndon B. Johnson and His Excellency Eisaku Sato, 
Prime Minister of Japan Following Talks in Washington, January 12 and 13, 1965 
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governments to reconfirm US nuclear assurance to Japan.1428 This invisible form of 
US END remains unchanged even today. Thus, this time period is doubtlessly a key 
to understanding the nature of US END over Japan.  
 Moreover, the thesis makes three key contributions to the field of IR and 
Strategic Studies broadly and the deterrence literature more specifically. First it 
theorises ―Invisible‖ US END built on both empirical historical analysis and 
deterrence literature. It provides both a novel theoretical and empirical insight into 
the invisibility of US END. As already noted, a historical study on NATO‘s case or 
―Visible‖ END is well studied. A systematic study on ―Visible‖ and ―Invisible‖ is, 
however, still missing. Such a study is still needed to identify the true nature of US 
END. The thesis nevertheless adds the other half solid account of US END to 
deterrence literature. 
Second, the thesis empirically reveals how a socio-cultural factor (Japanese 
nuclear mentalities) shaped Japan‘s defence strategy. There were some policy 
makers in both the US and Japanese government who saw strategic value in the 
deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan but after all they could not simply 
ignore Japanese public opinion severely against such an operation. It therefore 
empirically explains why Japan was the rare exception of close US allies which 
became nuclearised: one of the most important US allies located in a strategic 
location but it never hosted US allies. In other words, Japan‘s strategic preferences 
cannot be explained by focusing solely on external threats and pure military logic. 
This leads to the final point.  
Third, the thesis empirically debunks the main assumption of IR Realists: a 
rational uniform actor who is cautious of external threats and seeks security and 
power in the world of anarchy and self help. It proves that domestic beliefs matter a 
                                                   
1428 In February 2017 President Trump reconfirmed US security commitments to Japan. The Joint 
Statement released following the first official meeting declared that ―The U.S. commitment to defend 
Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional is 
unwavering.‖ See Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
10 February 2017, the White House, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-prime-mi
nister-shinzo-abe/, accessed on 4 November 2018. 
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great deal and Japan holds unique strategic preferences that are quite distinct from 
the assumption of IR Realism. After the end of the Cold War, IR realists such as 
Kenneth Waltz and Christopher Layne argued that Japan would acquire nuclear 
weapons for its security because Japan was completely surrounded by regional 
nuclear powers. Yet as this thesis shows Japan‘s non-nuclear path is firmly 
established. Behind their contention, apart from external nuclear threats they 
viewed that Japan had an economic and technological capacity to develop its own 
nuclear weapons.1429 In this respect, some Western analysts too regarded Japan as 
a latent nuclear state although their argument is not fully supported by empirical 
evidence. Yet this might have been somewhat inevitable as primary sources have 
been classified until quite recently and English literature on the subject has been 
scare. To be sure it is true that Japan could technically build its indigenous nuclear 
weapons. Yet this does not automatically mean that Japan could go nuclear rapidly. 
There are many practical hurdles that could delay the Japan‘s nuclear weapons 
programme. This was particularly so in the 1960s as we have seen. According to 
empirical evidence elaborated in this chapter, it is safe to say that Japan at least in 
the 1960s could not have produced nuclear weapons in a short period of time. Japan 
had neither political will nor the immediate technological capacity.   
 
The Strategic Logic Behind ―Invisible‖ END.   
    
 Having answered the first research question in the previous section, this 
thesis will address and answer the second research question: 
 
What factors have shaped invisible extended nuclear deterrence?  
 
                                                   
1429 Christopher Layne: ―The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise‖, International 
Security Vol. 17 No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; Waltz, ―The Emerging Structure of International 
Politics‖, pp. 5-41; Kenneth N. Waltz: ―Structural Realism after the Cold War‖, International Security 
Vol. 45 No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41. See also Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate. 
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In the end, no US government has so far placed nuclear weapons on the mainland of 
Japan. The USA also removed its nuclear weapons from Okinawa by 1972.This did 
not necessarily mean that key Japanese decision makers such as Kishi, Ikeda and 
Sato underestimated more visible nuclear deterrence or even an independent 
nuclear deterrent. This thesis has shown that Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment 
mattered greatly and established the non-nuclear path, but this was not the sole 
factor to shape ―Invisible‖ US END over Japan. If the actual decision makers such 
as Sato had completely supported the path, he would not have even requested 
President Johnson for an American nuclear assurance to Japan. There were also 
other key factors (Economy, Geography, Technology, and Nuclear Mentalities) to 
shape ―Invisible‖ END. It is important to stress that the interaction of these factors 
in turn shapes ―Invisible‖ END. As Clausewitz warned us, there are certain factors 
in the formulation of strategy and they function interconnectively: ―It would…be 
disastrous to try to develop our understanding of strategy by analyzing these factors 
in isolation.‖1430  
 Economy. While he was the leader most favourable to nuclear weapons, 
Sato was also a pupil of Yoshida. Although he was personally determined to raise 
public awareness of defence issues, he actually did not raise defence spending (see 
IV. Figure: Military Expenditure). Even today, the Japanese defence budget is only 
around 1 % of its GDP. If we look at the political reality, even Sato‘s security policy 
was still in line with the Yoshida line. Although Yoshida was not necessarily 
opposed to rearmament when Japan‘s economy was recovered, his successors did 
not change the course and the constitution. What this tells us is that Japan‘s 
post-war path was clearly not military but economic. Since rearmament or a major 
military buildup programme was unpopular and was considered to hinder Japan‘s 
economic recovery, the Japanese government prioritised economic developments. 
Behind this political priority, there also was an evident public mood of a war and 
military aversion. Since the end of devastating war, they did not want to think 
                                                   
1430 Clausewitz, On War, p. 183. 
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about war any longer and it was understood that their future lay in economy. 
Although the economic factor did not directly shape ―Invisible‖ END, it still shows 
the domestic context where Japan‘s defence strategy was made. Given that defence 
issues were not popular and the Japanese public was clearly averse to the military, 
nuclear weapons were never welcome in Japan.   
 Geography/ Technology. While geography and technology are two distinct 
factors, they were closely interactive and interconnected when it came to shaping 
―Invisible‖ END. Therefore, it is important to discuss the two factors together but 
not in isolation. Technology coupled with geography certainly has an impact on 
strategy considering what technology has enabled: overcoming physical distance 
and terrain.1431 
 At the beginning of US occupation, the USA came to Japan with a view to 
demilitarising and democratizing Japan so that Japan could no longer pose any 
threat to the USA. Indeed the USA successfully achieved these two occupation goals 
by 1950. As a consequence of the defeat of the Republic of China in the Chinese Civil 
War in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War, the US occupation policy had to be 
reversed. After complete disarmament Japan had to be rearmed so that Japan could 
closely work with the USA to contain the further spread of communism in the Far 
East. It is important to note that the US government especially in the 1950s wanted 
a stronger Japan even equipped with US tactical nuclear weapons. This was mainly 
because Japan is located in close proximity to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, China 
and the Soviet Union. In other words, Japan was regarded as a US strategic outpost 
in the Far East. US military bases were, for instance, heavily used during the 
Korean War. Moreover, initially the flying range of strategic bombers such as B-29s 
and B-47s until the introduction of B-52 in 1955 was so limited that operationally 
these earlier types of bombers could only carry out nuclear strikes against the 
Soviet Union from its peripheral areas and Japan was situated in such a key 
                                                   
1431 Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 40; Strachan, The Direction of War, pp.191-192; William Walker: A 
perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order (London: Routhledge., 2012), p. 61. 
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location.  
 In this regard, it was militarily logical for the US government to deploy 
nuclear weapons in case of the renewal hostilities on the Korean Peninsula or some 
contingency in the Far East. The US military clearly recognised the strategic 
importance of Japan and there was no question that it wanted to introduce nuclear 
weapons on the mainland of Japan due to its strategic location. Moreover, nuclear 
weapons were also needed to be deployed in Japan in order to defend US forces in 
Japan. Indeed the US government made an attempt to deploy nuclear weapons in 
Japan (e.g. Honest John missile deployment in 1955) but it completely foundered on 
Japanese resistance.  
 It is worth noting that the US military deployed its nuclear weapons in the 
other US allied countries in the region such as South Korea and Taiwan. In fact 
Japan was the only America‘s regional allied state that did not host US nuclear 
weapons.1432 Aware of the importance of the introduction of nuclear weapons onto 
the mainland of Japan, in the 1950s and 1960s both the US and the Japanese 
governments attempted to cure Japan‘s nuclear allergy through nuclear education 
(the Atoms for Peace Programme and port call visits of nuclear-powered naval 
vessels) in the hope that the Japanese public would eventually accept the 
deployment of US nuclear weapons. Yet this public attempt through nuclear 
education did not succeed either. Instead, the US government deployed nuclear 
weapons in the Bonin Islands and mainly the Ryukyu Islands, which were under 
US control. For Japanese policy makers, following a severe backlash against the 
Honest John missile development of 1955, it became nearly politically impossible to 
accept US nuclear weapons on Japan‘s soil. That said, they still needed and indeed 
sought American nuclear assurances to Japan especially China became the first 
Asian nuclear power in 1964. It is notable that American security protection of 
Japan had to be provided in the form of invisibility. As both the US and Japanese 
                                                   
1432 See for example, Norris, Arkin and Burr, ―Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?‖, pp. 
11-13, 78-79. 
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governments were clearly aware of Japan‘s nuclear allergy, US END over Japan 
became invisible. While it is true that the geographical location of Japan was key for 
US grand strategy, the nature of Japan‘s geography is maritime (in comparison to 
another key strategic location such as West Germany). This Japanese geographical 
feature was crucial when it came to the emergence of ―Invisible‖ END. As the 
Sato-McNamara discussion in January 1965 revealed, Sato sought the US nuclear 
umbrella, but he stressed that Japan did not want the deployment of American 
nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan. Instead, Sato asked McNamara for 
deterrence at sea (Invisible END). At the time, it was not particularly clear exactly 
what constituted deterrence at sea. As US-Japan negotiations over reversion of 
Okinawa progressed, it became evident that Japan sought American protection by 
Polaris nuclear submarines operated in the middle of the (Pacific) ocean.  
 The extent to which technology changes strategies is a matter of vigorous 
debate. 1433 The technological dimension of strategies especially with respect to 
nuclear strategy was nevertheless more influential than ever before, ranging from 
bomber-delivered free fall bombs to submarine-launched missiles. 1434 Major 
technological developments of strategic missiles, particularly the introduction of 
SLBMs, changed strategic calculations of both American strategists and Japanese 
political leaders. Even though the US military still demanded the continued 
forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Okinawa, both countries‘ practitioners 
observed that forward-deployed nuclear weapons could be replaced by SLBMs. In 
fact already in the early 1960s Regulus missiles in the Bonin Islands were removed 
based in part on the logic that the newly introduced Polaris missiles would render 
the forward deployment of the older generation of the missiles unnecessary in the 
Bonins. More specifically, to echo Albert Wohlstetter, US nuclear forces in the late 
                                                   
1433 See for example Stephen Biddle: ―The Gulf War Debate Redux‖, International Security Vol.22 
No.2 (Fall 1997), pp. 163-174, Christopher Coker: Can War Be Eliminated? (Cambridge: Polity Press., 
2014), pp. 34-52; Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, pp. 153-184; Freedman, The Future of War:, p.xviii; 
Howard: ―The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy‖, pp. 970-980 and Strachan, The Direction of War, 
pp.166-192. 
1434 Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 74; Rosenberg, ―The Origins of Overkill‖, p.10; Snyder, 
Deterrence and Defense, p.8; Strachan, The Direction of War, p.187; Payne, Deterrence in the Second 
Nuclear Age, p. xi; Walker, A perpetual Menace, p. 62. 
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1960s already constituted strategic missiles that could be launched from the US 
mainland and ―ocean areas to distant targets.‖ 1435  Japanese policy makers 
including Wakaizumi agreed upon this point and they believed that Polaris could 
replace forward-deployed nuclear weapons (i.e. Mace B) in Okinawa.  
 To be sure, it was desirable for the US military to keep American nuclear 
weapons stationed in Okinawa even after the return of Okinawa to Japan. Although 
it was in favour of maintaining nuclear weapons in Okinawa, even the JCS was 
confident that SLBMs would render forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Okinawa 
unnecessary. This, however, did not mean that the new missile technology canceled 
differences among the geographical environments (land, sea and air). Indeed the 
nuclear ―triad‖ (bomber, ICBM, SLBM) represents three distinct geographical 
dimensions: air, ground, and sea respectively. 1436 Both Japanese and American 
policy makers applied the new technology to one geographical dimension: sea. As 
Gray plausibly explained, geography is not wholly determinative but it ―typically 
provides the necessary explanation for why particular defence choices are made.‖1437 
Gray even insisted that ―That technology has cancelled geography contains just enough 
merit to be called a plausible fallacy.‖1438 In view of the maritime nature of Japan and 
the very low likelihood of a bolt out of the blue attack by the Soviet Union or China 
against Japan, sea-based deterrence backed by ballistic missile submarines was 
probably a logical solution. This was also what Japanese strategists considered to 
be suitable for Japan. 
 Based in part on this broad strategic calculation along with other various 
reasons, Okinawa was returned to Japan without any forward-deployed nuclear 
weapons. Thus, Japan completely relied on the invisible form of US END. While it is 
true that the completion of ―Invisible‖ END was enabled by the newly available 
technology (SLBMs) and Japan‘s unique geographical features (maritime), the 
                                                   
1435 Emphasis added. Seconds Agenda Topic, Place of Okinawa Return of Administrative Rights and 
U.S. Bases, by Albert Wohlstetter, Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference January 1969. 
1436 Gray, ―The Continued Primacy of Geography‖, p. 257; idem, ―Inescapable Geography‖, p. 174. 
1437 Gray, The Future of Strategy, p. 84. 
1438 Colin S. Gray: ―The Continued Primacy of Geography‖, Orbis Vol. 40 No. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 251 
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strategic calculation behind ―Invisible‖ END was significantly influenced by 
political consideration for Japan‘s nuclear allergy, which did not allow any forward 
deployment of nuclear weapons on Japan‘s soil. As Gray stressed, ―All knowledge is 
local knowledge, all policy is made domestically, and every maker of policy and 
strategy has been encultured by a particular tradition and society.‖1439 In other 
words, a final product, strategy, is a reflection of local contexts where strategy is 
ultimately made.  
 Nuclear Mentalities. Each key nuclear－related event in Japan such as the 
deployment of Honest John and the Enterprise‘s port call at Sasebo, the Japanese 
public was severely opposed to weapons that were closely related to nuclear bombs 
although they were technically not nuclear weapons by themselves. As the thesis 
has revealed, despite the public anti-nuclear sentiment, some key Japanese political 
leaders and Japanese elites did not necessarily share Japanese nuclear allergic 
reactions to nuclear weapons. Sato in particular saw strategic values in Japanese 
indigenous nuclear weapons. He was personally convinced that nuclear deterrence 
was vital for Japan‘s security. He personally hoped that the younger generation who 
did not have direct experience in the war could be educated so that the future 
Japanese would eventually have more objective attitudes toward Japan‘s defence. 
Yet this was his optimistic observation. Like his predecessors, he simply could not 
afford to ignore public opinion. As a defence-minded leader, he still successfully 
elicited the Johnson administration‘s nuclear assurance to Japan. ―Invisible‖ US 
END over Japan was a product of compromise for Sato. For the Johnson 
administration, nuclear proliferation became one of the most impending global 
issues in the wake of a nuclear China. The provision of the US nuclear umbrella to 
Japan was a practical solution to prevent Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons.   
    The complete defeat of Japan symbolized by the two atomic weapons 
dropped on Japan was a major turning point for Japan and even in Japanese history. 
Japanese nuclear mentalities can be simply described as mentalities of ―never 
                                                   
1439 Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, p.61. 
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again‖, a postwar norm of a war aversion: fervent anti-military and anti-nuclear 
sentiments. The national consensus of postwar Japan was that ―we never ever want 
another war.‖ The last war was devastating and traumatic enough for the Japanese. 
This emotional reaction was natural and probably inevitable.  
 As already noted, Japan could have built a full-fledged army and arguably 
introduced even nuclear sharing arrangements similar to NATO‘s given the fact 
that US grand strategy sought to build up a stronger Japan closely aligned with the 
USA. Japan was expected to play a key role in combating communism in the Far 
East.     
 Ultimately, it was a Japanese choice to make slow progress in rearmament. 
Historical memories of World War Two were still vivid especially in the late 1940s 
and the 1950s. Indeed most Japanese people including the decision makers were not 
prepared to take a ―reverse course‖ so that Japan could actively contain communism 
in the Far East with the USA. This reluctant posture incited the ire of the US 
government although the American leaders had to accept the reality as they were 
the one who imposed several stumbling blocks on Japan. The introduction of the 
peace constitution was an ultimate American strategic mistake as Nixon lamented. 
It virtually thwarted the US strategic plan to increase Japan‘s defence capabilities 
to the level the US government wanted (e.g. 10 Army divisions and the deployment 
of US tactical nuclear weapons in the mainland of Japan.)  
    Between the 1950s and 1970s Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment was shaped 
and even embodied in actual policies including ―Three Non-Nuclear Policies‖ and a 
―Nuclear-Free‖ Okinawa. That Japan sought US ―Invisible END‖ in the 1960s could 
also be a consequence of Japan‘s anti-nuclear sentiment. As Japan insulated itself 
from nuclear weapons because of its unique historical experiences of atomic 
bombing, Japan also created public apathy about its own security. War has become 
somebody else‘s problem for postwar Japan. It has become a norm for the Japanese 
to rely on the USA for Japan‘s defence even though there is no automatic guarantee 
that the American will do so. 
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   Had it not been for Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Daigo Fukuryumaru, the 
Japanese would not have been extremely sensitive and emotional about the 
treatment of nuclear weapons. That said, it is not correct to conclude that this 
non-material factor alone led to the creation of ―Invisible‖ END. Material factors 
such as geography and technology were decisive as well. It can be argued that 
looking out for culture is important but it does not explain everything any more 
than does geography, or technology by itself. The cultural approach is of particular 
use and value when employed with other explanatory factors including material 
variables.1440 Focusing on geography, Sloan cogently argued that ―Geography does 
not directly condition strategy; instead, it is refracted through prisms of culture and 
technology.‖1441 With this in mind, the answer to the second research question is 
that the combination and dynamic interaction of material and non-material factors 
in turn shaped ―Invisible‖ END. Without the distinct geographical features of Japan 
and the technological development of sea-launched ballistic missiles, both the US 
and the Japanese government would have made a totally different strategic 
calculation with respect to nuclear deterrence. 
 Having answered the research questions, it is important to discuss the 
nature of ―Invisible END.‖ The nature of ―Invisible‖ END can simply be surmised as 
―existential deterrence‖ in the invisible form of US deterrence provided to Japan by 
the oral assurance of American leaders. Since the US nuclear assurance to Japan 
was invisible (deterrence at sea), the nature of such deterrent form relies on 
ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in American military response and a crisis 
itself. So long as Japanese security against the hostile Japanese nuclear neighbours 
was left in the hands of American President‘s will to retaliate and even make a 
preemptive strike, this did not appear credible. This was especially so where US 
nuclear weapons were not physically deployed on the territory of its allies. The 
                                                   
1440 On this point see Michael C. Desch: ―Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security 
Studies‖, International Security Vol.23 No.1 (Summer 1998), pp. 169-170; Gray, Strategy and Politics, 
p. 107.  
1441 Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History, p. 25. 
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invisible form of assurance appears less credible as a deterrent. A Communist 
military aggression against Japan without provoking US nuclear retaliation might 
have been logical considerations. 
   That said, as elaborated previously, a would-be aggressor could not 
completely eliminate the possibility of an actual US military response including 
nuclear retaliation. The US government repeatedly declared that the US would 
protect Japan from all the forms of attack. It just did not specify exactly when, how 
and where it would use nuclear weapons to protect Japan (calculated ambiguity). 
This fact would complex the strategic calculation of the enemy. To some extent, it 
did not matter whether US would initially retaliate with nuclear weapons. Once a 
conflict erupted and escalated, the possibility of nuclear war always existed.  
 The political leaders of hostile nuclear powers had to be wary of what their 
military strike against Japan might set off. Once US forces in Japan were attacked 
and thus, the USA lost its strategic assets, this would be no longer a military 
confrontation between Japan and the enemy. Moreover, as discussed throughout the 
thesis, Japan is one of the key US strategic areas. If the USA did not act to protect 
its key strategic interest, it would completely lose its credibility and reputation as 
the leader of the West. Further escalation appeared inevitable in this regard. 
During the Cold War, there was no question that the final stage of escalation was 
all-out nuclear war. This prospect of nuclear war would prompt prudence and 
restraint of an opponent. In essence, the nature of ―invisible‖ END was founded on 
―existential deterrence‖: Purely theoretically, it can be argued that the prospect of 
nuclear escalation always exists as the USA would take a military response to 
protect Japan and its fellow American soldiers if they are attacked. Therefore, it can 
deter an enemy. Of course, the reality was much more complex.  
  In case of contingency, nevertheless, the US military could have 
technically reintroduced nuclear weapons into Okinawa although this secret 
agreement is no longer valid. In such a situation, they could have also been 
deployed to the mainland of Japan. To be sure, this is truly hypothetical but this 
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could apply even today. More realistically, a B-52 bomber (regardless of whether it is 
armed with nuclear weapons or not) could fly into Japan during a crisis. Japanese 
Air Self Defence could conduct an in-flight refueling mission for a B-52 and 
Japanese F-15s could guard the bomber if the former plan did not work out well. 
Indeed F-15s of Japan Air Self-Defence Force and a B-52 of the US Air Force 
conducted a joint military exercise in the sky above the Japanese sea in July 
2018.1442  
 Essentially ―Invisible‖ US END over Japan has been a cornerstone of 
Japanese security policy since Japan accepted it in the 1960s. One can argue that 
memories of war and Hiroshima and Nagasaki are fading away. That is probably 
true, but public indifference to defence issues remains strong today. What is distinct 
from the Cold War context to the today‘s context is that the security landscape of 
East Asia is increasingly complex and volatile with the rise of China, which also 
modernized its nuclear forces, and North Korea as a nuclear power. The key 
question is whether Japan will seek a more visible form of US END to deal with the 
new security challenges at its own initiative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1442 ―Kuuji Kaku Tosaigata Bakugekiki to Kyodo Kunren Kitachosen he no Keikai Taisei Kenji‖, 
Sankei Shimbun, 28 July 2018, 
https://www.sankei.com/photo/story/news/180728/sty1807280008-n1.html, accessed on 24 January 
2019. 
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I.C. Map: Estimate of Global Nuclear Weapons in January 2018 (SIPRI Year Book 
2018) 
Source: SIPRI Year Book 2018, SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/2018-june,accessed 30 
January 2019. 
III.G Table: Estimate of Global Nuclear Weapons in January 2018 (SIPRI Year Book 2018) 
 
Source: SIPRI Year Book 2018, SIPRI, 
https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/modernization-nuclear-weapons-continues-number-pe
acekeepers-declines-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now,accessed 30 January 2019. 
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What Does Japanese Nuclear History Tell US About Current Japan? 
 
   The main approach of this thesis is to employ history as a tool to 
understand the present. There are several key things the Japanese nuclear history 
covered in this thesis can help us understand about Japan‘s strategic preferences 
today. Surprisingly some key features of the foregoing period that shaped Japanese 
strategic preferences remain unchanged. Nearly fifty years ago Sato held that the 
Japanese public was not ready for an independent nuclear deterrent option ―but 
would have to be educated to this point, and he felt younger generation showed 
hopeful signs of going this way.‖ Sato also insisted that ―[the] constitution must be 
revised, though time not yet ripe for this.‖1443 Probably current Japanese political 
leaders can make exactly the same statement. In other words, the domestic 
condition of Japan for making a defence strategy is not fundamentally different 
from the time of Sato. To be sure, there are many more people who did not 
experience the war, and younger generations do not even know what 9/11 is. That 
being said, the non-military-cum-nuclear path is already established and 
self-reinforced. Once this path is well established, the younger generations will 
likely follow the path too as they grow up within the path.     
 What does this continuity tell us about current Japan and its likely security 
path? To be sure, the current security environment is quite different from the Cold 
War situation. Now North Korea, for example, joins the nuclear club. This means 
Japan is even more or completely surrounded by the nuclear neighbours. In fact, six 
out of the nine nuclear states are situated in the Asia-Pacific region.  
 That being said, it is important to note that nuclear threats from a rogue 
state (North Korea) are nothing new. China was not only the first regional but also 
global ―rogue‖ state. 1444 In the words of political scientist Francis Gavin, ―China 
was in many ways the original rogue state. Veering between the ironclad rule of 
                                                   
1443 Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 29 December 1964, NSF, 
Country File, Japan , Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.  
1444 Gavin, ―Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War‖, p. 402. 
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Mao Zedong and the anarchy of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, China‘s successful program to develop 
its own atomic weapons worried its neighbours and both Cold War superpowers.‖1445 
According to Japanese nuclear history, Japan lived with China under the US 
nuclear umbrella. In the 1960s, China was a purely nuclear threat to Japan. The 
exactly same thing can be said of a nuclear North Korea. Given its limited 
conventional capability it poses a purely nuclear threat to Japan. In the 1960s 
Japan‘s choice was to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. What about this time? Given 
that the non-nuclear path is firm in Japan, it is not a realistic idea for Japan to 
pursue an independent nuclear deterrent. Against this backdrop, IR Realists will 
probably suggest that the US nuclear umbrella is no longer credible and if Japan 
cannot have nuclear weapons, it should still build up its conventional capabilities by 
increasing defence spending. This is easier said than done. As we have seen, Japan 
has never had a major defence build-up but a slow and moderate programme of 
increasing defence capabilities. To some extent, Japan still continues to keep the 
Yoshida line at least in terms of the low military budget.  
 Alternatively, one might recommend that as President Eisenhower and 
Prime Minister Sato attempted, the present political leaders should raise Japanese 
public awareness of defence issues including nuclear deterrence. It did not succeed 
in the past and it is questionable that if it will work this time. Given the 
non-military-cum-nuclear path is strong and institutionalized, a drastic shift is 
unlikely. While Japanese policy makers are clearly aware of the nuclear threat of 
North Korea, ordinary Japanese do not share the same threat perception as in the 
1960s. The latest Japanese Defence White Paper in August 2018 observed that the 
level of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme now poses ―the gravest and 
most impending danger ever.‖1446 If North Korea continued ―Nuclear Brinkmanship‖ 
or missile tests against the Japanese sea, the Japanese public would feel constantly 
                                                   
1445 Ibid., p. 402. 
1446 Heisei 30 Nen Ban Nihon no Bouei: Bouei Hakusho [Defence of Japan: Annual Defence White 
Paper, 2018] (Tokyo: Bouei Sho, August, 2018), p. 25. 
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threatened and might recognise the importance of self-defence capabilities. Yet after 
the historic June meeting between President Donald Trump and Supreme North 
Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea has found it difficult to resume its 
―brinkmanship‖ approach. In this situation, public attention naturally goes to 
domestic issues. This still does not deny that an eventual and gradual shift of the 
Japanese attitude toward defence issues even though such a sign does not appear 
clearly as we will see below. There are two acute constraints Japan faces when it 
shifts toward a more defence-oriented path. These are institutional and 
socio-cultural constraints.  
 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution introduced nearly 70 years ago has 
not been amended even once. So long as this article is in effect, Japanese defence 
capabilities are limited and Japan has no option but to rely on the USA. Due to the 
existence of the article, Japan has adopted the concept of Senshu Boei (the 
exclusively defence-oriented policy). It essentially means that ―defensive force is 
used only in the event of an attack…the defense capabilities to be possessed and 
maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense.‖1447 In 
accordance with Article 9 the Japanese government considers that ooffensive 
weapons such as ICBMs and strategic bombers are a violation of the article.1448   
 On the one hand, it is true that as stated previously Japanese government‘s 
interpretation of Article 9 does not necessarily prohibit Japan from acquiring 
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in practice the government decision to acquire 
nuclear weapons requires the Japanese government to revise the article. Of course, 
a fervent public backlash against the decision can easily be expected. That said, the 
nuclear option is not acceptable to Japanese public or even political leaders. It is 
highly questionable that they will endure the severe diplomatic repercussions 
caused by producing indigenous nuclear weapons. As the secret study commissioned 
                                                   
1447 ―Fundamental Concepts of National Defense‖, Ministry of Defence, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161105124319/http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html,accesse
d on 11 September 2018. 
1448  Boei cho: Showa 45 Nenban Boei Hakusho [Defence White Paper, 1970], available at 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1970/w1970_02.html, accessed on 10 February 2019. 
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by the Cabinet Research Office in the 1960s suggested, Japanese own nuclear 
weapons will not enhance its global standing. The same study also suggested that 
―the day that the possession of nuclear weapons was prerequisite for major power 
status was simply gone now.‖ 1449 Looking at the case of North Korea and Iran, a 
nuclear Japan is not a realistic choice. Unless it wants to sever diplomatic relations 
with the USA, the immediate benefits of nuclearisation would be small as the 
studies in the 1960s illustrated.  
 Moreover, Article 9 also is a clear symbol of Japan as a peace state.1450 The 
main reason why the article has not been amended is that domestically it has been 
unthinkable to change it. It is to some extent treated as a sacred object. Even those 
who back the conservative Abe administration do not see the immediate necessity of 
the revision of the constitution today.1451 Even today most Japanese opposition 
parties are vehemently opposed to the revision of Article 9.1452 According to the 
results of opinion surveys conducted between 1997 and 2017, on average 
approximately 30 % of respondents favoured the revision of Article while 
approximately 60 % did not support the revision.1453  
 The actual procedure to amend the constitution is ultimately left in the 
hands of the Japanese public because the final decision is made through a national 
referendum after the special bill passes through both the lower and upper house 
two thirds of which approves it. Following this procedure, more than half of the 
Japanese must vote in favour of the revision of the constitution.1454 To be sure 
whether the Japanese approves it or not is unpredictable. What this suggests is that 
the institutional problem will not be solved immediately. The most likely security 
                                                   
1449 Ibid., p.  28. 
1450 Ohta and Nakazawa, Kenpo Kyuzyo wo Sekai Isan ni. 
1451 ―Kaikenan Akino Kokkai Teishutsu Hihan‖ [Unrealistic Plan to Submit a Proposal for the 
Revision of the Constitution at the Coming Diet] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18 August 2018. 
1452 ―Jimin Kaikenan, Sanin Teiji Miokuri‖ [LDPJ postpones sending its proposal to the Diet], Jiji, 4 
December 2018, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2018120400834&g=po,l accessed on 6 December 
2018.  
1453 The survey results are cited in Shogo Suzuki and Corey Wallace: ―Explaining Japan‘s Response to 
Geopolitical Vulnerability‖, International Affairs Vol. 94 No. 4 (2018), p. 730. 
1454 ―Motto Kuwashiku Kokumin Tohyo Seido‖, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/kokumin_touhyou/kokkai.htmlaccessed on 10 December 2018. 
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path for Japan will be a gradual but incremental increase of defence capabilities as 
Prime Minister Yoshida did under the security umbrella of the USA.1455  
 The second constraint is Japanese nuclear mentalities. Japanese 
anti-nuclear sentiment is deeply-embedded in the minds of the Japanese. It is true 
that the memories of the atomic bombing upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki are 
certainly paling as time goes by. Yet this does not mean the end of a nuclear taboo. It 
is already deep-seated and long lasting. Furthermore, the impact of the Fukushima 
Daiichi Accident (nuclear plant explosion and nuclear leak) on 11 March 2011 could 
be equivalent to the ―fourth bombing.‖ The accident caused by the largest 
earthquake ever recorded in Japan damaged the nuclear plants and released high 
radioactive materials that subsequently made the peripheral areas uninhabitable. 
Due to this accident, the Japanese people are more aware of the danger and risk of 
nuclear power. They are now more against anything nuclear. It must be noted that 
most nuclear plants in Japan have been forced to suspend their operation since the 
earthquake. It is safe to say that the nuclear path is further self-reinforced. In this 
regard, it will be truly unlikely that Japan will develop an independent nuclear 
deterrent or rely on visible END even if this were not in line with Japanese 
strategists‘ visions. As the security environment in East Asia deteriorating, it may 
be realistic for some Japanese strategists to review nuclear sharing arrangements. 
 A NATO-style nuclear-sharing option is raised as a political agenda by 
some Japanese strategists today. They prioritise military logic over the domestic 
anti-nuclear norm as the US military did in the 1950s. Concerned about the future 
East Asian security environment, one prominent Japanese think tank (IIPS) 
proposed that Japan adopt the NATO‘s nuclear sharing model in 2009.1456 The 
impact of its recommendation has been slight. In the end, Japan‘s realistic choice is 
to rely on ―Invisible‖ END. 
                                                   
1455 Hughes, Japan‘s Re-emergence as a ‗Normal‘ Military Power, p. 40; Kase, ―Japan‖, p. 129. 
1456 Research Group on the Japan-US Alliance: ―A New Phrase in the Japan-US Alliance: 2009 Project 
Report‖, Institute for International Policy Studies (September 2009), p. 10. See also Green and 
Furukawa, ―Japan: New Nuclear Realism‖, pp. 359-361. 
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 In fact, since 2010 the Japanese government has regularly held a dialogue 
on extended deterrence with the US government.1457 It is quite likely that Japan 
and US will strengthen their bilateral nuclear relations in light of the current 
nuclear politics of the Far East.1458 Yet this does not mean the Japanese public 
accepts the nuclear sharing arrangements. Japanese political leaders might be able 
to secretly adopt them but not without negative implications.  
 First of all, this surreptitious deployment obviously lacks a deterrent effect 
unless it is made public. Second, China and Russia could technically detect unusual 
movements by the US military through their intelligence satellites. Needless to say, 
the Japanese public would be resentful when this clandestine operation was 
revealed. After the Fukushima incident, it is very hard to gain general public 
support for the plan. The nuclear-sharing option is also about breaking a norm of 
nuclear-free Japan the country has managed over 70 years Moreover, if the US 
government were to decide deploy nuclear weapons in Japan, it would be more 
likely to do so for reassurance purposes. This measure would be designed to 
discourage the nuclearisation of Japan.1459 In the current domestic climate of Japan, 
it is questionable that the Japanese public would be reassured by the presence of 
US nuclear weapons. On the contrary it would create nothing but repugnance and 
turmoil in Japan. 
 According to Elaine Bunn, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for Nuclear and Missile Policy, unlike South Korea, Japanese officials too admitted 
that the Japanese are still not ready to accept the peacetime deployment of US 
nuclear weapons on Japan‘s soil. 1460  The most fundamental question to the 
Japanese is whether they are prepared to commit mass slaughter which they 
                                                   
1457 Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Japan: ―Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue‖ (11 July 2016) 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001202.html, accessed on 21 November 2016. 
1458 See for example Roberts, ―Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia‖, pp. 4-9, 
25-26; Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, pp. 198-208; Michito 
Tsuruoka: Why the NATO Nuclear Debate is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa, Policy Brief 
(Washington D.C : German Marshall Fund of the United States., 2010). 
1459 On this point, see Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, p. 41 and Weitz, ―The Historical Context‖, p. 10.  
1460 Elaine Bunn: ―Keynote Address‖ at Deterrence & Assurance Academic Alliance Conference, 
University of Nebraska, Lincoln, the USA (16 March 2018). 
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suffered from in 1945 for its security. If Japan is not ready to accept the visible form 
of US security assurance, ―Visible‖ END may not serve as effective ―assurance.‖ It 
may achieve the opposite. Worse still, the political sensitivity of Japan might be 
exploited by the regional nuclear states. They might take advantage of the political 
rift and aggravate it through political or financial aid to opposition groups against 
the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons. China might threaten to take 
economic sanctions (stop exporting vital natural resource as shown in the rare earth 
incident in 2010 over the Senkaku Islands). 1461 In other words, it is a matter of 
Japanese political determination. In view of this Japanese political climate, a more 
realistic nuclear operational plan may be the introduction of nuclear weapons such 
as a B 52 strategic bomber into Japan in an emergency situation. This might not be 
so different from the secret agreement made in 1969 between Sato and Nixon. While 
it is true that the security and political condition of East Asia and Japan has 
changed, it is difficult to conclude that Japan would like a drastic change from the 
Cold War security mechanism Japan adopted in the 1960s. The die has long been 
cast and it is only Japan that can break the rules.   
 Given these institutional and socio-cultural constraints, the most realistic 
security path is not a drastic shift from ―Invisible‖ END. It will most likely continue 
so long as they remain unchanged. Coupled with the total defeat of the war, Japan 
also lost the knowledge and emotional base to debate its national defense. Younger 
generations (the millennium and the post millennium generation) certainly do not 
have any direct encounter with war and they might have more objective views about 
war and military affairs as opposed to the older generations who directly experience 
the war. Yet as these issues have long been disconnected from postwar Japanese 
society, the Japanese public as a whole does not have keen interests in them. The 
non-military-cum-nuclear path has been firmly established. When the specific path 
has already been selected by older generations or their (grand) parents, the younger 
                                                   
1461 Keith Bradsher: ―Amid Tension: China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan‖ (22 September 2010) 
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generations may follow the path even without thinking of alternative path. Of 
course, external shocks might make the Japanese rethink about their existing path. 
The clear sign of such a shift has not appeared yet. Drawing on Japan‘s nuclear 
history, this thesis contends that a drastic shift from the nuclear path is absolutely 
unlikely while it is conceivable that the path itself may be reviewed and readjusted 
to the present security context of the Asia-Pacific. Given that the current path is 
highly institutionalized, institutional changes will probably come after a shift of 
Japanese public opinion about defence issues. When they occur, we can certainly see 
a major change in the direction of the established path. In the foreseeable future, 
Japan will continue to rely on US ―Invisible‖ END for its security against regional 
nuclear threats.  
 With the advent of the Trump administration, however, the credibility and 
reliability of US END is severely questioned by US allies in Europe and the Asia 
Pacific. This is mainly due to President Trump‘s repeated negative comments about 
America‘s allies. At the same time, nuclear politics in the 21st century is more 
complex with more nuclear actors or what some defence specialists call the ―Second 
Nuclear Age.‖1462  
 In the face of this worsening security backdrop, America‘s allies in Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific have started to express their concerns about their security 
especially with respect to growing nuclear threats once again. Without doubt, US 
END is back to international security. Notwithstanding the growing importance of 
such deterrence for American allies, over the last two years Trump‘s words and 
deeds have raised doubts about the credibility of US END among US allies. We will 
review the impact of his statements on Japan‘s perceptions of the credibility of US 
                                                   
1462 On the Second Nuclear Age See Paul Bracken: The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the 
New Power Politics (New York: St. Martin‘s Press., 2013), pp. 1-14; Victor D. Cha: ―The second nuclear 
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Washington Quarterly Vol. 26 No.1 (Winter 2002-03), pp. 7-15; Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st 
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END. In terms of American nuclear assurances to Japan, one of the key assurance 
measures has been public declaration of assurance by US President since 1965. 
 
Words Matter: Trump‘s Controversial Remarks and Japanese Reactions 
 
 During his presidential campaign and even after he came into office, Trump 
made several controversial remarks about America‘s allies, which has created their 
political concerns. During the campaign he, for instance, asserted that if Japan does 
not increase host nation support, the USA should withdraw US troops from Japan 
on the grounds that America cannot afford to keep deploying its military forces in 
Japan for Japanese security without Japanese serious financial support. Moreover, 
he even suggested that Japan would be better off by protecting itself by its own 
means even ―including with nukes.‖1463 Accordingly, he implied ending US defence 
commitments to Japan. These statements dismayed Japan as the US- Japan 
alliance has been central foundation of its security as elaborated throughout this 
thesis. 
 These comments indeed influenced Japanese political debates. In response 
to Trump‘s comment on Japan‘s acquisition of its own nuclear weapons, the then 
Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida clarified the Japanese government stance and 
explicitly stated that ―arming ourselves with nuclear weapons is unthinkable.‖1464 
Even a pro-American Japanese newspaper, Sankei Shimbun, condemned Trump for 
                                                   
1463  ―Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees Transcripts‖, CNN, Aired 29 March 2016, 21:00, 
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his irresponsible comments on Japan‘s security.1465 Considering Trump‘s words and 
deeds during the presidential campaign, the emergence of the Trump 
administration was expected to be a major blow to the Japanese. One Japanese 
scholar noted that ―For the Japanese, accordingly, there was more than enough 
reason to doubt the new U.S. president‘s competency and willingness to maintain 
the alliance－and thus more than enough reason to begin seeking alternative ways 
to ensure Japanese security.‖1466  One Japanese Journalist also suggested that 
Japan cannot rely on Trump for its security as he has been under the investigation 
of FBI while the strong leadership of US president is essential for a stable world 
order.1467 That said, some conservative Japanese including a former governor of 
Osaka Toru Hashimoto and a retired Lieutenant General Mamoru Sato welcomed 
this new opportunity, both claiming that the Trump administration finally make us 
aware that ―we must defend our country by ourselves.‖1468 Yet this sort of opinion is 
quite a minority view in Japan. In contrast to Germany where its doubts about 
Trump‘s security commitments to Europe generated a very small-scale but still 
―German Nuclear‖ debate (Germany should get its own nuclear weapons), a similar 
debate has not arisen yet in Japan.1469 In the case of Japan, it is conceivable that 
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The Economist, 4 Mary 2017, 
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n, accessed on 23 January 2019. See also Hans Ruhle and Michale Ruhle: ―German Nukes: The 
Phantom Menace‖ National Institute For Public Policy, Information Series, Issue  No.. 419, (22 
March 2017), 
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the Japanese elites simply do not want to face the Japanese nuclear taboo even if 
they believed it necessary to have the nuclear debate.     
 Trump‘s indiscreet words also targeted European alliance (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation: NATO), calling NATO ―obsolete.‖ Trump demanded NATO 
member states to increase defence budget to meet NATO‘s stated goal of spending 
2% of GDP on defence; the current share of the financial burden was ―very unfair to 
the United States.‖ The then Foreign Minister of Germany, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, expressed his concerns about Trump‘s statement, spreading dismay and 
uneasiness in the alliance. 1470  During the US presidential campaign, he also 
showed doubts about honouring Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mutual 
assistance clause. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reacted to Trump and 
stressed the importance of the alliance; ―This is no time to question the partnership 
between Europe and the United States…Going it alone is not an option.‖1471 Later 
he modified his views on the transatlantic alliance, referring to NATO as ―no longer 
obsolete‖ when NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg visited the White House in April 2017.
 Worse still, he did not explicitly mention and confirm US commitment to 
Article 5 at a special ceremony held at the new NATO headquarters in Brussels, 
which commemorated the time for invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history 
after the 9/11 attacks in spite of Defence Secretary James Mattis‘ and Vice 
President Mike Pence‘s preceding acknowledgement of Article 5. There again, he 
reiterated claims that NATO member states should increase their defence 
spending.1472 This generated major alarm and unease to NATO countries in view of 
this special occasion for an Article 5 memorial. Before the ceremony there was also 
naïve hope of Trump‘s final and long overdue endorsement of the collective defence 
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clause given the importance of the event attached to NATO as a whole.1473 In short, 
Trump failed to reassure the alliance that the US firmly stands by its European ally. 
Nearly two weeks after the summit Trump finally acknowledged that ―absolutely, I 
would be committed to Article 5‖ while it is important to note that this remark was 
made only when a journalist asked him a question about whether America would 
invoke Article 5 should the Eastern European members be attacked by Russia.1474 
Worse still, recently the New York Times reported that in 2018 Trump privately said 
several times that he wanted the USA to leave NATO.1475 If America shows its 
unwillingness to protect the most important alliance (NATO), the other US allies in 
other regions may naturally think that the same event will happen to them next. 
Trump might say that he wants the US troops to withdraw from Japan sooner or 
later. 
 As for Japan, since he took office, President Trump has seemingly 
moderated his political stance on the US-Japan security alliance, first by sending 
Defence Secretary Mattis to Japan and second through the first Japan-America 
summit meeting, both of which took place in March 2017.  
 On both occasions, the US government officially assured Japan that US 
nuclear commitments to Japan remain robust. Japan‘s doubts about US nuclear 
commitments, however, cannot be completely cleared away when Trump‘s 
unpredictable interventions continue and his treatment of the European allies is 
also causing uncertainly about the US security commitments to Europe. This raises 
a fundamental question whether Japan can still trust the US as its nuclear 
defender. The salience of US END over Japan is, however, increasing when the 
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future of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is still uncertain and China‘s 
newest Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), DF 41, which can carry ten 
warheads is very close to be operationalised.1476 Even though he is behaving more 
moderately than he was during the presidential campaign, can the Japanese put 
their complete faith in the US nuclear umbrella? It is true that the latest US 
Nuclear Posture Review of 2018 evinces that ―The U.S. commitment to our 
allies…in the Asia-Pacific region is unwavering.‖1477 With uncertainty surrounding 
the Trump administration, this unwavering support can be perceived as an empty 
promise by the nuclear powers in the Asia-Pacific.  
 Furthermore, one poll revealed by the Pew Research Centre in June 2017 
illuminates that Japan has quite low confidence in President Trump‘s global 
leadership (only 24%).1478 It must be reemphasised that President Trump is the 
only person who can authorise the launch of American nuclear weapons to defend 
its allies.1479  
 In the absence of any visible nuclear reassurance form, what the US 
supreme leader says has a considerable impact on the credibility of extended 
nuclear deterrence as this thesis has illuminated. If the President shows his 
unwillingness to protect US allies or give any sign of US reluctance to stand by 
them, the credibility of extended deterrence can be substantially diminished as it is 
ultimately the US President that decides whether or not to use nuclear weapons to 
protect American allies. 
  Whether the Trump administration will last another four years is or not, 
in view of Japan‘s non-military-cum-nuclear path, Japan must work closely with the 
USA (whoever runs the country) for its defence. At the same time, it is time for the 
Japanese to rethink its own problem. The worsening security environment in the 
                                                   
1476 ―Shingata ICBM Chikaku Haibika Toranpu Seikei Ikaku Chugoku‖ [New ICBM is soon to be 
deployed: China threatens the Trump administration], JIJI.COM, 17 June 2018, 
https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2018061700231&g=use, accessed on 18 June 2018. 
1477 Nuclear Posture Review 2018, p. 35, 36. 
1478  ―Low confidence in Trump worldwide‖, Pew Research Centre, 23 June 
2017,http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/u-s-image-suffers-as-publics-around-world-question-trump
s-leadership/pg_2017-06-26-us_image-02-0/, accessed on 18 June 2018. 
1479 Betts and Waxman, ―The President and the Bomb‖, pp. 119-120. 
341 
 
Asia-Pacific and the fear of American isolationism creates an opportunity for the 
Japanese to face a long-time nuclear taboo regardless of whether they will take it. 
The first step should be to ask themselves two fundamental question: Why does 
Japan relies on the US nuclear umbrella? What does this umbrella entail? This 
thesis helps guide them to answer these questions. To conclude, this thesis 
paraphrases a Japanese proverb: Itsumademo aruto Omouna Oya to Kane, Sosite 
Amerika [Never expect your sweet parents live forever, your money will not run out 
and American military support lasts for good].  
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